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Abstract	
The	central	research	question	of	this	thesis	is:	how	can	firms	build	capabilities	in	resilience?	
Resilience	is	an	ability	to	adapt	to	and	grow	from	adversity.	The	research	question	points	to	
adversity	 being	 both	 ubiquitous	 and	 varying	 in	 intensity	 over	 time	 among	 organizations.	
Firms	 will	 inevitably	 encounter	 adversity	 and	 either	 thrive	 or	 succumb.	 Notwithstanding	
those	 circumstances	 when	 severe	 adversity	 besets	 firms,	 the	 best	 course	 of	 action	 may	
appear	 as	 abandoning	 the	 cause.	 Yet	 giving	 up	 does	 not	 build	 future	 resilience.	 Firms	
inexperienced	 with	 adversity	 can	 panic	 in	 the	 face	 of	 decline	 and	 adopt	 random	 ad	 hoc	
responses,	which	may	do	more	harm	than	good.	So,	resilience	to	adversity	seems	important,	
ubiquitous	and	unavoidable	for	firms	and	so	a	rich	area	for	theory	and	skill	building.		
Turnaround	 literature	 offers	 useful	 insights	 into	 organizational	 decline	 and	 skill-
building	 for	 resilience	 but	 does	 not	 incorporate	 the	 unique	 insights	 that	 emerge	 from	
combining	both	resilience	and	capabilities-based	views.	Turnaround	literature	can	inform	as	
to	how	to	manage	an	episode	of	serious	decline	but	fails	to	show	how	firms	can	build	this	
into	 a	 capability;	 a	 capability	 that	 embeds	 the	 learning	 from	 decline	 into	 organizational	
decisions	 and	 actions	 that	 can	 be	 called	 upon	 in	 future	 episodes.	 Moreover,	 a	 resilience	
perspective	 calls	 for	 viewing	 recovery	 from	adversity,	not	 just	 as	 returning	 to	homeostasis	
but	 instead	 encourages	 growth	 from	 adversity.	 Such	 growth	 can	 involve	 adopting	 an	
entrepreneurial	 opportunity-forming	 mindset	 that	 uses	 adverse	 experiences	 to	 inform	
strategic	 renewal.	 Here,	 the	 inquiry	 intersects	 with	 dynamic	 capabilities,	 which	 aim	 to	
reconfigure	firms	in	the	face	of	change.		
This	 thesis	 combines	 these	 two	 concepts	 –	 resilience	 and	dynamic	 capabilities	 –	 to	
shed	light	on	how	firms	go	about	building	capabilities	in	resilience	that	may	enable	them	to	
use	adversity	to	assist	in	forming	strategic	opportunities.	In	studying	resilience,	the	impact	
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of	 adversity	 on	 capabilities	 occurred	 in	 different	 empirical	 contexts.	 This	 research	 project	
was	privileged	to	follow	a	firm	over	a	nine-year	period	where	the	thesis	author	was	one	of	
the	principal	directors.	This	firm	experienced	three	separate	episodes	of	near-death	collapse	
within	this	period.	Using	an	engaged	scholarship	methodology,	the	research	was	performed	
by	a	team	of	academics	and	practitioners	where	the	author	was	both	primary	researcher	and	
informed	participant	practitioner.	This	team	used	these	various	perspectives	to	co-produce	
knowledge	about	managing	collapse.	A	careful	focus	was	the	‘dance’	between	objectivity	of	
some	members	of	 the	 team	and	 the	 subjectivity	of	 the	practitioners	 involved.	Rich	 theory	
emerged	 through	 the	deliberate	arbitrage	of	 these	various	perspectives.	The	 research	 thus	
pursued	a	theory-building	agenda,	motivated	to	understand	how	firms	build	capabilities	in	
resilience.	
This	focus	on	organizational	resilience	is	expanded	in	the	introduction	as	Chapter	1,	
outlining	the	scope	of	the	research	project.	Chapter	2	follows	as	a	conceptual	work	aiming	to	
firmly	 ground	 foundational	 assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 resilience	 across	 four	 key	
disciplines	 of	 psychology,	 ecology,	 engineering	 and	 management	 science.	 The	 guiding	
research	question	is:		what	are	the	conceptual	foundations	for	a	resilience-based	approach	to	
organizations?	 This	 multi-disciplinary	 review	 of	 the	 resilience	 construct	 revealed	 that	 its	
conceptualization	 for	 management	 considerably	 lags	 other	 disciplines,	 particularly	 when	
compared	 to	 psychology.	 The	 comparatively	 impoverished	 nature	 of	 research	 into	
organizational	 resilience	motivated	the	quest	 for	a	deeper	understanding	of	 its	conceptual	
foundations.	The	key	contribution	 is	 the	enunciation	of	a	set	of	robust	assumptions	about	
resilience,	which	seek	to	overcome	the	frailties	that	plague	existing	usages	of	the	concept	in	
management	 science.	 A	 theoretical	 model	 of	 organizational	 resilience	 oriented	 towards	
positive	adaptive	growth	is	developed	based	on	these	assumptions,	providing	a	conceptual	
foundation	for	subsequent	chapters	with	inductive	theory-building.	
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Chapter	3	then	presents	the	major	empirical	study	of	the	thesis.	This	paper	asks	the	
question:	what	 capabilities	 are	 required	 to	 survive	 firm	 collapse?	 The	 key	 contribution	 is	 a	
theoretical	model	detailing	how	the	 focal	 firm	 learnt	 to	become	resilient,	 in	 the	 form	of	a	
heuristics-based	 dynamic	 capability.	 This	 capability	 set	 identifies	 strategic,	 resource	 and	
communication	heuristics	enhancing	resilience	across	four	inflection	points	which	emerged	
during	the	firm’s	collapse.		
Chapter	 4	 then	 examines	 the	 engaged	 scholarship	 method,	 as	 it	 developed	
throughout	 the	 research.	 While	 this	 implementation	 of	 engaged	 scholarship	 is	 to	 some	
extent	 an	 unorthodox	methodology,	 this	 chapter	 asks:	how	 can	 academic	 and	 practitioner	
engagement	encourage	new	real-time	knowledge?	The	use	of	this	method	yielded	a	rigorous	
framework	 for	 building	 new	 theory	 in	 deep,	 privileged	 contexts,	 provided	 real	 time	
assistance	 in	 resolving	 the	 stressed	 conditions	 being	 faced	 by	 the	 focal	 firm.	 The	 key	
contribution	is	enunciation	of	a	process	of	delve-test-innovate-unlock	as	underpinning	how	
engaged	scholarship	enabled	improved	research	skills.		
Chapter	 5	 represents	 the	 translation	of	key	empirical	 and	conceptual	 findings	 for	 a	
practitioner	audience.	It	describes	how	managers	may	misperceive	experiences	of	collapse,	
leading	 to	 panic	 and	 exacerbated	 consequences.	 The	 term	 ‘collapse	 trap’	 highlights	 key	
features	 for	 practicing	managers	 seeking	 to	 build	 capabilities	 in	 resilience,	 addressing	 the	
research	question:	how	 can	 organizations	 remain	 capable	when	 their	 capabilities	 are	 gone?	
The	key	contribution	is	the	dissection	of	key	managerial	pathology	associated	with	collapse	
and	associated	remedies.	The	thesis	concludes	with	Chapter	6	providing	a	synthesis	of	the	
work	 to	 yield	 an	 integrated	model	 for	 building	 organizational	 resilience,	 highlighting	 the	
contributions	 made	 to	 the	 dynamic	 capabilities	 view	 and	 the	 role	 of	 heuristics	 when	
strategy,	resources	and	routines	collapse.		
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Preface	
From	the	outset	of	this	research	project,	I	appreciated	that	many	different	phenomena	could	
be	 embraced	 that	 may	 or	 may	 not	 prove	 to	 be	 conceptually	 inter-connected.	 To	
accommodate	 this	 likelihood,	 I	 adopted	 a	 thesis-by-papers	 approach	 so	 that	 discrete,	
potentially	stand-alone	writing	could	explore	these	phenomena	as	they	might	emerge	from	
the	data.	As	an	added	benefit,	this	approach	allowed	me	to	gain	practice	with	the	core	skill	
of	 academics,	 to	 write	 papers	 proposing	 new	 knowledge	 for	 peer	 review.	 The	 insightful	
feedback	 I	 have	 gained	 from	 reviewer	 comments	 throughout	 this	 project	 has	 been	 of	
enormous	benefit	to	me	in	developing	my	academic	skills.	
	 Consequently,	four	chapters	(Chapters	2	to	5)	were	initially	framed	as	manuscripts	for	
publication	in	various	peer	reviewed	academic	journals.	These	chapters	are	preceded	by	an	
Introduction	 (as	 Chapter	 1)	 and	 summarised	 by	 a	 Conclusion	 (as	 Chapter	 6).	 Given	 this	
thesis-by-papers	approach,	each	of	the	four	chapters	are	a	standalone	 item,	but	showing	a	
progressive	 development	 towards	 the	 conclusions.	 The	 transition	 from	 each	 of	 these	
manuscripts	to	the	next	is	explained	by	a	brief	preface	introducing	each	subsequent	chapter.	
This	transitional	section	introduces	the	progression	of	thought	from	the	previous	chapter	to	
the	next	as	well	as	noting	any	publication	intentions	of	the	subsequent	chapter.		
Since	 these	 papers	 are	 intended	 for	 a	 range	 of	 journals,	 the	 style	 of	 writing	 varies	
according	to	the	target	audience	and	editorial	requirements.	Some	particular	features	have	
been	modified	for	the	purpose	of	consistent	thesis	presentation.	Also,	text	boxes,	tables	and	
figures	have	been	included	in	the	line	of	text,	as	these	would	appear	when	read,	rather	than	
maintaining	the	usual	manuscript	convention	of	collecting	tables	and	figures	at	the	end	of	
the	text	after	the	bibliography.	
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CHAPTER	1	|	ORGANIZATIONAL	RESILIENCE		A	Dynamic	Capabilities	Approach	
1.1			INTRODUCTION	
Building	 a	 new	 firm	 from	 scratch	 can	 be	 an	 exciting	 and	 lucrative	 endeavor	
(Bhidé,	 2000).	 Growing	 an	 already	 established	 firm	 to	 greater	 levels	 of	
performance	and	 returns	can	be	 similarly	 rewarding,	perhaps	especially	when	
such	growth	continues	to	be	pursued	after	the	firm	has	experienced	a	setback	
or	 series	 of	 setbacks	 (Powell	 &	 Baker,	 2014).	 The	 very	 nature	 of	 business	 in	
complex	capitalist	economies	means	that	unexpected	events	arise,	both	inside	
and	outside	the	firm	(De	Carolis,	Yang,	Deeds,	&	Nelling,	2009).	Consequently,	
navigating	 adverse	 conditions	 is	 the	 norm	 rather	 than	 the	 exception	 in	
managing	business	ventures	(Bhidé,	2000).		
The	 notion	 of	 a	 sustainable	 competitive	 advantage	 suggests	 that	 firms	
seek	continued	growth	and	are	able	 to	 sidestep	obstacles	 that	arise	along	 the	
way	 (Barney,	 1991).	 This	 linear	 equilibrium	 view	 often	 doesn’t	 reflect	 lived	
experience	 (Agarwal,	 Audretsch,	 &	 Sarkar,	 2007).	 Even	 the	 assumptions	 of	
punctuated	 equilibrium	 (Gersick,	 1991),	 where	 periods	 of	 stability	 are	
interrupted	 by	 relatively	 short	 periods	 of	 turbulence	 that	 need	 special	
management,	belie	 the	 type	of	market	and	organizational	dynamism	faced	by	
many	 firms.	While	 there	 are	 many	 studies	 exploring	 strategy	 and	 stages	 for	
growth	in	business	(a	review	of	growth	models	is	given	by	Levie	&	Lichtenstein,	
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2010),	there	are	far	fewer	exploring	the	beneficial	role	of	adversity	 in	enabling	
renewed	growth,	where	new	opportunities	are	formed	(Alvarez	&	Barney,	2007)	
and	 new	 capabilities	 learned	 (Zollo	 &	 Winter,	 2002).	 Yet	 there	 has	 been	 a	
growing	 literature	 on	 firm	 failure	 (Mellahi	 &	 Wilkinson,	 2010;	 Mitchell,	
Mitchell,	&	Smith,	2008).		
The	 middle	 ground	 of	 navigating	 adversity	 is	 less	 well	 understood.	
Literatures	such	as	organization	decline	(van	Witteloostuijn,	1998),	turnaround	
(Chowdhury,	 2002)	 and	 persistence	 (Holland	 &	 Shepherd,	 2013)	 have	 made	
useful	 contributions	 to	 the	 area.	 The	 imbalance	 is	 so	 distinct	 that	 one	 could	
form	the	view	that	when	things	get	tough,	it’s	probably	an	indicator	to	pack	up	
and	search	for	a	new	project	(Dew,	Goldfarb,	&	Sarasvathy,	2006).	Yet	setbacks	
can	open	the	door	to	many	rewards	as	well	as	pitfalls	(De	Carolis	et	al.,	2009).	
Harnessing	the	rewards	is	a	space	well	covered	but	navigating	the	pitfalls	is	less	
well	understood.	
	 This	thesis	explores	the	actions	undertaken	when	conditions	turn	sour,	
strategy	 fails	and	resources	dissipate;	yet	 survivors	of	a	 firm	choose	 to	persist	
and	seek	to	rebuild.	The	study	 isn’t	seeking	to	understand	why	entrepreneurs	
make	 such	decisions	 (Powell	&	Baker,	 2014)	nor	 the	passions	 that	drive	 them	
(Gielnik,	Spitzmuller,	Schmitt,	Klemann,	&	Frese,	2015).	This	choice	juxtaposes	
courageous	 persistence	 with	 foolish	 over-commitment,	 since	 the	 wisdom	 of	
either	of	these	two	conditions	can	only	be	assessed	in	hindsight.	The	firm	that	
tackles	 daunting	 obstacles	 head	 on	 and	 eventually	 carves	 a	market	 niche	 for	
itself,	 earning	 modest	 or	 even	 promising	 returns,	 is	 judged	 as	 courageous	
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(Rumelt,	 2011).	The	 same	 firm,	 tackling	 the	 same	obstacles	but	 failing	 to	gain	
eventual	 traction	 is	 often	 judged,	 in	 hindsight,	 as	 foolish,	 as	 if	 the	 futility	 of	
such	an	attempt	was	easily	apparent	at	the	time	(Raynor,	2007).		
Conditions	 of	 uncertainty	 represent	 more	 than	 a	 lack	 of	 information.	
Uncertainty	means	 that	 the	consequences	of	 any	particular	 set	of	 actions	can	
only	 be	 known	 by	 undertaking	 those	 actions	 and	 observing	 the	 results;	 they	
cannot	reliably	be	predicted	against	some	known	risk	profile	because	the	causal	
relationships	 are	 too	 complex	 and	 some	 or	 even	 most	 of	 the	 interacting	
parameters	 unknown	 or	 unknowable	 in	 advance	 (Knight,	 1921).	 Under	
conditions	 of	 uncertainty,	 actors	 within	 a	 firm	 can	 only	 focus	 on	 known	
relevant	information	and	must	ignore	the	remainder	(Gigerenzer	&	Gaissmaier,	
2011).	 The	 process	 for	 collecting	 these	 individual	 heuristic	 actions	 into	
collective	 capabilities	 as	 a	 firm	 learns	 to	 navigate	 uncertain	 conditions	 with	
both	 routine	 and	 non-routine	 actions	 has	 attracted	 some	 study	 (Bingham,	
Eisenhardt	&	Furr,	 2007).	These	non-routine	or	 idiosyncratic	actions	 required	
for	“transforming	the	enterprise	and	shaping	the	eco-system”		(Teece,	2012:	1395)	
would	appear	to	provide	a	key	to	navigating	conditions	of	uncertainty.	
It	 is	 at	 the	 collective	 action	 level	where	 the	 full	 impact	 of	 this	 shifted	
focus	 is	 realized.	 Accordingly,	 the	 unit	 of	 analysis	 for	 this	 thesis	 is	 the	
organization.	 Remaining	 capable	 in	 achieving	 positive	 results	 when	 the	
environment	outside	the	firm	is	chaotic,	uncertain	and	uncontrollable	and	the	
resources	 and	 actions	 inside	 the	 firm	 are	 unreliable	 is	 difficult	 in	 practice	
(Manfield	 &	 Newey,	 2015).	 Even	 in	 theory,	 while	 a	 range	 of	 literatures	 cover	
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varying	 aspects	 of	 navigating	 such	 uncertainty	 by	 exploiting	 perceived	
competitive	advantages,	as	outlined	in	Table	1,	each	of	the	six	chosen	literature	
sets	 adopts	 different	 approaches	 with	 different	 limitations	 and	 none	 fully	
encompasses	the	dynamic	space.	Even	the	capabilities	construct,	which	would	
appear	 to	directly	 address	 the	 issue	of	what	 actions	 a	 firm	 can	or	 cannot	do,	
consistently	 assumes	 underlying	 conditions	 of	 resource	 sufficiency	 and	
strategic	 coherence	 in	 sustaining	 firm	 performance	 (Ambrosini,	 Bowman,	 &	
Collier,	 2009;	 Eisenhardt,	 Furr,	 &	 Bingham,	 2010).	 Capabilities	 are	 commonly	
assumed	 as	 being	 built	 on	 routine	 actions,	 even	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 assuming	
routine	sequences	 in	changing	the	configuration	of	 the	resource	base	and	the	
way	 these	 resources	 are	 used	 (Helfat	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Such	 framing	 applies	 an	
evolutionary	view	of	routines	but	seems	to	do	 little	to	 inform	radical	shifts	 in	
action	 that	underpin	 creative	destruction	 and	 innovation	 (Schumpeter,	 1934),	
especially	under	adverse	conditions.		
Both	decline	 and	 turnaround	models	 commonly	 adopt	 a	 staged	 theory	
perspective,	 implying	 some	 rigidity	 in	 the	 number	 and	 sequencing	 of	 stages,	
resulting	 in	 a	 sense	 of	 an	 inevitable,	 even	 deterministic,	 lifecycle	 (Levie	 &	
Lichtenstein,	2010).	These	models	encompass	a	bias	towards	routine	actions	as	
the	 firm	 navigates	 adversities	 in	 order	 to	 regain	 the	 oft-articulated	 goal	 of	
organizational	 capabilities,	 being	 sustained	 competitive	 advantage	 (Collis,	
1994).	 In	 addition,	 while	 Collis	 (1994)	 argues	 that	 the	 dynamic	 capabilities	approach	 is	 vulnerable	 to	 ‘infinite	 regress’,	 my	 field	 research	 indicates	 that	organizations	 are	 able	 to	 maintain	 two	 sets	 of	 capabilities	 –	 operating	 and	dynamic	–	without	the	need	for	an	infinite	regress.		
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The	notion	of	simple	rules	 is	usually	couched	 in	terms	of	high	velocity	
environments	 (Eisenhardt	 &	 Sull,	 2001)	 yet	 needs	 care	 in	 guiding	 a	 firm	 to	
detect	when	such	rules	are	ecologically	rational,	or	not	(Gigerenzer,	2008).	
An	 interesting	 development	 of	 post-traumatic	 growth	 has	 been	
identified	in	the	psychology	literature	(Masten,	2014;	Pat-Horenczzyk	&	Brom,	
2007;	Zoellner	&	Maercker,	2006).	By	this	construction,	adversity	can	drive	an	
increase	in	capabilities	resulting	in	superior	levels	of	performance	than	existed	
prior	to	the	adversity	arising.	Such	an	occurrence	has	also	been	referred	to	as	a	
resilient	 reintegration	 (Richardson,	 2002).	 Indeed,	 the	 ecology	 domain	 also	
embraces	 the	 concept	 of	 resilient	 systems	 achieving	 improved	 performance	
after	adverse	impacts	(Walker	&	Salt,	2012)	but,	like	psychology,	the	construct	
needs	 greater	 definition	 and	 modeling	 to	 be	 applied	 more	 broadly.	 Key	
literatures	relevant	to	resilience	and	other	constructs	are	compared	in	Table	1.	
A	 framing	 of	 growth	 through	 adversity	 is	 helpful	 to	 the	 organization	
sciences	 (Carver,	 1998;	 Jacobs,	 2005).	Accepting	 that	 adverse	 conditions	 are	 a	
normal	part	of	doing	business	requires	a	consideration	of	how	the	resilience	of	
the	firm	can	be	developed	(Lengnick-Hall	&	Beck,	2009).	The	capabilities	lens	
draws	a	focus	to	the	firm’s	internal	attributes;	it’s	resources	of	people,	alliances	
and	other	assets	as	well	as	the	actions	by	which	these	resources	are	coordinated	
to	work	together	to	achieve	common	goals	(Teece,	Pisano,	&	Shuen,	1997).		
Informing	 the	 sequences	 of	 action	 a	 firm	 can	 undertake	 as	 it	 seeks	 to	
survive	and	prosper	from	adverse	conditions	is	the	focus	of	this	research.	This	
approach	is	relevant	to	researchers	seeking	to	build	more	robust	theory	around	
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the	 capabilities	 of	 the	 firm	 and	 to	 managers	 at	 the	 coalface	 of	 navigating	
promising	 and	 challenging	 conditions.	 Accordingly,	 the	 overall	 research	
question	is:	How	can	firms	build	capabilities	in	resilience?	
To	 review	 what	 is	 known	 on	 this	 topic,	 I	 considered	 literature	 on	
organizational	 decline	 to	 gain	 an	 understanding	 of	 firm	 collapse.	 I	 consulted	
turnaround	 literature	 to	 examine	 how	 firms	 could	 be	 guided	 in	 building	
resilience.	 	 Because	 the	 thesis	 question	 explores	 organizational	 capabilities,	 I	
also	considered	their	anatomy	across	operating	and	dynamic	types	in	states	of	
both	 construction	 and	 dismantling.	 Some	 dynamic	 capability	 literature	 also	
references	the	role	of	heuristics	in	addition	to	routines.	Further,	organizational	
resilience	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 capability	 growth	 after	 trauma	 was	 also	
referenced	 in	 some	 literatures.	 Accordingly,	 I	 have	 compiled	 Table	 1	 as	 a	
comparison	of	these	key	literatures	relevant	to	the	overall	research	question.	
1.2	A	RESILIENCE	CAPABILITY	APPROACH	
The	 construct	 of	 resilience	 has	 a	 strong	 history	 in	 the	 psychology	 domain	
spanning	some	50	years	 (Luthar,	2006).	Along	a	similar	yet	 independent	path	
and	an	even	longer	period,	ecological	resilience	has	sought	to	understand	how	
landscapes,	wildlife	populations	and	socio-ecological	systems	can	be	sustained	
under	 conditions	 of	 environmental	 stress	 (Allen,	 Cumming,	 Garmestani,	
Taylor,	&	Walker,	2011).	In	the	engineering	domain,	resilience	is	understood	as	
the	 building	 of	 systems	 that	 can	 retain	 normal	 function	 under	 a	 range	 of	
conditions	or	regain	such	normal	functioning	after	external	forces	return	to		
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Table	1:	A	comparison	of	key	literatures	relevant	to	the	overall	research	question	
Literature	 Contributions	 Limitations	 How	a	capabilities	approach	will	
overcome	limitations	
Relevance	to	overall	research	
question	
Decline	
(Cameron,	Whetten,	&	
Kim,	1987;	Lamberg	&	
Pajunen,	2005)	
Shows	sequence	of	steps	
through	decline	as	
consequence	of	strategy	
Shows	decline	as	single	
linear	trajectory,	
depending	on	strategic	
choice	when	such	options	
are	limited	
Show	what	capabilities	can	be	built	
at	various	points	
Informs	the	perceived	collective	
stages	and	antecedents	of	decline	
along	with	a	range	of	remedies	for	
each	stage	
Turnaround	
(Barker	&	Duhaime,	1997;	
Chowdhury,	2002)	
Shows	possible	inflection	
points	
Adopts	a	staged	sequence	
schema	
Allows	for	iterative	efforts	to	recover	
from	decline	or	turbulence	
Focus	on	recovering	a	firm’s	
competitive	advantages	assuming	
robust	context	prior	to	setbacks	
Operating	capabilities	
(Newey	&	Zahra,	2009;	
Teece,	2014;	Winter,	2012)	
Routine	actions	drive	
robust	&	repeatable	
efficient	outcomes	
Cannot	function	without	
routine	actions	
Attracting	&	configuring	resources	
even	without	routine	actions	enable	
iterative	entrepreneurial	actions	
Robust	outcomes	imply	collective	
resilience	across	bounded	array	of	
conditions		
Dynamic	capabilities	
(Eisenhardt,	Furr	&	
Bingham,	2010;	Helfat	et	
al.,	2007;	Teece,	2012)	
Framework	for	
reconfiguring	resources	
and	the	routine	actions	
that	exploit	them	
Role	of	routines	in	rapidly	
changing	environments,	
both	endogenous	&	
exogenous	
Heuristics	adopted	by	individuals	
can	allow	new	collective	capabilities	
to	form	despite	strategic	&	resource	
turbulence	
Establishes	mechanism	for	changing	
collective	actions	while	embracing	
goals	of	performance	&	flexibility		
Simple	rules	
(Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	
2011;	Eisenhardt	&	Sull,	
2001)	
Focus	on	essential	data	&	
ignore	irrelevant	
information	
Ecological	boundaries	
often	obscure	
Focal	heuristics	informed	by	
decline-collapse-rebuild	meta-
sequence	of	dynamic	states	
Provides	foundation	for	individual	
rules	to	be	aggregated	into	new,	
idiosyncratic	collective	actions	to	
resolve	uncertainty	dilemmas	
Post-traumatic	growth	
(Martin	&	Sunley,	2015;	
Watts	&	Paciga,	2011)	
Distinguishes	growth	
cognitions	from	growth	
actions	in	improving	post	
trauma	performance	
Insufficient	reliable	data	
to	support	a	valid	model	
Potentially	informs	the	origins	of	
capabilities	as	deliberate	sequences	
of	action	forming	and	resource	
accumulation	
Frames	adversity	as	a	distinct	&	
promising	occurrence	for	the	firm	to	
achieve	goals	unobtainable	absent	
such	adversity	
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within	a	desired	range	(Woods,	2006).		While	the	organization	sciences	have	
explored	resilience	as	a	desirable	search	for	positive	adaptation	to	adversity	
(Afuah,	1999;	Mallak,	1998)	for	perhaps	the	last	couple	of	decades,	it	has	been	
slower	than	the	other	domains	of	research	to	devise	models	of	development	
that	inform	business	practice	and	enhance	organizational	function	across	a	
range	of	distressed	operating	conditions	(Weick	&	Sutcliffe,	2007	being	an	
exception).			
1.2	A	RESILIENCE	CAPABILITY	APPROACH	
The	 construct	 of	 resilience	 has	 a	 strong	 history	 in	 the	 psychology	 domain	
spanning	some	50	years	 (Luthar,	2006).	Along	a	similar	yet	 independent	path	
and	an	even	longer	period,	ecological	resilience	has	sought	to	understand	how	
landscapes,	wildlife	populations	and	socio-ecological	systems	can	be	sustained	
under	 conditions	 of	 environmental	 stress	 (Allen,	 Cumming,	 Garmestani,	
Taylor,	&	Walker,	2011).	In	the	engineering	domain,	resilience	is	understood	as	
the	 building	 of	 systems	 that	 can	 retain	 normal	 function	 under	 a	 range	 of	
conditions	 or	 regain	 such	 normal	 functioning	 after	 external	 forces	 return	 to	
within	a	desired	 range	 (Woods,	 2006).	 	While	 the	organization	 sciences	have	
explored	 resilience	 as	 a	 desirable	 search	 for	 positive	 adaptation	 to	 adversity	
(Afuah,	1999;	Mallak,	1998)	for	perhaps	the	last	couple	of	decades,	it	has	been	
slower	 than	 the	 other	 domains	 of	 research	 to	 devise	models	 of	 development	
that	 inform	 business	 practice	 and	 enhance	 organizational	 function	 across	 a	
range	 of	 distressed	 operating	 conditions	 (Weick	 &	 Sutcliffe,	 2007	 being	 an	
exception).			
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Given	 the	 concurrent	 yet	 largely	 independent	 development	 of	 the	
construct	across	these	various	domains,	I	expand	on	this	brief	overview	in	the	
next	 chapter.	 For	 this	 research,	 I	 adopt	 a	 definition	 of	 resilience	 from	
organizational	 literature,	 as	 a	 firm’s	 ability	 to	 effectively	 absorb,	 develop	
situation	specific	responses	to,	and	ultimately	engage	in	transformative	activities	
to	 capitalize	 on	 disruptive	 surprises	 that	 threaten	 organizational	 survival	
(Lengnick-Hall,	Beck,	&	Lengnick-Hall,	2011:	244).		
A	 capabilities	 approach	 to	 resilience	 offers	 a	 number	 of	 advantages.		
First,	 the	capabilities	perspective	 integrates	an	accepted,	well	established	 lens	
to	 incorporate	 resilience	 as	 part	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 activities.	 Under	 this	
hierarchy,	activity	sets	are	applied	to	existing	resources	as	zero	order	activities,	
robust	 and	 reliable	 routines	 of	 action	 yield	 competitive	 advantages	 as	 first	
order	 activities,	 known	 as	 operating	 capabilities,	 and	 further	 actions	
reconfigure	 these	 routines	 in	 response	 to	 environmental	 changes	 as	 second	
order	activities,	or	otherwise	referred	to	as	dynamic	capabilities	(Ambrosini	et	
al.,	 2009;	 Danneels,	 2012;	 Hine,	 Parker,	 Pregelj,	 &	 Verreynne,	 2014).	 This	
division	 of	 routines,	 operating	 capabilities	 and	 dynamic	 capabilities	 in	 the	
context	of	resilience	allows	a	segmentation	of	actions	towards	building	robust	
adaptations	at	various	levels	of	organizational	endeavor.		
Second,	such	an	approach	embeds	the	notion	of	reliable	and	repeatable	
action	into	this	interpretation	of	resilience,	beyond	simply	phases	of	evolution	
and	revolution	addressing	various	sequences	of	crisis	and	resulting	growth	as	a	
function	of	the	size	and	maturity	of	eth	firm	(Greiner,	1972).	This	means	that	a	
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resilience	 capability	 is	 not	 simply	 an	 option	 that	may	 be	 nice	 to	 have	 under	
some	circumstances,	but	rather	an	essential	quality	to	be	developed	for	a	firm	
to	 realize	 competitive	 advantage	 through	 good,	 strategically	 coherent	 and	
resource	 sufficient	 times,	 along	 with	 the	 challenges	 accompanying	 adverse	
conditions	of	strategic	and	resource	collapse	(Manfield	&	Newey,	2015).		
Third,	 capabilities	 and	 in	 particular	 dynamic	 capabilities,	 embody	
change	 where	 the	 firm	 must	 make	 rational	 decisions	 based	 on	 the	
opportunities	 and	 resources	 it	 can	 attract	 and	 develop	 (Sull,	 2004).	 Since	
resilience	 is	 primarily	 concerned	with	 the	 process	 of	 adapting	 to	 challenging	
complex	conditions,	viewing	resilience	through	the	capability	lens	represents	a	
dynamic	 alignment	 (Lengnick-Hall	 &	 Beck,	 2009)	 that	 seeks	 to	 avoid	 the	
converging	 focus	of	 a	path	dependency	 approach	 (Sydow,	 Schreyögg	&	Koch,	
2009)	and	to	rebuild	efficient	yet	flexible	performance	(Eisenhardt	et	al.,	2010).	
By	adopting	the	capabilities	lens,	I	aim	for	theory	to	describe	how	firms	
can	 be	 more	 resilient	 over	 time	 and	 therefore	 more	 likely	 to	 gain	 sustained	
competitive	 advantage	 while	 experiencing	 both	 promising	 and	 adverse	
conditions.	
1.3			THESIS	MOTIVATION	
The	impetus	for	undertaking	this	research	program	came	from	my	experience	
at	a	technology	start	up	called	ActiveSky.	I	joined	the	firm	when	it	was	less	than	
two	 years	 old	 in	 2001,	 as	 the	 Finance	 and	 Operations	 Manager	 based	 in	
Australia.	 My	 initial	 role	 was	 to	 support	 the	 activities	 for	 the	 core	 software	
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development	 efforts,	 themselves	 led	 by	 the	 technology	 inventor.	 I	 initially	
reported	 to	 this	 founder	 and	 about	 a	 year	 later	 to	 the	 Chairman	 and	 CEO,	
based	in	Silicon	Valley,	as	I	became	more	involved	in	operational	matters	across	
the	entire	organization.		
	 From	 the	 time	 I	 joined	 the	 firm	 through	 to	 when	 I	 began	 my	 PhD	
program	in	2006,	I	was	aware	of	a	range	of	literatures	covering	entrepreneurs,	
start	ups,	strategy	and	capabilities.	From	my	research,	none	of	these	seemed	to	
address	 the	 complex	 set	 of	 issues	 facing	 this	 particular	 firm	 nor	 indicate	
productive	next	steps.	Primarily,	I	judged	that	the	options	available	to	the	firm	
were	 fundamentally	 restricted	 when	 it	 was	 struggling	 to	 find	 a	 coherent	
strategy	 or	 had	 lost	 much	 of	 its	 resource	 base.	 Commonly,	 the	 literatures	 I	
accessed	at	this	time	(eg:	Baker	&	Nelson,	2005;	Bourgeois	&	Eisenhardt,	1987;	
Helfat,	2000;	Helfat	&	Peteraf,	2003;	Sheppard	&	Chowdhury,	2005;	Teece	et	al.,	
1997)	 assumed	 conditions	 of	 strategic	 coherence	 and	 resource	 sufficiency,	
which	 appeared	 largely	 irrelevant	 to	ActiveSky.	 To	 place	 this	 frustration	 into	
context,	 it’s	 helpful	 to	 give	 a	 brief	 outline	 of	 the	 conditions	 that	 existed	 at	
ActiveSky	from	its	foundation	in	1999	through	to	the	present.	
Focal	Case	Inspiration	
ActiveSky	 had	 begun	 life	 as	 a	 then	 radical	 wireless	 technology	 platform	 for	
compiling	 and	 distributing	 video	 and	 other	 interactive	 data	 files	 over	 public	
mobile	 networks	 during	 1999.	 	 The	 technology	 inventor	 was	 able	 to	 build	
concept-proving	 prototypes	 that	 quickly	 attracted	 investor	 attention,	 with	 a	
modest	 Series	A	 investment	 round	 late	 in	 1999	 enabling	 a	more	 adventurous	
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Series	B	raising	of	US$22mill	early	 in	2000,	 just	before	the	dotcom	collapse	 in	
April	 of	 that	 year.	 Despite	 the	 change	 of	 market	 sentiment	 to	 technology	
ventures,	 ActiveSky	 began	 laying	 down	 the	 foundations	 of	 a	 substantial	 firm	
with	 extensive	 capabilities	 to	 develop,	 test	 and	 deploy	 their	 radical	 wireless	
technology.	 By	 the	 close	 of	 2000,	 they	 operated	 5	 offices	 around	 the	 globe,	
headquartered	in	Silicon	Valley	with	software	development	undertaken	in	two	
offices	in	Australia,	product	engineering	in	Japan	and	a	small	sales	office	in	UK.		
The	business	development	team	had	to	educate	an	entirely	new	market	
to	 the	 commercial	 potential	 of	wireless	 service	 delivery	 at	 a	 time	when	most	
players	 were	 still	 trying	 to	 understand	 how	 to	 harness	 the	 internet	 for	 new	
revenues.	For	a	year	or	so,	ActiveSky	was	courted	by	major	players	around	the	
world,	 sensing	 that	ActiveSky	provided	a	solution	 to	wireless	delivery	 that	no	
other	platform	offering	could	claim	at	that	time.	Despite	internal	conflicts	over	
strategy,	the	firm	secured	groundbreaking	venture	agreements	in	US	and	Japan,	
along	 with	 a	 string	 of	 concept	 trials	 with	major	 telcos	 in	 US,	 UK,	 Germany,	
Australia	and	Japan.	By	2003,	however,	the	company	was	in	deep	trouble.	Their	
tagline	 of	 “write	 once,	 deploy	 anywhere”	 implied	 a	 simple	 translation	 of	
collateral	built	for	the	web	to	be	seamlessly	deployed	to	handheld	devices.	This	
promise	 could	 not	 be	 fulfilled.	Wireless	 devices,	 particularly	 mobile	 phones,	
were	not	consistent	in	their	performance,	commonly	not	even	adhering	to	their	
manufacturers’	own	specifications.	ActiveSky	found	itself	constantly	reworking	
its	source	code	to	accommodate	these	device	variations,	resulting	in	quite	slow	
deployments	to	new	handsets	as	these	were	released	to	market.	Once	deployed,	
many	 surprise	 technical	 glitches	 arose	 as	 handsets	 failed	 to	 perform	 as	
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specified,	tying	up	extensive	resources	for	panicky	quick	fixes.	
Large	corporate	backers	lost	their	enthusiasm	for	the	ActiveSky	platform	
when	 the	 anticipated	 exponentially	 growing	 revenues	 from	wireless	 offerings	
did	 not	 eventuate.	 End	 users	 commonly	 compared	 the	 wireless	 offering	 of	
ActiveSky	 to	 that	of	 the	emerging	 fixed-line	broadband	 services.	 Surprisingly,	
ActiveSky	 sometimes	 was	 judged	 as	 superior	 but	 more	 commonly	 end	 users	
wanted	more	 features,	 faster	 downloads	 and	 greater	 personal	 configurations,	
just	 like	 they	 were	 getting	 used	 to	 with	 fixed-line	 internet	 applications.	
ActiveSky	found	itself	in	a	downward	spiral,	as	more	resources	were	directed	to	
patch	 up	 gaps	 in	 a	 bid	 to	meet	 these	 features	 expectations	 and	 increasingly	
ignoring	foundation	development	of	a	robust	underlying	platform.	
As	a	 start	up	with	enormous	growth	potential	 in	 an	emerging	wireless	
market	and	even	greater	return	on	investment	expectations,	ActiveSky	lacked	a	
disciplined	approach	to	strategy,	resource	allocation	and	capability	growth.	The	
early	 mindset	 of	 the	 firm	 assumed	 success	 and	 its	 strategy	 and	 resources	
reflected	 this	 assurance.	 Even	 in	 2003,	 when	 revenues	 continued	 to	 fall	 well	
below	expectations,	the	company	was	spending	ten	times	as	much	as	it	earned,	
depleting	precious	investor	capital.	The	Series	B	funding	ran	out.	The	Series	C	
funding	round	early	in	2004	tried	to	stave	off	collapse	for	long	enough	to	effect	
a	trade	sale.	These	funds	too	ran	out,	so	the	investors	agreed	essentially	to	walk	
away,	 handing	 control	 of	 the	 firm	 and	 its	 patent	 assets	 to	 a	 few	 surviving	
members	based	in	Australia.	I	was	one	of	these	survivors	and	led	the	buyout.	
After	securing	full	control	of	the	firm	along	with	modest	new	investment	
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late	 in	 2004,	 the	 survivors	 set	 about	 to	 rebuild	 the	 company	 from	a	depleted	
condition,	 seeking	 to	 realize	 the	 full	 potential	 of	what	 they	 considered	world	
changing	wireless	technology.	The	dominant	mindset	at	this	time	was	that	this	
small	 surviving	 team	 could	make	 better	 choices,	 avoid	 the	 strategic	missteps	
and	 wasteful	 resource	 allocations	 of	 the	 earlier	 incarnation	 and	 in	 doing	 so	
could	 rebuild	 organizational	 capabilities	 to	 carve	 out	 a	 new	 high	 growth	
trajectory.	 Despite	 a	 string	 of	 promising	 opportunities,	 these	 ambitions	were	
not	realised.	 It	was	here	I	began	to	explore	academic	 literature	 in	an	effort	to	
understand	why	such	a	promising	company	had	failed	and	what	it	could	do	to	
rebuild.	On	the	back	of	these	bruising	experiences,	the	first	research	proposal	
that	led	to	this	thesis	was	written	early	in	2006.	
ActiveSky	 did	 gain	 access	 to	 new	 markets	 in	 India,	 Malaysia	 and	
Singapore.	These	deals	supported	the	momentum	for	an	initial	public	offering	
as	a	media/technology	entity,	proposing	to	acquire	four	established	and	growth	
oriented	firms	in	Australia	and	US,	for	ASX	listing	late	in	2007.	Yet	the	global	
financial	 crisis	 of	 2008	 brought	 the	 IPO	 ambition	 to	 painful	 end.	 ActiveSky	
exists	today	despite	the	fundamental	changes	 in	the	wireless	marketplace	and	
could	yet	provide	new	growth	opportunities.		
These	experiences	have	formed	the	backbone	of	the	research	material	to	
answer	 the	 question	 of	 how	 a	 firm	 can	 rebuild	 its	 capability	 after	 suffering	
strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse.	 The	 interaction	 with	 academic	 literature	 for	
strategy,	capabilities	and	resilience	directly	shaped	how	the	persistent	survivors	
of	ActiveSky	navigated	 the	 setbacks	 and	 interpreted	 growth	opportunities.	 In	
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this	 regard,	 ActiveSky	 represents	 success	 as	 a	 research	 subject	 through	 its	
repeated	failures	allowing	insights	from	comparative	real	time	observations	by	
deeply	embedded	actors.	The	firm	does	not	need	to	ultimately	prove	successful	
in	 the	 conventional	 sense	 of	 achieving	high	 growth	 or	 profits,	 since	 it	 allows	
study	of	otherwise	difficult-to-access	phenomena	of	organizational	resilience.	
1.4			THESIS	STRUCTURE	
This	chapter	serves	to	 introduce	the	overarching	thesis	research	question	and	
the	 supporting	 literatures	 for	 exploration	 in	 subsequent	 chapters,	 each	
anchored	with	 a	 sub-question	of	 the	overall	 thesis	 research	question.	Table	 2	
below	lists	how	each	of	the	following	four	chapters	relates	to	the	core	research	
question,	 along	 with	 the	 major	 contribution	 to	 literature.	 The	 concluding	
section	 of	 the	 thesis	 (Chapter	 6)	 then	 recapitulates	 the	 contribution	 of	 each	
chapter	 before	 focusing	 on	 their	 integration,	 providing	 an	 integrative	 and	
comprehensive	response	to	the	overall	thesis	research	question.	
Chapters	2	through	5	are	written	for	journal	manuscripts,	one	of	which	
(chapter	5)	has	so	far	been	published.	The	thesis	was	conceived	as	a	collection	
of	journal	manuscripts	in	order	to	facilitate	an	expected	multi-faceted	approach	
to	 embrace	 the	 breadth	 of	 theoretical	 material	 and	 practitioner	 applications	
derived	from	the	overall	research	question.		Not	only	does	this	approach	allow	
several	facets	of	the	central	phenomenon	to	be	addressed,	but	it	also	provided	
an	opportunity	to	develop	a	range	of	writing	styles	for	empirical	and	conceptual	
theory	development,	addressing	academic	and	practitioner	audiences.		
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	 The	thesis	represents	the	culmination	of	a	highly	iterative	development	
process	over	the	 last	nine	years.	Earlier	work	has	been	exposed	to	the	 journal	
review	process,	mostly	A*	(see	the	publications	during	candidature	section	on	
page	vi).	This	exposure	has	added	considerably	to	the	robustness	of	the	papers	
presented	for	thesis	review.	My	point	 is	that	the	ideas	and	contributions	have	
had	a	long	gestation	and	are	summarized	below	in	Table	2.		
1.5			RESEARCH	METHOD	
This	 thesis	 pursues	 a	 theory-building	 research	 agenda.	 This	 is	 because	
organization	 resilience	 theory	 is	 lacking	 consistency	 regarding	 how	 it	 can	 be	
built	from	given	antecedents	to	yield	positive	outcomes.	In	order	to	address	the	
thesis	 research	 question	 then,	 an	 iterative	 process	 between	 data	 to	 theory	 is	
needed,	where	the	general	direction	is	from	empirical	to	conceptual	data.		
I	 undertook	 a	 theory-building	 process	 of	 engaged	 scholarship	 using	
ActiveSky	as	a	focal	case	study.		Engaged	scholarship	(Van	de	Ven,	2007)	seeks	
to	 leverage	deep	privileged	access	 to	 strategic	 and	operating	decisions	 in	 real	
time,	to	build	new	theory.	Exploiting	such	privileged	knowledge	offers	context	
specific	 tests	 of	 rival	 hypotheses	 towards	 generalizable	 theory,	 with	 theory	
building	being	driven	by	 integrating	 the	 subjectivity	of	practitioners	with	 the	
objectivity	 of	 researchers	 (Van	 de	 Ven,	 2007).	 The	 conceptual	 process	 of	
engaged	 scholarship	 is	 given	 in	 Figure	 2	 below	 and	 expanded	with	 data	 and	
lived	experience	in	Chapter	4.	
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Table	2:	Arrangement	and	contribution	of	the	four	chapters	written	as	journal	manuscripts,	representing	Chapters	2-5	respectively.	
Chapter	 Research	Question	
How	relates	to	overall	thesis	research	
question	
Type	of	
study	
Primary	
Audience	
Main	Contributions	
2	
	What	are	the	conceptual	
foundations	for	a	
resilience-based	approach	
to	organizations?	
Understanding	organizational	resilience	
requires	identifying	conceptual	
foundations	including	assumptions	
regarding	the	nature	of	resilience	and	
how	it	can	be	built	
Conceptual	 Academic	
	A	process	model	of	organization	resilience	
including	antecedents,	processes,	orientations	
and	outcomes	
3	
What	capabilities	are	
required	to	survive	firm	
collapse?	
Longitudinal,	real	time	case	study	which	
uses	14	years	of	data	to	build	theory	of	
how	focal	firm	built	resilience	
capabilities	following	three	episodes	of	
decline-collapse-rebuild		
Empirical	
multi-case	
Academic	
Theoretical	model	of	how	focal	firm	built	
heuristics-based	dynamic	capabilities	for	
navigating	and	growing	from	collapse	through	
purposeful	capability	dismantling	during	
collapse	and	capability	re-building	post-
collapse			
4	
How	can	academic	and	
practitioner	engagement	
encourage	new	real-time	
knowledge?	
Detailed	articulation	of	how	the	engaged	
scholarship	method	was	applied	and	the	
insights	it	enabled	through	iterations	of	
theory	building	and	problem	solving	
Conceptual	 Academic	
Advances	rigor-real	time-impact	nexus	to	
explore	impact	goals	and	gives	an	empirical	
example	of	engaged	scholarship	method	to	
include	real	time	assistance	and	research	
impact	
5	
How	can	organizations	
remain	capable	when	
their	capabilities	are	
gone?	
The	building	of	capabilities	in	resilience	
requires	understanding	the	anatomy	of	
collapse	and	adjusting	practical	strategies	
to	different	phases	in	a	cycle	of	decline-
collapse	and	re-build		
Empirical	
case	study	
Practitioner	
	Offers	detailed	practical	guidance	to	
practitioners	experiencing	collapse,	including	
documenting	the	major	phases	of	collapse	and	
the	adjustment	of	practical	strategies	as	each	
phase	is	encountered		
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	 The	 research	 explores	 the	 resilience	 experience	 of	 ActiveSky	 across	 a	
period	spanning	a	total	of	14	years	of	case	data.	Most	of	the	data	was	collected	
in	real	 time.	While	 the	study	 focused	on	one	 firm,	 it	derived	distinct	cases	 to	
yield	 an	 embedded	 case	 structure	 (Yin,	 2009).	The	 advantage	 of	 this	 study	 is	
the	deep	and	privileged	access	to	the	firm’s	principal	decision-makers.		
The	ActiveSky	case	provided	an	excellent	basis	for	this	style	of	empirical	
analysis.	A	total	of	24	informants,	including	myself	as	an	insider	informant	and	
researcher,	 provided	 information	 to	 the	 study	 either	 as	 transcribed	 semi-
structured	interviews,	email	files	or	diary	notes.	In	addition,	I	had	access	to	the	
entire	 archive	 of	 code	 development,	 technical	 documentation,	 marketing	
presentations,	 legal	 documents	 and	 investment	 proposals	 that	 allowed	 both	
real	time	and	retrospective	analysis	of	decisions	and	actions	to	be	made.	
Other	 scholars	 have	 commented	 how	 inherent	 discontinuities,	
commonly	 overlooked	 or	 assumed	 away,	 disrupt	 a	 clear	 and	 linear	
understanding	of	a	theoretical	representation	of	a	history	and	instead	proposed	
true	understanding	as	 flowing	 from	a	study	of	 the	 transformations	 that	occur	
(Foucault,	 1972).	 Accordingly,	 the	 engaged	 scholarship	method	 embraces	 the	
turbulent	 histories	 of	 the	 case	 to	 highlight	 the	 disruptions	 that	 arose,	 the	
boundary	conditions	that	applied	and	the	transformations	that	occurred.	It	also	
allows	an	exploration	of	participant	expectations	and	the	determination	of	the	
best	course	of	action.	“They	can	approach	the	problem	instrumentally,	trying	to	
establish	an	equilibrium	using	a	sort	of	“mirror	reasoning”	that	 is	 familiar	from	
game	theory.	This	generates	what	Habermas	refers	to,	following	common	usage,	
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as	 strategic	 action.	 The	 alternative	 is	 that	 they	 can	 talk	 to	 one	 another,	
announcing	 intentions,	 issuing	 imperatives	 and	making	assertions.	 In	 so	 far	 as	
they	 are	 able	 to	 establish	 a	 set	 of	 stable	 mutual	 expectations	 in	 this	 way,	
Habermas	refers	to	it	as	communicative	action”	(Heath,	2011:	80).	These	notions	
of	boundary	conditions,	 transformations,	 strategic	action	and	communication	
form	 critical	 elements	 of	 the	 analysis	 that	 follows	 in	 later	 chapters	 resulting	
from	the	engaged	scholarship	that	applies	the	academic	craft	of	theory	building	
to	the	realities	of	practical	experience.	
	
 
Figure	1:	The	generic	iterative	cycle	of	engaged	scholarship	through	four	stages	
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In	 line	with	 Figure	 1	 above,	 analysis	 of	 this	 deep	 data	was	 undertaken	
iteratively	and	in	collaboration	with	some	of	the	informants	and	academic	staff	
supporting	 the	 research.	 This	 analysis	 often	 began	 with	 identifying	 a	
circumstance	or	condition	that	existed	in	ActiveSky	that	either	contradicted	or	
was	not	addressed	in	the	literature.	By	formulating	a	problem	that	reflected	a	
real	 condition	 and	 proposing	 a	 possible	 theory	 to	 explain	 the	 problem	 and	
predict	successful	solutions	and	then	re-engaging	with	the	real	case	to	see	if	or	
how	that	particular	problem	was	solved	by	applying	that	possible	theory,	new	
pathways	were	developed.		
A	 clear	 example	 of	 this	 process	 occurred	with	 the	 development	 of	 the	
cyclic	nature	of	the	decline,	collapse,	rebuilding	sequence.	For	the	early	stages	
of	theory	development,	I	worked	on	the	presented	timeline	of	capability	growth	
and	 then	 a	 long	 tail	 of	 decline	 with	 some	 perturbations	 at	 various	 stages,	
roughly	 consistent	with	 a	punctuated	equilibrium	conceptualization	 (Gersick,	
1991).	 Yet	 this	 conceptualization	 of	 capability	 performance	 did	 not	 provide	
insights	into	the	complex	dynamics	of	efforts	to	rebuild	opportunities,	nor	did	
it	 inform	 the	 notion	 of	 organizational	 resilience	 development.	 By	 iteratively	
collaborating	 with	 informants,	 the	 model	 evolved	 into	 the	 cyclic	 decline-
collapse-rebuilding	 sequence.	 This	 breakthrough	 was	 only	 achieved	 by	 real-
time	iterative	analysis	with	academic	and	practitioner	informants.	I	contend	it	
could	not	have	been	achieved	by	retrospectively	analyzing	case	data	alone.	
Importantly,	 a	 key	 aim	 from	 the	 outset	 of	 this	 thesis	 research	 is	 to	
conduct	research	that	bridges	the	rigor-relevance	divide.	This	divide	recognizes	
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that	 knowledge	 is	 of	 different	 types	 –	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 academic	 is	
different	 to	 that	of	 the	practitioner	but	 their	 integration	 in	 theory	building	 is	
possible.	 Thus,	 the	 integrative	 approach	 of	 engaged	 scholarship	 helps	 to	
cultivate	 theoretical	 rigor	 in	 a	 way	 that	 connects	 with	 the	 subjectively	
experienced	world	of	the	practitioner.		
1.6	SUMMARY	STATEMENT	OF	CONTRIBUTIONS	
Theoretical	
As	 introduced	 earlier	 in	 Table	 2	 each	 of	 the	 following	 chapters	 makes	 an	
individual	contribution	to	particular	literatures,	as	these	manuscripts	target.	In	
terms	of	the	overall	thesis	a	number	of	key	contributions	are	made.	First,	I	offer	
a	detailed	empirically	grounded	understanding	of	the	anatomy	of	firm	collapse.	
Such	 understanding	 lays	 a	 foundation	 for	 an	 organization	 resilience	 research	
agenda	(a	"future	research"	goal	articulated	in	Limnios,	Mazzarol,	Ghadouani,	
&	 Schilizzi,	 2014).	 Understanding	 resilience	 necessitates	 exploring	 how	 firms	
experience	adversity	and	collapse.		
	 Second,	 I	 offer	 a	 resilience	 perspective	 to	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
organizational	 adversity,	 decline	 and	 collapse	 (Holland	 &	 Shepherd,	 2013;	
McGrath,	1995).	A	resilience	perspective	explicitly	emphasizes	how	firms	learn	
to	 be	more	 ‘capable’	 in	 adversity	 (Manfield	 &	Newey,	 2015).	 Such	 ‘capability’	
represents	a	third	option	for	firms	beyond	the	usual	dichotomy	of	escalation	of	
commitment	or	abandonment	(Ghemawat,	 1991;	Ross	&	Staw,	 1993;	Sleesman,	
Conlon,	McNamara,	&	Miles,	2012).			
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	 Adversity	 is	 an	 opportunity	 for	 ‘sensing,	 seizing	 and	 transforming’	
(Teece,	 2007,	 2012)	 into	 new	 pathways	 previously	 unseen	 or	 unavailable.	
Accordingly,	 my	 third	 contribution	 is	 to	 extend	 existing	 treatments	 of	
organization	resilience	by	taking	a	dynamic	capabilities	perspective.	This	offers	
a	way	to	understand	the	dynamic,	adaptive	aspects	of	resilience	in	conditions	of	
adversity	 so	 that	 resilience	 can	 be	 purposefully	 built	 as	 a	 reliable	 positive	
capability.	In	addition,	it	also	probes	the	boundary	conditions	of	these	dynamic	
capabilities	 for	 firms	 navigating	 high	 velocity	 conditions	 in	 terms	 of	
sustainability	 and	 competitive	 advantage	 (Peteraf,	 di	 Stefano	&	Verona,	 2013)	
and	distinguishes	between	capabilities	-	both	dynamic	and	operating	-	built	on	
routines	 (Helfat	 et	 al.,	 2007)	 and	 those	 built	 on	 heuristics	 (Bingham	 et	 al.,	
2007).	
	 Fourth,	 I	 offer	 new	 understandings	 and	 insights	 into	 heuristics-based	
dynamic	 capabilities	 for	 organization	 resilience,	 explored	 in	 Chapter	 3.	 This	
contributes	 to	 the	 growing	 research	 into	 heuristic-based,	 as	 opposed	 to	
routine-based,	dynamic	capabilities.	Circumstances	of	adversity	can	cripple	the	
firm’s	resources	and	expose	them	to	a	fight	for	survival	in	highly	uncertain	fluid	
contexts.	 When	 routines	 become	 inadvisable	 or	 unavailable,	 heuristics	 give	
shape	to	ad	hoc	entrepreneurial	action	(Teece,	2012).		
	 Fifth,	 I	 draw	 on	 the	 conceptual	 development	 of	 resilience	 in	 other	
disciplines	 to	more	 fully	 identify	key	assumptions	about	 resilience	 to	serve	as	
the	 foundation	 for	a	resilience	research	agenda	 in	management	sciences.	This	
cross-domain	 comparison,	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 to	
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framing	positive	adaptation	responses	to	adverse	conditions	(Martin	&	Sunley,	
2015).	
	 Sixth,	informed	by	process	research	methods	(Langley,	1999),	I	am	able	
to	 connect	 these	 insights	 into	 a	 process	 model	 of	 organizational	 resilience	
shedding	 light	 on	 antecedents,	 processes,	 orientations	 and	 outcomes.	 Such	 a	
model	 exposes	 how	 different	 approaches	 to	 resilience	 can	 lead	 to	 different	
outcomes.		
Practical	
This	 research	 draws	 on	 deep	 privileged	 information	 from	 rich	 case	 data	 not	
commonly	 available	 to	 researchers,	 to	 offer	 new	 insights	 for	 managers	
navigating	 states	 of	 collapse.	 By	 moving	 beyond	 simple	 linear	 models	 of	
decline,	 with	 collapse	 as	 an	 annihilating	 endpoint,	 and	 offering	 an	 iterative	
sequence	 of	 navigating	 a	 changing	 array	 of	 boundary	 transitions	 exploiting	
various	 classes	 of	 heuristics,	 the	 model	 helps	 practitioners	 to	 purposefully	
dismantle	 existing	 capabilities	 in	 preparation	 for	 strategic	 and	 resource	
collapse.	Such	dismantling	actions	are	decided	on	rules	that	seek	to	ignore	the	
irrelevant	information	and	make	simple	decisions	based	on	a	narrow	sub-set	of	
relevant	 data	 to	 persevere	 through	 collapse	 towards	 positioning	 the	 firm	 to	
rebuild	 fresh	 capabilities	 around	 new	 resource	 configurations	 and	 adaptive	
activity	sets.	
	 Specifically,	this	work	shows	where	managers	should	focus	their	efforts	
in	 the	 turmoil	 of	 decline	 and	 restricted	 options.	 Instead	 of	 attempting	 to	
turnaround	with	current	resource	and	activity	sets,	 this	work	shows	a	process	
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to	 strip	 high	 resource	 consuming	 assets	 and	 enable	 opportunity	 creation	
heuristics,	to	select,	process,	time	and	prioritize	options	as	these	form.	If	such	
formation	gains	insufficient	traction	to	enable	new	capabilities	then	managers	
are	 guided	 to	 re-iterate	 through	 collapse	 of	 those	 actions	 and	 resources.	 By	
developing	 theory	 in	 this	 area	 managers	 can	 then	 avoid	 typical	 paralyzing	
responses	in	the	face	of	adverse	conditions	and	learn	to	be	capable	even	when	
traditional	capabilities	are	gone	(Miller,	Eisenstat,	&	Foote,	2002).	
1.7			GLOSSARY	OF	KEY	TERMS	IN	THESIS	
Capabilities	 reliable	and	repeated	sequence	of	actions	using	resources	to	
yield	robust	positive	outcomes	for	the	firm	
Dynamic	
Capability	
capacity	of	an	organization	to	create,	extend	or	modify	its	
resource	base	towards	strategic	goals	
Routines	 repeatable	sequences	of	action	using	resources	controlled	by	
the	firm	
Adversity	 negative	disruption	to	an	organization’s	strategic	or	
operational	actions	or	resource	base	
Strategic	
Collapse	
inability	to	implement	plans	to	achieve	intended	positive	
goals	for	the	firm		
Resource	
Collapse	
key	assets	such	as	staff	and	cash	reserves	become	
unavailable	or	inaccessible	so	blocking	reliable	delivery	of	
products	and	services	
Resilience	 ability	to	withstand	and	adapt	to	disruptive,	adverse	
conditions	that	threaten	firm	survival	
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Preface	to	Chapter	2	
Introducing	the	Conceptual	Foundations	for	Organizational	Resilience	
 
The	 purpose	 of	 the	 next	 chapter	 is	 to	 lay	 a	 foundation	 for	 understanding	
organization	resilience,	through	a	multidisciplinary	review	that	asks:	what	 are	
the	 conceptual	 foundations	 for	 a	 resilience-based	 approach	 to	 organizations?	
These	 four	 disciplines	 spanning	 psychology,	 engineering,	 ecology	 and	
organization	 science	 offer	 the	 most	 active	 development	 of	 the	 construct	 of	
resilience.	 The	multidisciplinary	 review	 allows	 comparisons	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
resilience	in	order	to	draw	insights	that	might	be	useful	in	organization	science.	
Although	 the	 systems	 studied	 in	 these	 other	 disciplines	 are	 different	 to	
organizations,	 the	 respective	 underlying	 assumptions	 are	 exposed,	 allowing	 a	
clarification	of	the	nature	of	resilience	and	so	securing	a	better	foundation	for	a	
resilience	research	area	in	organization	science.	A	paper	based	on	this	chapter	
is	targeted	for	submission	to	the	International	Journal	of	Management	Review.	
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CHAPTER	2	|	BOUNCING	FORWARD	A	Dynamic	Capability	View	of	Organizational	Resilience	
ABSTRACT	
While	 use	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 is	 on	 the	 rise	 in	 the	 management	
sciences,	 it	 lacks	 clarification	 of	 underlying	 assumptions.	 Yet	 resilience	 has	 a	
strong	 history	 across	 various	 disciplines.	 This	 paper	 reviews	 the	 key	 issues	
exposed	by	this	history	in	the	domains	of	psychology,	ecology,	engineering	and	
organization	 science	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	 resilience.	 The	 review	 clarifies	
the	assumptions	that	can	be	used	to	build	a	conceptualization	of	organizational	
resilience.	 These	 assumptions	 lead	 to	 a	 process	 model	 of	 organizational	
resilience	 with	 an	 underlying	 idea	 that	 different	 orientations	 to	 resilience	
enable	 the	 development	 of	 different	 dynamic	 capabilities.	 In	 turn,	 these	
different	capabilities	lead	to	different	outcomes	from	threats	and	the	resulting	
disorganizations.	Resilience	building	can	 invoke	a	deliberate	heuristic	process	
in	 response	 to	 particular	 threats,	 whereby	 a	 firm	 learns	 to	 deploy	 such	
heuristics	 with	 an	 orientation	 of	 growth	 from	 adversity,	 not	 just	 recovery	 to	
previous	 levels	 of	 performance.	 The	 chapter	 contributes	 to	 the	 dynamic	
capabilities	 view	 by	 dissecting	 different	 types	 of	 disorganization	 which	 can	
ensue	from	threats,	approaches	to	resilience	and	the	heuristics	which	support	
processes	 of	 sensing,	 seizing	 and	 transforming	 in	 order	 to	 build	 a	 dynamic	
resilience	capability.		
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2.1	INTRODUCTION	
Firm	 failure,	organizational	decline	and	 irregular	performance	can	beset	 even	
the	 best	 of	 firms.	 Different	 theoretical	 perspectives	 try	 to	 account	 for	 why	
business	 failure	 rates	 are	 high	 (Stuetzer,	 Obschonka,	 Davidsson,	 &	 Schmitt-
Rodermund,	2013).	Economic	theories	may	assert	that	firm	exits	are	a	sign	of	an	
efficient	economy	shedding	inferior	businesses.	This	fatalistic	view	is	balanced	
by	 literatures	 such	as	 turnaround	 (Barker	&	Duhaime,	 1997;	Morrow,	Sirmon,	
Hitt,	 &	 Holcomb,	 2007;	 Shein,	 2011)	 and	 dynamic	 capabilities	 (Helfat	 et	 al.,	
2007;	Teece,	2007;	Zahra,	Sapienza,	&	Davidsson,	2006)	which	assert	proaction,	
resilience	 and	 optimism	 regarding	 the	 ability	 of	 firms	 to	 endure	 and	 recover	
from	distress.			
Although	sometimes	organization	members	may	decide	that	it	is	best	to	
abandon	the	cause	(eg.	Dew,	Goldfarb,	&	Sarasvathy,	2006),	this	paper	explores	
how	organizations	can	build	resilience	to	adversity	and	learn	to	grow	from	the	
experience.	Experiences	of	adversity	are	times	when	the	organization	can	learn	
how	 to	 be	 more	 resilient	 in	 the	 future	 and	 this	 can	 involve	 harnessing	 the	
learning	into	a	capability.	Here,	a	view	of	organization	resilience	as	a	dynamic	
capability	is	developed,	to	steer	decision-makers	to	new	strategic	incarnations	
of	the	firm	as	necessary.		
Within	management	science,	the	topic	of	resilience	has	been	indirectly	
addressed	 through	 literatures	 such	 as	 turnaround	 and	 dynamic	 capabilities.	
Others	have	been	more	direct	in	their	use	of	the	concept	of	resilience	(Hamel	&	
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Välikangas,	2003;	Hayward,	Forster,	Sarasvarthy,	&	Fredrickson,	2010;	Limnios,	
Mazzarol,	Ghadouani,	&	Schilizzi,	 2014;	Sutcliffe	&	Vogus,	 2003).	However,	 in	
agreement	with	Limnios	et	al	(2014),	the	conceptual	development	of	resilience	
in	organization	science	 remains	underdeveloped	and	what	does	exist	 is	based	
on	 weakly-held	 assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 organizational	 capabilities.	
Valuable	 steps	 forward	 for	 the	 conceptual	 development	 of	 resilience	 as	 a	
dynamic	capability	can	be	made	by	incorporating	the	dimensions	used	in	other	
disciplines	where	the	construct	has	been	adopted.	
2.2			A	MULTIDISCIPLINARY	UNDERSTANDING	OF	RESILIENCE	
In	 this	 section	 I	 briefly	 review	 literatures	 across	 the	 four	 domains	 of	
psychology,	 ecology,	 engineering	 and	 management	 science	 to	 distil	 key	
underpinning	 dimensions	 of	 the	 resilience	 construct.	 These	 four	 disciplines	
have	been	chosen	because	each	exhibits	significant	extant	literature	developing	
the	construct	as	 it	applies	within	each	domain.	The	intention	is	to	establish	a	
foundation	for	defining	and	further	developing	resilience	as	it	can	be	applied	to	
organizations,	 to	 achieve	 a	 higher	 degree	 of	 operating	 reliability	 and	
performance	across	a	range	of	fortunate	and	less	fortunate	circumstances	that	
firms	may	confront	(Weick	&	Sutcliffe,	2007).	Table	1	highlights	the	differences	
in	interpretation	and	between	the	three	main	types	of	resilience	offered	by	the	
literature	 (from	Martin	 &	 Sunley,	 2015:4).	 Each	 of	 these	 disciplines	 are	 now	
explored,	as	they	relate	to	the	resilience	construct.	
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Table	1:	The	three	main	types/definitions	of	resilience	(Martin	&	Sunley,	2015:4)	
Definition/type	 Interpretation	 Main	field	of	use	
Resilience	as	
‘bounce	back’	from	
shocks	
System	returns,	‘rebounds’,	to	
pre-shock	state	or	path:	
emphasizes	speed	and	extent	of	
recovery	
So-called	‘engineering	resilience’,	
found	in	physical	sciences,	some	
versions	of	ecology;	akin	to	‘self-
restoring	equilibrium	dynamics’	in	
mainstream	economics	
Resilience	as	
‘ability	to	absorb’	
shocks	
Emphasizes	stability	of	system	
structure,	function	and	identity	
in	the	face	of	shocks.	The	size	of	
shock	that	can	be	tolerated	
before	system	moved	to	new	
state/form.	
So-called	‘extended	ecological	
resilience’,	found	in	ecology	and	
social	ecology;	akin	to	multiple	
equilibrium	economics	
Resilience	as	
‘positive	
adaptability’	in	
anticipation	of,	or	
in	response	to,	
shocks	
Capacity	of	a	system	to	maintain	
core	performances	despite	
shocks	by	adapting	its	structure,	
functions	and	organization.	Idea	
of	‘bounce	forward’.	
Found	in	psychological	sciences	and	
organizational	theory;	akin	to	
‘robustness’	in	complex	systems	
theory;	can	be	linked	with	
evolutionary	economics.	
Resilience	in	Psychology	
Researchers	 and	 practitioners	 in	 this	 domain	 seek	 to	 understand	 why	
individuals	 and	 particularly	 children,	 experience	 “a	 phenomenon	 or	 process	
reflecting	 relatively	 positive	 adaptation	 despite	 experiences	 of	 significant	
adversity	or	trauma.	Resilience	 is	a	superordinate	construct	subsuming	two	key	
dimensions	 –	 significant	 adversity	 and	 positive	 adaptation	 –	 and	 thus	 is	 never	
directly	 measured,	 but	 is	 indirectly	 inferred	 based	 on	 evidence	 of	 the	 two	
subsumed	constructs”	(Luthar,	2006:	742).	In	dealing	with	adversity,	or	the	risk	
of	confronting	such	adversity,	some	researchers	in	this	domain	have	proposed	
that	protective	factors	or	assets	need	to	be	accumulated	to	offset	the	negative	
consequences	 or	 the	 risk	 of	 such	 consequences.	 Commonly,	 adaptation	 is	
measured	 in	 terms	of	 the	degree	of	 competence	 in	undertaking	defined	 tasks	
against	expected	development	milestones	(see	Masten	&	Obradović,	2006).	
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In	this	domain,	researchers	came	to	recognise	that	resilience	is	not	fixed	
but	 changes	 with	 time	 and	 circumstances,	 following	 a	 developmental	
progression	 as	 new	 vulnerabilities	 and	 strengths	 emerge	 along	 this	
developmental	 path	 (Luthar,	 2006).	 	 Accordingly,	 recovery	 from	 shocks	 and	
adversity	in	this	domain	is	built	on	“the	mastery	motivation	system”	(Masten	&	
Reed,	2002:	83)	where	not	only	skills	at	particular	protective	 factors	are	built,	
but	also	adaptation	to	adversities	that	need	to	be	navigated	to	effect	recovery.	
Masten	(2007)	proposes	that	the	resilience	construct	 in	psychology	has	
progressed	 through	 four	 stages	 of	 conceptual	 development.	 Firstly,	 the	
construct	was	 framed	as	a	 trait	based	phenomena	and	researchers	sought	out	
characteristics	 that	 described	 resilient	 behaviours.	 	 These	 traits	 proved	
ambiguous	 in	 predicting	 future	 resilient	 adaptations.	 Secondly,	 researchers	
then	began	to	explore	the	processes	engaged	over	time	in	building	a	repertoire	
of	resilient	abilities.	As	in	the	first	stage,	the	attempts	to	model	the	process	of	
resilient	development	did	not	lead	to	strong	predictive	power.	During	the	third	
stage,	 researchers	 attempted	 interventions	 to	 externally	 impact	 on	 levels	 of	
competence	and	wellness	as	well	as	 seeking	 to	steer	away	 from	 looming	risks	
where	 the	 individual	 appeared	 vulnerable	 to	 poor	 outcomes.	 The	 fourth	 and	
current	stage	by	this	schema	sees	researchers	seeking	to	harness	the	potential	
unleashed	 by	 experiences	 in	 navigating	 adversities	 as	 a	 means	 of	 building	
individual	resilience	against	future	setbacks.	The	possibility	of	growth	resulting	
from	 traumatic	 experience	 is	 captured	 through	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘bouncing	
forward’	 (rather	 than	 bouncing	 back	 to	 an	 earlier	 condition)	 from	 adversity	
(Walsh,	2002).			
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Table	2:	Conceptual	Building	blocks	for	resilience	drawn	from	psychology	literature	
Conceptual	Building	Block	from	Psychology	 Insight	Development	 Implication	for	Organizational	Resilience	Resilience	defined	as	“a	class	of	phenomena	characterized	by	patterns	of	positive	adaptation	in	the	context	of	significant	adversity	or	risk”	(Masten	&	Reed,	2002:	75)	
• Divides	resilience	framework	into	risks	or	threats	to	good	adaptation	vs	protective	factors	and	assets	and	the	processes	by	which	efficacy	&	motivation	are	enhanced	
• Suggests	that	particular	assets	or	attributes	can	be	used	to	protect	against	known	risks	before	those	risks	actually	arise	for	the	firm	
Resilience	“conceptualized	as	a	dynamic	process	consisting	of	a	series	of	ongoing,	reciprocal	transactions	between	child	and	the	environment”	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	&	Shaw,	2008:	31)	
• Focus	on	transactions	with	the	external	forces	impacting	on	the	individual,	rather	than	patterns	of	adaptation	as	above		 • Not	so	much	an	accumulation	of	assets	and	attributes,	but	the	routines	used	in	interacting	with	these	resources	that	shape	org	resilience	
“Few	researchers	now	view	children	with	positive	outcomes	as	‘invulnerable’	and	there	is	increasing	recognition	that	the	effects	of	risk	persist	over	time	or	emerge	in	unexpected	ways”	(Vanderbilt-Adriance	&	Shaw,	2008:	30-31)	
• Even	though	child	may	gain	experience	with	a	particular	risk	and	achieve	positive	outcomes	in	navigating	it,	the	effects	persist,	implying	that	a	later	adverse	incident	on	the	same	risk	could	possibly	result	in	negative	outcomes	
• Suggests	that	inoculation	against	future	adversity	is	similarly	unlikely	in	organization	settings	
“an	understanding	of	the	(resiliency)	model	accords	choice	and	control”	(Richardson,	2002:	311)	 • Reintegration	after	disruption	requires	the	disrupted	party	to	have	the	freedom	to	control	their	own	choices	of	pathways	forward	 • Control	of	the	firm	needs	vesting	in	the	people	who	are	navigating	the	adverse	conditions,	rather	controlling	parties	external	to	these	operational	activities	“Resilient	integration	is	to	experience	some	insight	or	growth	through	disruptions”	(Richardson,	2002:	312)	 • Which	means	growth	of	capability	results	from	navigating	adversity,	as	compared	to	pre-disruption	levels	 • Leadership	mindset	of	embracing	adverse	conditions	to	enlarge	organizational	capabilities	
• Capabilities	develop	through	adversity	“(There	exists)	the	tantalizing	possibility	that	fundamental	adaptive	systems	that	develop	within	the	individual	child,	once	thought	to	be	enduring	attributes,	may	be	‘reprogrammable’	to	a	degree	unimagined	by	the	pioneers	of	resilience”	(Masten	&	Obradović,	2006:	24)	
• Implies	that	ways	of	responding	&	adapting	to	adverse	conditions	can	be	re-learned	and	enlarged	to	achieve	different	outcomes	 • Firms	can	teach	resilience	methods	with	values	and	behavioural	cues	that	guide	anticipation	&	containment	of	the	consequences	of	adverse	circumstances	
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	 Overall,	research	in	the	psychology	domain	is	primarily	concerned	with	
the	 way	 individuals	 and	 communities	 respond	 to	 setbacks	 and	 to	 exploit	
“regulatory	capital”	to	gain	some	level	of	protection	from	any	inbuilt	tendencies	
to	adopt	destructive	behaviours	(Masten,	2007:	926).	Table	2	shows	a	summary	
of	the	conceptual	building	blocks	of	the	construct.	
Resilience	in	Ecology	
Natural	 systems	 do	 not	 stand	 alone,	 independent	 from	 human	 activity,	 but	
represent	 a	 complex	 interaction	 between	 human	 decision	 making	 and	
ecological	 consequences.	 Human	 activities	 have	 led	 to	 such	 phenomena	 as	
global	warming,	pollution	and	 landscape	degradation.	Consequently,	 research	
into	 the	 resilience	 of	 such	 landscapes	 and	 natural	 systems	 involves	 a	 socio-
ecological	mapping	 to	 understand	 the	 steps	 taken	 by	 humans	 that	may	 have	
caused	a	particular	outcome	and,	most	importantly,	the	possible	steps	humans	
can	 take	 to	 either	 reverse	 this	 outcome	 (if	 undesirable)	 or	 a	 least	 achieve	 a	
further	transition	to	a	more	desirable	state	than	the	one	currently	in	place	(for	
examples	of	such	socio-ecological	thinking,	see	Walker	&	Salt,	2006).		
	 In	ecological	systems,	resilience	is	a	measure	that	indicates	how	large	a	
disturbance	can	be	absorbed		before	the	system	changes	state,	usually	to	a	less	
desirable	condition	(Brock,	Mäler,	&	Perrings,	2002).	Understanding	this	state	
change	 requires	 appreciating	 the	 underlying	 slow	 changing	 variables	 that	 are	
hard	to	detect	but,	if	correctly	identified	and	managed,	can	lead	to	solutions	to	
avoid	 or	 at	 least	 ameliorate	 undesirable	 consequences	 (Walker,	 Holling,	
Carpenter,	 &	 Kinzig,	 2004).	 Detecting	 such	 impending	 regime	 shifts	 prior	 to	
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their	 occurrence	 offers	 the	 possibility	 of	 human	 intervention	 to	 avoid	 the	
change	of	state,	if	it	is	to	lead	to	a	less	desirable	condition	(Biggs,	Carpenter,	&	
Brock,	2009).		
	 A	key	 contributor	 to	 resilient	 ecological	 systems	 is	 functional	diversity	
(Folke	et	al.,	2004).	Such	diversity	can	exist	where	different	species	or	groups	of	
species	undertake	different	 functions,	 so	 that	 the	 removal	 of	 just	 one	 species	
from	 the	 system	 can	 shift	 towards	 a	 change	 of	 state.	 Alternatively,	 the	
combination	of	diverse	species	may	represent	a	diversity	of	responses	to	a	range	
of	 adverse	 impacts	 indicating	 that	 a	 healthy	 and	 resilient	 system	 needs	
redundancy	(that	is,	over-lapping	functions)	to	avoid	a	possible	change	to	a	less	
desirable	 state	 when	 shocks	 are	 applied	 to	 the	 system.	 A	 summary	 of	 the	
conceptual	building	blocks	of	resilience	in	ecology	is	given	in	Table	3.	
Resilience	in	Engineering	
Engineering	 resilience	 applies	 to	 systems	 and	 the	 people	 that	manage	 them,		
designed	 to	operate	 to	a	 reliable	and	stable	pattern	within	a	defined	range	of	
inter-dependent	 operating	 parameters.	 This	 means	 that	 an	 underlying	
assumption	 in	 this	 domain	 is	 that	 the	model	 by	 which	 the	 system	 functions	
remains	 viable	 and	 purposeful	 over	 time,	 despite	 expected	 and	 unexpected	
perturbations	 that	 may	 impact	 on	 its	 operations.	 This	 also	 means	 that	
engineering	 resilience	 is	 concerned	with	monitoring	 the	boundary	 conditions	
of	the	current	model	for	competence	(how	strategies	are	matched	to	demands)	
and	 adjusting	 or	 expanding	 that	 model	 to	 better	 accommodate	 changing	
demands	(Woods,	2006).	
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	 The	primary	 focus	 is	 on	maintaining	 system	 stability	 across	 a	 range	of	
known	 operating	 conditions	 or	 the	 regaining	 of	 stability	 when	 conditions	
return	to	such	a	range.	 	 In	addition,	engineering	resilience	seeks	to	anticipate	
likely	 system	 responses	 if	 operating	 parameters	 fall	 outside	 these	 known	
conditions.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	quest	 for	 stability	 of	 a	 system	 “focuses	 on	 the	
behaviour	 of	 the	 system	 near	 an	 equilibrium	 point	 or	 trajectory,	 and	 can	 be	
measured	 by	 the	 speed	 at	 which	 the	 system	 returns	 to	 the	 stable	 point	 or	
trajectory	 following	 perturbation”	 (Gallopín,	 2006:	 299).	 In	 this	 domain,	
adaptation	to	perturbations	and	adversities	by	a	system	requires	that	system	to	
anticipate	possible	exogenous	 impacts	and	 to	at	 least	 issue	 some	signal	when	
those	impacts	cause	or	are	about	to	cause	performance	of	the	system	outside	its	
defined	patterns.	The	approach	of	the	psychology	research	appears	to	seek	an	
understanding	of	a	person’s	past	to	understand	and	inform	their	current	state	
in	relation	to	their	environment,	whether	or	not	resilience	to	future	set-backs	
may	emerge.	By	comparison,	engineering	resilience	is	forward	looking,	seeking	
to	alert	emerging	conditions	that	may	cause	the	system	to	fail.		
	 A	number	of	models	have	been	used	 to	help	visualise	 the	processes	 at	
work	 in	 resiliently	 engineered	 systems.	 Most	 common	 are	 the	 cup	 and	 ball	
model,	 showing	the	state	of	a	system	relative	 to	 the	equilibrium	position	of	a	
single	 attractor,	 and	 the	 stress-strain	 state	 model,	 showing	 the	 progression	
stress	levels	in	a	system	as	the	impact	of	perturbations	increase	over	time	(for	
an	 appraisal	 of	 such	 models,	 see	 Woods,	 Schenk,	 &	 Allen,	 2009).	 In	 both	
models,	an	equilibrium	state	of	optimal	performance	is	assumed.	
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Table	3:	Conceptual	building	blocks	for	resilience	drawn	from	ecology	literature	
Conceptual	Building	Block	from	Ecology	 Insight	Development	 Implication	for	Organizational	Resilience	
“Managing	for	resilience	focuses	on	system-
level	characteristics	and	processes,	and	the	
endurance	of	system	properties	in	the	face	of	
social	or	ecological	surprise”	(Allen,	
Cumming,	Garmestani,	Taylor,	&	Walker,	
2011:	337)	
• Leading	a	resilient	system	requires	defined	
processes	to	work	without	interference	
• Focus	on	those	processes	that	impact	the	
viability	or	stability	of	the	whole	system	
• Encourages	firm	level	development	of	positive	impact	
resources	and	capabilities	
• Seeks	to	avoid	micro-management	of	particular	
capabilities	and	resources	
Ecological	resilience	refers	to	the	ability	to	
recover	from	shock,	not	necessarily	the	speed	
of	recovery	(Walker	&	Salt,	2006:	63)	
• Resilience	implies	a	focus	on	the	ability	to	
rebound,	with	recovery	speed	assumed	to	be	
sub-critical	in	most	cases	
• In	the	process	of	recovering	from	shock,	firms	focus	on	re-
assembling	a	stable	resource	set,	taking	time	to	re-
establish	inter-connections	towards	long	term	survival	of	
the	firm,	even	as	a	changed	regime	
Redundancy	increases	adaptability	of	a	
system,	while	decreasing	efficiency	(Walker	&	
Salt,	2006:	71)	“A	more	efficient	system	is	
increasingly	stable	over	a	decreasing	range	of	
conditions”	p77	
• Implies	a	trade	off	with	efficiency	(ie	some	
level	of	redundancy	&	overlap)	when	
resource	depletion	sets	in,	as	a		post	shock	
resilience	building	approach	
• Deliberately	reducing	efficiency	to	gain	such	
redundancy	represents	a	counter-intuitive	
system	management	action	
• Capabilities	that	overlap	by	delivering	similar	outcomes	
under	different	conditions	help	to	inoculate	a	firm	against	
future	shocks,	albeit	at	the	cost	of	decreased	efficiency	
• The	firm	can	prepare	for	anticipated	adversities	by	
building	some	select	capability	redundancies,	even	if	
specific	resource	attrition	is	not	known	in	advance	
Biodiversity,	in	both	functional-group	and	
functional-response	dimensions,	aids	
ecological	resilience	(Folke	et	al.,	2004:	570)	
• Resilience	requires	diversity	of	response	to	
adverse	events,	coupled	with	a	range	of	
functional	capabilities	across	resource	types	
• Develop	capabilities	not	only	in	expertise	(ie	function)	but	
also	to	operate	under	various	conditions	(ie	response	
context)	
Regime	shifts	entail	changes	in	internal	
dynamics	and	feedbacks	of	an	ecosystem	that	
often	prevent	it	from	returning	to	a	previous	
regime,	even	when	the	driver	that	
precipitated	the	shift	is	reduced	or	removed	
(Biggs	et	al.,	2009:	826)	
• If	system	changes	prevent	a	return	to	a	
former	regime,	then	the	new	regime	needs	
to	adapt,	even	when	former	regime	exhibits	
more	attractive	elements	
• Inoculation	implies	controlling	a	key	
variable	that	drives	a	particular	regime	shift	
• Periods	of	growth	&	re-organization	require	implanting	
new	capabilities	to	be	implanted	
• Supports	the	outcome	of	a	positive	adaptation	&	growth	
as	a	consequence	of	navigating	adverse	events	
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Undesired	shifts	between	ecosystem	states	
are	caused	by	the	combination	of	external	
forces	and	slow	internal	changes	of	the	
system	(Biggs	et	al.,	2009:826;	Folke	et	al.,	
2004:567)	
• Detecting	underlying	variables	that,	if	
changed	can	trigger	a	threshold	leap	into	
another	regime,	underpins	and	evolving	
awareness	of	the	impact	of	slow	changing	
variables	on	the	stability	of	the	current	
regime	
• Focus	on	slowly	changing	variables	within	the	firm	&	the	
conditions	that	may	cause	unexpected	reactions	to	
external	shocks	
• Slow	changing	parameters	are	best	addressed	early	in	
their	cycle,	often	before	they	have	become	significant	in	
their	impact	on	the	firm.	This	implies	wide	ranging	
control	by	key	decision	makers	
Feedbacks	play	a	large	role	in	maintaining	or	
reducing	system	cohesion	and	can	push	the	
system	over	a	threshold	(Allen	et	al.,	2011:343)	
• Maintaining	a	feedback	loop	assumes	
knowledge	of	key	variables	that	impact	
system	operation	and	detecting	variable	
changes	
• Diverse	tightly-coupled	and	loosely-coupled	feedback	
loops	enhance	firm	resilience	
Resilience	is	the	distance	of	an	existing	state	
to	a	threshold	of	change	into	another	regime	
(Walker	&	Salt,	2006:	74)	
• Sensing	distance	in	ecological	“basins”	
assumes	knowledge	of	detecting	&	
measuring	relative	variable	states	
• Specific	management	of	a	state	can	enable	the	firm	to	
choose	to	deliberately	remain	close	to	a	threshold	
condition,	ready	to	change	regimes	should	a	strategic	
context	arise,	into	a	more	attractive	state		 	
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Table	4:	Conceptual	building	blocks	for	resilience	drawn	from	engineering	
Conceptual	Building	Block	from	Engineering	 Insight	Development	 Implication	for	Organizational	Resilience	
Resilience	does	not	equate	to	reliability.	
Reliability	is	focussed	on	reducing	the	
probability	of	failure	in	defined	operating	
frameworks	of	high	reliability	organizations	
(Weick	&	Sutcliffe,	2007);	resilience	is	focussed	
on	recovery	from	irregular	variations	(Nemeth,	
2009:	3)	
• Highly	reliable	orgainzations	focus	on	mindful	
systems	awareness	(focus	on	failures,	reluctance	
to	simplify,	sensitivity	to	operations,	deference	to	
expertise)	
• Resilience	focus	on	navigating	unstable	
operations	in	unstable	conditions;	built	by	
practised	adaptation	to	irregular	variations	
• Resilience	building	requires	different	but	
complementary	strategies	to	reliance	building	
• Various	staff	resources	have	differing	
interpretations	of	the	way	to	solve	unreliable,	ie	
unstable	systems	attempting	to	re-build	after	
decline.	A	few	or	a	single	key	decision	maker	with	
clear	and	wide	ranging	control	need	to	detect	
small	emerging	failures	&	impose	solutions	
towards	operating	stability	
• Risks	reducing	feedback	sensing	if	this	judgement	
fails	to	drive	increased	operating	stability,	
assuming	alternatives	courses	of	action	are	
available	
“…	depending	on	their	level	of	resilience	capacity,	
(firms	can)	potentially	become	more	hardy	and	
capable	as	a	consequence	of	effectively	
responding	to	disruptive	shocks”	3)(Lengnick-
Hall	&	Beck,	2009:	43)	
• Again,	implies	resilience	can	be	built	through	a	
practiced	repertoire	of	adaptation	to	irregular	
variations/disruptive	shocks	
• Requires	sufficient	operational	&	political	control	
to	attempt	variations	to	historical	responses		to	
adverse	events	–	a	capacity	to	try	&	perhaps	fail	&	
try	again	
“the	parameters	of	Holling’s	ecological	systems	
and	ball	&	cup	models	are	essentially	the	same	
and	only	characterise	a	system’s	base	adaptive	
capacity	(whereas	the)	stress-strain	state	space	is	
a	broader	characterization	of	a	system’s	different	
adaptive	capacities	and	the	transitions	between	
them”	(Woods	et	al.,	2009:	74)	
• Resilience	transforms	with	context	and	changing	
conditions	and	this	transformation	can	perhaps	
be	guided	if	the	correct	variables	are	manipulated	
• Stress	strain	state	system	assumes	linear	path-
dependency	beyond	base	adaptive	capacity,	
disallowing	foresight	to	anticipate	future	strains	
in	response	to	stresses	and	resilience	inoculations	
that	can	be	installed	
• Firm	response	changes	when	stressed	and	key	
decision	makers	seek	to	select	the	best	time	to	
restructure	firm	&	response	routines	to	avoid	
fracture/collapse	
• Suggests	an	integration	of	resilience	with	
operating	reliability	may	be	possible	across	a	wide	
range	of	conditions	
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“Vulnerability	is	something	that	lengthens	or	
shortens	the	vertical	line	on	the	recovery	delta	
…	because	the	angle	…	is	what	determines	the	
time	to	full	recovery”		(Birkland	&	Waterman,	
2009:	27)	
• Emphasis	on	speed	of	recovery	from	damage	to	
pre-disaster	infrastructure	performance	as	a	key	
measure	of	system	resilience,	as	greater	recovery	
time	indicates	lower	resilience,	even	if	the	same	
level	of	vulnerability	applies	
• Return	to	normalcy	seeks	to	avoid	re-establishing	
earlier	levels	of	vulnerability	
• Can	only	seek	to	reduce	vulnerability	when	
exposures	are	known	
• In	uncertain	climates,	enlarge	capabilities	to	
respond	to	&	contain	shocks,	even	if	such	
response	takes	time,	rather	than	consume	
resources	anticipating	possible	setbacks,	some	of	
which	may	not	eventuate	
“Managing	the	unexpected	consists	of	
extrapolating	the	possible	effects	of	small	
discrepancies,	imagining	scenarios	not	yet	
experienced,	hypothetically	constructing	
alternative	lines	of	action	and	envisioning	what	
might	have	been	overlooked	given	the	narrow	
focus	of	a	set	of	expectations”	(Weick	&	
Sutcliffe,	2007:	159)	
• Requires	a	culture	of	mindful	awareness	of	
alternatives	and	so	learning	&	adapting	to	
unexpected	events	and	embracing	failures	
• “reliable	outcomes	require	the	capabilities	to	sense	
the	unexpected	in	a	stable	manner	and	yet	deal	
with	the	unexpected	in	a	variable	manner”	(p67)	
• If	alternative	action	is	not	possible,	the	firm’s	
members	can	only	persevere	with	the	course	or	
surrender	
• Times	of	strategic	&	resource	collapse	force	the	
creation	or	consideration	of	opportunities	that	
otherwise	get	ignored		
“Resilience	is	the	capability	of	a	system	to	
maintain	its	function	and	structure	in	the	face	
of	internal	and	external	changes	and	to	degrade	
gracefully	when	it	must”	(Weick	&	Sutcliffe,	
2007:	69)	
• System	can	still	operate	even	when	parts	of	it	may	
fail	to	function	
• Firm	seeks	to	identify	central	qualities	that	slow	
degradation	or	present	the	capability	to	renew	
growth	trajectory	
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	 The	 other	 key	 concept	 behind	 engineering	 resilience	 is	 the	 speed	 of	
recovery	 from	 perturbation,	 with	 higher	 speed	 of	 recovery	 more	 desirable.	
Speed	 of	 response	 is	 not	 a	 critical	 factor	 in	 either	 psychology	 or	 ecology	
domains.	 A	 summary	 of	 the	 conceptual	 building	 blocks	 of	 engineering	
resilience	is	shown	in	Table	4.	
Resilience	in	Organization	Science	
Organizational	 resilience	 as	 a	 positive	 adjustment	 to	 challenging	 conditions	
conceptualises	responses	as	either	resilient	(being	more	 likely	 in	the	presence	
of	enabling	conditions)	or	 rigid	 (being	more	 likely	 in	 the	absence	of	enabling	
conditions)	 (Sutcliffe	 &	 Vogus,	 2003).	 Such	 a	 construct	 yields	 two	 possible	
consequences	to	threats	of	either	positive	or	negative	adjustment.	The	ability	to	
learn	 from	mistakes	 and	 to	 quickly	 process	 feedback	 are	 highlighted	 but	 the	
actual	 core	 requirements	 for	 building	 a	 resilience	 capability	 in	 a	 firm	 that	
currently	 doesn’t	 possess	 such	 capability	 remains	 unclear.	 Learning	 under	
conditions	 of	 ambiguity,	 where	 causation	 between	 events	 are	 inferred	 from	
individual	 beliefs,	 individual	 actions	 and	 resulting	 organizational	 actions,	
requires	 trusting	 relationships	 between	 key	 actors	 within	 the	 firm	 (March	 &	
Olsen,	1975).	
	 Also	 undefined	 are	 the	 dynamics	 of	 capability	 adjustments	 over	 time	
under	different	contexts	of	 threat	 response.	Further,	 the	conditions	when	 the	
firm	may	be	capable	 in	terms	of	achieving	some	level	of	performance	to	meet	
its	objectives	yet	possesses	unstable	resources	remains	unexplored.	I	argue	that	
it	is	the	condition	of	strategic	failure	combined	with	deep	resource	loss	where	
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resilience	 is	 most	 required.	 Consequently,	 building	 adaptive	 agility	 under	
stressed	circumstances	is	of	key	importance.		
	 Dynamically	 re-inventing	 business	 models	 and	 strategies	 as	
circumstances	change	may	sound	straight	forward	(Hamel	&	Välikangas,	2003)	
but	 such	 re-invention	 may	 not	 be	 possible.	 Firms	 face	 many	 competing	 or	
incompatible	 strategic	 forces	 with	 unknowable	 consequences;	 incorporating	
these	 forces	 in	 a	 climate	 of	 uncertainty	 requires	more	 than	 just	 a	 desire	 for	
renewal.	Renewal	as	a	response	to	hard	times	can	lead	to	a	series	of	constantly	
changing	short-term	fixes	for	a	cascade	of	emerging	issues	and	crises.	
	 Schemes	 for	 building	 organizational	 resilience	 have	 been	 outlined,	
covering	management	of	a	sub-set	of	assets	being	human	resources	(Lengnick-
Hall,	Beck,	&	Lengnick-Hall,	2011),	a	focus	on	cognitive	frameworks	for	adapting	
to	 environmental	 conditions	 (Watts	 &	 Paciga,	 2011),	 a	 focus	 on	 reducing	
vulnerabilities	 by	 reducing	 the	 propensity	 to	 disruptive	 events	 (Sheffi,	 2005)	
and	 the	 desirability	 of	 various	 dynamic	 states	 (Limnios	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Further,	
learning	 mechanisms	 derived	 from	 routine	 actions	 serve	 as	 a	 means	 to	
incorporating	 individual	 skills	 into	 collective	 actions	 (Levitt	 &	March,	 1988).	
Taken	together,	none	of	 these	 frameworks	give	an	empirically	grounded	basis	
to	 build	 robust	 resilience	 capabilities	 that	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 a	 firm	 across	 a	
range	 of	 conditions.	 Organizational	 resilience	 can	 be	 appreciated	 in	
comparison	with	other	domains,	with	Table	5	 showing	key	parameters	across	
the	four	disciplines.	This	table	expands	and	validates	the	distinctions	drawn	in	
the	definitional	Table	1	(Martin	&	Sunley,	2015).	
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Summary	of	Multidisciplinary	Review	
Organizational	 learning	 underpins	 the	 development	 of	 resilience	 within	 the	
firm	and	draws	on	 the	classical	observations	 that	 learning	 is	enacted	 through	
routines,	 which	 are	 history-dependent	 and	 oriented	 toward	 specific	 targets	
(Levitt	 &	 March,	 1988).	 Indeed,	 while	 “organizations	 are	 intendedly	 rational,	
they	frequently	act	on	incomplete	or	 incorrect	 information	without	being	aware	
of	all	their	alternatives”	(March	&	Olsen,	1975:	148)	thereby	paving	the	way	for	
consideration	of	heuristic	as	opposed	to	routine	capabilities.		
	 Table	 6	 summarises	 the	 key	 parameters	 across	 the	 four	 domains,	
highlighting	 the	 underlying	 assumptions	 and	 arising	 gaps	 for	 each	 space.	
Tables	 7	 and	 8	map	 the	 key	 underlying	 assumptions	 with	 related	 constructs	
across	each	domain,	which	can	be	 incorporated	into	developing	the	construct	
for	 organization	 science	 application.	 Two	 key	 insights	 emerge	 from	 these	
tables.		
	 Firstly,	 in	 complex	 real-world	 environments,	 complete	 and	 rational	
cognition	 is	 rarely	plausible	 so	 that	 some	 information	must	be	overlooked	by	
adopting	simple	rules	 that	enable	quick	and	accessible	decision	making	when	
resources	are	stressed	or	collapsing.	By	ignoring	some	information,	an	effective	
heuristic	 allows	 the	 key	 principles	 of	 interest	 to	 gain	 nearly	 full	 attention	
providing	a	cycle	of	 learning	occurs	that	builds	the	performance	of	successive	
adaptations.		
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Table	5:	A	comparison	of	key	parameters	of	resilience	across	the	four	domains	
Parameters	 Psychology	 Ecology	 Engineering	 Organizations	
Dominant	
Logic	
Threats	&	hazards	as	a	
disruption	to	individual	
function	&	development,	
requiring	adjustment	&	
adaptation	to	regain	positive	
achievement	(Masten	&	Reed,	
2002)	
The	capacity	to	absorb	shocks	
and	to	still	maintain	function		
(Walker	&	Salt,	2006)	
Disturbance	that	can	be	
sustained	before	change	in	
system	regime	(Holling	&	
Gunderson,	2002)	
Recovery	to	normal	function	
after	irregular	variations	
(Nemeth,	2009)	
System	degrades	gracefully	if	it	
cannot	regain	normal	function	
(Allenby	&	Fink,	2005)	
Capacity	for	continuously	dynamic	
reconstruction	of	business	models	&	
strategies	as	circumstances	change		
(Hamel	&	Välikangas,	2003)	
Metaphor	
adopted	
Resilient	re-integration	of	
capabilities	after	disruption,	
seeking	to	regain	or	exceed	
previous	performance	levels		
(Richardson,	2002)	
Manage	slow	moving	variables	
that	act	to	shorten	the	distance	
to	a	change	threshold		
(Walker	et	al.,	2004)	
Barriers	to	both	disruption	
from	hazards	&	propagation	of	
consequences		
(Hale	&	Heijer,	2006)	
Resilience	allows	a	rebound	from	
adversity,	strengthened	&	more	
resourceful			
(Sutcliffe	&	Vogus,	2003)	
Alternative	
metaphor	
Protective	factors	to	offset	
vulnerabilities	&	stressors		
(Masten	&	Obradović,	2006)	
Negative	regime	shifts	follow	loss	
of	functional	diversity,	while	
positive	transformations	require	
active	adaptive	management		
(Folke	et	al.,	2004)	
Ability	to	continuously	steer	
activities	close	to	danger	yet	
avoid	disaster	
(Hale	&	Heijer,	2006)	
Whereas	fragile	systems	seek	stability	&	
robust	systems	seek	to	return	to	normal	
function,	anti-fragile	systems	thrive	on	
volatility	(Taleb,	2012)	
Operating	
framework	
Multilevel	process	analysis	&	
adaptation	dynamics		
(Masten,	2007)	
Ability	to	recover	from	shock	in	a	
complex	adaptive	system,	not	
necessarily	the	speed	of	recovery	
(Walker	&	Salt,	2006)	
Time	yields	evolution	of	
complexity,	resulting	in	a	more	
robust	system		
(Klein,	2012)	
Complex	adaptive	systems	with	
embedded	propensities	to	integrate	to	
emerging	contexts	via	
technical/systematic/systemic/	unitive	
leadership	styles	(Watts	&	Paciga,	2011)	
Antecedents	 Accumulate	protective	factors	to	
reduce	vulnerabilities	to	future	
disruptions	&	grow	competence	
(Masten	&	Obradović,	2006)	
Redundancy	increases	
adaptability	of	an	ecological	
system,	while	decreasing	
efficiency	(Walker	&	Salt,	2006)	
Readiness,	response	&	recovery	
require	capabilities	of	control,	
coherence	&	connectedness	
(Ponomarov	&	Holcolmb,	2009)	
Reducing	vulnerability	to	high	
impact/low	probability	disruptions	
improves	responses	to	more	regular	
operating	fluctuations	(Sheffi,	2005)	
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Table	6:	Reviewing	each	domain	to	identify	gaps	for	further	analysis	
Parameter	 Psychology	 Ecology	 Engineering	 Organizations	
Typical	Definition	
of	resilience	
positive	adaptation	despite	
experiences	of	significant	
adversity	or	trauma	(Luthar,	
2006:	742)	
capacity	of	a	system	to	absorb	
disturbance	and	still	retain	its	
basic	function	&	structure	
(Walker	&	Salt,	2006:	xiii)	
monitoring	&	adjusting	system	
performance	to	accommodate	
changing	demands	(Woods,	
2006:	22)	
a	firm’s	ability	to	effectively	absorb,	
develop	situation	specific	
responses	to,	and	ultimately	
engage	in	transformative	activities	
to	capitalize	on	disruptive	
surprises	that	threaten	
organizational	survival	(Lengnick-
Hall	et	al.,	2011:	244)	
Key	Dimensions	 protective	assets;	vulnerability	
to	risk	factors	
Distance	to	state-change	
thresholds;	slow	changing	
variables		
Speed	of	recovery	from	shock;	
attraction	to	a	stable	state	
Adaptive	capacity	to	mediate	risks	
Unit	of	analysis	 Individual,	families	or	
communities,	even	national	
populations;	usually	under	
stress	
Specific	landscapes	or	entire	
ecological	systems	comprising	
multiple	landscapes	
Stable	systems	usually	with	a	
single	attractor	
A	business	preparing	for	or	
navigating	adverse	conditions	
Major	Insights		 Maps	dynamics	of	risk,	assets,	
vulnerabilities	&	protections	
(Masten,	2007:	927)	
Functioning	diversity	supports	
resilience	rather	than	stability	
(Brock	et	al.,	2002:	272);		
Future	looking	to	assess	
capability	of	a	system	to	
continue	to	function,	even	
outside	designed	operating	
parameters	
Diversity	of	skills	allows	dispensing	
of	constraining	routines	and	
creation	of	new	competencies	
(Watts	&	Paciga,	2011)	
Reducing	vulnerability	reduces	
outcome	risk	(Sarewitz,	Pielke	Jr,	&	
Keykhah,	2003:	809)	
Gaps		 Focus	on	individual	&	
immediate	environment	rather	
than	creating	qualities	that	
elicit	desired	environment	
How	to	achieve	transformations	
to	new	&	sustainable	stable	
states	(Walker	et	al.,	2004)	
Assumes	an	equilibrium	state	
for	optimal	performance,	and	
so	recovery	from	shock	rather	
than	performance	
enhancement		
Dynamics	of	enabling	org	
resilience	building	following	high	
impact	events	currently	
unexplored	(Burnard	&	Bhamra,	
2011:	5595)	
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Table	7:	Key	underlying	assumptions	for	resilience	across	the	four	domains	
Key	
Assumptions	
Psychology	 Ecology	 Engineering	 Organizations	
Traits,	phases	
&	path	
attributes	
Process	focus	on	
building	adaptive	
response	sequences		to	
adversity	(Luthar,	2006)	
Trait	focus	on	genetic	&	
emotional	attributes	that	
protect	against	target	
stressors		
(Luthar,	2006)	
4	stage	adaptive	cycle:	growth-
conservation-release-
reorganization	(Walker	&	Salt,	
2006)	
Change	is	episodic,	spatial	
attributes	are	discontinuous	&	
ecosystems	sustain	multiple	
scale-dependent	equilibria		
(Holling	&	Gunderson,	2002)	
Resilience	is	the	ability	to	adjust	
functioning	prior	to	or	during	an	event	
to	maintain	function	along	with	a	
process	of	monitoring	performance	to	
confirm	the	suitability	of	such	
adjustment	
(Hollnagel,	2009)	
Resilience	requires	strategic	agility	to	
exploit	unexpected	opportunities	
(Lengnick-Hall	&	Beck,	2009)	
Specific	&	
general	
characteristics	
of	change	
Adaptations	to	specific	
adversity	require	a	
specific	competence;	
composite	(ie	global)	
protections	indicate	
variance	in	adaptation	
paths	&	outcomes	
(Luthar,	2006)	
Optimising	parameters	to	
achieve	a	specific	goal	increases	
stability	over	a	decreasing	
range	of	conditions		
(Walker	&	Salt,	2006)	
Need	to	differentiate	
behavioural	(impacting	
vulnerability)	from	structural	
(impacting	resilience)	change	
(Gallopín,	2006)	
Resilience	engineering	grounded	in	
actual	experience	&	imagined	possible	
states	–	a	collection	of	specific	
adjustments	in	adapting	to	envisaged	
disruptions		
(Nemeth,	2009)	
Not	all	agile	firms	are	resilient	–	
determined	by	nature	of	
environmental	shifts	each	org	
capability	is	designed	to	address,	
implying	a	specific	focus	for	each	
capability	
(Lengnick-Hall	&	Beck,	2009)	
	 	
	 51	
How	routines	
are	coupled	
Adapting	most	salient	
individual	tasks	for	a	
given	developmental	
period	–	indicating	
different	routine	
requirements	at	different	
stages	(Egeland,	Carlson,	
&	Sroufe,	1993:	525)	
Slow	changing	variables,	often	
unnoticed,	impact	on	routines	
that	control	proximity	to	
thresholds	–	left	unaltered,	
resilience	degrades	(Walker	&	
Salt,	2012:	161,	193)	
Resilience	capacity	couples	with	&	
moderates	strategic	agility	re	future	
performance	(Lengnick-Hall	&	Beck,	
2009:	66).		Routines	to	mitigate	
disasters	can	be	project	(building	
things)	or	process	(policy	tools)	based	
(Birkland	&	Waterman,	2009:	30)	
Loosely	coupled	org	systems	are	less	
efficient	but	more	adaptive	to	delays	&	
unforseen	changes,	although	linkages	
&	consequences	can	be	obscure		
(Stacey,	2003)	
Building	
resilient	
capabilities	
before	adverse	
impacts	
Relationship	quality,	
particularly	within	an	
enduring		proximal	
circle,		a	key	protective	
mechanism	to	enable	
growth	through	
disruptions	(Egeland	et	
al.,	1993;	Luthar,	2006)	
Define	critical	indicator	levels	
&	rapid	response	to	these	levels	
rather	than	simply	detecting	
change	in	particular	levels	
(Biggs	et	al.,	2009)	
Develop	cognitive,	behavioural	&	
contextual	dimensions	of	resilience	
capacity	to	enhance	strategic	agility	
when	disruptions	arise		
(Lengnick-Hall	&	Beck,	2009:	44)	
Improving	general	overall	capability	to	
be	vitally	prepared	for	adversity	
(Sutcliffe	&	Vogus,	2003)	
Optimisation	assumes	no	
fundamental	change	in	outputs	–	
disruptions	change	such	underlying	
requirements		
(Hamel	&	Välikangas,	2003)	
Key	
characteristic	
to	enable	
performance	
growth	
Risk	modifiers	
generative	of	other	
assets,	catalysing	
strengths	&	mitigating	
vulnerabilities		
(Luthar,	2006)	
Sufficient	control	to	focus	on	
attributes	exhibited	in	the	back	
loop	(release-reorganization)	to	
increase	adaptability	&	make	
thresholds	more	distant	from	
current	state	
(Walker	&	Salt,	2012)	
Preparedness	for	future	adversity	key	
characteristic	to	hasten	recovery	–	
engineering	resilience	does	not	
embrace	concept	of	improved	
performance,	but	recovery	to	prior	
performance	levels		
(Birkland	&	Waterman,	2009:	29)	
Anticipate	change	(through	failure	
focus,	complex	analysis	&	operational	
sensitivity)	and	contain	consequences	
(through	improvised	workarounds	
that	defers	to	expertise)	(Weick	&	
Sutcliffe,	2007)		Small	changes	in	
initial	conditions	can	lead	to	large	
unexpected	outcomes,	desired	or	
undesired	(Plowman	&	Duchon,	2008)	
	 52	
Table	8:	Constructs	related	to	resilience	capability	across	the	domains	
Related	
Constructs	
Psychology	 Ecology	 Engineering	 Organizations	
Adaptation	 Focus	on	individual,	family	unit	
or	community	group	coping	
with	&	adapting	to	stressors	&	
shocks	
Focus	on	thresholds	&	
conditions	that	will	lead	to	
crossing	them	into	a	changed	
(assumed	less	desirable)	regime	
state	(Walker	&	Salt,	2012)	
Change	designed	boundaries	of	
system	operations,	to	cover	
wider/changed	set	of	possible	
conditions	yet	maintain	desired	
function	(cf.	Walker	&	Salt,	2012:	
145)	
Flexibility,	agility	&	adaptability	are	
configured	to	achieve	org	purpose	&	
identity	in	dynamic	climates	
(Lengnick-Hall	et	al.,	2011)	
Evolution	 Growth	of	psychological	traits	&	
processes	(including	resilience)	
measured	against	identified	
developmental	stages	–	an	
average	metric	across	
populations	
Resilience	depends	on	functional	
diversity	of	species	that	support	
critical	structuring	processes		
(Brock	et	al.,	2002:	272)	
Focus	of	eng	resilience	is	on	system	
stability	whereas	evolution	focus	is	
on	growth	&	change	of	a	system	as	
it	adapts	to	an	(implied,	stable)		
environment	or	set	of	states	
Symbolic-interpretivism	&	
complexity	thinking	(Houghlum,	
2012)	operating	near	edge	of	
disintegration	learn	faster	than	in	a	
stable	zone		
(Stacey,	2003:	256)	
Learning	
from	failure	
Adapting	to	new	conditions	but	
also	reintegrating	a	more	robust	
capability	because	of	adversities,	
not	in	spite	of	them	(Richardson,	
2002)	
Little	focus	on	reverting	to	a	
previous,	considered	more	
desirable,	state	–	less	learning	
than	coping	with	new	state	
conditions	
Recovery	from	shock	can	embrace	a	
transition	to	a	new	desirable	state	
through	human	interaction	in	
design	(Smith,	Spencer,	&	Billings,	
2008:	150)	
	
Build	a	variety	of	possible,	workable	
states	through	diverse	&	efficient		
adaptive	resources	and	org	cohesion		
(Bhamra,	Dani,	&	Burnard,	2011)	
Acquiring	
resources	
Overcome	liabilities	or	reduce	
vulnerability	to	future	shocks	by	
external	interventions	–	focus	on	
positive	relationships	&	personal	
control	(Luthar,	2006)	
Resources	made	available	
exogenously	to	a	particular	state	
&	exploited	by	that	state	–	
implies	event	opportunism	
(Holling,	Gunderson,	&	Ludwig,	
2002:	14)	
Systems	prone	to	mitigate	future	
disasters	through	engineering	
resources	than	collective	changes	in	
behaviour		
(Birkland	&	Waterman,	2009:	29)	
Invest	in	capabilities	&	their	
requisite	resources	that	yield	greater	
flexibility	to	manage	anticipated	
uncertainties			
(Maritan	&	Alessandri,	2007)	
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Options	&	
Bricolage	
Resources	needed	for	adaptive	
implementation	shaped	by	self-
efficacy	(Brown	&	Westaway,	
2011:	325)	
Seek	alternative	stable	states	to	
guide	variable	selection	&	so	
define	options	for	change	
(Holling	&	Gunderson,	2002:	36)	
Encourage	diversity	in	design	
process	&	options	to	gain	
robustness	in	function	&	
redundancy	of	systems		
(Walker	&	Salt,	2012:	153)	
Create	options	through	trial	&	error,	
making	do	by	recycling	resources	
that	would	otherwise	be	wasted	
(Taleb,	2012:	181)	
Change	&	
conflict	
Shape	resilience	by	interactions	
of	multilevel	dynamics	–	an	
adaptive	systems	approach	to	
change	emphasising	regulatory	
capital	
(Masten,	2007:	926)	
Change	enhances	resilience	–	
resisting	change	increases	
vulnerability		
(Walker	&	Salt,	2012:	24)	
Event	readiness	assumes	a	complete	
mapping	of	system	attributes	&	
performance	to	render	efficient	
response	to	disruption	(Ponomarov	
&	Holcolmb,	2009)	
Cybernetic	views	seek	to	avoid	
conflict	&	plan	change	whereas	
emergent	views	embrace	conflict	as	
an	accompaniment	to	change	
(Plowman	&	Duchon,	2008)	
Heuristics	 Efficient	cognitive	processes	that	
ignore	information	(Gigerenzer	
&	Brighton,	2009)	
A	handful	of	heuristics	aid	help	
understand	resilience	of	social-
ecological	systems	(Walker	et	al.,	
2006)	
Analyzing	disruptions	allows	
resilience	principles	&	heuristics	to	
be	built	through	anticipation,	
learning,	recovery	&	adaptation	
(Madni	&	Jackson,	2009)	
Fast	&	frugal	heuristics	provide	
robust	strategies	to	perform	well	
under	uncertainty	(Mousavi	&	
Gigerenzer,	2014)	
Org	heuristics	relate	to	the	strategic	
logic	of	opportunity	(Bingham,	
Eisenhardt,	&	Furr,	2007)	
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	 Secondly,	 the	 ability	 to	 undertake	 such	 adaptation	 is	 central	 to	 a	
system’s	 resilience	 capability	 suggesting	 that,	 in	 the	 organizational	 sense	 at	
least,	 the	 ability	 to	 sense	 the	 need	 for	 change	 then	 to	 corral	 the	 resources	
necessary	to	enact	the	transformation	form	a	central	component	of	a	resilient	
firm.	 Other	 techniques	 such	 as	 bricolage,	 resolving	 conflicts,	 learning	 and	
evolution	 can	 be	 used	 at	 different	 times,	 depending	 on	 the	 adversities	 the	
system	is	encountering	and	the	resources	it	can	access.	
	 Since	 the	 ongoing	 performance	 of	 firms	 under	 dynamic	 conditions	
requires	 continual	 balancing	 (and	 rebalancing)	 of	 structure	 against	 flexibility	
responses	(Eisenhardt,	Furr,	&	Bingham,	2010)	so	too	this	summary	highlights	
that	 resilient	 systems	 must	 balance	 agile	 adaptation	 with	 efficiency.	 This	
suggests	a	tension	between	routine	actions	and	adhocracy	(Teece,	2012).	
2.3	THE	LINK	WITH	DYNAMIC	CAPABILITIES	RESEARCH	
Consequently,	the	process	model	of	resilience	embraces	similar	tensions	to	the	
dynamic	 capabilities	 view	 in	 organization	 science.	 Responses	 to	 adverse	 or	
traumatic	 events	 generally	 require	 a	 reconfiguration	 of	 existing	 resources	 or	
activity	 sequences.	 Dynamic	 capabilities	 are	 generally	 construed	 as	 higher-
order	processes	 for	 reconfiguring	 resources	 and	 associated	operating	 routines	
in	 changing	 environmental	 circumstances	 to	 yield	 sustained	 competitive	
advantage	(Burnard	&	Bhamra,	2011:	5595).		
	 A	disruptive	innovation	for	instance	can	cause	a	firm	to	go	into	decline	if	
it	was	unprepared	for	the	strategic	shift	(Eisenhardt	&	Martin,	2000;	Peteraf,	Di	
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Stefano,	 &	 Verona,	 2013;	 Teece,	 Pisano,	 &	 Shuen,	 1997).	 Dynamic	 capabilities	
must	be	developed	to	handle	the	resulting	disorganization	and	re-steer	the	firm	
to	 strategic	 renewal.	 Such	 capabilities	 also	 must	 be	 committed	 to	
organizational	memory	in	the	form	of	routines	(or	perhaps	simple	rules,	that	is	
heuristics)	 in	 order	 to	 be	 available	 again	 in	 circumstances	 of	 disruptive	
innovation	(Danneels,	2010).	In	Richardson’s	(2002)	psychology	process	model,	
this	 learning	 and	 institutionalization	 of	 the	 capability	 is	 akin	 to	 resilient	
reintegration	 as	 the	 firm	 learns	 to	 cope	 with	 such	 adversity	 and	 make	 such	
learning	beneficially	available	to	 future	occurrences.	 In	the	setting	of	the	firm	
navigating	 such	 disruptions,	 “learning	 includes	 both	 the	 processes	 by	 which	
organizations	adjust	themselves	defensively	to	reality	and	the	processes	by	which	
knowledge	is	used	offensively	to	improve	the	first	between	organizations	and	their	
environments”	(Hedberg,	1981:	3).	
In	 addition,	 Teece	 (2007)	 describes	 dynamic	 capabilities	 as	 possessing	
three	 main	 processes	 of	 sensing,	 seizing	 and	 transforming.	 These	 three	
processes	 align	with	 intervention	points	 for	building	a	 capability	 in	 resilience	
before	 (sensing),	 during	 (seizing)	 and	 after	 (transforming)	 adversity.	 The	
dynamic	capabilities	framework	therefore	offers	promise	in	accommodating	the	
assumptions	 learned	 about	 resilience	 in	 psychology	 research	 and	 providing	 a	
platform	 for	 the	 building	 of	 a	 robust	 foundation	 for	 organizational	 resilience	
conceptualization.			
Dynamic	 capabilities	 are	 relevant	 to	 circumstances	 that	 are	 fluid,	
uncertain	and	unpredictable.	In	such	circumstances,	dynamic	capabilities	take	
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the	 form	 of	 heuristics,	 providing	 cognitive	 shortcuts	 in	 decision	 making,	
particularly	 in	uncertain,	 limited	 information	contexts	 (Peteraf	 et	 al.,	 2013)	 so	
allowing	 faster	 action	 where	 speed	 of	 response	 is	 a	 critical	 criterion.	 In	 his	
seminal	work	on	uncertainty,	economist	Frank	Knight	(1921)	demonstrated	how	
risk	 differed	 from	 uncertainty	 (Bingham	 &	 Haleblian,	 2012;	 Mousavi	 &	
Gigerenzer,	 2014).	 Whereas	 risk	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 addressed	 by	 considering	
probabilities,	 uncertainty	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 addressed	 by	 frugal	 rules	 or	
heuristics	(Knight,	1921).		
The	 ‘simple	 rule’	 form	 of	 a	 heuristic	 lays	 down	 some	 cognitive	 and	
behavioural	 parameters	without	 over-prescribing	 action	 sequences	 such	 as	 in	
routines.	 Routines	 are	 different	 to	 heuristics	 in	 that	 the	 former	 are	 detailed	
steps	 for	 narrow	 problems	 whereas	 heuristics	 apply	 to	 a	 range	 of	 similar	
problems	 without	 behavioural	 detail	 (Mousavi	 &	 Gigerenzer,	 2014).	 Davis,	
Eisenhardt	&	 Bingham	 (Cohen,	 2012)	 showed	 that	 heuristics	 can	 be	 viable	 in	
predictable	 environments	 and	 vital	 in	 volatile	 ones,	 thus	 indicating	 a	 wider	
effectiveness	 of	 heuristics	 in	 strategic	 decision-making	 than	 often	 assumed.	
Bingham	 &	 Haleblian	 (2012)	 found	 that	 firms	 can	 develop	 heuristics	 from	
negative	 outcomes	 particularly	 when	 their	 attributions	 converge	 across	
organizational	 levels	 concerning	 the	 causes	 of	 those	 negative	 outcomes.	
Linking	with	Teece’s	(2007)	 framework,	how	can	heuristics	guide	processes	of	
sensing,	seizing	and	transforming	before,	during	and	after	adversity?	
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2.4	A	PROCESS-BASED	MODEL	OF	ORGANIZATIONAL	RESILIENCE	
Psychology	 is	 the	 only	 domain	 to	 highlight	 the	 idea	 of	 resilient	 reintegration	
(Richardson,	2002);	that	is,	a	positive	adaptation	to	adverse	conditions	so	as	to	
achieve	levels	of	performance	higher	than	would	have	been	achieved	absent	the	
adversity.	Expanding	this	construction,	Figure	1	incorporates	a	range	of	criteria	
to	 classify	 and	distinguish	 a	process	model	 of	 resilience	 across	dimensions	of	
threats	and	disorganizations	as	these	may	impact	on	a	firm	after	trauma.	These	
dimensions,	drawing	on	earlier	tables,	are	important	antecedents	to	the	firm’s	
ability	to	respond	to	adversity	and	prosper.	
Threat	Dimensions	
Threats	 can	differ	 in	 terms	of	severity,	meaning	 the	extent	 to	which	 they	can	
threaten	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 firm.	 In	 some	 cases,	 for	 example,	 technological	
change	 can	 cause	 significant	 disruption	 and	 demise	 to	 incumbents1	 (Davis,	
Eisenhardt,	&	Bingham,	2009).	Threats	can	also	be	distinguished	in	terms	of	the	
scale	 and	 scope	 of	 response	 required	 to	meet	 the	multidimensionality	 of	 the	
threat.	Complex	threats	implicate	numerous	organizational	sections	and	entail	
more	 extensive	 coordinated	 responses.	 Product	 recalls	 following	 threats	 to	
public	 safety	 are	 an	 example.	 Threats	 can	 also	 be	 catalytic	 as	 they	 trigger	 a	
ripple	effect	of	other	threats.	The	loss	of	a	key	customer,	for	instance,	can	cause	
consequent	investor	and	staff	withdrawal.	The	frequency	with	which	particular	
																																								 								
1	A	key	issue	here	of	course	is	whether	a	valid	threat	is	in	fact	perceived	that	way	(Levitt	&	
March,	1988).	I	leave	aside	perception	limits	to	focus	on	the	objective	properties	of	threats.	
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threats	 strike	 the	 firm	 can	 also	 be	 debilitating	 through	 attrition	 and	
compounding	 effects.	 Finally,	 the	 familiarity	 of	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 firm	 is	 also	
determinative	of	the	firm’s	ability	to	handle	it,	with	new	and	unfamiliar	threats	
sparking	 non-routine	 (and	 therefore	 unproven)	 responses	 and	 a	 higher	
likelihood	of	disorganization.		
The	 extent	 of	 a	 threat’s	 severity,	 complexity,	 catalysis,	 frequency	 and	
familiarity	is	also	firm-specific	with	firms	differing	across	a	profile.	For	example,	
in	general	terms	and	faced	with	the	same	‘threat’,	start-ups	may	face	a	different	
profile	across	the	threat	classification	criteria	than	a	large	incumbent.	Within-
group	differences	will	 also	occur	 as	 firms	have	different	past	 experiences	 and	
different	 resilience	 capabilities,	 leading	 to	 different	 threat	 classifications	 and	
effects.	For	any	one	firm,	threats	are	regarded	as	high	risk	when	they	have	the	
potential	for	serious	disorganization.		
Interaction	effects	between	the	different	characteristics	of	threats	points	
towards	 a	 decision	 context	 where	 heuristics	 and	 behavioural	 flexibility	 are	
required	in	dynamic	capabilities	for	resilience.	Also,	faced	with	different	threat	
profiles	 firms	 will	 develop	 heterogeneous	 portfolios	 of	 rules	 to	 cope	 and	
respond,	attesting	to	the	state	of	their	resilience	capability.	
Disorganizations	
Specific	 threats	require	specific	 types	of	 resilience.	Figure	1	shows	 that	 threats	can	 trigger	 disorganization	 which,	 in	 an	 organizational	 setting,	 is	 a	 loss	 of	reliable	positive	outputs	from	routines	of	action.	Further,	different	threat	profiles	in	terms	of	severity,	complexity,	catalysis,	 frequency	and	familiarity	can	 lead	to	
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different	types	of	disorganization	experienced	by	the	firm.	An	important	 lesson	from	psychology	is	the	need	to	classify	these	different	types	of	disorganization	if	we	are	 to	better	understand	how	 firms	build	 resilience	against	 specific	 threats	and	disorganizations.	
	 In	this	chapter,	different	types	of	disorganization	are	classified	according	
to	type	and	complexity,	with	three	main	types	being	strategic,	operational	and	
resource2.	 Strategic	 disorganization	 can	 occur	 following	 such	 threats	 as	
technological	obsolescence,	competitor	countermoves,	competence-destroying	
disruptions,	and	product	failure.	Strategic	disorganization	can	be	characterized	
by	 the	 entering	 of	 a	 strategic	 vacuum	 as	 the	 generic	 strategy	 collapses,	
competencies	are	made	irrelevant	and	key	product-market	strategies	fail.		
	 In	addition,	there	may	be	considerable	fallout	and	dissension	among	the	
principal	decision	makers	contributing	to	a	lack	of	coherence	about	the	future	
strategy.	 Operating	 disorganization	 can	 be	 characterized	 by	 gaps	 arising	 in	
operating	routines	so	that	regular	coordinated	collective	actions	do	not	reliably	
deliver	 positive	 outcomes	 for	 the	 firm.	 Resource	 disorganization	 is	
characterized	 by	 loss	 of	 control	 or	 access	 to	 resources	 in	 the	 short	 term	
meaning	 strategic	 outcomes	 cannot	 be	 reliably	 achieved	 and	 that	 new	
approaches	will	be	required	to	form	stable	opportunities	for	the	firm.	
	 Resource	 disorganization	 occurs	 when	 key	 resources	 become	 both	
unavailable	and	difficult	to	access	in	the	near-term	making	the	firm	unable	to	
																																								 								
2	These	three	types	of	disorganization	correspond	to	the	turnaround	tripod	–	the	three	common	
areas	of	focus	for	turnaround	efforts	(Shein,	2011)	
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sustain	its	strategic	and	operating	objectives.	Staff	may	leave	the	firm	and/or	be	
poached,	 lenders	 become	 unprepared	 to	 extend	 uncollateralized	 loans,	 loan	
defaults	 worsen	 credit	 ratings	 and	 make	 further	 finance	 difficult,	 investors	
withdraw,	key	customers	and	suppliers	collapse,	and/or	key	strategic	assets	are	
rendered	mute.	 Further,	 the	 firm’s	 income	 streams	 reverse	 and	 are	unable	 to	
cover	 debt	 and	 provide	 the	 positive	 cash	 flow	 for	 needed	 working	 capital	 to	
sustain	assets	and	operations.	
	 Any	disorganization	is	likely	to	have	an	adverse	effect	on	other	parts	of	
the	 organization	 and	 thus	 possibly	 trigger	 further	 disorganizations.	 To	 an	
extent	then	the	different	types	of	disorganization	overlap.	However,	consistent	
with	 the	 general	 finding	 in	 psychology	 that	 specific	 threats	 require	 specific	
resilience,	each	disorganization	can	entail	distinctive	remedial	actions.		That	is,	
a	distinct	dynamic	capability	is	required	to	address	each	disorganization.		
	 When	 firms	 face	 just	 a	 single	 form	 of	 disorganization	 we	 call	 this	 a	
singular	disorganization.		 However,	 ensuing	 multiple	 disorganizations	 are	
referred	to	as	a	complex	disorganization.	This	distinction	between	singular	and	
complex	disorganizations	has	implications	for	firm	responses	through	different	
dynamic	capabilities.	
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Figure	1:	Process-based	model	of	organizational	resilience,	
with	resilient	integration	pathways	shaded	and	showing	
a	similar	promising	outcome	whether	disorganization		
present,	limited	or	absent.	
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2.5	RESILIENCE	RESPONSES,	ORIENTATIONS	AND	OUTCOMES	
Firms	 undergoing	 disorganization	 have	 an	 opportunity	 for	 growth	 through	
expansion	 of	 the	 firm’s	 resilience	 repertoire.	 Yet	 firms	 can	 choose	 different	
ways	 of	 processing	 the	 threat,	 whereby	 a	 disruptive	 event	 is	 followed	 by	
reintegration	 (Christensen,	 1997;	 Tripsas	 &	 Gavetti,	 2000).	 At	 the	 individual	
level,	people	are	capable	of	choosing	the	psychological	outcomes	of	disruptive	
events.	 According	 to	 Richardson	 (2002),	 disorganizations	 mean	 that	 an	
individual’s	world	 paradigm	has	 changed,	 possibly	 expanded	 (post-adversity).	
Eventually	 the	 person	must	 ask	 how	 they	 are	 going	 to	 overcome	 this	 serious	
disruption,	which	invokes	the	process	of	reintegration.		
	 Reintegration	 is	 the	process	of	 incorporating	a	 trauma	 into	a	resilience	
repertoire	 that	 enables	 rebuilding	with	 stronger	 resistance	 and	more	 tools	 to	
navigate	 future	 adverse	 episodes.	 As	 indicated	 in	 Figure	 1,	 firm	 responses	 to	
threats	 and	 disorganizations	 can	 range	 from	no	 reintegration	 leading	 to	 firm	
extinction,	partial	reintegration	which	leads	to	a	recovery	to	performance	levels	
lower	 than	 the	 previous	 homeostasis,	 reintegration	 back	 to	 homeostasis	 or	
resilient	 reintegration	 which	 is	 the	 most	 mindful	 reintegration	 orientation.	
Resilient	 reintegration	 is	 a	 deliberate	 approach	 to	 building	 resilience	
characterized	 by	 not	 only	 recovery	 but	 also	 attempts	 to	 build	 new	 rules	 and	
action	sequences	which	may	enable	a	level	of	post-disorganization	performance	
higher	than	the	previous	homeostasis.	This	resilient	reintegration	captures	the	
idea	of	resilience	being	a	growth	experience.	
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	 Also,	 different	 resilience	 outcomes	 emerge	 from	 how	 firms	 configure	
their	 responses	 and	 orientations.	 Firms	 that	 use	 particular	 heuristics	 or	
routines	 with	 a	 resilient	 reintegration	 orientation	 position	 themselves	 to	 be	
able	to	exploit	new	opportunities	beyond	the	former	set	they	were	pursuing.	In	
contrast,	 firms	 without	 such	 a	 resilient	 reintegration	 orientation	 are	 more	
focused	on	returning	to	homeostasis	and	thus	their	resilience	outcome	is	more	
about	 the	 re-pursuit	 of	 former	 opportunities.	 Their	 resilience	 orientation	 has	
not	permitted	the	larger	growth	process	inherent	to	resilient	reintegration.	
	 The	key	assumptions	in	Table	7	hint	at	an	efficiency/flexibility	trade-off	
in	 resilience	 responses,	 a	 trade-off	 well	 recognized	 in	 organization	 research		
(Eisenhardt	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Figure	 1	 shows	 that	 when	 threats	 cause	 little	 to	 no	
disorganization	then	the	firm	may	deploy	routinized	resilience	responses.	Such	
responses	 will	 maximize	 efficiency	 through	 local	 search	 for	 solutions	 (Flach,	
1997).	The	resilience	orientation	is	one	of	return	to	homeostasis	where	the	firm	
is	merely	trying	to	overcome	the	disruption	and	restore	former	circumstances.	
Here,	 learning	 for	a	broader	resilience	repertoire	 is	 limited.	Alternatively,	and	
as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 1,	 the	 firm	may	use	 the	 experience	 of	mild	 disruption	 for	
greater	 resilience	 learning.	This	 is	coupled	by	an	orientation	 towards	resilient	
reintegration,	 a	 wider	 search	 for	 solutions	 and	 greater	 cognitive	 and	
behavioural	flexibility.		
	 These	flexibilities	are	indicated	by	the	range	of	constructs	listed	in	Table	
8,	including	evolution,	adaptation,	bricolage	and	heuristics.	As	disorganization	
becomes	 more	 substantial	 there	 is	 greater	 resource	 loss	 and	 so	 routine	
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responses	become	unavailable.	Heuristics-based	responses	predominate.	These	
allow	 wide	 search	 and	 cognitive	 and	 behavioural	 flexibility	 to	 identify	 new	
solutions	from	a	resilient	reintegration	orientation	(March,	1991).	Firms	are	now	
using	 a	 resilience	 mindset	 to	 reinvent	 the	 firm	 beyond	 former	 homeostasis.	
Taken	together,	these	arguments	contend:		
Proposition	 1:	 Firms	 that	 deploy	 routine-based	 resilience	 responses	 are	
more	 likely	 to	 return	 to	 homeostasis	 rather	 than	 resilient	 reintegration.	
The	 primary	 mechanisms	 are	 routines,	 efficiency,	 local	 search	 and	
homeostasis.	
Proposition	 2:	 	 Firms	 that	 deploy	 heuristics-based	 resilience	 responses	
are	more	 likely	to	aspire	to	resilient	reintegration	than	homeostasis.	The	
primary	mechanisms	 are	 heuristics,	 flexibility,	 wide	 search	 and	 resilient	
reintegration.	
The	advantage	of	heuristics	 is	 that	 they	minimise	 the	 requirements	 for	
cognitive	 resources	 to	 every	 emerging	problem,	 allowing	 selected	evidence	or	
cues	to	quickly	indicate	the	rule	to	be	applied	and	so	ignoring	large	swathes	of	
irrelevant	information	to	yield	desired	results	(Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	2011).	By	
ignoring	 this	 irrelevant	 information	or	noise,	heuristics	assume	an	underlying	
evolved	capacity	to	interpret	the	context	for	particular	cues	and	the	subsequent	
rule	 selection	 for	 the	 problem	 to	hand.	 Such	 fast	 and	 frugal	 decision	making	
yields	 flexibility	 in	application	 in	achieving	positive	outcomes	but	assumes	an	
often	 tacit	disposition	 in	 the	way	contextual	 factors	are	 interpreted	and	noise	
overlooked.	Such	contextual	disposition	 is	 referred	 to	as	ecological	 rationality	
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(Gigerenzer	 &	 Gaissmaier,	 2011)	 and	 is	 the	 key	 predictor	 of	 when	 particular	
heuristics	 will	 fail	 or	 succeed.	 Accordingly,	 heuristics	 are	 best	 employed	 to	
facilitate	 rapid	 and	 flexible	 decision	making	 under	 conditions	 of	 uncertainty,	
when	 the	 pathway	 to	 desired	 outcomes	 are	 undefined	 due	 either	 to	 resource	
collapse	or	 transience	(that	 is,	unreliable	or	unstable	availability).	This	means	
that	new	opportunities	can	be	formed	and	tried	quickly	without	high	decision	
making	overheads,	 yielding	 strategic	 and	operating	 agility.	Heuristics	 are	 less	
well	 suited	 to	conditions	of	certainty	of	 resource	availability	because	 ignoring	
information	is	 likely	 to	 decrease	 efficiency	 of	 attaining	 desired	 goals,	
unnecessarily	increasing	operating	overheads.	Accordingly:	
Proposition	 3:	 The	 greater	 the	 uncertainty	 and	 resource	 loss	 from	
disorganization	 the	 more	 the	 firm	 will	 use	 heuristics-based	 dynamic	
capabilities	for	resilience.	
In	a	 related	vein,	 routines	apply	recurrent	behaviour	patterns	 to	derive	
an	 advantage	 from	 particular	 conditions,	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 historically	 such	
recurrent	action	sequences	have	yielded	the	desired	results	(Gigerenzer,	2008).	
When	 such	 adopted	 routines	 reliably	 yield	 positive	 results	 they	 are	 termed	 a	
capability	 (Teece,	 2012).	Like	heuristics,	 routines	 are	 a	behaviour	pattern	 that	
seek	 to	 lessen	 the	 uncertainties	 of	 complexity	 and	 tension	 between	
organisational	 units	 when	 conditions	 of	 resource	 certainty	 exist.	 Unlike	
heuristics,	however,	routines	strive	for	the	efficient	exploitation	of	the	available	
resources	 in	 achieving	desired	objectives.	By	way	of	 a	boundary	 condition,	 “a	
more	efficient	system	is	increasingly	stable	over	a	decreasing	range	of	conditions”	
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(Walker	 &	 Salt,	 2006:	 77).	 This	 implies	 that	 a	 more	 efficient	 system	 is	 less	
resilient	to	disruption	across	its	operating	range.	Accordingly:	
	 Proposition	 4:	 On	 average,	 the	 flexibility-orientation	 of	 heuristics	
increase	 resilience	 across	 a	 greater	 range	 of	 adverse	 situations	 than	 the	
efficiency-orientation	of	routines.	
2.6	HEURISTICS-BASED	DYNAMIC	CAPABILITIES	FOR	RESILIENT	
REINTEGRATION	
This	 background	 supports	 a	 contention	 that	 resilient	 reintegration	 and	
reintegration	 back	 to	 homeostasis	 involve	 applying	 heuristics	 from	 a	 learned	
repertoire	that	facilitates	dynamic	resilience	capability	development.	Resilience	
against	 strategic	 disorganization	 requires	 a	 distinct	 dynamic	 capability	 versus	
operating	 and	 resource	 disorganizations	 and	 vice	 versa.	 Generically	 though,	
resilient	 reintegration	 requires	 each	 dynamic	 capability	 to	 involve	 three	
processes:	sensing,	seizing	and	transforming.	We	discuss	each	in	turn.			
Sensing		
Teece	 (2007)	 frames	 the	 sensing	 function	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities	 from	 an	
opportunity	 perspective.	 That	 is,	 sensing	 is	 a	 primary	 activity	 set	 involving	
scanning	 for	and	recognising	possible	growth	options	and	then	proceeding	 to	
interpret,	create,	learn	and	shape	new	opportunities	(Teece,	2012).	A	resilience	
perspective	calls	 for	also	being	able	 to	 ‘sense’	when	 trouble	 is	 impending	and	
take	preparatory	action.		
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Seizing		
Seizing	involves	catalyzing	the	organization	response	to	the	sensed	threat	and	
resulting	 opportunity.	 Here	 again,	 the	 firm’s	 resilience	 orientation	 is	
determinative.	 If	 the	 resilience	mindset	 is	 one	of	 return	 to	homeostasis	 post-
disorganization,	 then	 seizing	 is	 undertaken	 in	 a	 way	 that	 seeks	 to	 minimize	
damage	 from	 the	 threat	 and	 get	 the	 firm	 back	 on	 track.	 But	 a	 resilience	
orientation	of	 reintegration	 engages	 a	deeper	 learning	process	with	 a	 view	 to	
‘future-proofing’	against	similar	threats	that	may	arise.	Here	seizing	attempts	to	
minimize	damage	by	actors	are	not	bound	by	the	limited	perception	of	the	firm	
returning	to	its	former	state.	Seizing	from	a	reintegration	resilience	orientation	
uses	 learning	 to	 embed	 future	 access	 should	 similar	 threats	 be	 encountered	
again.	But	also,	seizing	is	open	to	the	possibility	of	larger	organizational	change	
and	response	as	sense	is	made	of	threats	in	a	way	that	can	re-define	the	firm’s	
opportunity	 set.	 Seizing	 is	 thus	 part	 of	 a	 growth	 process	 in	 response	 to	
adversity.		
Transforming		
Transformation	 is	 a	 learned	 capability	 by	 repeated	 steps	 of	 forming	 and	
enacting	 new	 options,	 attracting	 or	 gaining	 access	 to	 new	 resource	 sets	 and	
allowing	 activity	 sequences	 to	 be	 applied	 in	 a	 way	 that	 continues	 the	
emergence	of	 the	new	options.	Organizational	 resilience	 is	conferred	 through	
this	iterative	practice	because	the	firm	learns	to	embed	the	dynamic	capability	
of	 reconfiguring	 resources	 and	 activities	 around	 a	 changing	 set	 of	 strategic	
opportunities,	 “by	 enhancing	 the	 importance	 of	 chance,	 flux	 and	 unintended	
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consequences”	(Teece,	2007:	1343).	Those	opportunities	that	cannot	attract	new	
resources	 and	 productive	 attendant	 activities	 will	 attenuate;	 those	 that	
successfully	 attract	 resources	 and	 activities	 will	 consolidate	 and	 emerge	 into	
new	 strategic	 options.	 The	 disequilibrium	 experience	 thereby	 confers	 greater	
robustness	 in	 navigating	 future	 disruptions	 because	 of	 this	 embedded	 and	
transforming	iterative	skill.	
2.7	HEURISTICS	AND	DYNAMIC	RESILIENCE	CAPABILITIES	
Connecting	 Teece’s	 (2007)	 framework	 with	 Figure	 1	 reveals	 that	 different	
resilience	orientations	(reintegration,	homeostasis	and	loss)	can	mean	different	
development	pathways	for	sensing,	seizing,	transforming	abilities	and	therefore	
dynamic	 resilience	 capabilities.	 	 Actors	 develop	 firm-	 and	 situation-specific	
heuristics	through	practice	by	trial	and	error	and	experimentation	(Bingham	&	
Eisenhardt,	 2011).	 Table	 9	 lists	 examples	 of	 selection	 heuristics	 based	 on	 the	
cognitive	 science	 work	 of	 Gigerenzer	 &	 Brighton	 (MacKay	 &	 Chia,	 2013)	
(MacKay	&	Chia,	2013:	226).	These	heuristics	offer	a	useful	starting	point	with	
which	to	conceive	firm-specific	heuristics	for	particular	situations,	including	for	
guiding	 resilience	 responses	 to	 different	 disorganizations.	 These	 heuristics	
permit	 resilient	 responses	 in	 decision	 contexts	 marked	 by	 complexity	 of	
choices,	ongoing	resource	depletion,	and	closing	windows	of	opportunity.		
The	 skill	 required	 for	 actors	 is	 to	 learn	 the	 portfolio	 of	 heuristics,	
including	 identifying	 the	 conditions	when	each	 is	best	 applied.	A	portfolio	of	
heuristics	allows	actors	to	confront	a	myriad	of	rapidly	changing	circumstances,	
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each	 requiring	 particular	 nuances	 in	 heuristics.	 For	 example,	 the	 first	 three	
heuristics	 in	Table	 9	 (recognition,	 fluency	 and	 take	 the	 best)	 refer	 to	 how	 to	
make	choices	about	different	decision	pathways.	They	each	emphasize	selecting	
highly	recognizable	options	but	fluency	is	best	when	speed	of	option	selection	
is	 most	 important,	 while	 ‘take	 the	 best’	 pertains	 to	 selecting	 options	 in	
circumstances	where	more	detailed	analysis	or	comparison	to	selection	criteria	
is	warranted.		
Table	9	also	indicates	the	classification	of	the	various	heuristics	based	on	
Bingham	&	Eisenhardt	 (2011)	 into	selection,	procedural,	 temporal	and	priority	
types.	 Selection	 heuristics	 pertain	 to	 choosing	 action	 options,	 whereas	
procedural	 heuristics	 guide	 how	 the	 option	 is	 to	 be	 enacted.	 Temporal	
heuristics	 guide	 the	 sequencing	 and	 time-related	 aspects	 of	 heuristic	
application	 while	 priority	 heuristics	 inform	 the	 relative	 urgency	 of	 attention	
given	to	the	options	available.				
The	list	of	heuristics	developed	by	Gigerenzer	&	Brighton	offers	a	point	
of	departure	for	matching	specific	heuristics	to	disorganizations	across	various	
stages	of	dynamic	capability	(sensing,	seizing	and	transforming).	Table	10	gives	
examples	of	the	sorts	of	priority	issues	and	heuristics	which	might	characterize	
sensing,	 seizing	 and	 transforming	 for	 threats	 of	 each	 type	 of	 disorganization	
(strategic,	 operating	 and	 resource)	 but	 from	 a	 resilient	 reintegration	
perspective.		
Generally	 speaking,	 selection	 heuristics	 assist	 sensing	 and	 seizing	
dynamic	capability	processes	while	procedural	and	temporal	heuristics	 largely	
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inform	 seizing	 and	 transformation.	 Table	 10	 then	 offers	 a	 framework	 for	
matching	 heuristic	 types	 (selection,	 procedural	 and	 temporal)	 with	 dynamic	
capability	 processes	 and	 different	 types	 of	 disorganization.	 The	 result	 is	 a	
comprehensive	heuristic-based	resilience	dynamic	capability.	
For	 each	 disorganization,	 a	 resilience	 dynamic	 capability	 requires	
deploying	different	heuristics	at	different	times	across	the	different	processes	of	
sensing,	seizing	and	transforming.	The	‘capability’	then	is	the	ability	to	identify	
and	 match	 relevant	 heuristics	 to	 each	 process	 and	 know	 when	 to	 switch	
heuristics	as	processes	 (sensing,	 seizing,	 transforming)	change	over	 time.	The	
results	of	this	process	will	differ	depending	on	the	resilience	orientation	used.	
In	turn,	different	resilience	outcomes	will	also	emerge	from	this	configuration	
of	 heuristics,	 processes	 and	 orientations.	 These	 observations	 can	 be	
summarised	as:	
Proposition	 5:	 Firms	 that	 match	 heuristics	 to	 processes	 of	 sensing,	
seizing	and	 transforming	along	with	a	 resilient	 reintegration	orientation	
are	 more	 likely	 to	 pursue	 more	 new	 opportunities	 rather	 than	 merely	
return	to	homeostasis	or	reintegrate	with	loss.	
If	 an	 earlier	 strategy	 architecture	 has	 failed	 or	 been	 abandoned	 and	
competing	 options	 prove	 difficult	 to	 harness	 in	 uncertain	 and	 volatile	
conditions,	 Table	 10	 suggests	 a	 change	 to	 the	 heuristic	 repertoire	 as	
opportunities	progress	through	sensing,	seizing	and	transforming.	Sensing	is	a	
process	where	the	firm	perceives	threats	but	also,	from	a	resilience	orientation,	
new	 opportunities	 from	 an	 emerging	 yet	 transient	 coalescence	 of	 factors,	
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including	resource	options,	business	models	or	partnerships.	The	priority	issue	
in	the	sensing	stage	of	a	strategic	disorganization	can	revolve	around	gaining	a	
cohesive	 threat	 interpretation,	 in	 particular	 to	 guide	 which	 information	 to	
ignore.	The	heuristic	of	tallying	removes	an	intuitive	impulse	to	weight	various	
threat	options	according	 to	 their	 eventual,	 albeit	uncertain,	negative	 impacts.	
The	 tallying	 heuristic	 discards	 any	 information	 as	 regards	 to	 weighting	 such	
potential	 negative	 outcomes	 and	 incorporates	 only	 the	 quantity	 of	 negative	
cues	 across	 an	 array	 of	 emerging	 threats,	 allowing	 an	 easy	 comparative	
interpretation	despite	uncertain	conditions	and	outcomes.		
Tallying	as	a	selection	activity	then	can	be	quite	quickly	executed,	in	line	
with	the	transient	nature	of	opportunity	emergence	and	decay.	The	tit	 for	 tat	
heuristic,	 outlined	 in	 Table	 9,	 is	 a	 procedural	 rule	 for	 cooperative	 partnering	
with	 knowledge	 resources	 that	 allow	 some	 level	 of	 knowledge	 transfer	 to	 be	
undertaken	 to	 bridge	 identified	 gaps	 in	 the	 short	 term.	 Such	 knowledge	
transfer	 may	 involve	 providing	 access	 to	 typical	 documents	 such	 as	
representation	 or	 licence	 agreements,	 investment	 term	 sheets	 or	 corporate	
governance	policies.	It	may	involve	access	to	established	processes	undertaken	
by	the	partner	 firm	such	as	 investor	relation	actions,	diagnosing	and	enacting	
strategy	or	operational	management.		
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Table	9:	Portfolio	of	Heuristics	to	Aid	Resilience		(*adapted	from	Gigerenzer	&	Brighton,	2009:130)	
Heuristic*	 Description*	 Explanation	 Heuristic	
Type	+	
Example	of	Use	in	Resilience	
Recognition	 Infer	recognised	option	
has	higher	value	
Disorganization	forces	resource	
conservatism.	Actors	need	to	act	
frugally	in	order	to	avoid	resource	over-
use	bit	still	try	to	create	new	
opportunities	
Selection	 Firm	may	seek	to	be	financially	resilient.	The	recognition	heuristic	
could	be	used	to	guide	selection	of	a	law	firm	to	advise	&	guide	IPO	
process	
Fluency	 Infer	the	option	
recognised	faster	has	
higher	value	
This	heuristic	is	similar	to	‘recognition’	
but	where	speed	of	decision-making	is	
paramount.	It	means	choosing	options	
which	register	with	actors’	recognition	
the	quickest	
Selection	 Resilience	in	the	form	of	bouncing	back	from	collapse	can	require	
making	decisions	about	outside	partners,	accountants,	law	firms.	
Firms	may	be	overwhelmed	with	options	yet	time	may	dictate	speedy	
choice	and	so	a	fluency	heuristic	guides	the	decision	maker	to	choose	
that	option	they	recognize	with	most	reputation.	This	aids	additional	
external	interactions	as	the	reputation	of	the	chosen	actor	carries	
weight	with	other	potential	partners	thus	avoiding	getting	bogged	
down	in	trying	to	make	partners	familiar	with	other	partners		
Take	the	
best	
Arrange	cues	in	order	
of	validity,	select	
option	corresponding	
to	first	cue	that	meets	
criteria	
The	previous	heuristics	are	applied	
when	information	uncertainty	is	high.	
This	heuristic	is	applied	in	
circumstances	of	action	option	
selection	where	your	criteria	for	
selection	are	more	detailed	and	clear	
Selection	 Some	decisions	made	in	resilience	carry	greater	consequences	than	
others.	Therefore	it	becomes	necessary	to	make	some	action	selection	
decisions	that	are	based	on	more	rigorous	comparison	to	criteria.	Take	
the	best	action	option	that	meets	the	criteria	then	take	the	best		
Tallying	 Count	positive	cues	of	
action	options	without	
weighting	to	achieve	
highest	value	
Choosing	those	action	options	that	
appear	to	have	the	greatest	number	of	
benefits	without	any	further	evaluation	
of	the	relative	quality	of	those	benefits.	
Such	quality	evaluations	may	not	be	
possible	because	of	time	or	energy	
Selection	 Resilience	requires	sensitivity	to	resourcing	decisions.	A	key	aim	can	
be	to	make	resource	investments	in	options	that	will	deliver	the	most	
benefits.	Therefore,	the	firm	maximizes	its	resource-benefit	ratio	
	+	Heuristic	type	uses	the	same	schema	as	Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	2011	 	
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Satisficing	 Select	first	option	that	
exceeds	aspiration	level	
Like	‘take	the	best’	except	satisficing	
takes	the	first	best	option	that	presents	
and	meets	predetermined	criteria.	
Search	is	then	stopped.	
Selection	&	
Priority	
Resilience	can	mean	quick	actions	in	order	to	stem	resource	bleeding.	
Where	time	is	critical	to	resource	salvaging	and/or	opportunity	
capture,	then	satisficing	may	be	better	than	the	fuller	assessment	of	
‘take	the	best’.	The	time	that	would	be	spent	on	a	larger	analysis	is	
then	instead	used		
One	
bounce	
Continue	searching	for	
as	long	as	options	
improve;	at	first	
downturn	select	
previous	option	
Allowing	better	options	to	emerge	and	
develop	sequentially,	postponing	
selection	for	this	development,	but	
acting	quickly	when	signals	reverse	
Selection	&	
Temporal	
Allows	the	firm	to	maximize	upside	potential	to	move	it	faster	and	
further	to	the	re-generation	of	slack	that	serves	as	buffer	for	resilience	
1/N	equality	 Allocate	resources	to	
each	of	N	alternatives	
Nurturing	multiple	simultaneous	
options	with	small	resources	in	order	to	
see	which	matures	best	
Selection	&	
Temporal	
Gives	time	for	the	better	option	to	emerge	thus	enhancing	resilience	in	
terms	of	maximizing	resource	investment	versus	benefit	
Tit	for	Tat	 Cooperate	first	then	
imitate	partner’s	last	
behaviour	
Prioritise	access	from	partner	to	
specific	information	requirements		that	
you	cannot	afford	through	other	means	
and	imitate	even	if	partnership	ceases	
Priority	&	
Procedural	
Partnering	may	be	transient,	so	this	heuristic		allows	knowledge	
transfer	from	partner	to	the	firm	for	key	otherwise	difficult-to-access	
actions	which	have	longer	term	benefits	even	after	engagement	is	
broken	or	ceases	
Imitate	
majority	
Imitate	majority	
behaviour	of	identified	
peer	group		
Form	peer	collective	(eg.	advisory	
board)	to	exchange	knowledge	of	
benefit	to	all	members,	allowing	
imitation	of	chosen	behaviours	
Selection,	
Procedural	
&	Priority	
Engaging	peers	and	imitating	their	advice/example	can	offer	
experienced	judgements	in	difficult	situations	thus	providing	a	source	
of	resilience		
Imitate	
successful	
Imitate	most	successful	
person/firm	in	
identified	peer	group	
Similar	to	imitate	majority	except	an	
exemplar	peer	behaviour	is	chosen	as	a	
priority	
Selection,	
Procedural	
&	Priority	
If	environment	for	success	is	common	between	parties,	then	chosen	
priority	action	can	build	resilience	in	the	firm	as	information	accessed	
is	gained	through	low	learning	costs	
Default	 When	default	option	
exists,	do	nothing	
Follow	a	default	option	when	much	
noise	exists	in	environment	such	to	
make	it	hard	to	discern	relevant	data	
from	irrelevant		
Procedural	 Avoids	de-stabilization/wrong	choices	from	acting	on	high	noise-to-
signal	ratio.	Avoids	resource	loss	from	unnecessary	risk	taking		
Cultural	Fit	 Select	option	of	
greatest	social	
cohesion	
Selecting	courses	of	action	based	on	the	
fit	between	people	and	their	ability	to	
solve	problems	together	rather	than	
what	they	can	accomplish	individually	
Selection	&	
Procedural	
Individual	attributes	that	can	form	a	collective,	innovative,	problem	
solving		capability	as	a	resource	to	overcome	adverse	challenges		
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Self	
Sufficiency	
Choose	partners	that	
are	willing	to	do	most	
of	the	work	not	the	
other	way	round		
Motivated	partners	that	have	vested	
interest	in	the	task	can	apply	their	own	
slack	resources	to	build	the	option	
Temporal	&	
Priority	
Since	timing	of	option	development	cannot	be	controlled	under	
conditions	of	uncertainty,	this	heuristic	offers	virtual	slack	to	both	
firms	in	early	stages	when	resources	are	most	scarce	
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Table	10:	Dynamic	Resilience	Capabilities	for	Disorganizations	using	a	Resilient	Reintegration	Orientation	
Disorganization	 	Characteristics	 Sensing	 Seizing	 Transforming	
Strategic	 -Strategic	vacuum	
-Competence	destruction	
-Product/market	failure	
-Generic	strategy	failure	
-Lack	of	coherence	about	
future	
-	Many	strategic	options	
possible	but	none	stand	out	
as	obvious,	given	uncertainty	
of	environment	
-Limited	resources	to	pursue	
extensive	information,	with	
much	info	inaccessible	
without	full	engagement	
Key	Issue:	Sensing	new	
threats/opportunities	relies	on	
environmental	context;	can	be	
dispersed	among	surviving	members,	
leading	to	destructively	competitive	
strategic	agendas	without	cohesive	
rule	of	assessment;	particularly	which	
information	to	ignore	
Example	Heuristic:	Tallying	&	Tit	
for	Tat	
Heuristic	Advantages:	simplifies	
option	assessment	and	encourages	
engagement	with	parties	that	bring	
knowledge/process	assets	
Key	Issue:	Similarly,	sufficiently	
coherent	yet	flexible	structure	is	
required	to	seize	newly	formed	
opportunities	to	then	allow	
requisite	operating	&	resource	
organization	to	form	
Example	Heuristic:	Tallying	&	
one	bounce	
Heuristic	Advantages:	Allows	
correspondence	of	tallied	options	
to	strategic	goals	rather	than	
comprehensive	alignment,	so	
bypassing	discordant	factors	
outside	heuristic	that	may	
dissipate	over	time		
Key	Issue:	Iterative	cycle	of	
strategy	formation	from	an	
array	of	options,	with	
operating	actions	&	resource	
access/attraction,	underpins	
the	transformation	&	
rebuilding	of	the	firm	into	an	
ordered	state	
Example	Heuristic:	Cultural	
fit	&	Self	sufficiency	
Heuristic	Advantages:	
Practice	assessing	fit	and	
sustainability	of	options,	
given	resource	availabilities	
Operating	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
-Gaps	in	routines	of	action	
emerge	due	to	strategic	
and/or	resource	collapse	
-Routines	are	replaced	by	ad	
hoc	decisions	&	actions,	
incoherent	in	relation	to	
emerging	opportunity	
formation		
-	Lack	of	routines	requires	
embracing	complexities	&	
tensions	otherwise	
constrained	
Key	Issue:	Requisite	operating	
actions	sensed	in	conjunction	with	
emerging	strategy	option;	new	skills	
required	to	execute	such	actions	are	
identified	
Example	Heuristic:	Recognition	&	
Take	the	Best	
Heuristic	Advantages:	recognise	&	
match	actions	in	line	with	
environmental	requirements	
Key	Issue:	Ad	hoc	actions	
implemented,	in	support	of	
continued	emergence	of	strategic	
opportunity	
Example	Heuristic:	Satisficing	&	
default	
Heuristic	Advantages:	choosing	
first	actions	identified	to	meet	
objectives	maintains	problem	
solving	reserves	for	later	problems.	
If	no	clear	actions,	do	nothing.	
Key	Issue:	Ad	hoc	actions	
driven	by	a	selected	heuristic,	
consolidated	into	reliable	
sequences	of	action,	forming	
routines	utilising	a	stable	
resource	base	
Example	Heuristic:	
Satisficing	&	One	bounce		
Heuristic	Advantages:	Once	
changes	cease	to	benefit	firm	
towards	strategic	goal,	select	
new	option	
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Resource	 -Dissolution	of	strategic	
assets	
-Working	capital	deprivation	
-Loss	of	credit	rating	
-No/restricted	income	
-Inability	to	sustain	assets	
-Surviving	resources	don’t	
yield	coherent	capability	
Key	Issue:	Attract	resources	
sufficient	to	enact	emerging	strategy	
&	enable	requisite	operating	
sequences	as	identified		
Example	Heuristic:	Fluency	&	
Imitate	majority	
Heuristic	Advantages:	Quickly	
prioritise	resource	needs	&	requisite	
process	to	advantage	emergent	option	
Key	Issue:	Access	to	requisite	
resources	secured	or	negotiated,	
potentially	through	partner	
alliance	
Example	Heuristic:		Imitate	
successful	&	1/N	equality	
Heuristic	Advantages:	Imitation	
simplifies	learning	&	equal	spread	
among	options	of	unknown	future	
value	improves	outcomes	
Key	Issue:	Resources	
translate	from	access	to	
control	to	yield	greater	long	
term	stability	for	the	firm	
Example	Heuristic:	
Recognition	&	self	sufficiency	
Heuristic	Advantages:	
Resources	brought	inhouse	to	
integrate	with	newly	acquired	
skills,	to	form	new	routines	of	
reliable	output		
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Through	being	 exposed	 to	 and	participating	 in	 procedures	 undertaken	
with	an	engaged	partner,	a	focal	firm	can	learn	new	skills	despite	at	that	time	
possessing	insufficient	resources	to	sustain	the	activity	itself.	During	the	course	
of	the	engagement	with	such	a	partner,	the	firm	can	learn	not	only	the	benefits	
of	 particular	 resources	 and	 how	 to	 extract	 value	 from	 them,	 but	 also	 how	 to	
prioritise	 such	 emergent	 value	 against	 other	 options.	 Taken	 together,	 these	
tallying	and	prioritising	skills	potentially	provide	a	lasting	benefit,	even	if	that	
partnership	 eventually	 collapses.	 If	 the	 firm	 retains	 the	 knowledge	 for	 future	
exploitation,	 either	 alone	 or	 with	 other	 partner	 engagements,	 these	 sensing	
skills	accumulate.	
Following	 sensing,	 the	 seizing	 of	 opportunities	 to	 overcome	 threats	
requires	coherence	and	flexibility	in	the	organizing	response.	Absent	sufficient	
resources,	 tallying	 becomes	 a	 simple	 selection	 action	 of	 assessing	 and	
comparing	 benefits	 between	 options,	 exploiting	 complex	 evolved	 capacities	
tuned	to	the	context	of	cues	that	are	present	for	the	firm.	Seizing	opportunities	
requires	a	selection	decision	to	be	made	and	that	process	enacted.	Accordingly,	
the	 one	 bounce	 heuristic	 attracts	 the	 firm	 to	 a	 path	 of	 improving	 options,	
discarding	an	option	as	soon	as	a	drop	in	desired	performance	occurs.	This	rule	
not	 only	 impacts	 on	 option	 selection	 but	 also	 timing	 of	 such	 enactment,	
simplifying	 the	 judgement	 of	 complex,	 even	 conflicting,	 data	 sets	 in	 fast	
shifting	contexts.		
The	 transformation	 phase	 involves	 the	 application	 of	 a	 strategic	
opportunity	 towards	 realising	 a	 desired	 set	 of	 benefits.	 Enacting	 such	
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transformation	 remains	 uncertain	 since	 the	 chosen	 options	 themselves	 are	
likely	unstable	or	transient.	The	firm	aims	to	establish	patterns	of	activity	that	
are	sufficiently	stable	to	allow	its	capacity	to	expand	and,	should	the	strategic	
option	continue	to	prove	beneficial,	to	rebuild	a	viable	future.	In	that	case,	the	
highest	 priority	 strategic	 options	 will	 be	 largely	 self	 sufficient,	 not	 requiring	
extensive	 or	 unavailable	 resources	 from	 the	 firm	 in	 the	 short	 term	 yet	
delivering	 readily	 accessible	 benefits.	 	 The	 selection	 and	 processing	 of	 such	
options	will	be	guided	by	a	rule	of	cultural	 fit	between	actors	within	the	 firm	
and	those	within	the	engaged	partner.		Taken	together,	these	two	heuristics	of	
self-sufficiency	 and	 cultural	 fit,	 act	 to	 define	 the	 process	 of	 rebuilding	 and	
transforming.	
Collectively,	 an	 integrated	 pathway	 of	 heuristic	 application	 is	 defined	
across	 the	 three	 processes	 of	 sensing,	 seizing	 and	 transforming	 strategic	
disorganizations	incorporating	selection,	procedural,	temporal	and	prioritising	
actions.	 The	 repeated	 practice	 of	 these	 adaptive	 activities	 builds	 a	 resilient	
strategic	 rebuilding	 capacity	 by	 avoiding	 set	 routines	 of	 action	 in	 favour	 of	
context	specific	and	flexible	rules	that	seek	to	discard	irrelevant	noise	and	focus	
the	 firm	 on	 the	 building	 blocks	 it	 can	 at	 least	 influence,	 if	 not	 control.	
Therefore:	
Proposition	 6:	 Tallying,	 tit-for-tat,	 one	 bounce,	 cultural	 fit	 and	 self-
sufficiency	 form	a	portfolio	of	heuristics	matched	to	sensing,	seizing	and	
transforming	that	increase	the	likelihood	of	resilient	reintegration	and	an	
ability	to	pursue	new	opportunities	post-strategic	disorganization.			
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An	operating	disorganization	is	characterized	by	the	failure	of	previously	
established	 routine	 procedures	 as	 resources,	 like	 staff,	 cash	 or	 alliances,	
dissipate.	Without	a	resilience	orientation,	responses	under	conditions	of	such	
resource	dissipation	can	be	incoherent	and	without	strategic	purpose.	Table	10	
indicates	that	the	priority	issue	for	the	sensing	function	of	a	dynamic	capability	
for	 an	 operating	 disorganization	 is	 to	 recognise	 not	 only	 the	 activity	 and	
resource	 implications	 of	 a	 threat,	 but	 also	 to	 make	 resource	 shedding	 and	
reconfiguration	 decisions	 around	 possible	 new	 strategic	 pathways.	 Here	 the	
heuristic	of	 ‘take	the	best’	is	useful	because	it	encourages	a	sharp	focus	by	the	
firm	on	what	actions	are	possible	and	required	for	each	emerging	option,	rather	
than	 a	 focus	 on	 existing	 routines	 that	 may,	 or	 may	 not,	 meet	 the	 emergent	
needs.	Satisficing	can	guide	seizing	because	it	requires	an	a	priori	articulation	
of	 the	 essential	 requirements	 of	 any	 potential	 deal,	 as	 this	 translates	 to	
operating	 action.	 Rarely	 do	 multiple	 deal	 options	 arise	 of	 equally	 high	
attractiveness	so	this	heuristic	simplifies	comparative	assessments;	the	first	deal	
to	meet	or	exceed	essential	aspirational	components	is	accepted.		
The	 simplified	 comparison	 sustains	 through	 to	 the	 transformation	
process,	 testing	 and	 laying	 down	 new	 action	 sequences	 with	 potentially	
unstable	 resource	 access	 and	 entrenching	 those	 actions	 that	 sustain	 long	
enough	to	yield	benefits.	Note	the	focus	here	rests	more	on	reliable	enactment	
rather	than	achieving	reliable	outcomes,	as	this	latter	condition	is	a	function	of	
stable	 routines	 and	 established	 capabilities.	 Prior	 to	 achieving	 such	 stable	
actions	 in	 a	 still	 resource	 deficient	 state,	 the	 firm	 remains	 sensitive	 to	
downturns	 in	 transformative	opporunities	 so	will	 revert	 to	a	new	sensing	and	
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seizing	cycle	should	the	one	bounce	occur.	This	enables	resilient	reintegration	
from	operating	 disorganization	 by	 simplifying	 the	 translation	 of	 an	 emerging	
strategy	into	a	beneficial	set	of	operating	practices,	in	uncertain	or	ambiguous	
conditions	where	the	ultimate	outcomes	are	unknowable.	In	summary:	
Proposition	 7:	 Recognition,	 take	 the	 best,	 satisficing,	 default	 and	 one	
bounce	 form	 a	 portfolio	 of	 heuristics	 matched	 to	 sensing,	 seizing	 and	
transforming	that	increase	the	likelihood	of	resilient	reintegration	and	an	
ability	to	pursue	new	opportunities	post-operating	disorganization.			
Resource	 disorganizations	 can	 cripple	 the	 firm	 by	 depriving	 it	 of	 vital	
means	to	handle	adversity	if	resilient	capabilities	are	not	built.	Slack	dissipates	
when	 resources	 collapse	 (Cheng	 &	 Kesner,	 1997).	 Sensing	 of	 such	 resource	
disorganization	requires	an	ability	to	salvage	and	assemble	a	core	stock	of	self-
sufficient	resources	that	can	be	sustained	due	to	their	low	dependence	on	other	
resources	such	as	cash	or	external	expertise.	Sensing	the	availability	or	access	to	
such	 resources	 likely	 requires	 a	 very	 dynamic	 identification	 sequence,	
suggesting	 a	 fluency	 selection	 heuristic	 coupled	with	 an	 imitative	 process,	 to	
avoid	delays	caused	by	 learning	unfamiliar	actions.	This	suggests	 that	sensing	
and	seizing	stages	occur	in	a	close	to	simultaneous	timeframe,	reinforcing	the	
volatile	 nature	 of	 gaining	 resources	 following	 a	 sequence	 of	 strategic	 and	
resource	 collapse.	 Resource	 priorities	 will	 be	 dependent	 on	 the	 perceived	
strategic	goals	that	can	be	plausibly	realised	as	different	options	emerge.	In	this	
context,	strategy,	operations	and	resourcing	are	inextricably	interconnected,	at	
least	 until	 a	 level	 of	 operating	 stability	 is	 regained	 and	 organizational	
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capabilities	 allow	 some	 measure	 of	 robust	 goal	 attainment.	 This	 suggests	 a	
pattern	of	equal	resource	distribution	between	options,	as	these	exist	at	various	
times,	to	drive	selection	of	resources	and	the	timing	of	their	use.	
The	 heuristic	 of	 ‘imitate	 majority’	 allows	 information	 gleaned	 from	 a	
range	 of	 competitive	 players	 to	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 focal	 firm,	 shortening	 their	
learning	time.	The	process	of	transformation	then	involves	shifting	from	mere	
resource	 access	 to	 ensuring	 control	 so	 that	 the	 firm	 has	more	 confidence	 in	
resource	 reliability	with	which	 to	 plan	 future	 steps.	While	 resource	 access	 or	
acquisition	begins	to	satisfy	the	strategic	goals	to	rebuild	the	firm,	resource	self	
sufficiency	 remains	 a	 key	 building	 block	 until	 stability	 replaces	 volatility.	
Incremental	gains	in	resource	control	serve	to	reinforce	the	resource	viability	of	
a	strategic	choice	made	in	volatile	conditions,	forming	a	resilient	response	to	an	
otherwise	distressed	condition.		
Proposition	8:	Fluency,	imitate	majority,	imitate	successful,	1/N	equality,	
recognition	and	self-sufficiency	 form	a	portfolio	of	heuristics	matched	 to	
sensing,	seizing	and	transforming	that	 increase	the	 likelihood	of	resilient	
reintegration	 and	 an	 ability	 to	 pursue	 new	 opportunities	 post-strategic	
disorganization.			
Complex	Disorganizations	
Firms	may	 face	 several	 or	 all	 of	 the	 disorganizations	 listed	 in	Table	 10	 at	 the	
same	 time,	 called	 a	 complex	 disorganization.	 Here	 the	 firm	 is	 challenged	 to	
identify	and	deploy	heuristics	across	sensing,	seizing	and	transforming	for	each	
disorganization.	This	represents	a	more	elaborate	dynamic	resilience	capability	
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based	 on	 a	 portfolio	 of	 heuristics	 (Gigerenzer	 &	 Brighton,	 2009).	 Although	
more	 cognitively	 demanding,	 this	 still	 represents	 a	 manageable	 resilience	
response	 than	 to	 be	 overwhelmed	 by	 the	 disorganizations.	 This	 position	 is	
consistent	 with	 the	 finding	 that	 better	 resilience	 occurs	 when	 strategies	 are	
tailored	to	specific	disorganizations	(Masten,	2014).	The	development	of	such	a	
portfolio	 of	 heuristics	 matched	 to	 disorganizations	 and	 processes	 within	
dynamic	 capabilities	 builds	 resilient	 reintegration,	 thus	 enabling	 the	 firm	 to	
better	withstand	shocks	from	unpredictable,	chaotic	environments.	
2.8	DISCUSSION	
Building	 resilience	 is	 important	 when	 disequilibrium	 characterizes	 the	
landscape.	 How	 can	 organizations	 build	 resilience?	 The	 accumulated	
understanding	of	this	question	in	organization	science	is	marred	by	inadequate	
conceptual	 groundwork	 which	 fails	 to	make	 explicit	 all	 the	 key	 assumptions	
about	 the	 nature	 of	 resilience.	 The	 contribution	 here	 is	 to	 commence	 this	
necessary	 conceptual	 ground-work.	 A	 theoretical	 framework	 has	 here	 been	
offered	on	which	organizational	resilience	research	can	proceed	based	on	more	
robust	 conceptual	 foundations.	 Included	 is	 clarification	 of	 underlying	
assumptions	 about	 threats,	 disruptions	 to	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 firm,	
capabilities	for	resilience	building,	firms’	different	orientation	to	resilience	and	
also	unpacked	the	concept	of	resilience	into	two	dimensions:	homeostasis	and	
growth	(reintegration).	This	contribution	will	help	to	avoid	reifying	resilience,	
yielding	a	construct	of	restricted	application.		
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Theoretical	Implications	&	Future	Research	
This	multi-disciplinary	 excursion	 into	 resilience	 offers	 useful	 steering	 for	 the	
whole	 stream	 of	 inquiry	 in	 organization	 science.	 Organization	 science	 can	
particularly	benefit	from	a	positive	adaptation	orientation	in	developing	a	more	
robust	research	field.	This	not	only	will	help	to	screen	out	more	reification	and	
problematic	assumptions	about	resilience	but	will	also	retain	an	orientation	on	
benefiting	from	adverse	conditions,	rather	than	seeking	to	avoid	them.	
Variable-focused	studies	can	identify	risk	and	protective	factors	specific	
to	developmental	stages	of	organizations.	This	can	lead	to	indices	that	measure	
how	 ‘at-risk’	organizations	are	by	asssessing	 their	configuration	of	cumulative	
risk	factors.	A	similar	line	of	inquiry	could	do	the	same	for	a	 ‘resilience	index’	
by	 studying	 protective	 factors.	 What	 are	 the	 risk	 factors	 that	 increase	
vulnerability	and	the	protective	factors	that	increase	resilience	at	various	stages	
of	organization	development?	Empirical	designs	 that	 look	at	high-risk	groups	
but	that	are	able	to	identify	resilient	and	non-resilient	sub-groups	would	help	
to	identify	these	factors.	Process	studies	will	need	to	complement	this	focus	by	
looking	 at	 longitudinal	 patterns	 of	 risk	 and	 resilience	 across	 time	 and	
developmental	 stages.	 In	 a	 prescriptive	 sense,	 an	 important	 aim	 of	 such	
research	 would	 be	 to	 identify	 the	 risk-based,	 protective-factor-based	 and	
process-based	strategies	that	firms	can	adopt.			
Another	 contribution	 is	 to	 a	 dynamic	 capability	 perspective	 of	
organizational	resilience.	Table	10,	in	particular,	addresses	a	key	question:	how	
can	 heuristics	 guide	 processes	 of	 sensing,	 seizing	 and	 transforming	 before,	
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during	 and	after	 adversity?	Future	 research	 can	 investigate	 the	 links	between	
types	 of	 disorganization	 and	 particular	 heuristics	 for	 processes	 of	 sensing,	
seizing	 and	 transforming.	 More	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 test	 which	 array	 of	
heuristics	works	 best	 for	 each	 type	 of	 disorganization	 and	how	 these	 achieve	
resilient	 reintegration.	 Research	 is	 also	 needed	 to	 better	 understand	 how	 a	
portfolio	of	heuristics	works	for	complex	disorganizations.		
This	conceptualization	adds	a	dynamic	capability	perspective	to	debates	
about	whether	to	abandon	or	fight	on.	The	choice	for	severely	impacted	firms	
may	boil	down	to	a	choice	between	persistence	or	abandonment.	If	persistence	
is	 chosen,	 the	 dynamic	 capability	 view	 of	 organizational	 resilience	 embraces	
learning	 new	 integration	 skills	 to	 overcome	 the	 extant	 trauma	 and	 to	 reduce	
future	 vulnerability.	 It	 calls	 for	 survivors	 of	 the	 firm	 to	 sense,	 seize	 and	
transform	 threats	 and	 opportunities	 so	 as	 to	 configure	 resources	 and	
opportunity	 constellations,	 including	 new,	 hitherto	 unimagined,	 incarnations	
or	 identities	of	the	firm.	This	 is	a	resilient	reintegration	approach	to	adversity	
which	seeks	to	grow	and	transform	from	a	negative	experience.		
	 A	 key	 aim	 of	 future	 research	 can	 be	 to	 develop	 a	 resilience	 scale	 for	
organizations.	 This	 would	 allow	 for	 large-scale	 empirical	 testing	 and	
comparisons	 between	 firms.	 Both	 retrospective	 and	 prospective	 studies	 are	
feasible.	 If	 such	 relationships	 are	 indeed	 found	 then	 the	 scale	 could	 be	 used	
prospectively	to	predict	a	‘resilience’	index.	This	would	articulate	the	state	of	a	
firm’s	 resilience	 capability,	 leading	 to	 inferences	 of	 preparedness	 for	 future	
strategic,	operating	and	resource	disorganizations.		
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Implications	for	Practice	–	A	Managerial	Approach	
An	 important	 implication	 for	 practicing	 managers	 is	 that	 resilience	 is	 an	
approach	 to	 building	 capabilities	 in	 good	 times,	 with	 coherent	 strategy	 and	
sufficient	 resources,	 as	 well	 as	 bad,	 with	 strategic	 and	 resource	 failures.	
Managers	can	fall	 into	the	trap	of	being	singularly	focused	on	getting	on	with	
their	business	by	discovering,	creating	opportunities,	setting	goals	and	building	
a	 business	 around	 them.	However,	 such	 adaptive	 execution	may	 ignore	what	
could	go	wrong	for	firms	that	lack	experience	with	disorganization.	A	resilience	
perspective	requires	managers	to	be	bi-focal.	This	means	consciously	nurturing	
a	 capacity	 to	 function	 during	 disorganization.	 The	 heuristics-based	 dynamic	
capability	perspective	offers	useful	practical	guidance	for	resilient	reintegration,	
even	after	survival-threatening	traumas.		
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Preface	to	Chapter	3	
Introducing	heuristics	to	survive	firm	collapse		
The	overall	research	question	is:	how	can	 firms	build	 capabilities	 in	 resilience?	
The	previous	chapter	served	to	review	the	capabilities	literature	specifically	in	
relation	to	organizational	resilience	and	leading	into	the	use	of	heuristics	as	an	
effective	 activity	 selection	method	when	 resources	 are	 collapsed,	 unstable	 or	
uncertain	and	reliable	routines	cannot	be	maintained.	Now	the	rich	empirical	
case	 is	 presented,	 responding	 to	 the	 research	question	outlined	 in	Table	 2	 of	
Chapter	 1:	 what	 capabilities	 are	 required	 to	 survive	 collapse?	 This	 question	
relates	to	the	overall	thesis	research	question	(How	can	firms	build	capabilities	
in	resilience?)	because	it	serves	to	identify	the	capabilities	needed	for	resilience.	
The	 contribution	 is	 to	 propose	 a	 theoretical	 model	 of	 how	 heuristics-based	
dynamic	capabilities	are	used	for	navigating	through	collapse.	A	paper	based	on	
this	 chapter	 is	 now	 targeted	 for	 submission	 to	 the	 Academy	 of	Management	
Journal.	
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CHAPTER	3	|	HEURISTICS	TO	SURVIVE	FIRM	COLLAPSE		Toward	a	Resilience-based	View	of	the	Firm	
 
 
ABSTRACT	
	
	
Dynamic	 capabilities,	 the	 reconfiguring	 of	 routine	 actions	 as	 applied	 to	
available	 resources,	 enable	 firms	 to	manage	 strategic	 change.	 Such	 change	 is	
often	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 environmental	 velocity	 assuming	 functioning	
strategy	 and	 stable	 resources.	 In	 this	 chapter	 strategic	 change	 is	 examined	 in	
the	 context	 of	 how	 firms	 learn	 and	 make	 adjustments	 from	 a	 position	 of	
collapse.	 	 The	 study	 documents	 how	 a	 firm	 learnt	 to	 develop	 a	 dynamic	
resilience	capability	using	heuristics	 instead	of	 routines,	drawing	on	real	 time	
data	 across	 three	 cases	 of	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 re-building	 over	 a	 14-year	
period.	By	embracing	heuristics	and	adopting	a	resilience	orientation,	collapse	
became	less	a	threat	to	the	firm	and	more	of	an	opportunity	enabling	strategic	
change.	 A	 resilience-based	 view	 of	 the	 firm	 is	 developed	 whereby	 dynamic	
capabilities	with	heuristics	form	the	central	component	of	the	firm’s	ability	to	
regain	stability	after	adversity.		
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The	 collapse	 of	 firms	 --	 wherein	 collapse	 is	 defined	 as	 recognition	 by	 senior	
management	that	they	lack	resources	to	sustain	ongoing	operations	--	has	been	
well	 documented	 by	 scholars	 of	 strategy	 and	 organizations	 {eg.	 Cameron,	
Whetton	 &	 Kim,	 1987;	 Lamberg	 &	 Pajunen,	 2005;	 van	Witteloostuijn,	 1998).	
Firms	are	disrupted	and	dislocated	because,	inter	alia,	they	lack	key	customers,	
relevant	technologies	and	the	ability	to	respond	to	competitive	realities	and	in	
a	 manner	 that	 can	 disable	 standard	 operating	 procedures	 (Christensen	 &	
Bower,	1996;	Hambrick	&	D'Aveni,	1988;	Hambrick	&	D'Aventi,	1992;	Tushman	
&	 Romanelli,	 1994).	 Research	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	 market	 entry,	 for	
instance,	highlights	not	only	the	high	base	rates	of	failure	of	new	ventures	but	
documents	 their	 manifold	 vulnerabilities	 arising	 from	 their	 liabilities	 of	
newness	(Dunne,	Roberts,	&	Samuelson,	1988;	Geroski,	Mata,	&	Portugal,	2010;	
Stinchcombe,	 1965).	 	Other	studies	 focus	on	the	cycles	that	account	 for	 firms’	
demise	 (eg.	 Hambrick	 &	 D'Aveni,	 1988;	 Hambrick	 &	 D'Aventi,	 1992;	 Staw,	
Sanderlands,	&	Dutton,	1981;	Tushman	&	Romanelli,	1994).	
	 However,	even	early	stage	firms	can	rebound	from	collapse	(e.g.	Apple,	
JDS	 Uniphase	 and	 Zipcar).	 	 An	 emerging	 literature	 on	 organizational	 crisis,	
while	 largely	 anecdotal	 and	 conceptual,	 describes	 the	 potential	 for	 crisis	 to	
galvanize	 managerial	 attention	 and	 induce	 change	 that	 can	 reverse	 firms’	
fortunes	 or	 assure	 their	 demise	 (eg.	 Pearson	 &	 Clair,	 1998;	 Probst	 &	 Raisch,	
2005).	 	 Turnaround	 research	 describes	 and	 prescribes	 a	 two-step	 process	
wherein	retrenchment	of	operations	and	assets	is	followed	by	adoption	of	new	
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routines	and	processes	(Arogyaswamy,	Barker,	&	Yasai-Ardekani,	1995;	Robbins	
&	Pearce,	 1992).	 	Each	of	 these	perspectives	suggests	 that	managers	will	go	to	
great	lengths	to	thwart	the	failure	of	their	firms.	
	 Left	largely	unresolved	in	these	studies	is	how	and	whether	firms	invoke	
capabilities	 to	 elicit	 such	 turnaround	 in	 light	 of	 the	 emerging	 evidence	 that	
firms’	 dynamic	 capabilities	 are	 central	 to	 explaining	 firm	 adaptation	 when	
conditions	 are	 rapidly	 changing	 (Eisenhardt	 &	 Martin,	 2000;	 Peteraf,	 Di	
Stefano,	 &	 Verona,	 2013;	 Teece,	 Pisano,	 &	 Shuen,	 1997).	 This	 changes	 the	
boundary	 conditions	 for	 applying	 dynamic	 capabilities	 and	 consequently	 the	
usefulness	of	a	focus	on	sustained	competitive	advantage	when	the	firm’s	very	
survival	 is	 at	 stake.	 	 Dynamic	 capabilities	 are	 “the	 firm’s	 processes	 that	 use	
resources	–	 specifically	 the	processes	 to	 integrate,	 reconfigure,	gain	and	 release	
resources	 –	 to	 match	 and	 even	 create	 market	 change”	 (Eisenhardt	 &	 Martin,	
2000:	 1107).	 Dynamic	 capabilities	 are	 thus	 central	 to	 the	 management	 of	
collapse,	whether	routine	based	or	not,	since	they	requires	processes	to	salvage,	
release,	 recombine	 and	 gain	 resources	 that	 enable	 adaptation	 (Brown	 &	
Eisenhardt,	1998).			
	 Thus	 our	 research	 question	 is:	what	 capabilities	 are	 required	 to	 survive	
firm	collapse?		We	seek	to	address	this	question	for	early	stage	firms	(i.e.	those	
that	 have	 encountered	 collapse	 shortly	 after	 their	 inception)	 because	 these	
firms	are	 frequently	subject	 to	dramatic	and	dynamic	accretion	and	depletion	
of	resources	that	materially	impact	performance	(Baum	&	Oliver,	1996;	George,	
2005;	Stinchcombe,	 1965).	At	 these	 firms,	managers	are	 found	to	marshal	and	
deploy	 capabilities	 to	 thwart	 the	 failure	 of	 their	 firms	 in	 what	 has	 been	
		
	
96	
described	 as	 an	 escalation	of	 commitment	 to	 a	 losing	 action	 (Danneels,	 2012;	
Helfat	&	Peteraf,	2003;	Ross	&	Staw,	1993).	
	 To	tackle	this	research	question,	and	gain	greater	insight	into	how	firms	
can	 reconfigure	 capabilities	 to	 become	 more	 resilient,	 we	 undertook	 an	
exploratory,	 theory-building	 study	 of	 an	 early-stage	 firm	 that	 underwent	
successive	 episodes	 of	 collapse.	 We	 sought	 to	 integrate	 the	 richness	 of	
practitioner	 insights	 with	 the	 rigors	 of	 a	 methodical	 research	 design	 that	
considered	 a	 range	 of	 hypotheses,	 explanations	 and	 concepts	 for	 theory	
building	 through	 engaged	 scholarship	 (Van	 de	 Ven,	 2007;	 Van	 de	 Ven	 &	
Johnson,	 2006).	 	 	 	 In	 this	 process,	 researchers	 collected	 data	 points	 from	
surviving	 decision	 makers	 to	 better	 understand,	 explain	 and	 predict	 focal	
phenomena	 (Bartunek	&	Rynes,	 2014;	Gulati,	 2007;	 Tranfield	&	 Starkey,	 1998;	
Van	de	Ven	&	Johnson,	2006).	Theory-building	proceeded	across	three	distinct	
episodes	of	decline,	collapse	and	re-building	with	each	episode	representing	the	
firm’s	attempt	at	building	a	capability	to	withstand	failure	or	what	we	describe	
and	elaborate	upon	as	a	capability	for	resilience.	
	 From	this	 research,	we	sought	 to	gain	 insight	 into	 the	capabilities	 that	
early	stage	firms	adopt	in	the	process	of	recovering	from	resource	collapse,	with	
managers	in	our	focal	case	accepting	that	their	firms	were	vulnerable	but	that	
such	 vulnerability	 could	 be	 managed.	 	 Our	 findings	 corroborate	 emerging	
evidence	that	in	the	absence	of	stable	routines,	managers	reverted	to	heuristics	
that	 place	 cognitive	 boundaries	 around	 decision	 options	 without	 over-
prescribing	 behavioural	 steps	 (Bingham	 &	 Eisenhardt,	 2011;	 Bingham,	
Eisenhardt,	&	Furr,	2007;	Eisenhardt	&	Martin,	2000).			
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	 In	 particular,	 our	 principal	 contribution	 is	 to	 delineate	 and	 elaborate	
upon	 a	 particular	 sequence	 of	 heuristics	 that	 guide	 firms	 through	 capability	
dismantling	 and	 rebuilding,	 a	 sequence	 that	 involves	 three	 core	 kinds	 of	
heuristics,	 involving	 strategy	 (choices	 about	 the	 firm’s	 future),	 resources	
(choices	 about	 resources	 and	 assets	 required	 for	 this	 future)	 and	
communications	 (choices	 about	whether	 and	how	 to	 engage	 staff	 to	 embrace	
that	 future).	These	heuristics	were	shown	to	arise	at	 four	points	of	 transition,	
two	as	the	firm	is	collapsing	and	two	as	the	firm	is	rebounding.			
	 At	 the	beginning	of	decline,	 strategic	heuristics	centre	on	 identifying	a	
core	 set	 of	 assets	 that	need	 to	be	preserved	 to	 secure	 a	platform	 for	 survival,	
including	those	that	reduce	overhead	and	strip	the	firm	of	assets	that	materially	
deplete	 cash	 (‘resource	 heuristics’).	 Communication	 heuristics	 serve	 to	 warn	
workers	 of	 impending	 constraints	 and	 consequences,	 especially	 new	 ways	 to	
work.	 If,	 after	 decline,	 collapse	 ensues,	 then	 strategy,	 resource	 and	
communication	heuristics	are	targeted	at	strategic	alliances	with	resource-rich	
partners,	getting	tasks	done	through	the	spreading	of	residual	human	resources	
and	collaboratively	 sharing	 strategic	options	with	 surviving	 staff,	 respectively.	
The	 ability	 to	 change	 and	 shift	 heuristics	 avoids	 deepening	 crisis	 and	 allows	
managers	 greater	 scope	 to	 seize	 new	 opportunities	 for	 rebuilding	 a	 new	
strategic	future.	In	the	turnaround	phase,	we	discovered	that	strategy,	resource	
and	 communication	 heuristics	 attend	 to	 assembling	 resources	 for	 a	 new	
opportunity,	 learning	 new	 activity	 patterns	 and	 building	 new	 systems	 and	
testing	and	reinforcing	expected	activity	patterns	of	employees.	
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	 The	 chapter	 proceeds	 by	 reviewing	 insights	 from	 the	 literatures	 on	 a)	
organizational	decline	and	turnaround,	b)	dynamic	capabilities	and	adaptation	
and	 c)	 organizational	 heuristics.	 	We	 then	 turn	 to	 the	 research	methodology	
deployed.		
3.2	THEORY	AND	EVIDENCE	ON	THE	ROLE	OF	CAPABILITIES	IN	
FIRM	COLLAPSE		
Literature	on	Organizational	Decline	and	Turnaround		Weitzel	&	Jonsson	
(1989)	synthesized	the	literature	on	organizational	decline	by	suggesting	that	it	
ensues	across	five	managerial	stages	--	blindness,	 inaction,	faulty	action,	crisis	
and	dissolution.	Some	organizations	decline	through	bad	luck,	but	managerial	
error	 also	 causes	 and	 exacerbates	 decline	 because	 it	 involves,	 say,	 poor	
surveillance	 of	 competitors	 and	 market	 conditions	 and	 escalation	 of	
commitment	to	losing	action	(Bateman	&	Zeithaml,	1989;	Cameron,	Whetten,	&	
Kim,	1987;	Chowdhury	&	Lang,	1996;	Levinthal	&	March,	1993;	Staw	et	al.,	1981).			
	 Whatever	the	cause,	the	result	is	that	the	declining	firm	lacks	cash	and	
operates	 with	 depleted	 capabilities,	 ultimately	 culminating	 in	 what	 we	 have	
defined	 earlier	 as	 ‘collapse’.	 Strategic	 collapse	 refers	 to	 an	 inability	 to	
implement	 strategy,	 often	 resulting	 in	 strategic	 dissension	 and	 incoherence	
(Lamberg	&	Pajunen,	 2005;	 Sheppard	&	Chowdhury,	 2005).	Resource	 collapse	
occurs	 when	 key	 assets	 become	 either	 unavailable	 or	 inaccessible,	 thereby	
disabling	operating	functions	and	systems	(Cameron	et	al.,	1987).	
	 Evidence	 on	 organizational	 turnarounds	 indicates	 that	 firm	 decline	 is	
reversible,	 particularly	 when	 remedies	 follow	 accurate	 diagnosis	 of	 causes	
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(Barker	 &	 Duhaime,	 1997).	 	 Couched	 within	 the	 strategic	 choice	 paradigm	
(Child,	 1972),	 this	approach	views	managers	as	pro-active	agents	able	 to	 steer	
their	 organizations	 towards	 better	 adaptation,	 even	 in	 deeply	 adverse	
conditions.	 	 According	 to	 Chowdhury	 (2002),	 turnaround	 occurs	 when	
managers	 end	 the	 threat	 of	 firm	 failure	 with	 a	 combination	 of	 strategies,	
systems,	 skills,	 and	 capabilities.	But	 turnaround	attempts	 can	be	 thwarted	by	
resource	 constraints	 and	 re-alignment	 of	 stakeholders	 (Filatotchev	 &	 Toms,	
2006).	 Robbins	 &	 Pearce	 (1992)	 proposed	 a	 two-stage	 retrenchment-recovery	
model,	 where	 turnaround	 is	 enabled	 via	 a	 first	 stage	 of	 retrenchment	 or	
deliberately	 reducing	 resources	 through	 staff	 downsizing,	 asset	 sales	 and	 so	
forth.	 	 	Recovery	 is	 a	process	of	 renewing	 the	 firm’s	 strategic	orientation	and	
market	positioning	together	with	revisiting	opportunities	and	projects	(Barker	
&	 Duhaime,	 1997).	 	 Overall,	 retrenchment	 approaches	 tend	 to	 halt	 resource	
collapse	while	recovery	redresses	strategic	collapse.		
	 Largely	left	unresolved	in	this	literature,	however,	is	the	question	of	how	
capabilities	are	transformed	(or	not)	and	the	links	between	such	transition	and	
firm	 performance,	 a	 material	 gap	 in	 light	 of	 managerial	 needs	 to	 invoke	
capabilities	to	thwart	collapse.	Some	research	considers	capability	as	operating	
according	to	a	hierarchy	comprising	a)	a	base	level	of	capabilities	for	acquiring	
resources	and	funding	operations,	b)	first	order	capabilities	that	configure	these	
resources	 to	 enable	 competitive	 advantage	 in	 product-markets	 and	 c)	 second	
order	capabilities,	including	the	ability	to	manage	capabilities,	that	respond	to	
exogenous	 and	 endogenous	 change	 (Danneels,	 2012;	 McGuinness	 &	 Morgan,	
2000;	Zahra,	Sapienza,	&	Davidsson,	2006).		
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Dynamic	 Capabilities	 and	 Strategic	 Change	 	 Dynamic	 capabilities	 are	
processes	 for	 re-configuring	 both	 resource	 combinations	 and	 the	 associated	
activity	routines	(Eisenhardt	&	Martin,	2000;	Teece	et	al.,	1997)	with	a	view	to	
creating	and	capturing	new	opportunities.		But	reconfiguring	the	firm	to	create	
and	capture	new	opportunities	in	changing	markets	assumes	the	availability	of	
sufficient	resources	that	can	assemble	and	deploy	the	capabilities.	For	example,	
in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 disruptive	 threat	 to	 its	 typewriter	 business,	 Smith	 Corona’s	
attempts	 to	 reconfigure	 itself	 to	 compete	 in	 computers	 required	 sufficient	
resources	to	acquire	and	assemble	components	(Danneels,	2010).		
	 During	the	decline	phase,	 firms	must	 first	develop	processes	to	salvage	
core	strategic	assets	while	releasing	high	maintenance	resources	–	a	process	we	
call	 purposeful	 dismantling.	 Then,	 the	 firm	 invokes	 processes	 for	 the	
acquisition	and	recombination	of	new	resources	targeted	at	fresh	opportunities	
–	a	process	we	call	 re-building.	Existing	case	study	research	has	shed	 light	on	
how	firms	leverage,	create,	access	and	release	resources	as	a	dynamic	capability	
in	 the	 face	 of	 serious	 environmental	 threats	 which	 involve	 organizational	
decline	((Danneels,	2010).		By	collecting	data	in	real	time,	we	were	also	able	to	
directly	witness	 the	challenges	and	opportunities	managers	 faced,	providing	a	
fresh	perspective	on	the	operation	of	dynamic	capabilities	during	collapse.	
	 To	 accomplish	 theory-building	 from	 a	 real	 time	 perspective	 involves	
search	for	the	content	of	the	dynamic	capability	(what	is	being	done)	but	also	
the	cognitive	and	behavioral	constraints	decision	makers	face	in	the	situation.	
When	resources	have	largely	dissipated	and	the	firm	is	in	disarray,	managers	in	
our	 study	 sought	 cognitive	 guidelines	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 preserved	 some	
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flexibility	 in	 the	 range	 of	 activities	 pursued.	 Recent	 work	 in	 heuristics-based	
dynamic	capabilities	has	highlighted	such	activities	as	core	to	strategic	action,	
particularly	 among	 firms	 that	 face	 dynamic	 change	 (Bingham	 &	 Eisenhardt,	
2011).		
Heuristics	and	Organizational	Adaptation	Eisenhardt	&	Martin	(2000:	1106)	
proposed	 that	 “effective	 patterns	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities	 vary	 with	 market	
dynamism”	 such	 that	 relatively	 stable	 businesses	 invoke	 routine	 processes	
(Teece	 et	 al.,	 1997).	 The	 cognitive	 and	 behavioral	 regularity	 of	 these	 routines	
means	 that	 they	 can	 be	 invoked	 somewhat	 automatically	 thus	 conferring	
efficiency	 gains	 by	 avoiding	 time-consuming	 analytic	 deliberation	 (Cohen	 &	
Bacdayan,	 1994;	Helfat	&	Peteraf,	2003).	 In	contrast,	 in	high	velocity	markets,	
Eisenhardt	 &	 Martin	 (2000)	 contend	 that	 dynamic	 capabilities	 are	 not	
“complicated,	 detailed,	 analytic	 processes”	 but	 rather	 “simple,	 experiential,	
unstable	 processes”	 that	 are	 amenable	 to	 heuristics	 or	 routine,	 satisfactory	
choices	or	 ‘simple	rules’	revolving	around	common	judgment	calls	required	to	
accomplish	goals	 (Newell	&	Simon,	 1972).	Heuristics	can	be	sufficiently	broad	
as	to	enable	behavioral	flexibility	alongside	cognitive	constraint.		
	 When	 managers	 recognize	 that	 their	 firm	 is	 collapsing,	 they	 face	
material	 stakeholder	 pressures	 to	 foresake	 business	 as	 usual.	 Employees	 are	
concerned	about	losing	their	jobs	and	become	more	vocal	about	where	the	firm	
is	going	wrong	and	what	action	needs	 to	be	undertaken.	Equity	 investors	can	
attempt	to	seize	strategic	control	and	force	certain	future	directions.	In	the	face	
of	 these	 contrary	pressures,	managers	 are	 found	 in	more	 stable	operations	 to	
remain	steadfast	and	resolute	in	sustaining	existing	commitments	(Staw,	1975).	
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By	 contrast	 in	 dynamic	 environments,	 attendant	 learning	 can	 coalesce	 into	
heuristics,	allowing	focus	on	key	priorities	during	collapse	and	opportunities	to	
rebound.	 These	 cognitive	 guides	 may	 prove	 consistently	 reliable	 across	
episodes	 of	 collapse	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 permit	 behavioral	 variety	 in	 their	
enactment,	 thus	helping	 the	 firm	 to	 remain	dynamic	 in	 the	 face	of	 flux.	This	
presents	 a	 (perceived	 positive)	 counter-point	 to	 the	 (perceived	 negative)	
escalation	of	commitment	perspective.		
	 The	heuristics	 perspective	 as	 applied	 to	 strategic	management	 informs	
what	is	learnt	from	process	experience	(Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	2011;	Gigerenzer	
&	Brighton,	2009).	Bingham	&	Eisenhardt	(2011)	show	that	firms	learn	heuristics	
in	a	developmental	order	progressing	from	opportunity	choices,	how	to	capture	
them,	when	to	capture	and	the	ordering	of	their	exploitation.	In	this	view,	firms	
develop	 over	 time	 a	 strategic	 portfolio	 of	 heuristics	 that	 embody	 the	 firm’s	
dynamic	capabilities.		
	 Guided	 by	 this	 evidence,	 and	 cognizant	 of	 its	 manifestations	 at	 our	
research	 site,	we	have	been	particularly	 attentive	 to	 the	 real	 time	managerial	
heuristics	that	were	used	to	help	manage	collapse.					
3.3	METHOD	AND	ANALYSIS	
Engaged	 Scholarship	 Theory-building	 here	 reflected	 the	 limited	 real	 time	
attention	 that	 has	 been	 paid	 to	 the	 operation	 and	 fate	 of	 capabilities	 in	 the	
process	of	organizational	decline,	collapse	and	re-building	(see	Danneels,	2010	
for	 an	 exception).	 Theory-building	 objectives	 revolved	 around	 engaged	
scholarship	defined	as	 “a	collaborative	 form	of	 inquiry	 in	which	academics	and	
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practitioners	leverage	their	different	perspectives	and	competencies	to	coproduce	
knowledge	about	a	complex	problem	or	phenomenon	that	exists	under	conditions	
of	uncertainty	found	in	the	world”	(Boyer,	1990;	Van	de	Ven,	2007;	Van	de	Ven	&	
Johnson,	 2006:	 803).	 In	 this	 approach,	 robust	 theory	 emerges	 through	 a	
dialectical	process	of	 synthesizing	academic	and	practitioner	perspectives	and	
ways	of	knowing.		
	 Engaged	 scholarship	 involved	 an	 attempt	 to	 generate	 insight	 through	
the	 rigor	 and	 relevance	 available	 when	 researchers	 co-build	 theory	 with	
practitioners	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 usual	 arms-length	 detachment	 between	
researchers	 and	 the	 managers	 who	 they	 study	 (Coghlan	 &	 Brannick,	 2010;	
Shani,	 Coghlan,	 &	 Cirella,	 2012;	 Van	 de	 Ven,	 2007).	 Collaborative	 research	
adopts	ontologies,	epistemologies	and	methods	that	are	distinct	from	positivist	
science	(Shani	&	Coghlan,	2014).		
	 Synthesis	 is	 achieved	 through	 a	 strategy	 of	 arbitrage	 –	 “a	 strategy	 for	
exploiting	 differences	 in	 the	 kinds	 of	 knowledge	 scholars	 and	 practitioners	 can	
contribute	on	a	problem	of	 interest”	 (Van	de	Ven	&	 Johnson,	2006:	803).	 	The	
knowledge-in-practice	of	the	practitioner	offers	real	time	context-specific	tests	
of	rival	hypotheses	while	the	more	detached	academic	converts	knowledge-in-
practice	 into	 rigorous,	 more	 generalizable	 theory.	 Therefore,	 engaged	
scholarship	 is	 a	 means	 for	 synthesizing	 complementary	 and	 pluralistic	
perspectives	towards	the	aims	of	rigor	and	real	time	relevance.		
	 Van	 de	 Ven	 &	 Johnson	 (2006)	 recommend	 practices	 to	 leverage	
knowledge	co-production	between	researchers	and	practitioners.	First,	engaged	
scholarship	is	best	suited	to	‘big’	research	questions	that	are	grounded	in	reality	
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and	whose	 complexity	 demands	multiple	 perspectives.	We	have	done	 this	 by	
focusing	 on	 phenomena	 relating	 to	 the	 vulnerabilities	 of	 firms	 endemic	 to	
Schumpeterian	 competition	 –	 adversity,	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 ensuing	
opportunity	–	that	form	complex	experiences	that	can	be	disentangled	into	data	
points.		
	 Second,	 given	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 research	 question,	 the	 research	
project	should	be	designed	as	a	collaborative	learning	community	of	academics	
and	 practitioners.	 Our	 research	 process	 principally	 involved	 extensive	 and	
regular	 interaction	 (at	 least	 once	 a	month)	 between	 two	 academics	 and	 two	
reflective	 practitioners	 over	 9	 years,	 but	 we	 also	 from	 time	 to	 time	 engaged	
other	academics	and	practitioners	to	freshen	and	sharpen	inferences.		
	 Third,	 the	 study	should	be	designed	 for	an	extended	duration	 to	allow	
for	 more	 on-site	 observation,	 reflection,	 assimilation	 and	 yet	 more	 data	
gathering.	 Our	 research	 design	 involved	 real	 time	 data	 collection,	 field	
observation	and	theory-building	that	reflected	the	stages	of	collapse	of	the	focal	
research	site.		
	 Fourth,	these	authors	recommend	multiple	models	that	offer	competing	
plausible	 explanations	 of	 the	 phenomenon.	As	 collapse	 occurred	we	 revisited	
relevant	 literatures	 (organizational	 decline,	 punctuated	 equilibrium,	
organizational	 turnaround,	 bricolage,	 improvisation,	 capabilities)	 for	 insights,	
but	 found	 theory	 to	 be	 insufficiently	 granular	 to	 inform	 how	 specific	
capabilities	are	deployed	in	real	time	during	collapse.	By	contrast	the	heuristics	
approach	 to	 dynamic	 capabilities	 was	 informative	 and	 instructive	 of	 the	
empirical	patterns	we	were	observing	(Eisenhardt	&	Martin,	2000;	Teece	et	al.,	
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1997),	 providing	 a	 unifying	 context	 for	 previously	 identified	 conceptual	
ambiguities	(Peteraf	et	al.,	2013).		
	 In	particular,	we	studied	one	firm	across	a	data	period	spanning	14	years	
where	our	 theoretical	 sample	yielded	 three	episodes	of	a	 sequence	of	decline,	
collapse	 and	 re-building	 across	 this	 period.	 These	 three	 episodes	 offered	 the	
opportunity	to	trace	what	surviving	members	learnt	from	managing	collapse	in	
each	 experience	 and	 see	 how	 their	 capabilities	 for	 doing	 so	 developed	 across	
the	three	episodes.		
Sample	 and	 Data	 Collection	Our	 focal	 firm	 is	 called	 ActiveSky,	 a	 wireless	
technology	 company	 that	was	 established	 in	 1999.	Company	 details	 follow	 in	
the	 next	 section.	 Rather	 than	 sample	 on	 success	 as	 a	 dependent	 variable,	we	
selected	 a	 company	 that	 encountered	 a	 series	 of	 severe	 adverse	 shocks	 and	
faulty	attempts	at	recovery.	 	One	of	the	lead	investigators	for	this	study	was	a	
senior	 executive	 at	 the	 firm	allowing	 for	 first	hand	observation	and	extensive	
note-taking	via	unrestrained	access	to	company	data	and	its	principal	decision-
makers.	
	 Data	was	 also	 systematically	 collected	 from	other	 sources.	 Researchers	
had	 frequent	 and	 regular	 interviews	 with	 other	 surviving	 and	 departed	
executives	 throughout	 the	 nine	 year	 period.	 We	 also	 accessed	 analysis	 of	
company	documents	such	as	capital	raising	prospectus	as	well	as	the	personal	
diaries	of	surviving	members	that	recorded	events	and	personal	interpretations.	
While	 an	 array	 of	 company	 executives	 engaged	 in	 capability	 development	
efforts	 from	 inception,	 three	 key	 executives	 oversaw	 the	 rebound	 attempts	
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through	 the	 three	 decline-collapse-rebuilding	 sequences	 to	 date.	 Overall,	 24	
informants	contributed	information	for	our	analyses.	
	 At	 critical	 times,	 usually	 in	 a	 re-building	 phase,	 we	 held	 ‘arbitrage	
sessions’	of	reflection	with	two	main	practitioners.	Several	objectives	grounded	
the	theory-building	aims	of	these	sessions.	First,	we	sought	to	gain	the	various	
interpretations	 and	 reflections	 of	 survivors	 regarding	 what	 happened	 during	
decline,	 collapse	 and	 re-building.	 Practitioners	 had	 emotional,	 even	 visceral,	
reactions	to	these	experiences,	motivating	them	to	want	to	make	sense	of	their	
experience	(Bingham	&	Haleblian,	2012)	and	tended	to	be	receptive	to	literature	
that	could	inform	their	circumstances,	especially	regarding	decline,	turnaround	
and	 dynamic	 capabilities.	 	 Often	 practitioners	 told	 us	 that	 insights	 about	
routine-based	 dynamic	 capabilities	 did	 not	 resonate	 with	 their	 intuition	 and	
reflection,	 providing	 opportunities	 for	 researchers	 to	 search	 further	 for	
explanations.	We	approached	 such	 feedback	as	 a	 theory-building	opportunity	
and	explored	these	anomalies	further.			
Data	Analysis	Our	interest	lay	in	how	surviving	members	built	a	capability	for	
managing	 collapse	 over	 time	 and	 to	what	 effect.	 As	 each	 episode	 of	 collapse	
ensued	 the	 research	 team	 compiled	 a	 table	 with	 the	 following	 columns:		
1)	description	of	the	threat	or	growth	event,	2)	the	response	to	such	an	event,		
3)	the	consequent	interpretations	of	the	event	by	firm	members,	4)	behavioural	
strategies	 (learning)	 for	 survival,	 5)	 theoretical	 implications	 of	 the	 event	 and	
subsequent	 learning.	We	 adopted	 this	 same	 table	 structure	 across	 the	 three	
episodes	of	collapse	enabling	comparison.	Across	the	episodes	and	as	learning	
occurred,	 what	 changed	 significantly	 were	 the	 cognitive	 interpretations	 and	
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behavioural	 strategies	 of	 practitioners.	 These	 changes	 occurred	 as	 a	 result	 of	
both	academic	interrogation	and	engagement	with	literature	but	also	trial	and	
error	 experimentation	 with	 new	 behavioural	 strategies	 sparked	 by	 new	
theoretical	 insights.	Here,	 rigor,	 relevance	and	 reflexivity	were	 combined	 in	a	
systematic	process.		
	 The	cumulative	 result	of	enacting	 this	process	across	 three	episodes	of	
collapse	 was	 the	 recording	 of	 how	 the	 firm	 learnt	 to	 develop	 a	 dynamic	
capability	 to	 manage	 collapse.	 We	 captured	 the	 dynamic	 capability	
development	process.	During	each	episode	of	collapse,	various	literatures	were	
studied	 in	 order	 to	 deepen	 understanding	 of	 causes	 and	 possible	 remedial	
actions.	This	process	resulted	in	a	theoretical	model	of	how	to	manage	collapse.	
However,	 the	 theoretical	 models	 became	 progressively	 richer	 in	 that	
subsequent	 models	 emerged	 from	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 previous	 models.	 So,	
after	the	first	episode	of	collapse,	articulating	the	five	columns	above	served	to	
produce	 a	 theoretical	 model	 which	 was	 subjected	 to	 wider	 academic	
interrogation	as	well	as	practical	trial	and	error	application.		
	 As	the	second	episode	(case)	of	collapse	ensued	we	again	recorded	what	
occurred.	 This	 time,	 managerial	 action	 was	 guided	 by	 the	 theoretical	 model	
developed	 from	 the	 first	 episode	 (case).	 Here,	 the	managers	 could	 employ	 a	
real-time	 test	 of	 the	 theoretical	 model	 developed	 to	 help	 manage	 collapse.	
However,	 during	 this	 episode,	 shortcomings	 in	 the	 theoretical	 model	 were	
noted	 both	 practically	 and	 academically.	 Academically,	 the	 theoretical	model	
was	criticized	for	failing	to	sufficiently	distinguish	the	prescribed	actions	from	
dynamic	capabilities.	This	then	led	to	a	revised	view	of	what	the	firm	was	trying	
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to	 do.	We	 came	 to	 view	 the	 situation	 as	 one	 of	 the	 firm	 learning	 to	 build	 a	
dynamic	 capability	 for	 managing	 collapse.	 This	 then	 sparked	 an	 intense	
engagement	with	dynamic	capabilities	literature.	
	 A	 third	 episode	 (case)	 of	 collapse	 ensued.	 However,	 during	 this	
experience	the	research	team	of	academics	and	practitioners	were	conscious	of	
developing	 and	 applying	 a	 dynamic	 capability-based	 model	 to	 better	 handle	
collapse	and	enable	better	strategic	recovery.	Decision-makers	sought	to	 limit	
resource	loss	but	also	purposefully	dismantle	capabilities	in	a	way	that	steered	
the	 firm	 towards	 new	 strategic	 opportunities.	 It	 was	 at	 this	 time	 that	 the	
heuristics	 literature	 (Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	2011;	Bingham	et	al.,	2007;	Davis,	
Eisenhardt,	 &	 Bingham,	 2009)	 within	 the	 dynamic	 capabilities	 conversation	
became	 apparent	 and	matched	what	 the	 firm’s	 survivors	 had	 learnt	 to	 better	
managing	collapse.	The	cumulative	experience	in	managing	collapse	combined	
with	the	literature	arbitrage	led	to	the	model	presented	in	this	chapter.		
	 The	 timeline	 for	 our	 case	 study	 is	 shown	 in	 Figure	 1,	 depicting	 the	
strength	 of	 organizational	 capability	 over	 time.	 Further,	 it	 signals	 the	 firm’s	
development	 of	 a	 dynamic	 capability	 for	 managing	 collapse	 and	 building	
resilience.	 Theoretically,	 the	 process	 of	 arbitrage	 saw	 evaluation	 of	 many	
alternative	 concepts	 as	 ways	 of	 framing	 the	 management	 of	 collapse.	 These	
included	routines,	bricolage,	ad	hoc	problem	solving	and	improvisation	(Baker	
&	 Nelson,	 2005;	 Winter,	 2003).	 Arbitrage	 between	 the	 academic	 and	
practitioner	 members	 of	 the	 research	 team	 found	 all	 somewhat,	 but	
insufficiently,	 helpful.	 Heuristics-based	 dynamic	 capabilities	 emerged	 as	 the	
perspective	to	yield	real-time	utility.	
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Figure	1:	Timeline	of	ActiveSky	in	terms	of	its	organizational	capabilities	showing	key	inflection	points	(as	large	dots)	
with	descriptive	boxed	text	with	three	successive	cycles	of	decline,	collapse	and	rebuilding	from	inception	to	the	present.	
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	 Collectively,	 in	 our	 experience	 of	 engaged	 scholarship	 across	 the	 nine	
year	 data	 collection	 and	 analysis	 period,	 we	 found	 that	 this	 iterative	 process	
between	 theory-testing	 and	 theory-building,	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 practitioners	
and	the	objectivity	of	academics,	yielded	the	richest	insights	and	most	meaning	
to	the	parties.	In	the	next	section	we	narrate	our	three	cases.	The	aim	is	to	show	
how	 a	 capability	 for	 managing	 collapse	 emerged	 over	 time	 from	 successive	
learning	experiences	resulting	from	collapse.	
3.4	CASE	EPISODES	OF	CAPABILITY	COLLAPSE	AND	REBUILDING	
ActiveSky	 is	 a	 wireless	 publishing	 and	 distribution	 technology	 company,	
founded	in	1999	with	offices	in	Australia,	Japan	and	the	US	established	shortly	
thereafter.	While	separate	legal	entities	were	created	in	each	of	these	markets,	
they	 are	 referred	 to	 collectively	 as	 ActiveSky.	 Development	 work	 was	
undertaken	by	the	technology	founder	to	prove	the	concept	of	wireless	service	
delivery	and	from	these	working	prototypes,	funding	sources	were	courted.	The	
company	was	 established	with	 angel	 investment	 funds	 injected	 specifically	 to	
attract	major	 venture	 capital	 to	 build	 and	 deploy	 the	 technology,	 which	was	
secured	conditional	on	control	of	strategy,	technology	and	assets	being	vested	
in	the	US	entity.		
	 Consequently,	once	these	major	funds	were	received	(US$22	million)	in	
2000,	the	US	headquarters	became	responsible	for	corporate	strategy,	while	the	
Australian	 subsidiary	 undertook	 core	 technology	 development	 in	 two	 offices	
and	the	Japanese	subsidiary	delivered	local	sales	&	development	in	that	market.	
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At	 its	 peak,	 ActiveSky	 employed	 76	 people	 across	 the	 four	 offices	 spanning	
these	three	countries.		
Case	1:	1999-2005	
Early	Stage	Growth	(1999	–	2003)	The	ActiveSky	platform	began	to	deliver	an	
interactive,	flexible	and	fully	reconfigurable	user	interface	on	mobile	devices,	in	
an	 era	 well	 before	 the	 current	 smartphone	 and	 tablet	 dominance.	 ActiveSky	
sought	 to	emulate	a	successful,	 fully	 resourced,	 substantial	 technology	player,	
shaped	 in	 part	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 position	 the	 firm	 as	 a	 global	 provider	 in	 an	
aggressive	and	volatile	market.	
	 By	mid-2000,	 the	 Board	 had	 settled	 on	 a	 strategy	 to	 deliver	 streaming	
video	to	wireless	devices.	This	was	difficult	to	achieve	at	the	time,	on	handsets	
limited	to	less	than	five	million	instructions	per	second	(<	5	MIPS)	processing	
speed	(compared	to	smartphones	today	routinely	achieving	in	excess	of	10,000	
MIPS).	 The	 video-to-wireless	 strategy	 required	 all	 the	 software	 development	
resources	 of	 the	 growing	 firm	 as	 it	 led	 the	 field	 of	 competitors	 in	 this	
apparently	emerging	market.	This	market	was	largely	unproven	representing	a	
key	 outstanding	 question:	 would	 users	 pay	 for	 wireless	 video	 sufficient	 to	
ensure	a	compelling	business	model?	
	 There	 existed	 a	 keen	 urgency	 to	 build	 technology	 development	
capabilities	to	harness	the	acute	sector	interest	in	the	platform	and	to	establish	
recurrent	 revenues.	 The	 company	 achieved	 a	 stable	 video-to-wireless	
development	 capability	 when	 experienced	 project	 managers	 were	 employed	
late	in	2000	and	clusters	of	routines	were	built.	As	the	platform	developed,	the	
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firm	 undertook	 trials	 of	 prototype	 services	with	 telecommunications	 carriers,	
handset	 manufacturers	 and	 content	 providers	 in	 many	 countries,	 extending	
their	alliance	network.		
	 It	became	apparent	that	 the	video-to-wireless	strategy,	while	attracting	
significant	 interest	 from	 some	 prospective	 customers	 and	 erstwhile	
competitors,	 did	 not	 provide	 a	 viable	 revenue	 stream.	 This	 lack	 of	 quick	
strategic	success	led	to	a	new	strategy	of	real	time	wireless	services,	focusing	on	
the	sports	information	market.		
	 Early	commercial	deals	were	secured	with	major	brands	in	US	and	Japan	
and	development	resources	were	re-configured	to	accommodate	the	new	focus.	
The	deployment	of	wireless	 sports	 products	 in	mid-2002	 (US)	 and	 early	 2003	
(Japan),	along	with	keen	interest	from	the	UK	and	German	markets	helped	seed	
the	firm’s	global	presence.	These	deals	resulted	in	a	regular	revenue	stream	for	
the	firm,	albeit	well	below	ongoing	operating	costs.		
Decline	 1	 (2003	 –	 2004)	 ActiveSky	 made	 a	 “write	 once,	 deploy	 anywhere”	
promise,	meaning	 that	only	a	 single	application	was	 required	 that	could	 then	
be	deployed	to	any	wireless	device	running	any	mobile	operating	system.	This	
outcome	 proved	 expensive	 to	 realize	 as	 many	 mobile	 devices	 at	 that	 stage	
didn’t	perform	to	their	published	specifications,	so	the	firm	bore	cost	overruns	
arising	from	technical	hurdles	to	meet	this	customer	promise.		
	 Consequently,	 ActiveSky	 steadily	 lost	 credibility	 with	 their	 alliance	
partners	 (but	not	with	 end	users)	 as	 it	 promoted	an	 easy	deployment	 regime	
that	 it	 actually	 lacked.	 The	 firm	 could	 not	 leverage	 existing	 license	 deals	 to	
generate	 new	 revenues.	 In	 addition,	 the	 wireless	 market	 remained	 highly	
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volatile	 in	 terms	 of	 customers’	 aspirations	 and	 willingness	 to	 pay.	 	 Overall,	
then,	 the	 firm	 navigated	 an	 uncertain	 climate	 and	 unclear	 or	 unknowable	
pathways	 for	 profitable	 resource	 configuration.	 The	 uncertainty	 of	 success	
drove	the	firm	to	begin	shedding	resources	to	improve	operating	efficiency	and	
retain	 cash,	 but	 strategy	 did	 not	 alter	 since	 the	 Board	 remained	 convinced	
about	the	high	underlying	value	of	the	technology.	
	 As	 capability	 gaps	 widened,	 services	 became	 less	 stable,	 subject	 to	
interruption	 and	 degradation	 from	 exogenous	 events.	 Soon,	 the	 firm	 was	
unable	 to	 mount	 service	 extensions	 or	 replacements	 as	 it	 could	 no	 longer	
reliably	 develop	 and	 deploy	 them.	 Consequently,	 revenue	 attrition	 followed,	
leading	to	a	spiraling	exodus	of	skilled	staff	and	further	setbacks	to	technology	
development.	 Even	 though	 expenses	 had	 dropped	 significantly,	 monthly	
revenues	remained	far	below	the	cash	burn	rate,	such	that	senior	managers	and	
the	Board	accepted	 that	ongoing	operations	were	untenable.	Late	 in	2003	 the	
Board	packaged	the	platform	for	sale	to	an	established	player	but	was	unable	to	
secure	 a	 suitable	 sale	 agreement.	 Lacking	 new	 strategic	 paths,	 the	 Board	 lost	
investor	support	and	faced	the	loss	of	all	assets,	including	staff	and	the	ability	
to	glean	value	from	the	firm’s	intellectual	property.		
Collapse	1	(late	2004)	Faced	with	the	collapse	of	the	firm,	the	Board	accepted	a	
last	resort	management	buy-out	wherein	the	surviving	team	assumed	control	of	
future	strategy,	including	turnaround	options	and	management	of	capabilities.		
Creating	 New	 Opportunities	 1	 (2005)	 This	 team	 maintained	 the	 sports	
information	services	with	declining	net	revenues	as	well	as	securing	new	sports	
services	 delivery	 into	 Asia.	 	 It	 was	 able	 to	 attract	 some	 professional	 services	
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work	using	 their	wireless	 technology	 skills,	 although	 such	work	brought	only	
relatively	 short	 periods	 of	 income	 with	 limited	 or	 no	 upside	 potential.	 It	
maintained	 as	 much	 as	 it	 could	 of	 the	 surviving	 resource	 base,	 only	
relinquishing	 resources	 through	unforced	 exodus	 (staff	 left,	 computers	 failed,	
licences	 could	not	be	 renewed).	 Since	 the	 strategic	 focus	 lay	 in	 recovering	 to	
former	levels	of	operating	stability,	there	were	no	attempts	to	jettison	staff,	sell	
assets	or	curb	deployed	applications	(which	were	expensive	to	maintain).	
	 At	 this	 time,	 an	 established	 mobile	 marketing	 company	 seeking	 to	
expand	the	clear	platform	limitations	of	its	messaging	platform	sought	a	merger	
with	 ActiveSky	 in	 order	 to	 share	 strengths	 (their	 customer	 base,	 with	
ActiveSky’s	 technology)	 to	 expand	 service	 delivery.	Now,	 the	 survivors	 learnt	
new	 skills	 in	 developing	 the	 business	 opportunity	 and	 negotiating	 strategic	
alignments	that	could	assure	incomes	at	least	for	the	mid-term.		
	 The	mobile	marketing	company	was	 financed	by	a	 single	 sophisticated	
investor	with	deep	media	interests,	seeking	to	grow	revenues	beyond	the	then	
popular	messaging	platform.	By	late	2005,	survivors	hoped	that	ActiveSky	was	
on	the	cusp	of	securing	growth	in	a	completely	unexpected	domain.	
Case	 1	 Capability	 Development:	 What	 was	 learnt	 from	 the	 experience	
Critical	 experiences	 catalyzed	 learning	 and	 became	 a	 foundation	 for	 the	
building	of	a	capability	to	manage	collapse	and	revolved	around:	1)	switching	to	
low	 resource	 consumption	 service	 delivery,	 2)	 judging	 resources	 in	 terms	 of	
their	 sustainability	 rather	 than	 immediate	operational	 value,	 and	3)	 assuming	
strategic	control	of	decision-making	within	the	surviving	team.		
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	 The	 events	 that	 prompted	 this	 “experiential	 learning	 under	 ambiguity”	
conditions	 (March	&	Olsen,	 1975:	 160)	along	with	 the	 theoretical	 implications	
are	captured	in	Table	1a.	This	Table	(and	the	next	two	-	1b	and	1c)	capture	what	
survivors	 learnt	 from	 the	 case	 experience.	 We	 identify	 key	 events	 which	
occurred	 across	 phases	 of	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 re-building,	 how	 the	 firm	
responded	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 its	 attempts	 at	 remediation.	 The	 fifth	
column	 captures	 key	 learning	 by	 the	 survivors,	 while	 the	 final	 column	 then	
states	the	implications	for	a	theoretical	model.		
	 Three	 classes	 of	 learning	 from	 doing	 under	 conditions	 of	 ambiguity	
became	 apparent.	 First,	 during	 the	 decline	 phase,	when	 there	was	 consistent	
resource	loss,	the	firm	learnt	to	switch	from	a	full-cost	service	provision	to	find	
alternative,	 more	 resource	 efficient,	 methods	 of	 service	 delivery.	 This	 was	
necessary	to	stem	resource	loss	in	response	to	revenue	decline	and	still	be	able	
to	 provide	 an	 acceptable	 service	 to	 end	 users.	 Examples	 of	 more	 resource	
efficient	methods	 used	 included	 alliancing,	 adapting	 freeware	 source	 code	 to	
meet	 particular	 system	 requirements	 and	 replacing	 staff	 travel	 to	 meet	
customers	 with	 online	 communications	 to	 build	 and	 secure	 new	 commercial	
deals.	
	 Second,	in	addition	to	switching	to	a	low	resource	consumption	service	
delivery,	 the	 firm	 also	 began	 to	 view	 and	 judge	 resources	 differently	wherein	
surviving	 members	 ascertained	 desirability	 according	 to	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
resources	could	be	used	sustainably	in	the	future.	Resources	that	heavily	relied	
on	other	resources	for	their	maintenance	were	shed	and	the	firm	switched	to	a	
low-resource-consumption	base.	For	example,	 IP	applications	require	ongoing	
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payments	to	keep	current.	The	firm	learnt	to	re-evaluate	the	long-term	value	of	
such	 resources	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 its	 sustainability	 came	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 other	
much-needed	resources.	The	firm	reconfigured	to	a	low-resource-consumption	
base,	for	example	by	shedding	some	of	the	IP	portfolio,	 losing	staff	that	could	
not	 sustain	 their	 commitment	without	 regular	 remuneration	and	by	adopting	
freeware	with	 fewer	 features	 than	 commercial	 software	 options	 but	 sufficient	
utility	to	meet	immediate	needs.		
	 Third,	the	team	felt	handicapped	with	strategic	control	remaining	in	the	
hands	 of	 key	 investors	who	were	 pursuing	 short-term	 agendas	 of	 investment	
returns	 for	 themselves	 rather	 than	 long-term	 business	 building.	 This	 made	
decision-making	 difficult	 in	 terms	 of	 choosing	 which	 resources	 to	 keep	 and	
which	 to	 shed	 as	 well	 as	 consolidating	 the	 firm’s	 strategic	 recovery.	 The	
survivors	 learnt	 to	value	strategic	control	being	held	by	those	directly	 leading	
and	navigating	the	recovery,	requiring	separation	from	those	stakeholders	with	
different	agendas.		
	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 resource	 constraints	 and	 process	 barriers	 being	
navigated	were	shared	with	remaining	staff	and	closely-held	advisors,	not	only	
to	devise	solutions	to	problems	and	implement	agreed	actions	but	also	to	build	
strategic	 coherence,	 as	 strategy	 adapted	 to	 emerging	 circumstances.	
Communications	 became	 a	 key	 process	 for	 binding	 adopted	 strategy	 to	 the	
resources	that	were	available	and,	because	of	the	small	and	engaged	nature	of	
the	 firm’s	 members,	 the	 three	 classes	 of	 learning	 outlined	 above	 became	
collectively	held	among	all	the	survivors.	
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Table	1a:	Collapse	Capabilities	in	ActiveSky	|	Case	1	1999-2005	
	
Phase	 Events	 Response	 Consequence	 Learning	
Implications	for	
Theoretical	Model		
(Figure	2)	
	
Decline	
	
Sought	to	maintain	sports	
information	service	with	
partner	provider	
undertaking	marketing	to	
grow	subscriber	base	–	AS	
had	no	control	over	
marketing	spend	or	focus	
Partner	disconnected	
from	AS	due	to	
instability	in	service	
support	-	placed	growth	
focus	on	other	products	
&	AS	product	declined	
Survivors	frustrated	by	
lack	of	provider	support	&	
their	own	inability	to	reset	
strategy;	left	to	deal	with	
legacy	relationships	&	
orientation	
AS	survivors	sought	to	
control	strategy	setting,	
even	with	inefficiencies	
that	existed	as	they	
learnt	new	skills	
Indicates	importance	of	
heuristics	around	resourcing	
during	collapse.	
Modelled	in	Figure	2	as	a	
resource	heuristic	at	boundary	
transition	1	
	
Collapse	
	
Survivors	threaten	
investor	controllers	with	
non-cooperation	or	walk-
away	if	strategic	control	
not	given	over	to	them	
Investors	decide	to	hand	
over	company	to	
survivors	in	exchange	for	
small	ongoing	share	
holding	
AS	survivors	secure	
control	of	operating	
entity,	ongoing	strategy	&	
patent	portfolio	
Judge	resources	on	
sustainability	in	
uncertain	environment	
rather	than	operational	
value	–	strategy	directed	
by	available	resources	
Strategic	heuristics	important	
during	collapse	phase.	
Modelled	in	Figure	2	as	a	
strategy	heuristic	at	boundary	
transition	2.	
Also,	indicates	a	different	sort	
of	dynamic	capability	than	
used	for	pursuing	advantage.	
Modelled	in	Figure	2	as	
advantage-oriented	dynamic	
capabilities	versus	stability-
oriented	dynamic	capabilities.	
	
Re-building	
	
AS	survivors	build	
opportunities	through	
new	partnerships	with	the	
same		strategy,	yet	in	
markets	previously	not	
considered		
AS	able	to	attract	
resources	to	service	new	
markets	
New	projects	(in	Asia)	
showed	early	growth	in	a	
chaotic	market	yet	began	
to	falter	–	not	sustainable	
as	projects	nor	as	a	
competitive	advantage	
factor	
Insufficient	underlying	
resource	strength	to	
provide	operating	
stability	in	uncertain	
market	conditions	–	
sought	alliance	with	a	
partner	with	resource	
sufficiency	to	maintain	
operating	momentum.	
All	survivors	included	in	
considering	new	options	
as	these	arose	
Importance	of	operating	
stability	and	specific	resource	
mixes	for	opportunity	pursuit.	
These	different	than	focus	in	
capability	dismantling.	
Modelled	in	Figure	2	as	
threshold	line	of	operating	
stability	and	two	phases	of	
capability	dismantling	and	
capability	re-building	for	
opportunity	capture		
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Case	2:	2006-2007	
Decline	2/	Collapse	2	(Jan	2006)	 	With	the	unexpected	death	late	in	2005	of	
the	 sophisticated	 investor	 backing	 the	 project,	 the	 momentum	 for	 the	
acquisition	evaporated	virtually	overnight	and	the	merger	collapsed.	Within	a	
week,	 the	 survivors	 had	 reverted	 to	 the	 next	 most	 attractive	 proposal	 to	 be	
acquired	 by	 a	 different	 investment	 consortium.	 Although	 this	 acquisition	
ultimately	 foundered	 within	 a	 few	 months,	 the	 project	 did	 introduce	 a	 new	
player	into	ActiveSky.		
	 This	new	actor	injected	a	radical	strategic	option;	to	prepare	for	an	ASX	
initial	public	offering	of	ActiveSky	stock	as	a	technology/media	play,	controlled	
by	 ActiveSky	 survivors.	 This	 fortunate	 development	 occurred	 so	 quickly	 that	
the	survivors	didn’t	need	 to	engage	 in	active	 resource	retrenchment,	 strategic	
options	 search	or	altering	 their	patterns	of	 activity.	The	 IPO	strategy	and	 the	
networks	 that	 were	 introduced	 allowed	 the	 survivors	 to	 retain	 a	 status	 quo	
ahead	of	a	capital	infusion.	
Creating	 New	 Opportunities	 2	 (2006	 –	 2007)	 By	 mid	 2006,	 with	 this	 new	
opportunity	horizon,	ActiveSky	 found	 itself	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 positive	 financial	
and	 technological	 attention.	 For	 the	 following	 12	 months,	 they	 attracted	 a	
number	of	acquisition	candidates	who	themselves	aspired	to	a	listing	outcome	
but	did	not	have	the	commercial	networks	or	skills	to	achieve	such	a	result.	By	
bundling	the	ActiveSky	platform	in	with	these	re-configured	assets,	ActiveSky	
was	able	to	re-build	a	market-credible	growth	trajectory	through	acquisition	to	
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again	deliver	 its	platform	 in	 a	 greatly	 changed	market	 as	 a	 technology/media	
conglomerate	rather	than	simply	as	a	technology	platform	provider.		
Rebuilding	 Capabilities	 as	 Resources	 Accrue	 (2007)	 The	 surviving	 team	
rallied	around	this	new	 listing	strategy	with	 its	clear	upside	potential	and	the	
firm	 was	 able	 to	 attract	 investment	 funds	 to	 support	 the	 bid.	 Securing	 the	
participation	of	four	acquisition	targets	to	be	bundled	into	the	listing	added	to	
the	allure	and	momentum	of	the	bid	into	a	market	increasingly	attuned	to	new	
media	opportunities.	These	funds	were	used	to	secure	requisite	alliance	partner	
resources	to	enable	the	machinery	of	listing	to	proceed.	Many	of	these	partner	
resources	were	negotiated	to	work	on	an	equity	fee	(that	is,	shares	in	the	new	
listed	entity)	rather	than	a	cash	fee,	representing	a	significant	retention	of	cash	
reserves.	The	survivors	worked	to	their	individual	strengths	yet	developed	new	
skills	to	manage	these	partners,	with	individual	survivors	taking	responsibility	
for	particular	 tasks.	Many	of	 the	 required	activities	 relied	on	 the	 resources	of	
partner	 firms	 so	 individuals	 learned	 to	 collaborate	 and	 began	 to	 predictably	
achieve	desired	outcomes.	In	this	iterative	way,	ActiveSky	was	able	to	achieve	a	
level	 of	 operating	 stability	 that	 hadn’t	 been	 experienced	 since	 the	 early	 stage	
growth.	 Target	 outcomes,	 commonly	 set	 by	 alliance	 partners	 and	 largely	
utilising	their	resources	and	sequences	of	action,	were	reliably	achieved	as	the	
target	listing	date	approached.	
Case	2	Capability	Development:	What	was	 learnt	 from	the	experience	 In	
the	Case	 2	 experience	 the	 firm	was	 able	 to	 continue	 to	make	use	 of	 its	 prior	
learning	from	Case	1	but	also	gained	more	new	learning	about	how	to	manage	
collapse.	As	in	Case	1,	the	firm	switched	to	a	low-resource-consumption	service	
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delivery,	 and	 judged	 resources	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 sustainability	 in	 difficult	
conditions.	They	 also	 again	 experienced	 the	 essential	 requirement	 to	 exercise	
full	 strategic	 control	 of	 the	 firm	 within	 the	 surviving	 team,	 since	 options	
reconfigured	 so	quickly	 in	non-obvious	ways	 that	 specific	detailed	knowledge	
was	 required	 to	 make	 adaptive	 decisions.	 The	 events,	 learning	 and	 theory	
impacts	are	captured	in	Table	1b.	
	 A	 new	 learning	 was	 the	 utilisation	 of	 the	 routines	 and	 resources	 of	
alliance	partners	to	assist	 in	realising	the	listing	goals	and	compensate	for	the	
lack	of	routines	and	resources	extant	within	the	 focal	 firm.	The	acceptance	of	
both	 the	 ActiveSky	 survivors	 and	 the	 alliance	 partners	 of	 the	 overall	 listing	
strategy	 and	 its	 benefits	 to	 those	 players	 yielded	 a	 cohesion	 to	 the	 way	
resources	were	applied	to	realise	that	goal.	This	alliance	utilization	came	about	
in	part	because	the	firm	had	pro-actively	sought	to	build	alliance	opportunities	
during	 the	decline	 stage	of	Case	2,	 so	 they	were	 attuned	 to	 the	benefits	 such	
alliances	could	bring	their	otherwise	restricted	firm.	Despite	not	representing	a	
high	performing	portfolio	of	alliances,	this	learning	nevertheless	reinforces	“the	
crucial	 logic	 of	multiple	 ties”	 (Ozcan	 &	 Eisenhardt,	 2009:	 268)	 as	 a	means	 to	
compensate	for	resource	gaps	by	using	partner	routines.	
	 Case	2	shows	that	by	learning	from	their	Case	1	experience,	where	they	
simply	reacted	to	decline	without	managing	it,	the	survivors	were	better	able	to	
anticipate	 future	 resource	 restrictions	 and	 to	 set	up	actions	 and	 relationships	
through	decline	that	were	of	benefit	when	conditions	enabled	re-building.	Case	
2	 shows	 improved	 management	 skill	 for	 the	 decline-collapse-rebuilding	
sequence.	
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	 Another	new	learning	was	the	shift	in	the	way	survivors	communicated.	
Instead	 of	 a	 motivational	 communication	 reflecting	 a	 positive	 mindset	 as	
existed	 in	 Case	 1,	 in	 Case	 2	 we	 observed	 a	 more	 emotionally	 engaged	
communication	 style,	 where	 survivors	 actively	 supported	 each	 other	 through	
difficult	and	uncertain	times	to	facilitate	the	harnessing	of	individual	skills	and	
attributes.	 An	 example	 was	 the	 way	 individual	 survivors	 may	 receive	 more	
funds	 than	 other	 survivors	 at	 a	 particular	 time,	 when	 funds	 were	 available,	
because	of	their	circumstances	with	a	home	mortgage	payment	or	the	like,	that	
was	distracting	them	from	their	work.	 	All	survivors	shared	in	these	pressures	
on	 the	basis	 that	 in	due	 course,	 rewards	would	be	distributed	 fairly.	Another	
example	is	the	inclusion	of	all	survivors	in	identifying	opportunities	and	setting	
strategy	 so	 as	 to	 gain	 a	 cohesive	 commitment	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 stability,	
incorporating	individual	needs	into	the	collective	actions	adopted.	 	
	 This	trusted	communications	environment	was	less	evident	in	case	1	and	
indeed	may	have	been	detrimental	at	that	time	when	the	firm	needed	to	shed	
resources	 and	 break	 alliances	 prior	 to	 its	 first	 collapse.	 Here,	 this	 engaged	
communications	 focus	 extended	 to	 alliance	 partners,	 where	 the	 resource	
constrained	 circumstances	 of	 the	 firm	 were	 shared	 with	 partners	 in	 seeking	
workable	 activity	 patterns	 to	 achieve	 the	 strategic	 goal.	 Overall,	 the	 firm	
learned	during	this	case	that	engaged	supportive	communication	patterns	with	
survivors	and	trusted	partners	enhanced	goal	delivery	and	task	capability.	
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Table	1b:	Collapse	Capabilities	in	ActiveSky	|	Case	2	2006-07	
	
	
Phase	 Events	 Response	 Consequence	 Learning	
Implications	for	
Theoretical	Model		
(Figure	2)	
	
Decline	
Sports	information	
services	&	
professional	services	
provision	in	Asia	
declines	
Sought	to	locate	&	build	
new	alliance	
opportunities	that	
exploited	unique	key	
features	of	software	
platform	&	could	be	
integrated	with	existing	
revenue	earning	
technology	
Survivors	oriented	towards	
integrating	AS	platform	
into	another	service	
offering	–	reconfiguring	
development	skills	
New	activity	patterns	around	
integration	&	commercial	
gains	rather	than	platform	
development.	All	survivors	
discuss	&	agree	to	focus	for	
each	alliance	option	
Pro-social	communication	
heuristic	important	at	
boundary	transition	1	
	
Collapse	
	
Key	backer	of	merger	
proposal	dies,	forcing	
new	merger	
arrangement	to	be	
quickly	consolidated	
2nd	preference	adopted,	
proves	problematic;	3rd	
preference	option	
rejected	
Importance	of	strategic	
cohesion	between	
survivors;	all	join	in	
process	of	integration	
Harnessing	individual	skills	of	
survivors	are	key	to	sensing	&	
seizing	new	opportunities	
Strategy	heuristic	important	
for	navigating	collapse	and	
positioning	for	opportunity	
pursuit.	Modelled	in	Figure	
2	at	Boundary	transition	2	
	
Re-building	
	
AS	coheres	around	
IPO	strategy;	rely	on	
external	partners	for	
specialist	activities	in	
what,	for	them,	is	an	
established,	practised	
activity	sequence	
Upside	of	IPO	means	
partners	can	be	secured	
largely	on	an	equity	fee	
basis	rather	than	cash	
fee	(since	AS	is	cash	
poor)	
new	option	develops	with	
coherent	strategy	towards	
IPO;	new	alliance	network	
delivers	stable	operating	
focus	with	this	strategy	;	
survivors	experience	
security	in	again	returning	
to	stable	actions	albeit	in	
new	operating	
environment	
New	activity	patterns	in	
coalition	with	engaged	
specialist	partners;	each	
activity	is	new	(to	AS)	&	not	
repeated,	inhibiting		
efficiency	building;	survivors	
work	within	own	expertise	to	
targets	commonly	set	by	
external	partners;	solve	
problems	quickly	to	keep	
partner	network	momentum	
Strategy	&	communications	
heuristics	important	in	
capability	re-building	and	
these	change	at	different	
times	in	the	capability	re-
building	phase.	Modelled	as	
two	boundary	transition	
points	in	capability	re-
building	phase	
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Case	3:	2008-present	
Decline	3	(2008)	By	late	2007,	several	partners	began	their	own	downturns	as	a	
precursor	 to	 the	 economic	 disruptions	 of	 the	 following	 year,	 limiting	 their	
ability	to	support	the	IPO.	It’s	important	to	note	here	that	the	global	financial	
crisis,	despite	the	immediacy	of	the	phrase,	did	not	manifest	itself	overnight	for	
ActiveSky.	It	unfolded	over	a	period	of	some	8	months	as	partner	services	fell	
away	 and	 the	 market’s	 appetite	 for	 a	 technology/media	 offering	 dissipated.	
ActiveSky	became	increasingly	isolated	as	the	year	passed	and	by	late	2008,	all	
hope	of	realising	the	IPO	had	collapsed	and	with	it	the	strategy	that	had	unified	
the	survivors.		
	 The	 most	 significant	 change	 to	 note	 with	 this	 decline	 phase	 was	 the	
active	campaign	to	inform	all	surviving	staff	as	well	as	alliance	partners,	since	
all	experienced	the	tensions	of	market	conditions	outside	of	their	control.	The	
mindset	 was	 that,	 if	 the	 IPO	 bid	 was	 to	 collapse,	 active	 engagement	 with	
partners	 and	 surviving	 staff	 would	 at	 least	 build	 a	 positive	 relationship	 in	
difficult	 times	 that	 may	 make	 these	 resources	 recruitable	 for	 any	 future	
opportunity	building	that	may	occur.	This	orientation	was	in	stark	contrast	to	
previous	phases	of	decline	the	firm	experienced.	
Collapse	3	(2008	–	present)	With	the	full	effect	of	the	global	financial	crisis	in	
play,	 nearly	 all	 surviving	 staff	 abandoned	 the	 firm.	 ActiveSky	 again	 had	 no	
coherent	 strategy,	 nor	 sufficient	 resources	 to	 mount	 any	 renewal	 except	 the	
accumulated	 learning	 and	 its	 legacy	 reputation	 as	 a	 wireless	 technology	
innovator.	 This	 distressed	 financial	 position	 meant	 the	 patent	 portfolio	
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dissipated	completely.	Although	dormant,	the	firm	explored	several	options	to	
insinuate	 the	 platform	 into	 a	 range	 of	 business	 licencing	 arrangements	 that	
each	 potentially	 could	 have	 yielded	 sufficient	 benefits	 to	 effect	 a	 re-building,	
yet	none	could	be	secured.	ActiveSky	remained	legally	alive	as	a	low	resource-
consumption	entity,	retaining	only	a	website	and	its	corporate	registration.	
	 As	learned	from	previous	collapse	phases,	the	survivors	kept	in	irregular	
contact	 with	 former	 staff	 and	 alliance	 partners	 throughout	 this	 period	 in	
recognition	 of	 the	 shared	 history	 and	 interest	 in	 future	 prospects	 of	
engagement.	 This	 communication	 provided	 a	 way	 of	 testing	 interest	 in	 any	
future	engagement,	if	the	option	arose.	
Creating	New	Opportunities	3	(2013	–	present)	Despite	the	lengthy	period	of	
sustained	collapse,	the	innovative	technology	reputation	persisted.	At	the	time	
of	writing,	one	of	the	available	options,	 first	created	 late	 in	2009,	appeared	to	
have	 secured	 funding	 support.	 This	 project	 requires	 ActiveSky	 to	 deploy	 its	
platform	 as	 a	 proposed	 emergency	 alerts	 service.	 These	 funders	 remained	
committed	 to	 ActiveSky	 because	 of	 its	 historical	 reputation,	 deep	 inimitable	
wireless	 technology	 experience	 and	 know-how,	 and	 a	 comfortable	 cultural	 fit	
with	 the	 key	 decision	 makers	 built	 over	 the	 years	 since	 2009.	 As	 the	
opportunity	evolves,	this	single	project	has	the	potential	to	enable	ActiveSky	to	
rebuild	operating	capabilities	for	this	and	any	subsequent	projects	that	can	be	
garnered	 in	 a	 completely	 altered	 wireless	 market,	 compared	 to	 the	 one	 that	
existed	during	its	early	stage	growth.		
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Case	3	Capability	Development:	What	was	learnt	from	the	experience	Case	
3	 shows	 further	 learning	 within	 the	 firm	 while	 also	 replicating	 and	 finding	
useful	prior	learning	from	the	previous	case	experiences.	Here,	they	identify	key	
low	resource-consuming	attributes	as	 their	 legacy	reputation,	 tacit	knowledge	
of	the	wireless	space	and	their	relationships	with	potential	alliance	partners	at	
some	 indeterminate	 future	 time.	 They	 accepted	 that	 new	 strategic	 goals	 and	
fresh	resource	attraction	steps	are	intertwined	and	unpredictable	and	to	rebuild	
the	 firm	around	 some	new	as	 yet	 unidentified	opportunity	 requires	 complete	
flexibility	on	strategic	and	resource	dimensions.	Further,	because	of	the	shared	
paths	 of	 the	 survivors	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 the	 alliance	 partners,	 they	 had	
formed	a	pro-social	motivation	to	make	the	project	work	for	each	other,	partly	
through	emotional	ambivalence	as	a	means	to	cope	with	the	doubt	and	hope	of	
the	venture.	Indeed,	“that	routinization	undermines	the	complexity	and	tension	
needed	to	trigger	prosocial	motivation	and	emotional	ambivalence	and,	 in	turn,	
mindful	 organizing”	 (Vogus,	 Rothman,	 Sutcliffe	 &	 Weick,	 2014:	 595).	 The	
increasingly	engaged	communications	between	survivors	and	partners	 fed	 the	
prosocial	and	emotional	needs	of	the	actors.	
	 By	maintaining	irregular	but	frequent	communication	with	former	staff	
and	 alliance	 partners	 that	 may	 offer	 skills	 and	 attributes	 that	 benefit	 a	
particular	 opportunity,	 the	 firm	 is	 able	 to	 keep	 abreast	 of	 resource	 and	 skill	
availability	to	exploit	at	a	later	time.	In	this	regard,	the	firm	can	assess	whether	
it	 is	capable	to	form	an	opportunity	at	a	point	in	time	or	let	that	option	pass,	
based	 on	 assessments	 flowing	 from	 the	 communication	 cycle.	 The	 events,	
learning	and	theory	impact	are	reflected	in	Table	1c.	
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Table	1c:	Collapse	Capabilities	in	ActiveSky	|	Case	3	2008-present	
	
	
Phase	 Events	 Response	 Consequence	 Learning	
Implications	for	
Theoretical	Model		
(Figure	2)	
	
Decline	
	
World	economy	slides	into	
“global	financial	crisis”	
AS	unable	to	shield	from	
GFC	fallout	–	can	only	
wait	as	alliances	wither,	
such	partners	coping	
with	their	own	fallout;	
IPO	target	becomes	
impossible	to	achieve	over	
8	month	period,	
eventually	collapsing	
From	earlier	cycles	of	
decline,	AS	survivors	retain	
low	resource	consuming	
assets	ie	reputation,	tacit	
knowledge,	trusted	partner	
relationships,	corporate	
registration	&	dismantle	all	
other	assets	
Indicates	importance	of	
purposeful	capability	
dismantling	during	
collapse.	Modelled	in	
Figure	2	as	dynamic	
capability	for	managing	
collapse	and	a	capability	
dismantling	phase	during	
collapse	
	
Collapse	
	
IPO	target	collapses;	all	
alliances	dissipate		
AS	survivors	(2)	decide	
to	wait	until	new	
opportunity	can	emerge	
where	reputation,	tacit	
knowledge	&	few	other	
assets	allow	some	
traction	
AS	stalls	as	it	waits	for	
forces	to	form	into	
promising	opportunity	
Facilitate	new	opportunities	
for	survivors	with	a	view	to	
re-attracting	them	if	
rebuilding	occurs	
Importance	of	resourcing	
heuristics	for	strategic	re-
positioning	and	capability	
re-building.	Modelled	at	
boundary	transition	2	
	
Re-building	
	
One	former	partner	
attracts	funding	to	build	
out	emergency	alerts	
service	&	requires	
specialist	skills		
Trusted	legacy	with	AS	
means	survivors	receive	
preferred	partner	status	
with	new	project	
Once	funding	received,	AS	
will	re-engage	with	former	
survivors	to	build	out	new	
platform	offering	tailored	
to	emergency	alerts	needs	
Survivors	apply	features	of	
dramatically	altered	
strategic	&	technology	
landscape	with	sharpened	
focus	on	business	models	&	
resilient	sustainable	
resources	&	activity	patterns	
Strategy	heuristic	for	
capability	re-building	
phase	
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Figure	2:	Process	Model	of	Resilience	Capability.	Note	that	if	rebuilding	at	Transition	4	fails,	the	model	suggests	reiteration	back	to	Transition	1.	
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3.5	CROSS-CASE	THEORY-BUILDING	
These	 three	 sequences,	 interpreted	 as	 three	distinct	 cases	of	decline,	 collapse	
and	 rebuilding,	allow	a	comparison	 to	better	understand	 the	phenomena	and	
define	 how	 actors	 can	 survive	 entrenched	 uncertainty	 (Knight,	 1921).	We	 can	
assess	 the	 timeline	 looking	 backwards,	 from	 an	 uncertain	 future	 towards	 the	
certain	 historical	 path	 already	 followed,	 to	 help	 determine	 where	 new	
opportunities	 lie	 and	 how	 these	 can	 be	 created	 from	 fleeting	 circumstances	
(Sull,	2010;	Sull	&	Escobari,	2004).	
	 Figure	 2	 integrates	 the	 insights	 from	 across	 the	 cases	 to	 provide	 a	
composite	picture	of	a	 ‘resilience	dynamic	capability’.	This	 term	describes	 the	
ability	 to	 consistently	 deploy	 a	 set	 of	 heuristics	 and	 skills,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
routine	 actions,	 to	 bounce	 back	 from	 circumstances	 of	 collapse.	 Figure	 2	
displays	 two	hemispheres	–	positive	and	negative	states	of	operating	stability.	
Positive	 operating	 stability	 is	 a	 situation	 characterized	 by	 a	 level	 of	 resource	
sufficiency	 and	 capability	 for	 the	 firm	 to	 pursue	 its	 agenda	 for	 competitive	
advantage.	Positive	operating	stability	is	represented	as	that	territory	above	the	
threshold	 line.	This	 territory	 is	 the	 focus	of	most	 strategy	 literature.	Negative	
operating	stability	occurs	where	resource	and	capability	loss	drives	a	downward	
spiral	of	decline,	collapse	and	possible	cessation	of	the	firm.	This	is	the	domain	
where	a	‘resilience	dynamic	capability’	operates,	to	be	discussed	in	this	section.	
	 Across	the	three	episodes	of	collapse	in	ActiveSky,	the	ability	to	manage	
collapse	and	shift	to	an	upswing	towards	positive	operating	stability	is	marked	
by	 two	 phases:	 purposeful	 capability	 dismantling	 and	 capability	 re-building.	
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The	 capability	 dismantling	 phase	 occurs	 during	 decline	 and	 collapse.	 This	
notion	is	grounded	in	the	observation	that	the	firm	learnt	to	take	charge	of	the	
decline	 and	 collapse	 process.	 That	 is,	 it	 learned	 not	 to	 be	 passive	 and	 let	
collapse	 take	 its	 own	 course.	 This	 learning	 was	 first	 observed	 in	 Case	 1	 but	
further	developed	as	a	capability	in	subsequent	cases.	Rather,	the	firm	became	
proactive	 in	 the	 way	 that	 it	 purposefully	 dismantled	 existing	 operating	
capabilities	in	order	to	move	to	a	low-resource-consumption	base.		
Temporal	Pattern	of	Resilience	Capability	Development	 	
Also	learnt	was	that	the	firm	needs	to	switch	its	priorities	as	decline	ensues.	We	
observed	 and	 confirmed	 key	 boundary	 transition	 points	 along	 the	 decline,	
collapse	and	re-build	curve.	The	first	of	these	boundary	transitions	occurs	when	
the	 firm	 transitions	 from	 a	 state	 of	 operating	 stability	 to	 one	 of	 instability,	
necessitating	a	shift	from	a	recovery	strategy	to	one	of	preparing	for	collapse.	It	
also	means	 a	 shift	 to	 low	 resource	 consuming	 assets	 and	 the	 suppression	 of	
structure	to	yield	the	greatest	flexibility	to	those	who	remain	committed	to	the	
ability	of	the	firm	to	survive	the	collapse.	Further,	communications	between	the	
survivors	centre	on	an	analysis	of	the	restrictions	and	resulting	consequences	in	
terms	 of	 how	 the	 firm	 will	 seek	 to	 rebuild.	 In	 Figure	 2	 this	 is	 shown	 as	
‘Boundary	 transition	 1’	 and	 ‘Boundary	 transition	2’.	The	 first	 transition	occurs	
when	instability	in	routine	actions	undercut	performance	and,	if	further	decline	
ensues,	then	a	second	boundary	transition	occurs	at	the	collapse	state.	
	 In	 collapse,	 strategy	 shifts	 from	 managing	 decline	 to	 scouring	 for	
opportunity	 formation	 and	 resource	 utilisation	 shifts,	 then	 to	 improvised	
activity	 sequences	 in	 line	with	possible	opportunities.	Survivors	communicate	
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in	the	context	of	shaping	the	impact	of	various	opportunity	formations	and	the	
required	 resourcing	 to	 further	 develop	 such	 a	 formation.	 So	 the	 context	 of	
opportunity	formation	(Zahra,	2008)	becomes	a	key	driver	for	rebuilding	from	
collapse.	
	 The	 third	 boundary	 transition	 signals	 opportunity	 formation	 allowing	
the	 firm	 to	 begin	 to	 exit	 collapse.	 The	 focus	 here	 is	 a	 viability	 testing	 of	 a	
particular	 opportunity	 with	 survivors	 and	 emerging	 partners,	 requiring	 a	
transition	 from	ad	hoc	 activities	 to	 increasingly	 stable	patterns	of	 action	 that	
use	newly	attracted	resources	that	in	turn	enable	full	opportunity	development.	
The	fourth	boundary	transition	shapes	the	firm’s	return	to	a	state	of	operating	
stability,	requiring	stable	resources,	proven	activity	patterns	to	become	routine	
actions	and	a	renewed	focus	on	efficiency	and	performance.	
3.6	HEURISTICS-BASED	DYNAMIC	CAPABILITY	
The	patterns	described	in	the	analysis	of	the	preceding	section	conform	to	that	
of	a	heuristics-based,	non-routine,	dynamic	capability	(Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	
2011).	They	are	a	dynamic	capability	because,	primarily,	they	are	not	about	the	
development	 of	 products	 and/or	 services,	 as	 in	 operating	 capabilities,	 but	
rather	 the	 reconfiguration	 of	 resources	 and	 activities	 to	 meet	 changing	
circumstances.		
Heuristics	are	defined	as	cognitive	shortcuts	that	allow	actors	to	quickly	
converge	on	key	steps	in	particular	situations	that	will	likely	advance	the	firm’s	
prospects	 (Boyer,	 1990;	 Van	 de	 Ven,	 2007;	 Van	 de	 Ven	 &	 Johnson,	 2006).	
Heuristics	are	preferred	over	routines	in	high	velocity	environments	because	of	
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time	and	 information	constraints	 in	novel	 situations.	Despite	 the	 information	
that	 is	 ignored,	 heuristics	 can	 prove	 surprisingly	 accurate	 relative	 to	 more	
detailed	 analyses,	 as	 well	 as	 easier	 to	 remember	 and	 apply	 (Bingham	 &	
Eisenhardt,	2011).		
The	conditions	driving	a	heuristics-based	capability	had	less	to	do	with	a	
high	velocity	external	environment,	as	in	traditional	understandings	(Bingham	
&	 Eisenhardt,	 2011).	 In	 fact,	 ActiveSky	 seemed	 to	 operate	 in	 a	 moderately	
dynamic	 environment,	 possessing	 routine-based	 operating	 capabilities	 in	 its	
positive	 operating	 stability	 history.	 This	 finding	 suggests	 that	 resource	 and	
strategic	 collapse	 represents	 a	 circumstance	 that	 resists	 routinization	 and	
favours	heuristics,	 regardless	of	 external	 environmental	 velocity.	This	 extends	
the	 identified	 boundary	 condition	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities	 in	 high	 velocity	
markets,	 where	 “effective	 patterns	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities	 vary	 with	 market	
dynamism”	 (Eisenhardt	 &	 Martin,	 2000:	 1106).	 Internal	 dynamism	 can	 also	
invoke	capability	variance.	
Organizational	routines	embrace	not	only	collective	sequences	of	action,	
but	also	the	rules	that	apply	to	such	actions,	the	behaviours	by	which	the	rules	
are	enacted	and	the	disposition	of	the	participants	engaging	in	these	collective	
actions	 (Bingham	&	 Eisenhardt,	 2011;	 Gigerenzer	 &	 Brighton,	 2009;	 Newell	 &	
Simon,	1972).	Heuristics	focus	more	on	the	rules	rather	than	specific	sequences	
of	 action,	 giving	more	 freedom	 for	 individual	 interpretation	 and	 application.	
This	flexibility	is	required	in	unstable	or	uncertain	environments	where	all	the	
parameters	that	shape	a	particular	context	are	not,	and	cannot,	be	known,	or	at	
least	not	in	a	timely	fashion	to	benefit	the	firm.	
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Table	2:	Identifying	Capability	Heuristics	from	Case	Data	
	
Heuristic	 Relevant	Event	from	which	heuristic	emerged	 Example	Quotes	
Corresponding	
Boundary	Transition	
in	Figure	2	
When	resources	fail	or	
withdraw,	maintain	
process	with	alternative	
or	re-configured	
resource	mix	
Case	1	(2003)	After	retrenchment	rounds,	
as	firm	became	increasingly	unstable,	
staff	attrition	not	controlled	by	key	
decision	makers	forcing	re-assessment	of	
service	delivery	and	gaps	in	routines	of	
action	
QA	(quality	assurance	as	a	distinct	firm	unit	&	separate	
routine)	is	a	bit	of	a	waste	of	time.	If	we	test	our	code	as	we	
build	it,	we	don’t	need	a	separate	QA	team	AS01	Sep2003	
It	is	important	as	we	are	negotiating	with	(Japan	customer)	that	
we	support	them	and	do	not	change	the	level	of	service	that	we	
have	provided	thus	far.		In	losing	(Japan	AS	staff),	we	have	
created	a	situation	where	they	may	feel	as	if	they	are	not	getting	
the	support	that	they	(have	been)	used	to.	AS13	Nov2003	
Transition	1:	lose	high	
resource	consuming	
assets	and	negotiate	
service	variations	
Pursue	multiple	
opportunity	formation	
strategy	to	avoid	single	
choice	succeed	or	cease	
checkpoint	
Case	1	(2004)	Engaging	simultaneously	
with	2	separate	investment/partnering	
options	allowed	survivors	to	gauge	
strategic	fit,	invoking	some	frustration	
I	have	found	it	incredibly	frustrating	to	try	and	complete	this	
transaction	(without	full	support	of	survivors)	AS19	Sep2004	
I	am	becoming	more	and	more	positive	with	regard	to	the	
potential	for	this	business	AS17	Aug2004	
Transition	2:	generate	
new	options	iteratively	
allowing	for	those	that	
don’t	grow	to	fall	away	
Dismantle	imposed	
communication	
barriers	to	include	
survivors	in	a	bid	to	gain	
greater	commitment	to	
the	firm	as	it	searched	
for	new	directions	
Case	1	(2004)	Firm	adjusted	advice	&	
information	exchange	circles	to	garner	
wider	contributions,	breaking	down	
earlier	restrictive	barriers	of	information	
flow	that	had	been	imprinted	since	start	
up		
Let’s	be	sure	we	are	on	the	same	page	before	I	respond	….	we	
need	to	be	realistic	about	what	can	be	done	on	reduced	burn	
scenarios	AS10	Apr2003	
We	have	only	enough	(money)	to	cover	expenses	to	May	AS11	
Apr2003	
Transitions	1	&	2:	
include	survivors	in	
small	wins	and	
looming	uncertainties,	
to	consolidate	trusted	
network	
Leverage	routines	&	
resources	of	alliance	
partners	to	achieve	
required	outcomes	for	
strategic	goal		
Case	2	(2007)	Fulfilling	the	requirements	
of	IPO	was	outside	the	existing	skillset	of	
survivors	so	they	had	to	rely	on	in-house	
skills	of	alliance	partners	to	meet	these	
needs	
It’s	like	playing	tennis	–	the	aim	is	to	keep	the	ball	on	their	side	
of	the	court	AS15	May2006	
As	these	are	new	technologies	which	we	…	aren’t	comfortable	
with,	we	need	to	pitch	them	very	confidently	and	accurately	in	
order	to	create	a	closed	sale	AS20	(partner)	Oct2005	
Transition	3:	test	
forming	option	
benefits	by	arranging	
access	to	essential	
assets	of	partners	
Deliver	simplified	
essential	requirements	
to	meet	service	offerings	
&	strategy	objectives	
Case	2	(2005)	While	considerable	service	
gaps	remained,	survivors	defined	a	very	
narrow	service	offering	(bare	bones)	to	
prove	the	viability	of	the	market	
We	can	add	bells	&	whistles	once	we	get	uptake	(in	the	
Malaysian	market	with	a	sports	information	application)	AS17	
Feb2005	
I	think	it	would	be	great	if	we	could	get	together	with	our	
respective	teams	to	work	through	a	few	practical	issues	on	how	
to	take	next	steps.	AS20	(partner)	Sep2005	
Transitions	2	&	3:	
reduce	service/product	
offering	to	market	in	
line	with	reduced	
uncertain	conditions	
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Marketing	&	technical	
functions	embrace	
convergence	&	
coherence	of	
communication	both	
inside	&	outside	the	firm	
Case	2	(2005)	As	alliance	partnership	
developed	with	mobile	messaging	
platform	firm,	marketing	&	technical	
connections	began	to	merge,	unlike	in	
earlier	times	when	these	were	kept	
separate	
Starting	to	get	urgent	on	this	issue	now.	Need	to	provide	a	
CLEAR	statement	about	our	recommended	handset	
compatibility	set	for	launch	services.	AS20	Oct2005	
We	just	finished	an	evaluation	of	the	ActiveSky	Java	App.	In	a	
nut	shell	we	like	it.	AS22	(telco)	Apr2005	
Transitions	3	&	4:	
experiment	with	new	
action	sets	towards	
collective	actions	as	
options	grow	and	shift	
Pro-actively	retire	or	
withdraw	resources	
that	are	judged	as	not	
being	able	to	survive	
collapse,	utilising	
available	resources	with	
fragile	or	unstable	access	
Case	3	(2008)	With	the	IPO	hopes	fading	
and	alliance	partners	withdrawing,	
survivors	anticipated	prolonged	collapse	
and	so	opted	to	push	out	processes	&	
resources	that	could	not	be	sustained,	
pre-empting	the	collapse	of	that	routine	
or	resource	
sorry	I	can't	help	more	but	my	stuff	seems	to	be	scattered	all	
over	the	place	atm...	so	not	sure	where	everything	is.	AS05	
Mar2008	
We	do	not	intend	for	this	trademark	to	be	renewed	-	please	
allow	to	lapse	AS02	Sep2014	
Transition	1:	Anticipate	
likely	resource	
collapses	to	proactively	
retire	these	when	
control	is	possible	
Renewal	strategy	
seeking	to	form	
opportunities	based	on	
relationships	that	value	
identified	attributes	
retained	from	collapse	
Case	3	(2010)	With	only	legacy	reputation	
in	the	wireless	space,	any	remaining	
strategic	insights	into	the	functioning	&	
drivers	within	that	space,	new	
opportunities	are	likely	to	be	drawn	from	
the	trusted	partners	the	survivors	still	
maintain	relationships	with	
If	(emergency	alerts	service	partner)	gets	the	money,	we	have	a	
chance	of	rebuilding.	If	he	doesn’t,	we’ll	just	have	to	wait	til	
something	else	comes	along,	which	will	be	quite	a	long	shot	
given	where	we	are	at	present		AS02	Sep2012	
Great;	please	inject	(into	your	proposal)	that	(telco)	may	be	
looking	at	opportunities	with	ActiveSky	AS23	(telco)	Jan2011	
Transitions	1	&	3:	adopt	
a	mindset	to	reduce	
corrosive	collapse,	
dismantling	resources	
with	a	view	to	later	
rebuilding	them	under	
promising	conditions	
Communication	
guided	by	outline	rules	
rather	than	prescriptive	
steps	so	parties	have	
freedom	to	adjust	fit	
Case	3	(2009)	Instead	of	responding	to	
stated	needs	of	potential	clients,	firm	
sought	exchange	of	needs	&	constraints	
to	adjust	service	goals	for	long	term	
engagement	
Their	simple	brief	to	us	is	think	big...be	future	ready....and	give	
us	a	solution	that	can	be	applied	across	all	our	media.	AS16	
Jul2008	
I	am	quite	confident	about	the	path	ahead	and	look	forward	to	
working	with	you	guys	real	soon.	I	hope	you	are	ready	for	iOS	
and	Android.	AS24	(emergency	alerts	service	partner)	Jun2013	
Transition	4:	enable	
individual	inputs	of	
trusted	network	to	
shape	activity	sets	and	
inform	emerging	
routines	
	
		
	
134	
Table	2	above	shows	each	of	the	heuristics	that	were	learnt	by	the	firm	
in	developing	a	resilience	dynamic	capability.	It	shows	the	case	from	which	the	
heuristic	emerged,	the	key	event	which	triggered	development	of	the	heuristic	
and	example	quotes	 from	different	 stakeholders,	 indicating	how	 the	heuristic	
was	 shared	 across	 surviving	 staff.	Collectively,	 a	 dynamic	 resilience	 capability	
requires	 particular	 heuristics	 and	 skills	 for	 different	 phases	 (capability	
dismantling	and	re-building)	and	boundary	transitions	within	phases	in	states	
of	negative	operating	stability.	
	 From	 the	 data,	 most	 critical	 heuristics	 followed	 a	 pattern	 centred	 on	
issues	 relating	 to	 strategy,	 resources	 and	 communications	 as	 the	 three	 most	
critical	areas	of	focus	for	the	managing	team.	This	pattern	was	upheld	across	all	
three	 embedded	 cases,	 across	 all	 phases	 of	 capability	 dismantling	 and	 re-
building.	The	particular	heuristics	and	skills	relating	to	strategy,	resources	and	
communications	for	each	boundary	transition	and	phase	are	shown	in	Figure	2.	
Each	of	these	heuristics	is	derived	from	the	portfolio	listed	in	Table	2.	The	last	
column	 of	 Table	 2	 shows	 the	 connection	 between	 Table	 2	 and	 Figure	 2.	 The	
firm	 learnt	 that	 implementing	 these	 heuristics	 limited	 the	 damage	 resulting	
from	decline	and	collapse	and	yielded	a	better	positioning	for	an	upturn.		
	 Supporting	 the	 work	 of	 Bingham	 &	 Eisenhardt	 (2011)	 with	 regards	 to	
developmental	 order	 for	 heuristics,	 survivors	 showed	 evidence	 of	 learning	
selection	heuristics	to	stabilize	the	firm	(strategy	heuristics	in	our	scheme)	first,	
then	 procedural	 heuristics	 which	 guide	 how	 stabilization	 is	 to	 be	 achieved	
(resource	heuristics	in	our	scheme)	second.	Furthermore,	survivors’	insight	into	
boundary	 transitions	 for	 switching	 heuristics	 also	 matches	 Bingham	 &	
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Eisenhardt’s	 (2011)	 temporal	 heuristics,	which	 focus	 on	 guiding	 the	 timing	 of	
the	 application	 of	 heuristics.	 A	 key	 difference	 lies	 in	 phases	 of	 decline	 and	
collapse,	 where	 a	 stability-seeking	 logic	 supplants	 the	 growth-seeking	 logic	
prevalent	 through	 the	 Bingham	 &	 Eisenhardt	 (2011)	 schema.	 This	 stability-
seeking	 logic	 is	 portrayed	 in	 Figure	 2	 as	 occurring	 below	 the	 threshold	 of	
operating	 stability,	 with	 growth-seeking	 logic	 pursued	 under	 conditions	 of	
strategic	coherence	and	resource	sufficiency.	
	 Figure	 2	 illustrates	 some	 features	of	 a	 resilience	perspective.	 Following	
the	upward	 trajectory	 through	 the	 re-building	phase	 (boundary	 transition	 4),	
four	possible	outcomes	emerge.	The	firm	may	fail	in	its	re-building	and	though	
bad	 fortune	 have	 to	 loop	 around	 again	 and	 repeat	 the	 boundary	 transitions.	
More	optimistically,	it	may	return	to	homeostasis	and	engage	in	the	re-building	
of	 its	 former	 operating	 capabilities,	 where	 the	 firm	 has	 restored	 former	
circumstances.	 If	 new	 opportunities	 are	 perceived,	 entirely	 new	 operating	
capabilities	 can	be	built.	 Finally,	 a	more	 radical	 option	 allows	 for	 the	 firm	 to	
bounces	 back	 and	 grow	 from	 adversity	 to	 become	 a	 different	 business.	 The	
perspective	 embraces	 scenarios	 to	 transform	 attainable	 futures	 even	 while	
strategic	and	resource	configurations	remain	uncertain.	 	 		
3.7	DISCUSSION	
This	empirical	study	has	explored	how	a	firm	can	rebound	from	collapse	with	
new	strategic	impetus.	The	longitudinal	case	offers	a	rich	look	into	the	anatomy	
of	firm	collapse	and,	in	particular,	the	role	and	texture	of	dynamic	capabilities	
in	the	process	of	resilient	rebounding.	The	work	has	extended	both	decline	and	
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turnaround	 literatures	 by	 incorporating	 a	 capabilities	 lens	 to	 determine	 how	
firms	 could	 be	 capable	 when	 traditional	 capabilities	 are	 shattered.	 This	 has	
resulted	in	a	process	model	of	a	dynamic	resilience	capability,	with	constituent	
phases	of	purposeful	capability	dismantling	and	re-building	using	heuristics	to	
navigate	 four	 identified	 boundary	 transitions.	 The	 work	 carries	 a	 number	 of	
implications	 for	 organizational	 resilience,	 the	 perspective	 for	 dynamic	
capability	portfolios	and	capability	development.		
	 A	resilience	perspective	fosters	a	long-term	focus	on	surviving	adversity,	
periods	when	 strategy	 doesn’t	 work	 and	 resources	 dissipate.	While	 resilience	
has	 been	 studied	 in	 other	 disciplines	 such	 as	 psychology	 (Becker,	 2008),	
ecology	 (Masten,	 2014)	 and	 engineering	 (Walker	 &	 Salt,	 2012),	 it	 lacks	
systematic	conceptual	development	in	organization	science	(Hollnagel,	2009).	
A	 resilience	 perspective	 seeks	 to	 leverage	 learning	 and	 experience	 to	
adjust	and	forge	new	pathways.	Resilience	is	presented	as	essentially	a	dynamic	
capability	for	unstable	systems	to	achieve	reliable	function	(Weick	&	Sutcliffe,	
2007).	 It	 embraces	 a	 pro-social	 orientation	 (Vogus	 et	 al.,	 2014)	 to	 surviving	
participants	and	possible	partners	in	regaining	reliable	function.	
	 Several	future	research	questions	emerge.	When	should	a	firm	invest	in	
a	resilience	capability	and	when	should	 it	exit	gracefully	(Peteraf	et	al.,	2013)?	
For	how	 long	 should	 a	 firm	 remain	 committed	before	 exit	 (Dew,	Goldfarb,	&	
Sarasvathy,	2006)?	Does	resilience	 lead	to	different	and	better	 incarnations	of	
the	business	and	under	what	conditions	(Watts	&	Paciga,	2011)?	
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A	Resilience	Perspective	of	Dynamic	Capability	Portfolios	
If	 a	 firm	 adopts	 a	 focus	 on	 achieving	 performance	 based	 on	 existing	 or	
incrementally	changing	 resources	and	routine	actions,	 it	will	most	 likely	view	
capability	 in	 a	 hierarchy	 (cf.	 Barreto,	 2010;	 Dew	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 A	 resilience	
perspective	places	dynamic	capabilities,	rather	than	resources	and	routines,	as	
central	 to	 the	 firm.	This	 suggests	heuristic-based	dynamic	capabilities	are	 the	
preferred	 option	 when	 the	 firm	 is	 unstable,	 below	 the	 threshold	 depicted	 in	
Figure	2.		
	 Under	 the	 stable	 conditions	 of	 strategic	 cohesion	 and	 resource	
sufficiency,	 dynamic	 capabilities	 are	 used	 to	 configure	 and	 re-configure	
operating	capabilities.	These	dynamic	capabilities	can	be	either	 routine-based	
(Hine,	 Parker,	 Pregelj,	 &	 Verreynne,	 2014)	 or	 ad	 hoc	 entrepreneurial	 action	
(Teece,	 2012;	 Teece	 et	 al.,	 1997)	 depending	 on	 environmental	 velocity.	 In	
uncertain	periods	of	operating	instability,	heuristics-based	dynamic	capabilities	
aim	 to	 restore	 the	 resource	 sufficiency	 and	 strategic	 coherence	 necessary	 to	
enable	the	re-building	of	new	operating	capabilities	created	from	new	routine	
and	resource	configurations.		
Placing	dynamic	capabilities	at	 the	centre	of	 a	 resilience-based	view	of	
the	 firm	 is	 a	 focus	 shift	 from	 the	 capability	 hierarchy	 perspective	 which	 has	
dominated	 conceptualizations	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities	 (Barreto,	 2010;	Hine	 et	
al.,	2014).	We	suggest	that	heuristics-based	capabilities	are	not	just	for	firms	in	
high	 velocity	 environments	 but	 must	 also	 be	 a	 learned	 skill	 of	 firms	 that	
experience	collapse,	regardless	of	environmental	velocity.	
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The	 monitoring	 function	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities	 (Peteraf	 et	 al.,	 2013;	
Schreyögg	&	Kliesch-Eberl,	2007)	remains	to	sense	the	requirement	for	strategy	
changes	and	acquiring	new	or	reconfiguring	existing	resources.	A	key	skill	 for	
firms	 is	 how	 they	 are	 able	 to	 build	 the	 portfolio	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities	 for	
different	 levels	 of	 operating	 stability	 and	 be	 able	 to	 switch	 between	 these	
dynamic	 capabilities,	 as	 circumstances	 require.	 We	 suggest	 that	 such	 firms	
stand	 to	 be	 more	 resilient,	 that	 is	 to	 better	 cope	 with	 survival-threatening	
adversities,	 than	 those	 that	 assume	 capabilities	 suited	 only	 to	 sustained	
conditions	of	strategic	cohesion	and	resource	sufficiency.	
Capability	Development	
ActiveSky	underwent	 three	 episodes	 of	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 re-building.	 Yet,	
while	 painful	 to	 those	 involved,	 the	 example	 has	 allowed	 an	 unusual	 insight	
into	resilience	capability.	Could	ActiveSky	have	learnt	its	lessons	quicker,	better	
and	 thus	 enabled	 faster	 or	more	 advanced	 resilience	 capability	 development?	
How	 do	 rate	 and	 type	 of	 learning,	 experience	 and	 managerial	 cognitive	
capabilities	 affect	 capability	 development?	 Do	 the	 gains	 from	 resilience	
capability	 development	 as	 a	 first-mover	 outweigh	 the	 costs?	 Do	 first-mover	
firms	who	bear	the	costs	of	resilience	capability	development	lose	competitive	
advantage	as	the	knowledge	is	articulated?		
	 The	heuristic	patterns	shown	in	Figure	2	at	transitions	3	and	4	are	a	form	
of	strategic	orchestration,	where	a	focus	lies	not	in	the	resources	a	firm	doesn’t	
have	 as	 it	 seeks	 to	 rebuild	 from	 collapse,	 but	 the	 relationship	 it	 strikes	 with	
partners	who	may	bring	resources	for	mutual	gain	(Sull	&	Ruelas-Gossi,	2010).	
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In	 the	 absence	 of	 stable	 resources	 and	 reliable	 patterns	 of	 action,	 rules	 of	
thumb	 guide	 survivors	 to	 develop	 new	 patterns,	 new	 capabilities,	 from	 a	
position	of	vulnerability.	From	the	case	data	collected,	we	propose	 that	when	
routines	fail,	heuristics-based	action	allows	the	firm	to	orchestrate	transient	or	
serendipitous	opportunities.	
3.8 CONCLUSION 
The	 tumultuous	 nature	 of	 economic	 markets	 renders	 the	 management	 of	
adversity	 as	 a	 fundamental	 issue	 for	 organizational	 and	 management	 theory	
and	practice.	By	definition,	organizational	resilience	engenders	transformation	
of	 the	 firm	 as	 a	 direct	 consequence	 of	 disruptions	 (Lengnick-Hall,	 Beck,	 &	
Lengnick-Hall,	 2011).	 In	 exploring	 the	 capabilities	 that	 allow	 firms	 to	 survive	
collapse,	 we	 propose	 a	 key	 role	 for	 iterative	 dynamic	 heuristic	 sequences	 in	
achieving	 such	 survival	 with	 uncertain	 strategy,	 incomplete	 routines	 and	
unstable	resources.		
	 Heuristics	 can	 lead	 to	 biases	 (Tversky	 &	 Kahneman,	 1974)	 which,	
unchecked,	 can	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	 strategic	 and	 resource	 rebuilding	 for	 a	
surviving	firm.	Yet	as	an	alternative	to	routine	actions,	we	show	they	provide	a	
promising	 basis	 for	 firms	 navigating	 adverse,	 unstable,	 survival-threatening	
conditions	to	interpret	complex	information,	capture	windows	of	opportunity,	
retain	 the	 freedom	 to	 improvise	 and	 co-ordinate	 actions	 (Bingham	 &	
Eisenhardt,	2011;	Vuori	&	Vuori,	2014).	 	Our	model	articulates	a	 framework	by	
which	 heuristic	 based	 action	 during	 unstable	 conditions	 of	 collapse	 can	 be	
applied.	
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Preface	to	Chapter	4	
Introducing	the	Engaged	Scholarship	Method	
 
The	previous	 chapter	 presented	 the	 empirical	 case	 to	 explore	 the	 capabilities	
required	 to	 survive	 collapse.	The	 engaged	 scholarship	method	used	 to	 gather	
and	 analyze	 the	 data	 was	 outlined.	 The	 next	 chapter	 details	 to	 a	 far	 greater	
degree	the	engaged	scholarship	method,	discussing	why	it	was	selected,	how	it	
was	applied	and	the	insights	gained	in	its	application	to	a	real	business	setting.	
From	 the	 theory	 building	 experience	 at	 ActiveSky,	 the	 chapter	 asks	 the	
question:	how	 can	 academic	 and	 practitioner	 engagement	 encourage	 new	 real-
time	 knowledge?	 It	 frames	such	new	knowledge	 in	 terms	of	 the	 impact	of	 the	
real	 time	assistance	 the	 collaborative	 research	project	 enabled	 for	 the	 firm	as	
data	was	harvested	and	new	theory	built.	 	The	chapter	is	targeted	to	form	the	
basis	of	a	manuscript	for	submission	to	Journal	of	Business	Research.	
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CHAPTER	4	|	USING	ENGAGED	SCHOLARSHIP	FOR	IMPACT	
The	Rigor-Real	Time	Assistance	Nexus	
ABSTRACT	
	
The	chapter	shares	the	learning	and	experience	of	the	academic-practitioner	research	
collaboration	 and	 how	 it	 was	 able	 to	 achieve	 the	 oft-perceived	 conflicting	 aims	 of	
academic	rigor	with	practitioner	impact.		It	aims	to	address	the	research	question:	how	
academic	 and	 practitioner	 engagement	 encourage	 new,	 real-time	 knowledge	 creation.	
This	experience	was	gained	through	a	nine-year	collaborative	research	project	aimed	
at	 theory-building	 in	 the	 area	 of	 organizational	 resilience.	 Van	 de	 Ven’s	 (2007)	
engaged	 scholarship	 framework	 was	 used,	 but	 the	 research	 team	 needed	 to	 devise	
additional	 ways	 to	 create	 both	 academic	 and	 practitioner	 value.	 In	 particular,	 this	
involved	providing	real-time	assistance	to	decision	makers	in	the	firm	under	study	as	
well	 as	 cognitive	 and	 behavioral	 impact.	 We	 outline	 a	 delve-test-innovate-unlock	
methodology	to	supplement	the	engaged	scholarship	framework.	In	addition,	we	find	
impact	 measurement	 models	 in	 social	 entrepreneurship	 literature	 provide	 a	 useful	
guide	for	assessing	the	value	of	the	research	on	the	firm’s	practice.		
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4.1	INTRODUCTION	
The	 debate	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 rigor	 and	 relevance	 has	 been	 extensive	
and	 long-standing	 (Bansal,	 Bertels,	 Ewart,	 MacConnachie,	 &	 O'Brien,	 2012;	
Bartunek	 &	 Rynes,	 2014;	 Hodgkinson	 &	 Rousseau,	 2009;	 Huff,	 2000;	 Kieser	 &	
Leiner,	 2009).	 Often	 the	 debate	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 polarity	 that	 academics	
value	theory	and	practitioners	want	to	side-step	theory	and	get	to	consulting-type	
step-by-step	 recommendations.	 However,	 action,	 insider,	 collaborative	 and	
engaged	 forms	 of	 research	 aim	 to	 bring	 together	 rigor,	 relevance	 and	 reflexivity	
(Coghlan,	 2011;	 Shani,	 Coghlan	 &	 Cirella,	 2012;	 Van	 de	 Ven,	 2007).	We	 seek	 to	
contribute	 to	 collaborative	 forms	 of	 research	 by	 sharing	 how	 we	 achieved	 dual	
aims	of	rigor	and	real-time	relevance	through	collaborative	theory-building	using	
a	 delve-test-innovate-unlock	methodology.	We	 interpret	 the	 real-time	 impact	 of	
the	collaboration	using	measurement	tools	developed	for	social	entrepreneurship	
(Ebrahim	 &	 Rangan,	 2014).	 In	 doing	 so	 we	 move	 beyond	 the	 rigor-relevance	
polemic	 (Kieser	 &	 Leiner,	 2009)	 to	 instead	 focus	 on	 theory-building	 skills	 as	 a	
guide	for	those	wishing	to	undertake	collaborative	forms	of	research.		
In	 our	 research	 project,	 theory-building	 was	 the	 goal	 shared	 by	 both	
academics	 and	 practitioners	 on	 the	 research	 team.	Here,	 practitioners	 learnt	 to	
become	theoreticians	as	they	exposed	their	routines,	actions	and	biases	to	critical	
analysis	 of	 underlying	 assumptions	 and	 causal	 relationships.	 Moreover,	 they	
developed	an	appreciation	for	academic	process	and	presentation	and	the	need	to	
appeal	 to	 accumulated	 literature.	 Exposure	 to	 competing	 theories	 triggered	
perceptions	of	gaps	 in	existing	theories	and	thus	was	born	the	mutual	agenda	of	
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academics	 and	 practitioners	 on	 the	 research	 team	 to	 contribute	 better	 theory.		
This	was	a	transformative	process	for	both	academics	and	practitioners	alike.		
	 Situated	 broadly	 within	 action	 research	 ontology,	 epistemology	 and	
methods	 (Coghlan,	 2011;	 Shani	&	Coghlan,	 2014;	 Shani,	Coghlan	&	Cirella,	 2012),	
the	project	 followed	Van	de	Ven’s	 engaged	 scholarship	 approach	 (2007;	 see	 also	
Van	 de	 Ven	 &	 Johnson,	 2006).	 Engaged	 scholarship	 is	 “a	 collaborative	 form	 of	
inquiry	 in	 which	 academics	 and	 practitioners	 leverage	 their	 different	 perspectives	
and	 competencies	 to	 coproduce	 knowledge	 about	 a	 complex	 problem	 or	
phenomenon	that	exists	under	conditions	of	uncertainty	found	in	the	world”	(Van	de	
Ven	&	Johnson,	2006:	803).	The	project	used	the	engaged	scholarship	approach	to	
investigate	the	question	of	how	the	focal	firm	built	capabilities	 in	resilience.	The	
catalyst	 for	 this	 research	 project	 occurred	 when	 this	 firm,	 ActiveSky,	 failed	 to	
deliver	on	its	initial	promise	and	experienced	collapse	on	a	number	of	occasions.	
Collapse	manifested	as	both	a	failure	of	 its	strategy	to	deliver	aspired	benefits	as	
well	as	a	depletion	of	resources,	principally	skilled	staff	and	cash.	One	of	the	key	
decision	 makers	 of	 the	 firm	 sought	 to	 understand	 why	 such	 a	 promising	 firm	
should	collapse	 in	 this	way	and	what	could	be	done	 to	 resurrect	 it.	 	A	complete	
collapse	 sequence	 occurred	 in	 real	 time,	 during	 the	 research,	 and	 remains	
ongoing.	
Our	theory-building	sought	a	rigorous	approach	while	providing	real-time	
assistance	to	the	practitioners,	as	they	traversed	the	various	adversities	and	began	
to	 build	 resilience	 capabilities.	 The	 research	 goals	 of	 real-time	 assistance	 and	
impact	required	more	extensive	theory-building	than	may	usually	be	executed	in	
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case	study	research,	because	the	findings	mattered	to	the	firm’s	survival.	It	seems	
that	many	theory-building	endeavors	truncate	the	theory-building	process	before	
the	 benefits	 of	 such	 theory	 to	 practical	 real-time	 decision-making	 have	 fully	
emerged	across	a	 range	of	operating	conditions.	That	 is,	 theory	 is	not	 framed	to	
guide	 practitioners	 in	 coping	with	 the	 real	 problems	 of	 complex	 contexts,	 often	
from	 a	 belief	 that	 to	 do	 so	 would	 jeopardize	 generalizability	 (Kieser	 &	 Leiner,	
2012).		
	 Our	main	contribution	is	to	introduce	real	time	assistance	as	a	key	benefit	
resulting	from	collaborative	research	where	both	academic	and	practitioner	goals	
can	co-exist.	Data	from	the	focal	firm	of	our	study	firm	shows	that	the	polarized	
debate	(Kieser	&	Leiner,	2009;	2012)	can	be	transcended	when	theory-building	is	a	
common	 superordinate	 goal	 of	 academics	 and	 practitioners.	 As	 such,	 our	 work	
adds	 further	voice	 to	 those	advocating	action,	 insider	and	collaborative	 forms	of	
research	 (Coghlan,	 2011;	 Shani	&	Coghlan,	 2014;	 Shani,	 Coghlan	&	Cirella,	 2012).	
Within	this	tradition,	our	paper	extends	the	engaged	scholarship	framework	(Van	
de	Ven,	 2007)	 to	 include	 criteria	 of	 real-time	 assistance	 and	 impact	 as	 research	
goals.	We	contribute	delve-test-innovate-unlock	as	a	process	 for	enhancing	real-
time	 relevance	 of	 theory-building.	 We	 also	 link	 management	 research	 with	
advances	 in	 impact	 measurement	 methodologies	 occurring	 in	 social	
entrepreneurship	 (Ebrahim	 &	 Rangan,	 2014).	 By	 impact	 we	 mean	 a	 positive,	
beneficial	change	in	the	quantity	and/or	quality	of	a	unit	of	analysis	(eg.	cognitive	
and	behavioral	changes	 in	the	practices	of	an	individual,	performance	of	a	 firm).	
We	introduce	and	show	how	both	program	logic	and	BACKS	(behavior,	attitude,	
condition,	knowledge	and	status)	 (Penna,	2011)	models	can	help	 to	make	 impact	
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measurement	 an	 explicit	 step	 in	 the	 research	 process.	 Both	 the	 delve-test-
innovate-unlock	process	as	well	as	the	impact	measurement	tools	are	amenable	to	
replication	by	others,	thus	serving	to	further	clarify	how	theory-building	is	done,	a	
topic	often	under-represented	in	research	higher	degree	curriculum.	
To	make	our	contribution	we	first	provide	a	brief	background	on	the	theory	
behind	 engaged	 scholarship	 as	 well	 as	 the	 debate	 concerning	 the	 twin	 aims	 of	
rigor	and	relevance.	Then,	three	features	of	the	current	debate	are	highlighted:	1)	
the	 lack	 of	 examples	 of	 engaged	 scholarship	 in	 action,	 2)	 how	 existing	 theory-
building	methods	 are	prone	 to	 truncate	data	 collection	prematurely,	 limiting	 its	
potential	to	assist	in	real	time	and	3)	how	the	combination	of	rigor	with	real	time	
decisions	leads	to	increased	stakeholder	impact	from	research.	
4.2	 THEORETICAL	 BACKGROUND:	 RIGOR,	 RELEVANCE	 &	 ENGAGED	
SCHOLARSHIP	
The	relationship	between	research	and	practice	has	been	an	area	of	intense	focus,	
certainly	 for	 academics	 if	not	necessarily	 for	practitioners	 (Nicolai	&	Seidl,	 2010;	
Walsh,	 Tushman,	 Kimberly,	 Starbuck,	 &	 Ashford,	 2007).	 A	 range	 of	 suggested	
actions	to	enhance	this	relationship	have	been	outlined	across	a	range	of	academic	
works	 (for	 a	 useful	 summary,	 see	 Bartunek	 &	 Rynes,	 2014).	 Commonly,	 the	
methodological	dilemma	that	emerges	 in	articulating	 this	 sharing	 is	 framed	as	a	
tension	 between	 rigor	 and	 relevance	 (Vermeulen,	 2005).	 Rigor	 in	 research	 is	
portrayed	as	a	focus	on	a	style	of	methodological	purity	that	emphasizes	technical	
thoroughness	and	refinement	(Singh,	Haddad,	&	Chow,	2007).	Academic	rigor	is	a	
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quest	for	systematic,	objective	inquiry	into	real	world	phenomena	(Augier,	March,	
&	Sullivan,	2005).	
Relevance	is	juxtaposed	as	a	competing	drive	to	yield	useful	applications	for	
managers	 where	 scientific	 method	 is	 less	 critical	 than	 the	 complex	 practice	 of	
embracing	 differing	 time	 horizons,	 communications	 and	 control	 mechanisms	
(Bartunek	 &	 Rynes,	 2014).	 Such	 an	 orientation	 of	 relevance	 has	 been	 used	 to	
suggest	 that	 rigor	 cannot	 be	 simultaneously	 delivered	 along	 with	 relevance	
objectives,	 since	 rigor	 and	 relevance	 occupy	 separate	 social	 systems,	 consigning	
academics	 and	 practitioners	 to	 perpetually	 inhabit	 different	 epistemological	
spaces	 (Kieser	 &	 Leiner,	 2009Kieser	 &	 Leiner,	 2009).	 This	 view	 frames	 research	
conducted	 by	 academics	 as	 striving	 for	 theoretical	 rigor	 yet	 accepting	 that	 the	
research	output	may	turn	out	 to	be	 less	 relevant	 to	practical	application	than	to	
theory	 development.	 Conversely,	 this	 view	 also	 implies	 that	 research	 projects	
seeking	to	inform	the	lived	experience	of	practitioners	is	likely	to	be	riddled	with	
bias	and	weakly-held	assumptions;	that	is,	relevant	but	without	rigor	(Vermeulen,	
2005).		
In	this	narrative	of	polarization,	practitioners	are	often	portrayed	as	being	
antithetical	 to	 theory.	 This	 may	 be	 an	 overstretched	 injustice	 to	 practitioners	
precluding	 the	 possibility	 (and	 confirmed	 by	 our	 experience)	 that	 practitioners	
may	 indeed	have	 a	penchant	 for	 theory.	 Indeed,	 this	 belies	 the	nature	of	 action	
research,	 which	 is	 to	 address	 an	 organizational	 issue	 as	 well	 as	 to	 generate	
scientific	knowledge	(Shani	et	al.,	2012).	Reflective	practitioners	realize	that	theory	
can	be	a	road	to	not	only	solving	a	present	problem	but	also	equipping	them	with	
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the	 skills	 of	 theoreticians,	 underpinning	 future	 approaches	 to	 practice.	
Practitioners	can	be	theorists	as	well,	understanding	what	works,	what	doesn’t	and	
why	(Mohrman,	Gibson	&	Mohrman,	2001).		
Engaged	Scholarship	
Engaged	scholarship	encourages	practitioners	to	join	in	the	theory-building	efforts	
(Van	de	Ven,	2007;	also	Van	de	Ven	and	Johnson,	2006).	As	a	research	method	it	
recognizes	 and	 values	 the	 different	 types	 of	 knowledge	 produced	 in	 real	 world	
settings.	 The	 underlying	 idea	 is	 that	 robust	 theory	 emerges	 not	 from	 a	 single	
perspective	 alone	 but	 through	 a	 dialectical	 process	 of	 synthesizing	 different	
perspectives	and	ways	of	knowing.		
The	 knowledge-in-practice	 context	 allows	 rival	 hypotheses	 to	 be	 tested	
towards	useful,	 generalizable	 theory.	 Synthesis	 is	 achieved	 through	 a	 strategy	of	
arbitrage	 –	 dialectical	 debate	 and	 conflict	which	 triangulates	 on	 a	 phenomenon	
and	from	which	a	more	robust	synthesis	can	emerge	(Barge	&	Shockley-Zalabak,	
2008).	Therefore,	engaged	scholarship	openly	embraces	practitioners	in	a	dialectic	
of	knowledge	co-production,	recognizing	that	knowledge	is	of	various	types	but	of	
equal	legitimacy	(Van	de	Ven,	2007;	Van	de	Ven	&	Johnson,	2006).		
This	collaborative	exchange	process	 includes	 learning,	by	the	practitioner,	
to	 create	 theory	 by	 gathering	 and	 processing	 data	 as	well	 as	 reporting	 evidence	
and	 new	 theories	 (Martin,	 2010).	 Such	 learning	 can	 trigger	 innovation	 as	
practitioners	 perceive	 shortcomings	 in	 existing	 theories	 and	 discern	 new	
extensions	 to	 explain	 complex	 phenomena.	 Engaged	 scholarship	 provides	 an	
environment	for	such	skills	learning	to	ripen.			
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4.3	 BUILDING	 ENGAGED	 SCHOLARSHIP	 SKILLS:	 EXTENDING	 THE	
TRADITION	
Engaged	scholarship	represents	an	opportunity	for	academics	and	practitioners	to	
harness	each	other’s	strengths	to	co-produce	knowledge.	However,	based	on	our	
experience	 in	 working	 with	 the	 method,	 there	 are	 three	 areas	 of	 the	 engaged	
scholarship	 tradition	 where	 further	 value	 can	 be	 unlocked:	 1)	 The	 need	 for	
empirical	 examples	 and	 a	 research	 community,	 2)	 how	 to	 incorporate	 real-time	
assistance	and	3)	delivering	impact	through	research	designs.	We	believe	progress	
in	 these	areas	will	help	 to	 increase	 the	presence	and	contribution	 from	engaged	
scholarship	methodologies	within	business	schools	and	published	research.	
The	Need	for	Examples	and	a	Research	Community	
The	 potential	 benefits	 of	 an	 increased	 use	 of	 engaged	 scholarship	 research	
methodologies	 include	 greater	 collaboration	 between	 academe	 and	 external	
stakeholders,	greater	flow	of	research	outputs	to	actual	 impact	 in	the	world,	and	
more	robust,	useful	and	insightful	theories	due	to	the	triangulated	perspectives	of	
different	stakeholders	(Martin,	2010).		
	 For	such	benefits	to	be	realized	requires	the	building	of	a	vibrant	research	
community,	necessary	to	build	upon	Van	de	Ven’s	(2007)	framework	and	provide	
ongoing	 refinement	 to	 methodologies.	 An	 engaged	 scholarship	 research	
community	 can	 share	 insights	 and	 experiences	 thus	helping	 to	build	 legitimacy,	
researcher	skills,	and	provide	a	broader	array	of	research	path	options	to	would-be	
researchers	(Mohrman	et	al.,	2001).	In	terms	of	the	rigor-relevance	debate,	such	a	
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community	is	necessary	in	order	to	build	the	critical	mass	of	empirical	examples	
to	support	arguments	made	in	defense	of	engaged	scholarship	(Vermeulen,	2005).		
Theory	and	Real	Time	Assistance	
Theory-building	 from	 traditional	 case	 study	 research	 does	 not	 explicitly	 make	
real-time	assistance	to	practitioners	a	criterion	of	the	theory	output	(cf.	Yin,	2009).	
That	is,	theory-building	stops	when	an	adequate,	valid	and	reliable	explanation	of	
a	 phenomenon	 is	 achieved.	 Such	 theory	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	 staying	 at	 a	 safe	
distance	from	the	action,	by	observing,	 inquiring	and	probing	the	factors	at	play	
but	not	fully	engaging	to	solve	real	world	problems.	Yielding	real-time	assistance	
requires	connection	with	the	decision	contexts	of	the	practitioner.		
	 For	 instance,	 our	 organizational	 resilience	 research	 explores	 how	 firms	
interpret	 and	 survive	 severe	 adverse	 conditions	 that	 may	 threaten	 the	 firms’	
survival.	Theory-building	here	needs	 to	 explain	 the	anatomy	of	 threats	 and	 firm	
responses	in	order	to	understand	the	constraints	under	which	decisions	need	to	be	
made.	In	turn,	such	explicit	appreciation	of	this	decision	context	further	deepens	
theory-building	around	the	anatomy	of	collapse	and	firm	responses.	Our	research	
led	to	the	heuristics	literature	(Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	2011;	Bingham	&	Haleblian,	
2012;	Mousavi	&	Gigerenzer,	2014)	as	a	way	to	explain	empirical	phenomena	and	
guide	 decision-making	 in	 real	 time.	 This	 synergy	 between	 theory	 development	
(how	we	were	conceiving	of	firm	collapse	and	organizational	resilience),	operating	
decision	 context	 (highly	 ambiguous	 and	 resource-constrained)	 and	 actual	
practitioner	decisions	involved	four	major	cyclical	phases	with	a	total	of	15	steps,	a	
process	we	detail	later	(in	Section	4.5).		
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Delivering	Impact	
All	 researchers	 seek	 to	 deliver	 impact	 on	 the	 real	 world	 (Pettigrew,	 2011).	 The	
measurement	of	impact	is	a	topic	that	is	receiving	high	levels	of	attention	in	fields	
such	as	in	the	non-profit	sector,	social	enterprises	as	well	as	management	academe	
more	 generally	 (Ebrahim	 &	 Rangan,	 2014).	 We	 define	 impact	 as	 a	 beneficial	
change	in	the	quantity	and/or	quality	of	a	unit	of	analysis,	being	either	individual	
actors	within	 the	 firm,	 the	 firm	 itself	or	 specific	capabilities	deployed	 to	achieve	
the	objectives	of	the	firm.		
In	our	research	we	interpreted	impact	in	terms	of	cognitive	and	behavioral	
changes	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 the	 firm’s	 key	 decision	 makers	 in	 handling	 severe	
organizational	disruptions	which	threatened	survival.	This	is	a	measure	of	how	our	
theory-building	 research	 led	 to	 learning	 outcomes	 for	 the	 practitioners	 which	
changed	 their	 cognition	 and	 behaviors.	 These	 changes	 impacted	 on	 the	
organization’s	 performance	 through	 their	 ability	 to	 avoid	 disintegration	 and	 to	
bounce	 back	 from	 collapse,	 showing	 evidence	 of	 new	 resource	 accumulation,	
capability	development	and	re-strategizing.		
	 The	measurement	of	impact,	from	our	research,	assesses	the	links	between	
theory	development	and	the	real-time	assistance	provided	by	theory-building.	It	is	
not	 a	 retrospective	 post	 hoc	 examination	 of	 relationships	 between	 independent	
and	dependent	variables.		
	 In	the	next	section	we	share	more	detail	regarding	alignment	between	the	
research	goals	of	rigor	and	real-time	assistance	and	the	impact	these	qualities	had	
on	the	focal	firm.		
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4.4	A	BRIEF	CASE	OUTLINE	
ActiveSky	is	a	wireless	technology	company	that	was	founded	in	1999	with	venture	
capital	 funds,	headquartered	 in	Silicon	Valley	with	additional	offices	 in	Australia	
and	Japan.	The	firm	grew	rapidly	in	the	period	up	to	2002	and	seemed	on	the	cusp	
of	benefiting	 from	the	explosion	of	demand	 for	wireless	 services	at	a	 time	when	
the	 potential	 of	 this	 medium	 was	 only	 beginning	 to	 be	 tapped.	 Yet	 the	 early	
traction	was	not	sustained	and	the	company	began	to	decline,	reducing	staff	and	
overall	 technology	development	 capabilities	 from	2003	onwards,	 even	 collapsing	
briefly	in	late	2004.	Yet	two	actors	within	the	firm	secured	control	of	the	firm	as	
well	as	new	funding	and	began	to	rebuild	capabilities	towards	new	strategic	goals.	
Despite	 some	 promise,	 this	 new	 strategy	 also	 did	 not	 sustain	 the	 firm	 and	 it	
experienced	a	second	collapse	in	2006.		
It	 was	 this	 second	 collapse	 that	 caused	 one	 of	 the	 actors	 to	 initiate	 a	
research	 project,	 seeking	 to	 understand	 why	 the	 firm	 was	 experiencing	 such	
difficulties	despite	 the	 general	 positive	outlook	 for	wireless	 technology	 and	how	
capabilities	could	be	rebuilt	 from	a	collapsed	state.	A	new	strategy	was	distilled,	
new	support	and	resources	attracted	and,	in	spite	of	good	early	traction,	the	firm	
experienced	a	third	collapse	during	2008,	the	year	of	the	“global	financial	crisis”.			
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Figure	1:	Timeline	of	ActiveSky	showing	three	iterations	of	capability	decline,	collapse	and	rebuilding	with	key	capability	
inflection	points	(as	large	dots)	and	descriptive	boxed	text	from	inception	to	the	present.	
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This	 progression	 of	 three	 sequences	 of	 decline,	 capability	 collapse	 and	
attempts	to	rebuild	new	capabilities	is	shown	by	the	timeline	in	Figure	1.	Initially,	
after	applying	venture	capital	funds	to	attracting	specialist	resources	and	building	
capabilities	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 software	 and	 business	 development,	 project	
management	and	adopting	a	sports	services	provisioning	strategy,	the	firm	yielded	
reliable,	 routine	 outputs	 with	 stable	 operating	 performance.	 When	 they	 were	
unable	to	leverage	these	early	successes	into	continued	revenue	growth,	resources	
were	 retrenched	 and	 capability	 decline	 became	 embedded	 leading	 to	 the	 first	
collapse.	 The	 reputation	 and	 reach	 of	 the	 firm’s	 capabilities	 allowed	 a	 new	
diversified	 strategy	 to	 be	 enacted,	 attracting	 sufficient	 funding	 and	 revenues	 to	
facilitate	some	rebuilding.		
However,	before	this	growth	could	stabilize	a	key	investor	withdrew	and	a	
brief	 second	 collapse	 ensued.	 Subsequently,	 a	 new	 strategy	 centered	 around	 an	
initial	 public	 offering	 (IPO)	 as	 a	 technology	 driven	 media	 company	 drew	
considerable	 market	 attention	 and	 buoyant	 valuations,	 based	 on	 the	 proven	
wireless	 platform	 development	 capabilities	 demonstrated	 in	 earlier	 years.	 The	
onset	 of	 the	 “global	 financial	 crisis”	 early	 in	 2008	 caused	 this	 IPO	 strategy	 to	
unravel	 leading	 to	 the	 third	 and	 current	 collapse.	 Taken	 together,	 this	 series	 of	
capability	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 rebuilding	 led	 to	 the	 theoretical	 and	 practical	
insights	of	heuristics	to	guide	capability	renewal	under	fast	changing	conditions1.	
																																								 								
1	Further	detail	of	the	case	is	given	in	Manfield	&	Newey,	2015	where	the	capabilities	required	to	
navigate	decline-collapse-rebuilding	sequences	are	explored.	
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Engaged	Scholarship	Team	Procedures	
Throughout	the	project	we	had	assembled	a	core	theory-building	team	consisting	
of	 three	 academics	 and	 two	 practitioners	 who	 all	 remained	 with	 the	 research	
project	across	the	nine	years.	This	core	team	was	supported	by	a	peripheral	team	
of	 transient	practitioners	 fulfilling	key	 roles.	So	we	studied	 14	years	of	 the	 firm’s	
history	 in	 total	 with	 the	 research	 team	 itself	 operated	 for	 nine	 years.	 This	
constitutes	nine	years	of	real	time	data	and	five	years	of	retrospective	data.	
Data	 collection	 included	 aspects	 common	 to	 traditional	 case	 study	methods,	
including	126	 interviews	with	diverse	stakeholders	and	recording	of	daily	diaries.	
But,	 true	 to	 engaged	 scholarship,	 key	 data	 also	 included	 real-time	 descriptions	
from	practitioners	 in	 the	core	research	team	of	what	was	being	experienced,	 the	
sense	they	were	making	of	it,	strategic	and	tactical	intentions	for	dealing	with	the	
circumstances,	 as	well	 as	 options.	 The	 academics	 on	 the	 team	were	 on	 hand	 as	
these	 events	 were	 occurring	 to	 ask	 probing	 questions,	 examine	 the	 cognitive	
frames	 of	 practitioners,	 identify	 relevant	 literatures	 and	 assess	 opportunities	 for	
theory-building	and	skill	coaching.	
The	 academics	 on	 the	 team	 were	 sensitive	 to	 those	 circumstances	 where	
existing	 theory	 failed	 to	 adequately	 explain	 the	 focal	 phenomena	 and	 proved	
unhelpful	 in	 guiding	 practitioners	 in	 real	 time.	 Practitioners	 would	 undertake	
detailed	 reading	 of	 key	 literatures	 such	 as	 turnaround,	 the	 resource-based	 view	
and	 capability	 research	 as	 well	 as	 resilience	 literature	 from	multiple	 disciplines	
(psychology,	 engineering,	 ecology,	 organization	 science).	 When	 practitioners	
experienced	disquiet	with	established	 literatures	and	their	 inability	 to	explain	or	
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help,	 the	 academic	 team	 sensed	 this	 as	 opportunities	 for	 building	 new	 theory.	
Focus	 groups	 meetings	 between	 academics	 and	 practitioners	 on	 the	 core	 team	
occurred	 frequently	 over	 the	 nine	 years	 of	 the	 study.	 These	 meetings	 would	
examine	 the	 links	 between	 the	 empirical	 phenomena,	 established	 theory	
shortcomings	and	the	discussion	of	alternative	explanations.		
4.5	THE	RIGOR-REAL	TIME	ASSISTANCE	NEXUS	
Adding	Real-Time	Assistance	to	Data	Analysis	&	Theory-Building	
Figures	2a	 to	c	 represent	 the	progressive	 theory-building	outputs	along	our	nine	
year	journey	of	tracking	and	working	with	our	focal	firm.	The	figures	represent	the	
outputs	from	our	own	iterative	skill-building.	Figure	1c	is	the	ultimate	product	of	
our	research	to	date.	Key	to	arriving	at	this	result	was	a	cyclical	process	of	Delve-
Test-Innovate-Unlock	and	15	underlying	steps,	which	kept	the	team	pursuing	the	
theory-building	process	and	prevented	premature	truncation.		
Table	 1	 illustrates	 the	 four	 phase,	 15	 step	 processs	 we	 enacted,	 and	 the	
progressive	theoretical	models	as	depicted	in	Figure	2a,	12b,	and	2c	that	emerged	
from	this	process.		
Phase	1:	Delve	(7	steps)	
Table	 1	 shows	 that	 our	 first	 step	 was	 to	 deeply	 engage	 with	 the	 empirical	
phenomenon	 of	 interest:	 organizational	 collapse.	 This	 exercise	 in	 construct	
validity	involved	defining	key	terms	(such	as	firm	collapse),	identifying	sub-parts	
(such	as	strategic	and	resource	collapse),	defining	sub-parts	and	identifying	their	
constituent	 dimensions,	 comparing	 our	 definition	 and	 description	 with	 existing	
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literature,	noting	any	new	phenomena,	testing	how	collapse	temporally	unfolded	
and	noting	its	effects.	We	then	examined	firm	response	strategies	including	what	
was	done	(behavior),	 the	beliefs	which	underpinned	 these	strategies	 (cognition),	
what	 worked,	 what	 didn’t,	 what	 was	 learnt	 from	 the	 experience	 and	 what	 was	
retained	 for	 future	use.	This	 is	a	highly	descriptive	 step	with	a	postponement	of	
analysis	 so	 to	 establish	 the	 boundaries	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 under	
investigation.		
	 Delving	 into	 an	 empirical	 phenomenon	 is	 a	 standard	 requirement	 for	
engaged	scholarship	and	process	research	traditions	(Pettigrew,	1997;	Van	de	Ven,	
2007).	However,	as	one	of	our	aims	was	to	offer	real	time	assistance	we	undertook	
a	 number	 of	 key	 steps	 to	 assist	 with	 this.	We	 sought	 to	 better	 understand	 the	
decision	context	of	the	practitioner,	 including	understanding	their	constraints	 in	
terms	of	resources,	their	cognitive	frames	in	terms	of	how	they	were	interpreting	
the	 experience	of	 collapse	 as	 it	 unfolded,	 the	 sequence	of	 events	 that	 led	 to	 the	
current	position	and	identifying	controllable	and	uncontrollable	factors.	
	 In	 testing	 for	 real	 time	 assistance	we	 also	 asked	 the	 practitioners	 on	 the	
team	how	the	emerging	model	(Figure	2a)	would	guide	them	in	real	time	and	how	
it	offered	anything	new	and	better	 to	what	 they	already	knew.	 	We	were	able	 to	
detail	 the	 construct	 of	 interest	 (firm	 collapse)	 and	 its	 dimensions	 (strategic	 and	
resource).	We	were	 able	 to	 also	 specify	 what	 we	 saw	 as	 the	 ultimate	 aim	 (firm	
recovery)	and	its	underlying	dimensions	that	response	strategies	needed	to	target	
(strategic	and	operating	activities).	
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Figure	2a:	Initial	Cause-Effect	Model	based	on	Utilities	as	a	particular	dynamic	capability	
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Figure	2b:	Microfoundations	of	Utilities	and	their	relationship	with	New	Operating	Capability	Development	as	the	firm	changes	from	
unstable	states	(requiring	utilities)	to	stable	states	(allowing	reliable	routine	actions).	 	
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Figure	2c:	Resilience	Capability	depicted	as	enacting	four	distinct	sets	of	heuristics	as	the	firm	strives	to	regain	stability	
with	attendant	strategic	cohesion	and	resource	sufficiency.	
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Table	1:	Delve-Test-Innovate-Unlock	Process	
Delve-test-innovate-unlock	
process	phase	
What	We	Did	 Resulting	Figures	
Phase	1:	Delve	into	the	anatomy	of	
organizational	collapse	
7	steps:	
1. Forensic	exercise	in	construct	validity	defining	key	terms	
2. Defining	sub-parts	and	identifying	their	constituent	
dimensions	
3. Comparing	our	definitions	with	literature	
4. Noting	any	new	phenomena	vis-à-vis	literature	
5. Testing	how	the	collapse	unfolded	and	its	effects	
6. Examining	firm	response	strategies	
7. Examining	what	was	learnt	from	the	experience	and	
retained	for	future	use	
Activities	resulted	in	drafting	initial	cause-effect	
model	based	on	utilities	as	a	particular	dynamic	
capability		
This	model	is	illustrated	in	Figure	2a.	
Phase	2:	Test	emerging	model	for	
rigor,	real	time	relevance,	impact	
2	steps:	
1. Submission	of	manuscript	based	on	utilities	model	(Figure	1a)	
2. Seeking	wider	practitioner	feedback	in	regard	to	model		
Tested	the	initial	theoretical	model	(Figure	2a).		
Feedback	from	this	test	phase	led	back	to	another	
delve	phase	where	more	data	was	collected.		
Phase	3:	If	model	fails	tests,	then	
Innovate	
2	steps:	
1. Failure	to	pass	tests	of	rigor	and	real-time	assistance	with	
model	1a:	Engagement	in	theory-building	innovation	
2. Second	‘delve’	phase	and	test	phase	
3. Abandoned	failed	theoretical	frames	(utilities)	
4. Adopted	new	perspectives:	dynamic	capabilities	and	
resilience	
First	round	of	innovation	resulted	in	new	
theoretical	model	(illustrated	in	Figure	2b).	In	this	
much	more	advanced	model,	we	remained	
committed	to	‘utilities’	concept	but	delved	
substantially	deeper	into	anatomy	of	utilities.	
Second	round	of	innovation	produced	Figure	2c,	
which	resulted	from	abandoning	utilities	and	
adopting	heuristics-based	dynamic	capability	frame		
Phase	4:	Unlock	value	from	new	
perspective	
2	steps:	
Unlock	full	potential	of	new	perspective	to	fulfil	both	academic	
rigor	and	real-time	assistance.		
1. Successive	rounds	of	external	academic	feedback	
2. Following	focal	firm’s	decision	makers	through	3	collapses.	
Activities	resulted	in	theoretical	model	as	
illustrated	in	Figure	2c.	New	model	emerged	by	
using	the	heuristics	perspective	after	having	studied	
three	episodes	of	collapse	and	rebuilding.	
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	 Our	analysis	of	what	worked	in	achieving	recovery	led	us	to	conceptualize	a	
new	 family	 of	 activities.	 This	 new	 family	 of	 activities	 we	 called	 utilities	 and	
believed	we	had	something	new	to	say	about	a	key	problem	in	capability	literature	
(Winter,	 2003)	 concerning	how	capabilities	 are	 formed.	The	 literature	contained	
arguments	that	capability	development	begins	with	ad	hoc	problem	solving	which,	
when	codified	and	replicated,	evolves	into	a	capability.	Capabilities	are	defined	by	
their	routinization,	exemplifying	that	the	firm	has	become	capable	in	identifying	a	
set	of	activities	and	processes	that	enable	it	to	get	a	job	done.	However,	when	we	
examined	our	data	we	felt	that	how	firms	need	to	deal	with	collapse	is	not	through	
either	ad	hoc	problem	solving	or	capabilities.	There	was	an	intermediate	class	of	
activities,	 which	 were	 labeled	 utilities.	 This	 became	 the	 focus	 of	 our	 theory-
building	for	the	next	few	years.	
Phase	2:	Test	(2	steps)	
Table	1	highlights	that,	after	developing	an	initial	model	(Figure	2a),	we	needed	to	
test	it	with	peers,	both	academic	and	practitioner.	We	submitted	Figure	2a	and	its	
accompanying	 manuscript	 for	 review	 at	 a	 high	 tier	 journal.	 This	 was	 a	 test	 of	
academic	rigor	and	our	claim	of	having	new	theory	 (the	utilities	construct).	The	
paper	was	rejected	as	reviewers	found	our	arguments	unconvincing	in	comparison	
to	 existing	 capabilities	 literature	 (Eisenhardt	 &	 Martin,	 2000;	 Teece,	 Pisano	 &	
Shuen,	1997).	These	reviewers	also	sought	greater	specification	of	the	dimensions	
and	nature	of	utilities.		
We	 also	 sought	wider	 practitioner	 feedback	 to	 test	 for	 generalizability	 in	
how	 well	 we	 satisfied	 the	 real	 time	 assistance	 criterion.	 The	 paper	 was	 sent	 to	
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three	experienced	practitioners	and	this	was	combined	with	a	focus	group	for	the	
airing	of	critiques	of	the	model	and	new	learning.	Feedback	from	this	Test	phase	
led	us	back	to	another	Delve	phase	where	we	needed	to	collect	and	analyze	more	
data	 that	 could	 help	 us	 to	 better	 conceptualize	 utilities	 and	 offer	 more	 fine-
grained	 real	 time	 assistance.	 Three	main	 conceptual	 challenges	 lay	 before	 us:	 1)	
demonstrating	 that	 utilities	 was	 a	 distinct	 and	 novel	 construct,	 2)	 better	
specification	 of	 utilities	 and	 3)	 more	 fine-grained	 real	 time	 assistance	 for	
practitioners	at	different	stages	of	the	collapse	process.	
Phase	3:	Innovate	(4	steps)	
When	we	failed	to	pass	tests	of	rigor	and	real-time	assistance	with	Figure	2a,	yet	
remained	 committed	 to	 the	 utilities	 idea,	 we	 undertook	 an	 incremental	 theory-
building	 innovation	 (Table	 1).	 	 Unexpectedly,	 the	 firm	 began	 to	 experience	 a	
second	 episode	 of	 collapse.	 This	 enabled	 a	 second	 ‘Delve’	 phase	 and	 gathering	
comparative	data	between	the	two	episodes.	Moreover,	strategies	developed	in	the	
initial	Delve	phase	and	embodied	in	Figure	2a	were	put	to	the	test	to	see	how	well	
they	worked,	in	real	time	
This	yielded	Figure	2b,	with	 several	noteworthy	aspects.	Experiencing	 the	
second	episode	of	collapse	and	recovery	allowed	us	to	observe	at	close	range	the	
anatomy	of	utilities,	 to	 specify	 their	nature	 at	 the	 level	 of	 individual	 cognitions,	
emotions	and	skills	as	well	as	collective	factors	of	coordination.		
We	 subjected	 the	 resulting	 new	model	 (Figure	 2b)	 and	 its	 accompanying	
paper	to	a	Test	phase	through	journal	submission	and	practitioner	review.	Again,	
the	 utilities	 idea	 did	 not	 gain	 acceptance	 from	 academic	 journal	 reviewers	 as	 a	
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construct	 distinct	 from	 capabilities.	 However,	 the	 construct	 as	 represented	 in	
Figure	 2b	did	 start	 to	 impact	positively	 on	 the	 focus	 group	of	 practitioners	who	
reported	some	level	of	assistance	yielded	by	the	model.	
Consequently,	 three	 turning	 points	 occurred:	 1)	 jettisoning	 the	 utilities	
concept	 and	 embracing	 dynamic	 capabilities	 as	 a	 frame,	 2)	 deeper	 engagement	
with	the	decision	context	of	the	practitioner	yielding	insights	 into	heuristics	and	
their	 role	 in	decision	making	under	 conditions	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 3)	 re-framing	
collapse	as	a	process	of	resilience.		
Jettisoning	 Utilities	 For	 a	 number	 of	 years	 now	 we	 had	 been	 viewing	 the	
problem	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 utilities	 and	 had	 dismissed	 the	 value	 in	 the	
perspective	offered	by	dynamic	capabilities	(Eisenhardt	&	Martin,	2000;	Teece	et	
al.,	1997).	The	feedback	from	rigorous	academic	and	practitioner	review	revealed	a	
new	aspect	of	dynamic	capabilities,	without	needing	a	new	construct	of	utilities.	
Deeper	 Engagement	with	 Practitioner	Decision	 Context	Our	 excursion	 into	
dynamic	capabilities	literature	led	to	a	sub-field	which	explores	how	decisions	can	
made	in	highly	dynamic	and	fluid	environments,	where	routine	actions	cannot	be	
maintained	 (Teece,	 2012).	These	 ‘simple	 rules	of	 thumb’	 can	guide	action	within	
certain	 parameters	without	 over-specifying	 how	 the	 rules	 should	 be	 carried	 out	
(Bingham	 &	 Eisenhardt,	 2011).	 Heuristics	 provide	 some	 decision	 structure	 but	
preserve	a	degree	of	behavioral	flexibility	given	the	dynamic	nature	of	a	particular	
context.	This	 exactly	matched	what	we	were	 finding	with	our	data	 and	how	 the	
firm’s	key	decision	makers	had	learnt	to	deal	with	collapse.	This	insight	provided	a	
new	lens	to	assess	the	role	of	resilience.	
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Construct	 Re-framing	 The	 term	 ‘Innovate’	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 all	 theory-
building	 pursues	 radical	 new	 perspectives	 and	 ways	 of	 understanding	 a	
phenomenon.	It	means	considering	alternative	ways	of	sensemaking	(Sandberg	&	
Tsoukas,	 2014)	 that	may	unlock	greater	explanatory	and	predictive	 theory	 to	aid	
real-time	 decision-making.	 	 This	 alternative	 sensemaking	 brought	 a	 resilience	
focus	and	marked	a	shift	in	the	core	research	question.		Instead	 of	 exploring	 how	
capabilities	emerge	in	adversely	impacted	firm	to	rebuild	growth	performance,	the	
team	 now	 sought	 to	 explore	 the	 capabilities	 required	 for	 the	 survival	 of	 an	
adversely	 impacted	 firm.	The	team	had	access	 to	deep	data	across	 three	cases	of	
collapse.	
The	shift	to	resilience	was	a	turning	point	in	unlocking	new	value	from	our	
research	 because	 resilience	 was	 commonly	 represented	 as	 a	 recovery	 from	
adversity	to	a	former	homeostasis.	The	embedded	case	analysis	instead	indicated	a	
resilience	 focus	as	yielding	new	future	pathways,	not	simply	recovering	a	 former	
pathway	to	growth,	representing	a	transformation	of	the	firm.	This	innovation	was	
driven	by	the	need	to	provide	real-time	assistance	to	the	firm	as	it	 lived	through	
adverse	conditions.	Neither	turnaround	literature	nor	the	practitioners	themselves	
were	viewing	the	problem	from	a	resilience	perspective.		
Phase	4:	Unlock	(2	steps)		
Figure	2c	represents	the	outputs	of	this	phase	in	our	theory-building	which	yields	
our	 best	 alignment	 with	 successive	 rounds	 of	 external	 academic	 feedback	 and	
practical	requirements	for	providing	real-time	assistance	to	survivors	in	the	focal	
firm.		 After	 three	 episodes	 of	 collapse,	 the	 firm	 has	 developed	 a	 capability	 in	
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resilience	that	aligns	the	decision	context	(dynamic,	highly	fluid),	constraints	(few	
resources)	 and	 opportunities	 (desire	 to	 persist)	 with	 a	 decision-making	 form	
(heuristics).		
Seeking	Impact	
Traditionally,	impact	is	measured	in	terms	of	academic	citation	rates	in	the	hope	
that	 findings	 will	 filter	 into	 lecture	 rooms	 and	 executive	 training	 programs	 in	
order	 to	 disseminate	 better	 practices	 (Aguinis,	 Shapiro,	 Antonacopoulou	 &	
Cummings,	2014).	We	propose	extending	this	measurement	to	include	impact	on	
practice.	 Improved	 firm	 performance	 is	 generally	 regarded	 as	 a	 contribution	 of	
research.	Engaged	scholarship	explicitly	seeks	to	solve	problems	through	research	
design	and	theory	building	rather	than	directly	improve	firm	performance	(Van	de	
Ven,	2007).	
	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 impact	 and	 its	 measurement	 could	 be	 built	
into	 our	 research	 process	 we	 turned	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 impact	 measurement	
adopted	 in	 the	 field	 of	 social	 entrepreneurship	 (eg.	 Ebrahim	 &	 Rangan,	 2014).	
Since	research	of	the	focal	case	incorporated	elements	in	common	with	this	field,	
we	chose	 include	the	traditional	program	logic	model	(Ebrahim	&	Rangan,	2014)	
and	the	BACKS	model	(Knight,	2002;	Penna,	2011)	as	impact	assessment	tools.	The	
program	 logic	 model	 requires	 actors	 to	 specify	 their	 chain	 of	 inputs,	 activities,	
outputs,	 outcomes	 and	 impact	 from	 their	 service	 provision.	 This	 allowed	 us	 to	
trace	changes	in	both	theoretical	and	practical	 inputs,	activities	and	outputs	and	
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how	 these	 led	 to	 changes	 in	 outcomes	 and	 impacts2.	 As	 our	 practitioners	
experienced	each	round	of	 firm	collapse	we	determined	what	they	were	 learning	
(inputs)	 and	 how	 this	 led	 to	 different	 responses	 (activities),	 outputs,	 outcomes	
and	impacts.	
	 We	 sought	 to	 capture	 direct	 beneficial	 impact	 on	 the	 entrepreneurs	
themselves	 as	well	 as	 the	 venture	 by	measuring	 outcomes	 (direct	 impact)	 using	
the	BACKS	model	(Knight,	2002;	Penna,	2011).	BACKS	is	an	acronym	for	Behavior,	
Attitude,	 Condition,	 Knowledge	 and	 Status.	 These	 five	 parameters	 frame	 an	
assessment	of	impact	on	the	entrepreneurs	and	the	venture.	In	terms	of	behavior	
we	 wanted	 to	 know	 how	 new	 learning	 from	 theory	 and	 practice	 resulted	 in	
different	 and	 hopefully	 better	 practices	 in	 managing	 collapse.	 We	 also	 sought	
changes	in	attitude	towards	collapse,	including	how	it	was	viewed	such	as	whether	
it	 meant	 the	 end	 or	 the	 beginning	 of	 something	 new.	 In	 the	 BACKS	 model,	
condition	 refers	 to	 the	 state	 of	 a	 subject	 (person,	 entity,	 thing)	 against	 an	
accepted,	 or	 social	 or	 cultural	 or	 universal	 standard	 (Penna,	 2011).	 Five	 stages	
along	 a	 continuum	of	 stability	 are	widely	used	 in	 the	 social	 sector	 and	we	were	
fortunate	that	this	model	is	also	directly	relevant	to	our	context	of	collapse.		These	
conditions	 range	 from	 “In	 Crisis”	 through	 vulnerable	 (about	 to	 fall	 back	 into	
crisis),	stable	(no	imminent	danger),	safe	(remedial	action	appears	to	be	holding)	
and	onto	thrive	(positive	adaptation	to	adversity).	
																																								 								
2	In	this	literature,	a	distinction	is	drawn	between	outcomes	and	impact	(Ebrahim	&	Rangan,	2014;	
Penna,	2011).	We	actually	view	outcomes	as	a	form	of	direct	impact.	In	our	Table	2	then	we	distinguish	
direct	impact	(outcomes)	on	a	focal	client	from	wider	impact	on	wider	stakeholders.	
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Table	2:	Using	a	logic	model	for	interpreting	the	impact	on	theory	and	practice	of	engaged	scholarship		
Chronology	
–	Inflection	
Points	in	
Learning	
Inputs		
(Practical:	Assets	&	Resources	
available;	Theoretical:	
knowledge	to	deal	with	
situation)	→ 	
Activities		
(how	responded	to	collapse)		→ 	
Outputs		
(Strategy	&	
Operations)	→ 	
Outcomes		
(Direct	Impact)		
(new	learnings,	behaviour	etc	
from	activity-output	
experience)→	
Wider	Impact		
(Practical	&	
Academic)	
2003	to	2008	
	
	
	
Practical:	Loss	of	almost	all	
resources	except	two	
founders,	intellectual	
property,	some	brand	
reputation,	motivation	to	
continue	venture	and	recover	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Theoretical:	Had	no	prior	
experience	of	collapse	or	
recovery	and	so	no	
theoretical	inputs	into	its	
management	
	
Practical:	Collect	source	code	as	
intellectual	property	to	form	
asset	base	for	new	strategic	
opportunities,	kept	business	
domain,	website	alive	to	show	
presence,	maintain	relationship	
and	motivation	between	
Founders	and	with	released	staff	
and	future	potential	partners	
	
	
	
	
Theoretical:	Began	to	study	
turnaround	and	capabilities	
literatures		
Key	relationships	
maintained	for	
ongoing	existence	and	
re-building	
	
No	new	strategy,	
waiting	for	new	
opportunities	and	a	
reason	that	provided	a	
means	to	re-build	and	
of	sufficient	interest	to	
motivate	keeping	going	
	
Operations	put	on	hold	
	
	
	
Theoretical:	Figure	1a	
Behavior	–began	to	expand	the	
skills	and	activities	required	to	
match	resource-collapsed	
circumstances	and	break	free	from	
routine	behaviors	previously	
enacted	to	conduct	operations		
	
Attitudes	–	From	collapse	
perceived	as	chaotic	to	
recognizing	the	need	to	develop	a	
set	of	coherent	activities	to	deal	
with	it	systematically	
	
Conditions	–	In	Crisis	
	
Knowledge-	started	to	theorize	
about	utilities	as	the	type	of	
activities	needed	by	resource-
collapsed	firms	and	seen	as	
contribution	to	capabilities	
literature.	Model	developed	Figure	
1a	
	
Status	–	Walking	Dead	
	
	
Practical:	firm	
barely	alive	
	
Academic:	no	
contribution	yet	to	
academic	
knowledge	
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2010	
	
	
Practical:	Secured	new	
financial	resources	
New	strategy	of	acquiring	
media	companies	
Outside	experts	engaged	to	
overcome	resource	
limitations	(accountants,	
lawyers,	technology	valuation	
companies)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Theoretical:	began	
remodelling	the	utilities	
construct	after	feedback	from	
journal	reviewers		
	
	
	
	
	
Practical:	As	collapse	ensued,	
focused	on	opportunity	creation	
to	create	new	strategy	for	firm	
and	gain	agreement	among	
stakeholders	as	to	new	strategy	
	
Then	worked	to	gather	necessary	
resources	internally	and	
externally	to	pursue	new	
opportunity	and	strategy			
	
	
Theoretical:	Explored	
microfoundations	literature	to	
understand	how	individual	
actions	collate	into	coordinated	
collective	activity	
	
Practical:	New	strategy,	
Staff	and	resources	
organized	around	roles	
needed	for	new	
strategy	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Theoretical:	Utilities	
Concept	to	explain	
how	firm	recovered.		
Figure	1b	
Behavior	–	no	longer	just	reactive	
and	chaotic	during	collapse.	
Action	priorities	became	to	create	
new	opportunities,	let	this	frame	
the	new	strategy	of	the	firm,	gain	
internal	agreement	as	to	strategy,	
salvage	necessary	resources	for	
strategy	and	acquire	those	missing	
through	external	relationships	
	
Attitudes-	Collapse	no	longer	
feared.	Seen	as	event	to	create	new	
opportunities	from	which	new	
strategy	can	emerge	and	which	
determines	resources	to	salvage	
and	how	to	organize	
	
Conditions	–	Stable	
	
Knowledge-	Fine-grained	
identification	of	both	individual	
and	collective	elements	of	utilities	
construct.	Developed	Model	
Figure	1b.	
	
Status	–	Walking	Dead	
	
Practical:	the	firm	
now	entered	new	
strategic	
opportunities	
	
Academic:	Figure	1b	
and	associated	
paper	rejected	
academically	
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2012	to	
Present	
	
	
	
Practical:	Secured	new	
financial	resources	
New	strategy	of	acquiring	
media	companies	
Outside	experts	engaged	to	
overcome	resource	
limitations	(accountants,	
lawyers,	technology	valuation	
companies)	
	
	
Theoretical:	Abandoned	
utilities	construct	and	
adopted	new	insights	from	
dynamic	capabilities	and	
heuristics	literatures.	Also	
adopted	resilience	as	a	lends	
with	which	to	view	the	
capability	the	firm	was	
developing	to	manage	and	
rebound	from	collapse		
Practical:	Sequenced	heuristics	
to	guide	actions	across	four	
inflection	points	–	2	along	the	
decline	and	collapse	curve	and	2	
on	the	upward	re-building	curve.	
The	firm	learnt	to	identify	and	
specify	heuristics	needed	around	
strategy,	resources	&	
communications		
at	each	of	the	inflection	points.	
Design	new	incarnation	of	firm	
for	new	opportunities		
	
Theoretical:	Began	researching	
the	notion	of	resilience	and	how	
it	relates	to	dynamic	capabilities	
concept	
Practical:	Specific	
heuristics	needed	to	
manage	distinct	critical	
points	along	the	U-
curve	of	decline,	
collapse	and	re-
building.	This	leads	to	
resource	salvaging,	
better	identification	of	
resources	most	
strategically	valuable,	
staff	included	in	the	
process	of	collapse	
management,	and	also	
new	firm	identity	
	
Theoretical:	Model	of	
resilience	capability	
building.	Figure	1c	
Behavior	–	action	based	on	
heuristics	
	
Attitudes-	Collapse	and	recovery	
now	seen	as	a	resilience	issue	for	
which	the	firm	needs	a	capability	
	
Conditions	–	Safe	
	
Knowledge-	Figure	1c.	Knowledge	
of	how	to	build	a	resilience	
capability	
	
Status	–	Firm	re-invented	into	new	
incarnation	and	in	start-up	phase	
	
Practical:	
knowledge	of	
resilience	capability	
now	being	passed	
on	to	early-stage	
ventures	
	
Academic:	Figure	1c	
the	basis	of	
submission	as	
contribution	to	
knowledge	about	
resilience	
capabilities	
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	 Table	2	above	shows	how	we	combined	both	the	program	logic	model	and	
BACKS	 models	 to	 explicitly	 incorporate	 impact	 assessment	 into	 our	 research.	
First,	we	divided	 the	 firm’s	experience	 into	 three	main	periods	where	 significant	
change	 occurred.	 These	 were	 periods	 of	 major	 learning	 and	 change,	 indicating	
measurable	impact.	These	periods	are	shown	as	column	one	“Inflection	Points	in	
Learning”	 and	 are	 distinct	 from	 the	 three	 embedded	 cases	 depicted	 in	 Figure	 1	
earlier.		
	 Following	the	program	logic	model	we	then	traced	inputs	that	refer	to	the	
available	options	to	handle	episodes	of	collapse.	These	inputs	were	both	practical	
(assets,	 resources)	 as	well	 as	 theoretical	 (what	knowledge	existed	about	 collapse	
and	 its	 management).	 The	 “Activities”	 column	 is	 used	 to	 record	 what	 the	 firm	
actually	did	in	practice	to	manage	the	collapse	(labeled	as	“practical”	in	Table	2).	
The	column	also	records	what	the	practitioner	members	of	the	research	team	did	
to	 learn	more	 about	 the	management	 of	 collapse	 as	 part	 of	 the	 theory-building	
engaged	scholarship	process	(labeled	as	“theoretical”	in	Table	2).		
Outputs	 then	 show	 what	 results	 emerged	 from	 both	 the	 practical	 and	
theoretical	 activities.	 Practical	 outputs	 were	 assessed	 in	 terms	 of	 changes	 to	
strategy	 and	 operations	 while	 theoretical	 outputs	 referred	 to	 the	 evolving	
theoretical	models	 being	 developed	 in	 the	 engaged	 scholarship	 process	 and	 are	
shown	as	Figures	2a-c.	The	outcomes	column	 then	 records	 the	direct	 impact	on	
both	 the	 entrepreneurs	 and	 the	 venture	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 BACKS	 model.	 The	
“Outcomes”	 column	 lists	 the	 results	 from	 the	 outputs.	 Finally,	 the	 last	 column	
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assesses	 the	 academic	 and	 practical	 impacts	 on	wider	 stakeholders	 arising	 from	
the	outcomes.		
The	 firm’s	 first	 experiences	of	 collapse	 (2003	 to	2008)	were	new	 to	 it	 and	
devastating.	After	 this	collapse	 their	practical	 inputs	 for	handling	 it	were	almost	
non-existent	 except	 for	 the	 two	 surviving	 founderss,	 some	 intellectual	 property,	
established	 brand	 reputation	 and	 a	 residual	 commitment	 to	 continue	 to	 pursue	
growth	opportunities	for	the	venture.	These	survivors	had	no	prior	knowledge	of	
collapse	 or	 how	 to	manage	 it.	 The	 activities	 column	 of	 the	 first	 row	 of	 Table	 2	
shows	 what	 the	 founders	 did	 to	 manage	 collapse.	 Further,	 they	 began	 taking	
action	 to	 study	 more	 about	 collapse	 through	 turnaround	 and	 capabilities	
literatures	 (“theoretical”	activity).	The	practical	activities	 sought	 to	 salvage	 some	
resources	 and	 led	 to	 outputs	 of	 the	 firm	 being	 alive	 but	 stalled,	 with	 no	 new	
strategy	and	operations	stopped.	The	theoretical	work	yielded	Figure	2a	as	a	first	
attempt	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 theoretical	 dynamics	 of	 collapse	 and	 recovery	
based	on	literature	insights	and	practical	experience.		
As	a	result	of	this	theoretical	work	and	the	experience	of	collapse	a	number	
of	 outcomes	 (direct	 impact)	 began	 to	 occur.	 The	 outcomes	 column	 of	 Table	 2	
shows	how	theory	and	practice	generated	impact.	In	the	first	row	we	see	that	the	
practical	 activities	 undertaken	 to	 manage	 collapse	 were	 basic,	 reactionary,	 and	
fearful.	But	the	theoretical	activities	and	outputs	led	to	new	learning	about	how	to	
manage	collapse.	This	is	recorded	in	the	outcomes	column	in	the	form	of	changes	
to	 behavior,	 attitudes	 and	 knowledge.	 These	 were	 beneficial	 impacts	 to	 the	
entrepreneurs.	Figure	2a	represented	an	early	stage	in	sensemaking	and	helped	to	
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organize	 survivor	 thinking	 about	 collapse	 and	how	 to	manage	 it;	 a	 step	 beyond	
their	 previous	 lack	 of	 any	 coherent	 knowledge.	 At	 this	 point,	 little	 beneficial	
impact	had	accrued	to	the	firm	which	remained	“in	Crisis”.		
The	 second	 row	 of	 Table	 2	 records	 further	 beneficial	 impact	 from	 the	
theory/practice	exchange,	as	the	firm	experienced	subsequent	episodes	of	collapse	
and	 trialed	 various	 counter-measures	 based	 on	 their	 evolving	 theoretical	 frame.	
The	firm	had	revived	from	two	successive	collapses	in	the	period	2003-08	and	had	
acquired	new	resources.	After	re-strategizing	the	firm	again	faced	collapse.	During	
the	 second	 episode,	 survivors	 had	 evolved	 their	 management	 orientation	 to	
embrace	utilities	that	would	hopefully	position	the	firm	for	better	recovery.		
This	 orientation	 embraced	 the	 concept	 of	 utilities,	 defined	 as	 the	 set	 of	
coherent	 activities	 which	 collapsed	 firms	 must	 engage	 to	 lessen	 decline	 and	
enhance	recovery.	With	this	experience	of	collapse	combined	with	a	rejection	of	a	
paper	outlining	an	early	rendition	of	the	utilities	concept,	Figure	1b	emerged	as	a	
stronger,	 clearer	 enunciation	 of	 the	 process	 of	managing	 collapse	 with	 utilities.	
This	figure	guided	the	practical	activities	in	row	2	of	Table	2.		
The	breakthrough	of	Figure	2b	created	various	BACKS	impacts.	Cognitively	
and	 behaviorally,	 the	 survivors	 reported	 no	 longer	 fearing	 collapse	 and	 instead	
embracing	 it	 as	 an	 opportunity-creator	 enabling	 new	 strategy	 to	 emerge.	 This	
insight	led	to	survivors	prioritizing	resources	for	salvaging	because	of	their	fit	with	
the	emerging	opportunities	and	strategy.	As	the	firm	entered	a	period	of	stability,	
as	 indicated	 in	Figure	 1	by	capabilities	above	 the	 threshold	of	 stability,	 survivors	
perceived	they	were	less	vulnerable	to	collapse.	
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However,	while	 impact	was	perceived	 in	practice,	 the	model	of	 Figure	 2b	
and	the	construct	of	utilities	had	failed	to	gain	traction	academically,	being	judged	
insufficiently	 distinct	 from	 a	 dynamic	 capability	 (Helfat	 &	 Peteraf,	 2003).	 This	
challenge	motivated	an	excursion	 into	dynamic	capabilities	 literature	 in	order	to	
find	 a	 more	 robust	 academic	 contribution.	 This	 excursion	 unlocked	 a	 new	
significant	wave	of	 insights	that	generated	greater	theoretical	and	practical	value	
that	 translated	 into	 BACKS	 impact.	 Figure	 2c	 emerged	 as	 the	 new	 theoretical	
frame	 and	 offered	 deeper	 guidance	 to	 managing	 the	 collapse	 process	 through	
heuristics.	The	 firm	 improved	 from	 ‘stable’	 to	 ‘safe’	 on	 the	 condition	continuum	
and	experienced	 the	 transformation	of	 its	collapse	 into	a	new	 incarnation	of	 the	
firm.	This	was	due	to	the	effective	management	of	resources	during	collapse	but	
also	 its	opportunity	creation	re-orientation.	By	casting	the	navigation	of	collapse	
as	a	resilience	capability,	as	embodied	in	Figure	2c	and	captured	in	the	third	row	
of	Table	 2,	 a	 sufficiently	 robust	model	had	been	distilled	 that	may	 inform	other	
entrepreneurs.	
4.6	CONCLUSION	
This	is	a	story	of	how	theory	and	practice	were	intertwined	to	create	impact	in	the	
form	 of	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 actual	 life	 of	 entrepreneurs	 surviving	 adverse	
conditions.	 This	 impact	 induced	 changes	 in	 behavior,	 attitude,	 condition,	
knowledge	and	status,	underscoring	the	value	of	engaged	scholarship	research	in	
the	overall	portfolio	of	research	tools	for	the	management	sciences.	Our	research	
approach	not	only	adds	to	the	comparatively	 few	examples	using	this	method,	 it	
demonstrates	how	new	theory	was	built	and	the	arising	hurdles	addressed.		
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	 The	 delve-test-innovate-unlock	 process	 for	 theory-building	 helps	
researchers	 to	deliver	real	 time	assistance	through	case	study.	Our	experience	of	
academic	 and	 practitioner	 synergy	 differs	 from	 arguments	 about	 zero-sumness	
(Kieser	&	Leiner,	2009,	2012).	Delivering	real	 time	assistance	to	a	struggling	 firm	
was	 neither	 separated	 from	 theory	 building,	 nor	 was	 the	 process	 a	 linear	
evolution.	The	two	were	iteratively	intertwined	such	that	our	ability	to	offer	useful	
and	important	practical	value	was	directly	correlated	with	the	quality,	robustness,	
validity	and	reliability	of	our	theory-building.		
Thus,	a	core	feature	of	our	experience	was	the	common	value	attributed	to	
theory-building	 by	 both	 researchers	 and	 practitioners.	 Practitioners	 sought	 to	
develop	 theory	 that	 assisted	 them	 in	 achieving	 their	 goals	 while	 the	 academics	
sought	theory	that	contributed	to	management	science	as	judged	by	their	peers.	In	
this	 sense,	 our	 arguments	may	 be	 limited	 to	 those	 academics	 capable	 of	 selling	
and	 teaching	 theory-building	 and	 those	 practitioners	 motivated	 to	 learn	 new	
theory-building	 skills.	We	 encourage	 a	 generation	 of	 researchers	 and	 leaders	 in	
business	schools	to	nurture	these	methods	towards	rigorous	research	that	delivers	
impact	with	assistance	in	real	time.	
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Preface	to	Chapter	5	
Introducing	the	Collapse	Trap	
	
To	review,	Chapter	1	positioned	the	experience	of	collapse	to	address	an	overall	
research	question	of	building	capabilities	in	resilience.	Chapter	2	then	outlined	
the	conceptual	framework	of	the	resilience	construct.	This	analysis	then	formed	
the	basis	of	an	empirically	derived	modeling	of	heuristic	based	capabilities	and	
how	 these	 enabled	 resilient	organizational	 actions.	Chapter	4	 then	developed	
the	findings	from	the	empirical	case	using	an	engaged	scholarship	framework,	
again	building	theory	for	the	process	of	resilience	capability	through	heuristics	
as	 this	 applies	 to	 firms	 navigating	 strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse.	 Chapter	 5	
now	 adds	 to	 this,	 applying	 a	 different	 lens	 to	 this	 data	 to	 explain	 the	 steps	
managers	can	take	when	seeking	to	break	a	cycle	of	instability,	to	address	the	
research	question:	how	can	organizations	remain	capable	when	their	capabilities	
are	 gone?	 This	 cycle	 breaking	 outcome	 is	 described	 as	 escaping	 the	 collapse	
trap,	 a	 phrase	 perhaps	 more	 resonant	 with	 practitioners	 who	 live	 with	 the	
consequences	of	set-backs.		The	focus	lies	in	iterative	sequence	of	actions	taken	
as	the	firm	pre-emptively	dismantles	capabilities	as	resources	decline,	survives	
collapse	of	resources	allowing	other	assets	to	come	to	the	fore	and	then	forms	
and	 develops	 new	 opportunities	 through	 collective	 actions	 from	 individual	
competency.	 The	 chapter	 has	 been	 published	 by	Wiley	 in	 Strategic	 Change:	
Briefings	in	Entrepreneurial	Finance,	appearing	in	the	July	2015	special	issue	on	
new	strategies	for	innovative	performance.	
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CHAPTER	5|	ESCAPING	THE	COLLAPSE	TRAP	Remaining	Capable	Without	Capabilities	
	
ABSTRACT	
Resilient	 firms	need	to	maintain	 function	even	while	under	duress,	both	with	
routine	 actions	 and	when	 routines	 collapse.	Capabilities	 are	 those	bundles	 of	
activities	 that	 organizations	 do	 really	 well	 and	 can	 give	 them	 a	 competitive	
edge,	but	what	do	you	do	when	 they	are	 shattered	by	adverse	environmental	
shocks?	Our	longitudinal	case	study	of	a	firm	that	experienced	three	episodes	
of	decline	and	collapse	reveals	a	particular	sequence	of	actions	that	managers	
need	 to	 learn	 in	 order	 to	 survive,	 even	 grow,	 from	 collapsed	 capabilities.	We	
find	that	firms	that	do	not	acquire	skills	are	likely	to	get	stuck	in	a	collapse	trap	
and	 that	 liberation	 comes	 from	 harnessing	 the	 unstable	 activities	 used	 to	
purposefully	 dismantle	 and	 rebuild	 capabilities	 under	 high-risk	 and	 volatile	
conditions.	
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5.1	 INTRODUCTION	
Old	wisdom	says	that	real	strength	is	shown	in	times	of	weakness	when	relied-
on	sources	of	strength	are	gone.	Such	wisdom	speaks	to	resilience	–	remaining	
capable	 even	 when	 things	 seem	 incapable.	 Our	 focal	 case	 study	 of	 real	 time	
decision-making	 through	 cycles	 of	 success	 and	 failure	 within	 ActiveSky	 over	
the	 last	 fourteen	 years	 indicates	 that	 resilience	 is	 critically	 important	 for	
organizations	 and	 managers	 as	 well.	 How	 can	 organizations	 remain	 capable	
when	their	capabilities	are	gone?		
ActiveSky	is	a	technology	company	founded	in	1999,	at	the	height	of	the	
dotcom	boom.	At	founding,	it	offered	a	radically	new	and	capable	platform	for	
handheld	wireless	devices	to	send	and	receive	interactive	content	over	the	air,	
enabling	 services	 that,	 at	 the	 time,	 were	 only	 dreamed	 of.	 	When	 handheld	
devices	 could	 typically	 garner	 processing	 speeds	 of	 no	 more	 than	 5	 MIPS	
(millions	of	 instructions	per	 second,	 compared	 to	400MIPS	or	greater	 today),	
the	ActiveSky	platform	was	able	to	deliver	functionality	for	online	forms,	audio	
and	 streaming	 video.	 The	market	 interest	 in	 this	 capability	 was	 intense	 and	
ActiveSky	successfully	raised	considerable	venture	capital	investment	to	fund	a	
rapid	and	ambitious	expansion.	In	addition	to	its	head	office	in	Silicon	Valley,	
within	a	year	it	had	opened	two	technology	development	facilities	in	Australia,	
a	sales	office	&	product	testing	facility	in	Japan	and	a	sales	office	in	UK.	
But	the	growth	didn’t	last.	ActiveSky	was	hardest	hit	by	the	volatility	of	a	
still	 forming	 wireless	 marketplace	 with	 fickle	 customer	 loyalties	 as	 new	
products	 hit	 the	 market	 and	 the	 consequent	 unstable	 and	 insufficient	 cash	
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flows.	 The	 firm	 found	 itself	 continually	 re-directing	 its	 resources,	 always	
catching	up	 to	 implement	 some	 latest,	desired	 feature	 set.	By	2003	 they	were	
well	 into	decline	with	a	series	of	staff	retrenchments.	By	2004,	they	collapsed.	
But	against	all	odds,	 they	 rebuilt	only	 to	collapse,	 rebuild	and	collapse	again.	
They	still	survive	today	and	their	lessons	offer	hope	to	those	who	would	like	to	
be	freed	of	“living	dead”1	status	(Bourgeois	&	Eisenhardt,	1987).	
We	have	studied	this	firm	throughout	its	entire	history	as	a	longitudinal	
case.	We	were	 fortunate	 to	be	amongst	 the	principal	decision-makers	as	 they	
faced	the	tough	choices	concerning	their	survival	and	rebuilding	through	three	
sequences	 of	 collapse.	What	made	 this	 case	 particularly	 instructive	 was	 that	
these	 principal	 decision-makers	 were	 also	 reflective	 practitioners.	 They	 were	
aware	of	existing	concepts	 in	management	 literature	 that	could	possibly	offer	
some	 help	 like	 turnarounds,	 capabilities,	 and	 bricolage	 (examples	 are	 Arend,	
2008;	 Arikan	 &	McGahan,	 2010;	 Baker	 &	 Nelson,	 2005;).	 But	 despite	 various	
attempts	to	apply	these	methods	during	troubled	times,	such	constructs	didn’t	
specifically	 address	 their	peculiar	 set	of	 circumstances:	 strategic	 and	 resource	
collapse.	 They	 had	 no	 or	 few	 discernable	 resources	 and	 no	 stable	 or	 optimal	
routines,	so	could	not	have	capabilities	as	this	construct	 is	commonly	defined	
(Nelson	 &	 Winter,	 1982).	 Despite	 a	 keen	 desire	 to	 turnaround	 the	 failing	
fortunes	of	the	firm,	none	of	the	attempts	appeared	to	work	and	just	making	do	
with	 what	 they	 had	 to	 hand	 didn’t	 fit	 comfortably	 with	 where	 the	 survivors	
aspired	 to	be.	Our	quest	 then	became	 to	make	 sense	of	 the	path	 followed	by	
																																								 								
1	The	living	dead	label	refers	to	those	firms	that	neither	achieve	great	growth	and	high	
valuation	nor	fail	outright,	as	perceived	from	the	venture	capitalist	point	of	view.	
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this	firm	through	engaging	with	key	decision	makers	and	to	contribute	to	our	
knowledge	 about	 how	 firms	 facing	 adverse	 conditions	 can	manage	 with	 and	
without	 capabilities.	 Sensemaking	 is	 a	 process	 of	 understanding	 the	 actions	
undertaken	 by	 a	 firm	 after	 these	 have	 occurred	 (Sandberg	 &	 Tsoukas,	 2014)	
which	we	coupled	with	both	real	time	and	retrospective	analysis.	
	 In	pursuing	this	sensemaking	goal,	we	observed	an	iterative	sequence	of	
focal	actions	that	indicates	a	possible	approach	to	escaping	a	collapse	trap	and	
to	 rebuild	 capabilities.	 	 Capabilities	 are	 established	 activity	 and	 resource	
utilisation	 routines	 that	 reliably	 produce	 positive	 and	desired	 outcomes	 for	 a	
firm	 (Helfat	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 They	 are	 mainly	 applicable	 in	 circumstances	 of	
strategic	 coherence,	 resource	 sufficiency	 and	 operating	 stability.	 When	
strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse	 occur	 through	 the	 impacts	 of	 adverse	
conditions,	capabilities	vanish	and	we	identify	a	different,	 fragile	yet	effective,	
set	of	activities	as	being	more	appropriate.	These	unstable	activities	are	used	to	
purposefully	 dismantle	 and	 rebuild	 capabilities,	 intended	 as	 an	 antidote	 to	
often	panicky,	chaotic	and	reactive	decision-making	which	can	occur	in	times	
of	 serious	 distress.	 Instead,	 we	 identified	 those	 actions	 that	 re-focus	 the	
managerial	 team	 to	 undertake	 a	 staged	 capability	 dismantling	 sequence,	
serving	to	prime	the	 firm	for	better	re-building.	 In	the	process,	a	 firm	able	to	
apply	such	actions	enhances	its	resilience	to	further	adversities	that	will	impact	
upon	it	at	later	times.	Those	that	do	not	develop	these	skills	are	more	prone	to	
remain	in	the	collapse	trap,	unable	to	manage	without	capabilities.				
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Next,	 we	 present	 our	 research	 method	 before	 outlining	 ActiveSky’s	
successive	 phases	 of	 collapse	 and	 re-building2.	We	 then	 use	 the	 case	 data	 to	
show	how	existing	literature	fails	to	inform	managers	on	escaping	the	collapse	
trap	and	how	such	actions	enhance	resilience.		
																																								 								
2	We	are	not	suggesting	that	ActiveSky	is	a	role-model	for	dealing	with	strategic	and	resource	
collapse;	the	firm	made	mistakes	in	strategic	choices	and	execution	of	worthwhile	strategies.	
We	are offering	these	focal	action	sequences	to	indicate	alternative	choices	to	the	dissolution	of	
the	firm,	outlining	real	and	specific	steps	for	actors	who	remain	committed	to	the	firm’s	
prospects	and	so	to	allow	them	to	realise	the	best	outcomes	from	a	fraught	situation.	
What	is	Collapse?	
By	 collapse	 we	 mean	 a	 situation	 where	 the	 firm	 has	 lost	 its	 vital	 strengths	 for	
capable	 action.	 In	 particular,	 we	 see	 two	 key	 sub-types	 -	 strategic	 and	 resource	
collapse	 –	 that	 form	a	sinister	 recipe	 if	 they	occur	 together.	 Strategic	 collapse	 is	
characterized	 by	 a	 paralysis	 of	 action	 as	 intended	 organizational	 goals	 are	
ambiguous	or	unfulfilled,	capabilities	have	disintegrated	and	key	product-market	
strategies	 have	 failed	 to	 secure	 growth.	 In	 addition,	 there	may	 be	 considerable	
fallout	and	dissension	among	the	principal	decision	makers	contributing	to	a	lack	
of	 coherence	 about	 future	 objectives	 and	 how	 best	 to	 achieve	 them.	 Resource	
collapse	is	characterised	by	key	assets	becoming	either	unavailable	or	difficult	to	
access	 in	 the	 near-term,	 rendering	 the	 firm	 unable	 to	 sustain	 the	 routines	 of	
resource	use	that	have	to	date	enabled	them	to	achieve	operating	objectives.	We	
suggest	that	this	particular	combination	of	strategic	and	resource	collapse	calls	for	
particular	skills	 in	 capability	dismantling	and	rebuilding	 in	order	 to	 avoid	death	
but	also	to	position	for	strategic	renewal.	
Box	1		
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5.2	 THE	RESEARCH	
Since	 the	 available	 constructs	 seemed	 not	 to	 provide	 useful	 remedies	 for	 the	
issues	our	case	experienced,	we	set	out	to	build	new	theory	to	show	how	firms	
can	 survive	 without	 capabilities	 after	 devastating	 strategic	 and	 resource	 loss.	
Our	 theory-building	 objectives	 occurred	 within	 the	 paradigm	 of	 engaged	
scholarship,	which	 is	 “a	 collaborative	 form	 of	 inquiry	 in	 which	 academics	 and	
practitioners	leverage	their	different	perspectives	and	competencies	to	coproduce	
knowledge	about	a	complex	problem	or	phenomenon	that	exists	under	conditions	
of	uncertainty	found	in	the	world”	(Van	de	Ven	&	Johnson,	2006:	803).		
The	 knowledge-in-practice	 of	 the	 practitioner	 offers	 context-specific	
tests	 of	 rival	 hypotheses	 while	 the	 more	 detached	 academic	 converts	
knowledge-in-practice	 into	 rigorous,	 more	 generalizable	 theory.	 Engaged	
scholarship	 thus	 is	 a	 means	 for	 synthesizing	 complementary	 and	 pluralistic	
views	of	a	given	reality	and	for	achieving	aims	of	rigor	and	relevance.	Synthesis	
is	 achieved	 through	 a	 strategy	 of	 arbitrage	 –	 dialectical	 debate	 and	 conflict	
which	triangulates	on	a	phenomenon	and	from	which	a	more	robust	synthesis	
can	emerge.	A	key	goal	is	the	generation	of	robust	theoretical	explanation	with	
knowledge	co-production	observing	a	number	of	practices	through	an	iterative	
cycle	 of	 problem	 formulation,	 theory	 building,	 research	 design	 and	 problem	
solving.	
First,	engaged	scholarship	is	best	suited	to	“big”	research	questions	that	
are	grounded	in	reality	and	whose	complexity	demands	multiple	perspectives.	
We	have	done	this	by	focusing	on	a	pervasive	problem	–	how	can	firms	survive	
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and	recover	from	severe	adversity	given	that	adversity	is	somewhat	inescapable.	
Second,	the	research	project	should	be	designed	to	be	a	collaborative	learning	
community	between	academics	and	reflective	practitioners.	 Third,	 the	 study	
should	 be	 designed	 for	 an	 extended	 duration	 to	 allow	 for	more	 time	 on-site,	
reflection,	 data	 gathering	 and	 observation	 across	 time.	 Our	 research	 design	
involved	 real	 time	 data	 collection,	 field	 observation	 and	 theory-building	
arbitrage	over	 a	 fourteen	year	period.	Fourth,	 is	 the	need	 to	 employ	multiple	
models	 that	 offer	 competing	 plausible	 explanations	 of	 the	 phenomenon.	 For	
this	 reason,	 our	 study	 compares	 routine-based	 capabilities,	 bricolage	 and	
turnaround	explanations	for	how	firms	survive	and	recover	from	strategic	and	
resource	collapse.		
We	 sought	 to	 achieve	 our	 theory-building	 goals	 by	 deploying	 engaged	
scholarship	 through	 a	 modified	 version	 of	 a	 traditional	 case	 method	
(Eisenhardt	 &	 Graebner,	 2007;	 Siggelkow,	 2007).	 The	 reflective	 practitioners	
brought	both	real	time	and	historical	 insights	about	their	work	context	under	
severe	resource	constraint	and	were	able	 to	 trial,	 in	real	 time,	various	activity	
options	suggested	by	the	literature	through	learning-by-doing.	This	sharpened	
the	 assessment	 of	 existing	 concepts	 such	 as	 routine-based	 capabilities,	
turnaround	strategies,	and	bricolage	as	suggested	by	academic	literatures.	But	
the	 richest	 results	 were	 achieved	 as	 each	 participant,	 academic	 and	
practitioner,	engaged	 in	arbitrage	within	 their	own	evolving	understanding	of	
the	 phenomenon.	 We	 believe	 that	 if	 we	 had	 have	 remained	 as	 detached	
academics	we	would	not	have	engaged	in	as	rich	a	theory-building	experience.		
	 	 	 	
	
192	
Sample	and	Data	Collection	
Our	 focal	 case	 afforded	 us	 deep,	 privileged	 access	 to	 real	 time,	 longitudinal	
decision-making,	 representing	 a	 rich	 opportunity	 in	 decline-turnaround	
research.	 It	 is	 usually	 difficult	 for	 researchers	 to	 identify	 and	 track	 collapsed	
firms	over	time	because	the	business	may	have	been	liquidated	and	the	people	
moved	on.	Other	researchers	also	have	yielded	rich	breakthroughs	on	account	
of	deep,	privileged	longitudinal	data	access	from	a	focal	case	to	expose	obscure	
or	hidden	capabilities	(Salvato,	2009).		
Data	was	 systematically	 collected	 from	a	number	 of	 sources	 and	 these	
sources	 differed	 across	 the	 three	 cycles	 of	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 rebuilding.	
Overall,	the	authors	undertook	a	total	of	126	interviews	across	eight	informants,	
iterating	 between	 interviews,	 data	 analysis,	 theory-building	 and	 some	 theory	
testing.	 From	 the	 point	 of	 strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse	 we	 asked	 the	
remaining	few	survivors	(hereafter,	‘survivors’)	of	the	firm	to	keep	daily	diaries.	
We	had	unlimited	access	to	these	diaries.		
These	 survivors	 participated	 to	 varying	 degrees	 in	 the	 capability	
development	 efforts	 from	 inception.	 In	 the	 process	 of	 theory-building,	 we	
triangulated	 diary	 entries	 and	 other	 written	material	 with	 interview	 data.	 In	
terms	 of	 historical	 chronology	 the	 diaries	 were	 remarkably	 similar,	 with	
differences	 in	 emphasis	on	 the	 impact	of	particular	 events.	This	 resulted	 in	 a	
relatively	easy	correction	of	differences,	lending	confidence	that	we	had	reliable	
data.	From	this	data,	we	were	able	to	delineate	ten	distinct	phases,	 framed	in	
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terms	of	its	organizational	performance	and	the	capabilities	that	enabled	such	
performance.	We	give	a	brief	summary	of	these	phases	in	Box	2.	
Theory-Building	Through	Arbitrage	
Theory-building	 proceeded	 by	 the	 researchers	 and	 the	 organizational	 actors	
collaboratively	 testing	 various	 literature-based	 activity	 options.	 Testing	 of	
theory	 by	 actors	 involved	 not	 only	 becoming	 familiar	 with	 the	 relevant	
concepts	 but	 also	 accepting/rejecting	 the	merits	 of	 each	 based	 on	 reasoning	
and/or	practical	application.	Actors	became	familiar	with	theory	about	routine-
based	capabilities	by	studying	seminal	articles	 in	the	resource-based	view	and	
organizational	capabilities	literature	sets.		
Turnaround	strategies	and	bricolage	literatures	were	also	examined	and	
tried	 in	 practice.	Our	 derivation	 of	 definitions,	 sources,	 key	 components	 and	
limiting	 assumptions	 resulted	 in	 Table	 1.	 We	 observed	 key	 commonalities	
among	 the	 range	 of	 different	 tasks	 that	 were	 required.	 This	 commonality	
emerged	from	the	constraints	imposed	by	strategic	and	resource	collapse.	Table	
1	 outlines	 how	 the	 observed	 actions	 appeared	 to	 be	 distinctively	 different	 to	
other	constructs.			
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The	Ten	Phases	of	ActiveSky	
Early	Stage	Growth	(1999	–	2003)	
• Received	investments,	established	5	offices	in	3	countries,	applied	resources	
to	technology	&	business	development	capabilities,	changed	core	strategy	3	
times,	launching	interactive	streaming	video	trails	and	live	deployments	in	
2	countries	marking	key	capability	milestones	
Decline	1	(2003	–	2004)	
• Failure	 to	 leverage	 more	 licence	 revenues,	 cost	 cutting,	 resource	
retrenchments	
Collapse	1	(late	2004)	
• Surrender	of	the	firm	by	investors	to	survivors	
Creating	New	Opportunities	1	(2005)	
• Retain	 former	 strategy,	 agility	 in	 seeking	 new	 revenues,	 building	 new	
commercial	 skills,	 formation	 of	 acquisition	 process	 by	matching	 industry	
player	
Decline	2/Collapse	2	(early	2006)	
• Failure	 of	 acquisition	 process,	 2nd	 opportunity	 chased,	 new	 aligned	
interests	
Creating	New	Opportunities	2	(2006	-	2007)	
• New	IPO	strategy	built	on	retained	reputation	&	know-how	
Rebuilding	Capabilities	as	Resources	Accrue	1	(2007)	
• Lay	down	activity	patterns	to	secure	IPO,	using	partner	firm	resources	
Decline	3	(2008)	
• GFC	destroys	 ability	 for	 funders	 to	 support	 IPO,	no	opportunities	 can	be	
leveraged	
Box	2		
	 	 	 195	
Table	1:	Activities	relevant	to	Collapse	
Activity	Type	 Definition	 Core	Components	 Dominant	
Logic	
Typical	
Environment	
Limitations	
Routine-based	
Capabilities	
(Arikan	&	
McGahan,	
2010)	
Repeatable	
processes		
involving	
collective	action	
above	a	certain	
threshold	of	
functionality		
• Cognitive	framing	across	
hierarchy		
• Routines	
• Integration	mechanisms	
Commitment,	
leverage,	
efficiency	
Stable	to	
moderately	
dynamic	
• Threshold	level	of	resources	required	for	
capability	leverage	and	replication	
• Assumes	stability	and	strategic	coherence	
across	organization	levels	to	know	what	
capabilities	need	to	be	developed	
Organizational	
Decline		
(Carmeli	&	
Schaubroeck,	
2008)	
Sustained	
reduction	in	
firm’s	
performance	
caused	by	
operational	&	
strategic	
problems	
• Operational	problems	
• Strategic	problems	in	a	
given	environment	
Devise	
recovery		
strategy	
Moderately	
dynamic	yet	
sufficiently	stable	to	
allow	for	firm	
recovery	
• Focus	on	recovery	of	former	performance	levels	
rather	than	a	new	strategic	&	operating	
configurations	implying	new	resource	sets	and	
new	routines	of	utilization	&	growth	
Bricolage	
(Baker	&	
Nelson,	2005)	
“making	do	by	
applying	
combinations	of	
the	resources	at	
hand	to	new	
problems	and	
opportunities”	
• Making	do	
• Combination	of	
resources	for	new	
purposes	
• Use	resources	at	hand	
	
Invention	to	
achieve	more	
from	less	
	
Resource	
constrained	
• Invention	also	needs	strategy	
• Ignores	how	executing	strategies	also	requires	
resource	acquisition	not	just	‘making	do’	
Turnaround	
(Arogyaswamy,	
Barker	&	Yasai-
Ardekani,	
1995)	
Convert	decline	
into	enduring	
success	through	
strategic	&	
operating	changes	
• Seek	to	recover	from	
decline	below	historical	
levels	of	performance	
back	to	a	firm’s	
equilibrium	state	
Response	to	&	
transition	from	
adverse	
conditions	
Adverse	event	in	an	
otherwise	stable	
operating	
equilibrium	
• Regards	decline	&	turnaround	as	single	
trajectory	whereas	multiple,	interacting	paths	
commonly	interact	
• No	focus	on	building	resilient	capabilities	to	
enable	an	enduring	success	with	future	shocks	
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Observed	
Actions	in	this	
Research	
Non-routine	
activities	in	
unstable	
operating	
conditions	during	
strategic	and	
resource	collapse.		
• Dismantle	existing	
routines	to	enable	future	
rebuild	
• Improvised	and	
opportunistic	resource	
rebuilding	&	
configuration	towards	
new	strategic	
foundation	
Deliberate	
dismantling	
then	
rebuilding	of		
resources	&	
patterns	of	
activity	
Strategic	and	
resource	collapse	
after	adverse	
discontinuity	
during	operating	
instability	
• Key	decision	makers	prepared	to	function	
below	operating	stability	threshold,	persisting	
with	shared	perception	of	future	value	
conditions	
• Creation	of	strategic	value	driven	by	
recognition	&	exploitation	of	exogenous	factors	
by	survivors	
• Entrenches	reactive	variability	when	resources	
become	stable	
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Figure	1:	Timeline	of	ActiveSky	viewed	through	a	capabilities	lens	and	expressed	in	terms	of	its	organizational	capabilities,	showing	key	
inflection	points	as	large	dots	and	brief	descriptions	of	various	phases	of	growth,	decline	&	collapse.	Note	the	2	periods	of	operating	
stability	(2001-2003	and	2007)	where	capability	(re)building	occurred.	
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5.3	 ACTIVESKY:	CYCLES	OF	DECLINE,	COLLAPSE	AND	REBUILDING	
By	 using	 a	 capabilities	 lens,	 this	 longitudinal	 case	 allows	 us	 to	 represent	 adverse	
impacts	 in	3	different	phases,	distinguished	 in	 terms	of	an	overall	capability	 (or	 lack	
thereof)	 to	 exploit	 available	 resources	 to	 deliver	 reliable	 outcomes.	 	We	 label	 three	
distinguishing	 phases	 as	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 rebuilding;	 these	 phases	 are	 briefly	
listed	 in	Box	 2	 and	 conceptually	 represented	 in	Figure	 1.	 Each	phase	 corresponds	 to	
periods	of	 either	 reduction	 in	organizational	 performance	 (decline),	 a	 sustained	 low	
level	or	zero	reliable	performance	(collapse)	and	periods	of	 increasing	organizational	
performance	(rebuilding).		
Our	 case	 data	 shows	 that	 during	 phases	 of	 decline,	 shown	 by	 successive	
downward	 gradients	 in	 Figure	 1,	 an	 evolving	 pattern	 of	 behaviours	 and	 activities	
occurred.	Triggered	by	the	failure	of	the	initial	business	model,	the	first	decline	sought	
to	retain	as	many	resources	as	possible	with	a	view	to	“recovering”	back	to	the	type	of	
operating	stability3	that	had	occurred	prior	to	the	onset	of	decline.	The	use	of	the	term	
recovery	 is	 instructive	 as	 it	 arises	 in	 turnaround	 literatures	 and	 suggests	 a	 view,	
derived	 in	hindsight,	of	 returning	 to	 former	 levels	of	 resourcing	and	generally	along	
the	lines	of	the	previously	existing	strategy	(Arogyaswamy,	Barker,	&	Yasai-Ardekani,	
1995).			
During	 the	 Decline	 2	 phase,	 the	 key	 decision	 makers	 had	 learned	 from	 the	
experiences	of	the	previous	decline,	recognising	that	recovery	may	not	be	possible	and	
																																								 								
3	We	define	operating	stability	as	a	threshold	of	reliably	exploiting	resources	through	routine	behaviour	
to	achieve	a	desired	outcome.	Falling	below	this	threshold	means	the	firm	can	no	longer	reliably	
achieve	desired	outputs	from	these	routine	patterns	of	action.	
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so,	as	a	 fresh	approach,	chose	 to	consciously	 focus	on	building	multiple	opportunity	
paths	to	be	exploited	across	a	range	of	contexts	(Barker	&	Duhaime,	1997).	When	the	
preferred	opportunity	collapsed	unforeseeably,	they	retained	two	other	options,	each	
of	which	 could	have	worked	 for	 the	 firm	 as	 it	 stood	 at	 that	 time.	The	 insight	 to	 be	
gained	here	is	the	development	from	an	historical	“recovery”	focus	into	a	more	future-
oriented	 “opportunity	 development”	 focus	 which	 involved	 a	 change	 in	 how	 they	
managed	collapse	and	planned	for	the	future.		
During	the	Decline	3	phase,	the	key	decision	makers	chose	for	the	first	time	to	
focus	 on	 pro-actively	 removing	 resource-consuming	 assets	 rather	 than	 waiting	 for	
them	 to	 collapse.	 They	 initiated	 a	 release	 of	 all	 assets	 that	 consumed	 resources	 of	
labour,	 attention	 or	 cash,	 such	 as	 the	 IP	 portfolio,	 office	 space	 and	 paid	 staff,	 but	
actively	 retained	 those	 few	resources	 that	could	possibly	withstand	collapse,	 such	as	
historical	reputation,	the	company’s	domain	name	and	stored	archives	of	the	platform	
source	code.	They	judged	that	these	low-resource	consuming	elements	would	yield	an	
essential	 contribution	 should	 more	 favourable	 conditions	 arise	 at	 some	 later	 time,	
enabling	a	 renewal.	The	key	decision	makers	here	 learned	 that	 resources	 are	not	 all	
created	equal	in	terms	of	their	resilience,	a	point	we	return	to	in	more	detail	later.	
Following	 these	 multiple	 decline	 phases,	 our	 data	 shows	 three	 periods	 of	
collapse,	the	last	occurring	over	a	prolonged	period.	Collapse	1	was	largely	pre-empted	
by	the	survivors,	even	encouraged,	as	a	way	of	 leveraging	the	legal	assets	of	the	firm	
from	the	control	of	 the	original	 investors.	 It	 is	a	powerful	yet	high-risk	approach,	 to	
deliberately	invoke	collapse	to	achieve	full	strategic	&	operating	control,	quarantined	
from	 domination	 by	 parties	 external	 to	 the	 survivors.	 Yet	 in	 this	 case,	 it	 worked.	
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During	the	unforseen	Collapse	2	phase,	the	surviving	members	had	anticipated	some	
shocks,	although	not	 the	particular	 shock	 that	caused	collapse	of	 the	 resources	 they	
had	 begun	 to	 accumulate.	 Accordingly,	 they	 had	 begun	 to	 accrue	 an	 array	 of	
opportunities	 that	 could	 be	 invoked,	 to	 various	 benefit	 profiles.	 Because	 they	 had	
invested	 in	 this	 effort,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 coherence	 of	 the	 surviving	 team	 and	 building	
trust	 between	 these	 survivors,	 they	 could	 collectively	 adjust	 to	 a	 radically	 new	 and	
hitherto	un-envisaged	 strategic	direction.	Collapse	 3	demonstrates	 	how	 successfully	
the	 	 strategy	 of	 stripping	 resource	 consuming	 assets	 has	 worked,	 in	 sustaining	 an	
apparently	resource-less	firm	for	an	extended	period.	
During	the	New	Opportunities	 1	phase,	 the	survivors	cohered	around	a	single	
strategy	 that	was	 largely	based	on	 re-creating	earlier	operational	norms	but	without	
strategic	interference	from	other	parties.		The	collective	coherence	was	a	continuation	
of	this	earlier	experienced	buoyancy.	New	Opportunities	2	showed	a	coherence	around	
an	entirely	new	strategy,	 the	 IPO,	made	possible	by	 the	attraction	of	new	skills	 into	
the	 surviving	 team	 that	 deepened	network	&	 commercial	 resources.	 The	 impending	
New	 Opportunities	 3	 phases	 is	 derived	 from	 a	 single	 project	 opportunity	 but	 the	
survivors	have	been	able	to	create	a	sustainable	collapsed	configuration	that,	while	the	
value	of	these	assets	attenuates	over	time	(that	is,	a	decay	in	historical	reputation	from	
earlier	successes,	technical	know-how	in	the	wireless	space,	connections	into	an	array	
of	commercial	projects	that	could	possibly	yield	as	yet	unformed	growth	opportunities	
for	 ActiveSky	 survivors)	 has	 proven	 to	 be	 a	 sustainable	 collapsed	 state,	 without	
dissipating	entirely	the	possibility	of	renewal	and	rebuilding.	
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5.4	 INADEQUACY	OF	EXISTING	CONCEPTS	
Interesting	findings	emerged	as	we	tried	to	explain	the	above	patterns	using	existing	
concepts	from	the	management	literature.	Table	1	lists	the	various	concepts	that	were	
considered	throughout	our	research	and	what	we	learnt	about	the	boundaries	of	their	
usefulness	to	explain	and	predict	in	the	circumstances	under	study.	
Bricolage	captured	aspects	of	the	mindset	and	action	required	when	both	decline	
and	 rebuilding	 were	 underway.	 Bricolage	 called	 attention	 to	 the	 need	 for	
resourcefulness,	for	discriminating	between	the	usefulness	of	various	resources,	of	the	
need	 to	 discard	 some	 and	 salvage	 others	 (Baker	 &	 Nelson,	 2005).	 However,	 the	
concept	of	bricolage	was	not	enough	to	capture	the	management	approach	required.	
In	 particular,	 bricolage	 does	 not	 capture	 the	 purposeful	 and	 staged	 way	 that	
capabilities	were	 dismantled	during	decline	nor	 the	 purposeful	 and	 staged	way	 that	
capabilities	were	rebuilt	to	realise	an	aspired	strategic	goal.		
Routine-based	 capabilities	 were	 not	 an	 applicable	 concept	 because	 there	 were	
none.	Critical	capability	conditions	of	strategic	coherence	and	resource	sufficiency	to	
maintain	a	level	of	operating	function	were	not	present.	We	needed	to	figure	out	how	
the	firm	could	get	back	to	this	position.	Much	of	the	capabilities	perspective	is	focused	
on	 reconfiguring	 existing	 resources	 and	 does	 not	 address	 what	 actions	 help	 once	
resources	have	collapsed	and	capabilities	cannot	be	sustained	(Helfat	&	Peteraf,	2003).	
Using	this	perspective	there	can	be	no	recovery	from	collapse,	so	the	survivors	in	2004	
would	have	walked	away	and	further	renewal	attempts	abandoned.	
Finally,	 if	 they	 had	 adopted	 a	 turnaround	 perspective,	 they	 would	 have	
retrenched	resources	during	the	Decline	1	phase	and	could	have	sought	to	renew	the	
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firm’s	 strategy	 using	 existing	 networks	 of	 investors	 and	 alliance	 partners	 (see	 for	
example	Lohrke,	Bedeian,	&	Palmer,	2004).	This	approach	would	have	left	the	existing	
strategic	 control	 framework	 in	 place,	 yet	 may	 have	 worked.	 The	 founders	 took	 a	
gamble	 that	 by	 riding	 through	 collapse,	 they	 could	 accrue	 full	 strategic	 control	 for	
themselves,	which	they	perceived	as	a	requirement	to	tackle	future,	as	yet	unknown,	
adverse	conditions.	
5.5	 COMMON	FLAWED	REACTIONS	AND	THE	COLLAPSE	TRAP	
We	 argue	 that	 the	 repeated	 cycles	 of	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 rebuilding	 in	 ActiveSky,	
without	 sustainably	 achieving	 stability,	 show	 a	 corrosive	 condition	 that	 becomes	
increasingly	 harder	 to	 sustain	 over	 time.	 	We	 call	 this	 condition	 a	 collapse	 trap;	 an	
extended	 state	 where	 “escape”	 into	 conditions	 of	 strategic	 cohesion	 and	 resource	
sufficiency	 above	 a	 threshold	 of	 operating	 stability	 are	 elusive.	 A	 collapse	 trap	 can	
occur	 when	 firms	 fail	 to	 learn	 from	 decline	 and	 collapse	 and	 so	 fail	 to	 initiate	 key	
actions	 that	 could	 indeed	 lift	 the	 firm	back	 on	 a	 path	 of	more	 stable	 resources	 and	
routines	into	capability	development,	when	opportunities	are	created.		
	 Existing	in	the	collapse	trap	indicates	that	survivors	may	have	failed	to	learn	to	
dismantle	resources	and	survive	a	collapse	episode	in	a	way	that	facilitates	rebuilding	
should	 opportunities	 emerge.	 The	 collapse	 trap	 may	 also	 result	 when	 firms	 have	
pursued	ad	hoc	approaches	to	stemming	resource	loss	during	decline	and	so	reach	a	
plateau	of	near-death	existence	but	without	the	pre-conditions	for	re-building.	That	is,	
capabilities	 have	 not	 been	 purposefully	 dismantled	 during	 decline	 and	 so	 a	 useable	
seedbed	for	capability	rebuilding	has	not	been	established.	As	such,	a	key	determinant	
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for	remaining	in	a	collapse	trap	is	managerial	error,	often	in	the	form	of	inexperience	
with	managing	decline	or	fear	of	collapse	itself.	
Table	 2	 below	 highlights	 some	 of	 the	 common	 actions	 undertaken	 during	
decline	 recovery	or	 reversal	 attempts	and	 the	various	assumptions	 that	apply.	These	
actions	and	assumptions	constitute	the	condition	we	label	as	a	collapse	trap	and	are	
derived	from	the	ActiveSky	data	as	it	navigated	repeated	cycles	of	decline,	collapse	and	
rebuilding.	
	 Next	 we	 outline	 how	 this	 model	 invites	 a	 different	 set	 of	 actions	 and	
assumptions	 to	 those	 currently	 offered	 by	 the	 strategic	 choice	 based	 turnaround	
models,	synthesizing	the	various	lessons	learned	by	ActiveSky	decision-makers	based	
on	their	various	decline	and	collapse	experiences	and	the	actions	that	led	to	capability	
rebuilding.	This	process	involved	changes	in	how	they	viewed	the	collapse	experience	
and	 the	 ways	 that	 action	 needed	 to	 be	 taken,	 to	 overcome	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	
existing	 conceptual	 repertoire	 in	 the	management	 literature	 related	 to	 dealing	with	
organizational	decline.	
5.6	 PURPOSEFUL	MOVES	IN	COLLAPSE	
The	U-model	 (Figure	 2)	 illustrates	 actions	 purposeful	 dismantling	 and	 rebuilding	 of	
capabilities	 on	 either	 side	 of	 collapse.	 Importantly,	 the	 U-model	 depicts	 a	 line	 of	
operating	 stability	 above	which	 capabilities	 are	 possible	 but	 below	which	 requires	 a	
different	 activity	 sequence.	 	 Existing	 capabilities	 literature	 has	 traditionally	 focused	
above	 the	 line	 carrying	 an	 in-built	 assumption	 of	 strategic	 cohesion	 and	 resource	
sufficiency	characteristic	of	relatively	stable	circumstances.		
	 	 	 	
	
204	
	
Flawed	Actions	 Flawed	Assumptions	
Attempt	 to	 survive	 by	 recovering	 resources	 to	
resume	existing	strategic	goals	
Resources	 can	be	 recovered	and	 so	 existing	 strategic	
goals	can	remain	intact		
Devise	new	strategy	based	on	existing	resources	 Existing	resources	can	deliver	new	strategic	outcomes	
and	 so	 remain	 relevant	or	 activated	 for	 long	 enough	
to	realise	new	opportunities	
Attract	 new	 resources	 into	 existing	 base	 to	
achieve	new	strategy	
Newly	attracted	resources	can	fit	into	existing	activity	
mix,	 without	 asymmetries,	 and	 be	 controlled	 with	
existing	structures	
If	 recovery	 attempts	 fail	 to	 reverse	 decline,	 its	
time	to	dissolve	the	firm	
Collapsed	firms	have	no	resources	to	maintain	action	
and	dissolution	is	the	only	option	
Fear	 of	 dissolution	 drives	 increasingly	 frantic	
attempts	 to	 secure	 any	 opportunity	 to	 regain	
operating	stability	
Survival	 in	 a	 state	 of	 depleted	 or	 no	 resources	 can	
only	 be	 sustained	 for	 a	 limited	 period	 before	
dissolution	occurs	
	
Our	 contribution,	 illuminated	 through	 the	 ActiveSky	 case,	 is	 to	 expose	 the	
subterranean	area	below	this	threshold.	The	U-model	depicts	the	descent	of	decline	on	
the	 one	 hand,	 followed	 by	 a	 possible	 period	 of	 flat-line	 risking	 dispersal	 into	 non-
existence	and,	 if	antecedents	are	 in	place,	a	possible	upswing	towards	new	capability	
development.	Whether	a	firm’s	path	is	a	u-shape	and	regains	stable	resources	or	fails	to	
climb	above	the	threshold	of	operating	stability	is	captured	in	our	figure	by	two	loops.		
First,	a	meta-loop	which	captures	how	firms	seek	to	escape	the	collapse	trap	and	
ascend	 to	 capability	 rebuilding.	 Second,	 an	 iterative	 sub-loop	 which	 illustrates	 a	
condition	of	 remaining	 in	 the	 collapse	 trap.	We	argue	 that	 firms	caught	 in	 this	 loop	
have	not	engaged	the	correct	activity	 sequence	during	decline	so	as	 to	 increase	 their	
chances	of	 capability	 rebuilding.	We	now	 look	at	 each	 side	of	 this	U-model	 to	more	
closely	identify	the	key	priorities	for	building	organizational	resilience.	
Table	2:	The	Collapse	Trap:	Flawed	Actions	and	Flawed	Assumptions	
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Transitioning	to	a	State	without	Capabilities	
Noteworthy	 during	 decline	 is	 that	 the	 firm	 is	 experiencing	 shattered	 capabilities	 –	
activity	sets	which	presume	strategic	coherence	and	resource	sufficiency.	Our	analysis	
of	 what	 went	 wrong,	 what	 worked	 and	 what	 could	 have	 been	 done	 better	 in	 the	
ActiveSky	case	shows	that	managers	must	rely	on	a	more	dynamic	set	of	capabilities,	
that	 embrace	 dismantling	 and	 focus	 on	 rebuilding.	 These	 non-routine	 activities	 are	
required	 so	 that	 strategic	 and	 operating	 tasks	 can	 be	 undertaken	 in	 an	 unstable	
environment	during	strategic	and	resource	collapse.			
These	 fragile	 processes	 are	 based	 on	 unstable	 assets	 and	 activity	 sets	 around	
strategic	 actions	 yet	 to	 prove	 their	 worth.	 By	 way	 of	 example,	 the	 recruitment	 of	
experienced	 project	 managers	 in	 the	 early	 stage	 growth	 phase	 marked	 a	 keen	
aspiration	to	achieve	reliable	performance	outcomes	with	stable	routines.	Conversely,	
the	 idiosyncratic	 and	 fragile	 combination	 of	 skills	 and	 learning	 rates	 applied	 as	 the	
firm	 sought	 to	 gain	 public	 listing	 proved	 sufficient	 for	 that	 context	 but	 was	 hardly	
sustainable	nor	reliable	over	time.	These	actions	are	underpinned	by	resilience	–	both	
personal	 and	 organizational	 -	 whereby	 the	 firms’	 decision	 makers	 are	 intent	 on	
growing	 from	adversity.	They	also	have	a	strategic	orientation	–	 the	 firm’s	managers	
are	 not	 making	 ad	 hoc	 decisions	 based	 on	 short	 term	 panic	 but	 rather	 through	
envisaging	 a	 new	 strategic	 future	 which	 requires	 the	 laying	 down	 of	 a	 resource-
opportunity	platform.	We	observed	three	focal	steps	during	dismantling	and	a	further	
three	focal	steps	as	the	firm	gained	sufficient	traction	to	re-build.		
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Actions	for	Capability	Dismantling	
Analyzing	 how	 ActiveSky	 learnt	 to	 manage	 the	 decline	 phase	 highlights	 three	 key	
actions	involved	in	purposeful	capability	dismantling,	each	becoming	more	relevant	as	
decline	ensues.	These	 three	actions	 cover	 routine	 reconfiguration,	 retaining	 resilient	
resources	and	consolidating	strategic	control	and	coherence.	
Routine	 Reconfiguration	 to	match	 changing	 resource	 base	Entering	the	 fragile	
zone	 below	 the	 level	 of	 operating	 stability	 need	 not	 be	 obvious.	 Our	 case	 shows	
participants	at	ActiveSky	seeking	to	deal	with	continued	decline	in	the	first	such	phase	
by	 reconfiguring	 remaining	 resources	 to	 patch	 up	 the	 service	 gaps	 that	 arose	 as	
apparently	random	gaps	emerged.	This	action	was	particularly	evidenced	in	customer	
services,	where	a	national	helpline	 for	 the	sports	 services	deployment	 in	 the	US	was	
diverted	 through	 to	 a	 single	 mobile	 phone	 carried	 by	 one	 of	 the	 staff,	 effectively	
providing	 around	 the	 clock	 support	 for	 40,000+	 end	 users	 in	 a	 bid	 to	 appear	more	
stable	 than	 they	 really	 were.	 This	 is	 a	 reasonable	 first	 step	 in	 response	 to	 loss	 of	
resources	but	will	prove	insufficient	if	decline	continues;	the	gaps	open	up	faster	than	
the	reconfiguration	process	can	match	with	the	remaining	(and	increasingly	unstable)	
resources.	
Actively	 retain	 low	 resource	 consumption	 baseline	 After	 successive	 decline	
episodes,	 the	 survivors	 at	 ActiveSky	 learnt	 to	 recognise	 the	 conditions	 of	 operating	
instability,	 so	 when	 they	 entered	 the	 third	 decline	 sequence,	 they	 learned	 that	
reconfiguration	would	be	a	futile	activity.	They	actively	sought	to	strip	those	resources	
that	 consumed	 other	 resources	 to	 remain	 viable.	 Rather	 than	 assuming	 dissolution,	
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they	 chose	 a	 small	 number	 of	 assets	 (legacy	 reputation,	 strategic	 insights	 into	 the	
wireless	 space	 and	 a	 small	 number	 of	 closely	 held	 commercial	 relationships)	 that	
could	 be	 retained	 in	 an	 otherwise	 resource-less	 state	 and	 jettisoned	 other	 resource-
consuming	 assets.	 This	 revealed	 the	 insight	 that	 some	 resources	 are	 more	 resilient	
than	others	 and	knowing	 this	difference	 can	 significantly	 affect	 the	path	of	 collapse	
and/or	recovery.	The	IP	portfolio	is	a	clear	example	of	this	active	selection	and	jettison	
process.	We	argue	that	if	the	survivors	had	learned	this	focal	activity	sooner,	they	may	
have	retained	more	resources	and	been	able	to	create	more	opportunities	at	successive	
rebuilding	sequences.	
Consolidate	 Strategic	 Control	 to	 create	 new	 opportunities	 The	 ActiveSky	
survivors	were	hampered	by	the	interference	in	setting	new	strategy	by	parties	remote	
from	the	operations	but	retaining	some	level	of	residual	control	over	the	choices	the	
firm	 could	make.	 The	 angel	 investor	 from	 1999	 still	 sought	 to	 exert	 influence	 over	
strategic	 choices	 in	 2007	 as	 the	 firm	 was	 preparing	 for	 IPO.	 Once	 that	 rebuilding	
attempt	collapsed	so	too	did	that	interference.		
	 We	draw	 from	 this	 a	 lesson	 that	navigating	 the	unstable	disquieting	 space	of	
strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse	 requires	 control	 for	 the	 strategy	 to	 be	 held	 by	 the	
survivors;	the	people	at	the	coal	face	making	the	key	decisions	that	impact	on	how	the	
firm	dismantles	and	then	how	it	rebuilds.	This	control	includes	the	freedom	to	make	
mistakes	and	to	learn	from	those	mis-steps.	
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Figure	2:	U-model	schematic	showing	an	iterative	capability	dismantling-collapse-rebuilding	cycle,	with	observed	focal	actions	
during	dismantling	and	rebuilding	phases,	functioning	below	levels	of	operating	stability.	
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What	are	resilient	resources?	
Circumstances	of	 strategic	 and	 resource	collapse	 teach	us	 something	new	about	
resources	 not	 currently	 taken	 account	 of	 in	 the	 popular	 resource-based	 view	
(Helfat	&	Peteraf,	2003).	Some	resources,	including	many	popularly	thought	of	as	
the	firm’s	strategically	most	valuable,	are	co-dependent.	That	is,	they	rely	on	other	
resources	 for	 their	 sustenance.	A	good	example	 is	 a	patent	portfolio	 –	 these	 are	
expensive	 to	establish	and	maintain,	while	their	commercial	benefits	to	the	 firm	
are	questionable	in	the	short	term	and	rely	on	a	deep	resource	base,	of	cash	and	
alliances,	 in	 the	 long	term	to	gain	strategically	valuable	returns.	Yet	many	 firms	
facing	 recurring	 adversities	 regard	maintaining	 the	patent	protections	 they	have	
in	place	as	top	of	their	list	on	which	to	spend	any	scarce	funds.	Circumstances	of	
strategic	and	resource	collapse	throw	this	co-dependence	into	the	spotlight	as	the	
firm’s	previous	strategically-most	valuable	resources	become	unsustainable	due	to	
co-dependent	 resource	 depletion.	 Resilient	 resources	 are	 those	 that	 not	 only	
demonstrate	low	or	no	co-dependencies,	but	also	can	be	sustained	during	a	period	
of	 strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse,	 as	 well	 as	 being	 able	 to	 lead	 strategic	 and	
operating	recovery.	In	our	ActiveSky	case,	the	most	resilient	resources	proved	to	
be	 the	surviving	members	 themselves,	 since	 they	could	adapt	sufficiently	and	 in	
the	 requisite	 timeframe	 to	 the	 adverse	 forces	 acting	 on	 the	 firm	 through	 its	
various	 phases	 of	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 rebuilding.	 The	 patent	 portfolio,	 the	
trademarks,	 the	 hardware,	 even	 the	 source	 code	 itself	 proved	 increasingly	
irrelevant	as	serial	new	opportunities	were	created.	
Box	3	
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Transitioning	back	to	capabilities	
Continued	 resource	 loss	 epitomises	 decline	 and	 resource-less-ness	 epitomises	
collapse.	In	this	sequence,	we	argue	that	a	deliberate	dismantling	process	can	put	the	
firm	into	a	position	where	strategic	focus	is	ultimately	stronger,	positive	rebuilding	is	
easier	and	successful	capability	construction	more	likely	as	opportunities	are	created.	
Yet	 the	 inverse	 of	 this	 path,	 back	 to	 capabilities,	 has	 it’s	 own	 challenges,	 since	
resources	 remain	 unstable	 and	 the	 strategic	 promise	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 proved;	 it	
remains	an	aspiration.		
Actions	for	Capability	Rebuilding	
We	 outline	 below	 3	 steps	 that	 are	 key	 to	 rebuilding	 capabilities,	 embracing	
asymmetries	 between	 survivors,	 coherent	 strategy	 and	 the	 seeding	 of	 repeatable	
activity	patterns.	
Identify	 asymmetries	 and	 build	 a	 functioning	 collective	 Before	 rebuilding	 can	
begin	 and	 even	 before	 opportunities	 can	 be	 created	 or	 assessed,	 the	 surviving	
individuals	need	to	have	some	sense	of	how	they	will	work	together.	Since	the	firm	is	
inherently	unstable,	this	step	is	critical	towards	enticing	a	collective	that	can	function	
effectively	 towards	 whatever	 shared	 goals	 may	 emerge.	 A	 dominant	 individual	
imposing	their	worldview	on	a	surviving	team	will	be	insufficient,	even	destructive,	to	
the	 formation	of	 a	 functioning	collective.	 So	 identifying	what	each	 survivor	 seeks	 to	
get	out	of	 the	venture	by	maintaining	 their	commitment	and	recognising	 that	while	
this	outcome	may	not	be	achieved	at	least	each	can	engage	in	activities	they	enjoy	is	a	
crucial	 first	 rebuilding	 step.	 The	 focus	 here	 is	 not	 so	 much	 to	 lay	 down	 efficient	
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activity	patterns	as	to	identify	the	limits	and	requirements	that	apply	to	each	survivor	
and	 devise	 activity	 sets	 that	 allow	 these	 various	 asymmetries	 to	 function	 to	 some	
degree	 of	 effectiveness	 (Miller,	 2003).	 It	 is	 because	 of	 this	 requirement	 to	
accommodate	individual	asymmetries	that	the	survivors	need	to	have	full	control	over	
their	own	strategy	setting	agenda4.		
Cohere	strategy	Creating	a	coherent	new	strategy	from	a	base	of	collapsed	resources	
with	a	fragile	collective	that	may	be	struggling	to	incorporate	an	array	of	incompatible	
asymmetries	 is	a	big	ask.	Yet	 it	 forms	a	critical	 step	 in	 the	 rebuilding	process,	 if	 the	
surviving	 firm	 is	 to	 escape	 the	 fragility	 of	 its	 resource	 collapsed	 state	 and	 have	 a	
chance	at	achieving	some	level	of	stability	and	reaching	its	goals	as	a	capable	firm	with	
sustainable	 long	 term	 prospects.	 Whether	 an	 attractive	 and	 viable	 strategy	 is	
discovered	from	existing	options	or	created	by	novel	combinations	of	current	and	yet	
to	 be	 secured	 options	 is	 less	 critical	 than	 the	 survivors	 cohering	 around	 an	 agreed	
strategy,	working	towards	that	shared	goal	and	cycling	through	this	process	as	many	
times	as	needed	in	order	to	sustain	a	prospect	of	rebuilding.	
Share	repeatable	patterned	actions	As	opportunities	gain	momentum	and	survivors	
embrace	the	shared	benefits	that	successful	 implementation	may	bring,	they	need	to	
lay	down	repeatable	patterns	of	actions	as	they	collectively	build	standard	responses	to	
frequently	 arising	 requirements.	 Given	 they	 still	 lack	 resources	 and	 the	 opportunity	
allows	them	to	attract	otherwise	unattainable	resources.	
																																								 								
4	Incorporating	the	individual	differences	and	preferences	to	build	a	functioning	collective,	that	is	
embracing	asymmetries,	implies	that	a	smaller	team	will	be	more	viable	to	rebuild	from	collapse	than	a	
larger	surviving	team,	although	insufficient	data	has	been	collected	in	our	studies	so	far	to	nominate	
preferred	surviving	team	size.	
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5.7	 RESILIENCE	PROOFING	
We	stress	here	that	our	U-model	is	dynamic	over	many	cycles,	not	necessarily	for	just	
one	cycle	of	capability	dismantling	and	rebuilding.	This	multi-cycle	capacity	is	shown	
by	our	data.	 It	 is	a	 sequence	of	 focus	and	action	 to	be	mastered	and	 improved	each	
time	strategic	and	resource	collapse	may	ensue.	This	cycle	has	 the	effect	of	building	
organizational	resilience	to	withstand	and	grow	from	repeated	shocks	in	the	future,	as	
key	 decision	makers	 and	managers	 lessen	 their	 vulnerability	 to	 the	 excess	 volatility	
that	 collapses	 in	 resources	and	 strategy	can	effect.	 It	does	 this	by	 incorporating	and	
balancing	 the	 firm’s	 skill	 sets	 and	 attributes	 between	 surviving	 members,	 in	 the	
absence	 of	 stable	 resources.	 In	 consequence,	 repetition	 of	 the	 action	 cycle	 equips	
managers	 to	 learn	 from	 failures	 to	operate	with	and	without	 capabilities	 and	 so	 can	
dilute	the	fear	of	collapse	that	organisational	crises	invoke,	a	fear	that	so	often	leads	to	
strategic	and	operational	paralysis	(Carmeli	&	Schaubroeck,	2008).		
By	articulating	our	U-model	in	Figure	2,	we	believe	that	the	knowledge	of	this	
sequence	provides	a	confidence	building	reference	to	improve	timely	decision	making	
and	 to	 focus	 survivors	 on	 what	 they	 can	 do,	 given	 their	 parlous	 state,	 rather	 than	
waste	energy	and	attention	on	matters	they	cannot	change.	A	clear	example	of	this	is	
the	 focus	 the	 IPO	gave	 the	ActiveSky	 survivors	 prior	 to	 their	 third	 and	most	 recent	
decline	 sequence.	 In	 earlier	 cycles,	 significant	 efforts	 were	 invested	 in	 appearing	 to	
look	 fully	 resourced,	 with	 a	 comprehensively	 capable	 operation.	 During	 the	 second	
round	 of	 creating	 new	 opportunities,	 the	 survivors	 openly	 acknowledged	 their	
limitations	and,	instead	of	pretending	to	be	something	they	weren’t,	focussed	on	what	
they	could	do	and	outsourced	to	alliance	partners	the	activities	they	couldn’t	do.	We	
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don’t	 pretend	 this	 is	 easy,	 but	 we	 do	 suggest	 that	 collapse	 can	 be	 survived	 with	 a	
pragmatic	approach	and	a	focus	on	key	actions.	
5.8	 FROM	SUB-LOOP	TO	META-LOOP:	ESCAPING	THE	COLLAPSE	TRAP	
Collapse	is	a	state	that	commonly	generates	some	fear	in	managers.	It	evokes	images	
of	 dispersal	 of	 all	 the	 firm’s	 remaining	 assets,	 loss	 of	 staff	 and	 their	 unique	 cultural	
construction	 and	 a	 surrendering	 of	 the	 aspirations	 that	 the	 firm	 embodied.	 Yet	 we	
believe	a	distinct	and	defined	set	of	actions	can	be	instigated	so	to	possibly	navigate	
through	 collapse	 and	 then	 to	 escape	 from	 the	 energy-sapping	 loop	 of	 hopeful	
opportunity,	 failed	 options	 and	 involuntary	 lock	 in	 to	 a	 corrosive	 sequence.	 These	
actions	 arise	 when	 the	 firm	 operates	 below	 the	 level	 of	 operating	 stability,	 when	
strategy	and	resources	are	in	flux	as	the	buffeting	impacts	of	adversity	rock	the	firm,	
and	are	invoked	to	navigate	through	and	to	escape	from	a	collapse	trap.	
5.9	 CONCLUSION	
We	 position	 these	 counter-intuitive	 actions	 for	 managers	 considering	 what	 is	
commonly	the	unthinkable;	allowing	collapse	to	proceed	and	conjecturing	a	future	for	
the	firm	beyond	it.	While	other	literatures	posit	an	array	of	lenses,	this	model	focuses	
the	 key	 decision	makers	 on	 very	 specific	 steps.	 These	 steps	 are	 invoked	 during	 the	
deliberate	 stages	 of	 capability	 dismantling,	 when	 temptations	 are	 strong	 to	 try	 to	
“recover”	 former	 resource	 configurations	 and	 routines,	 to	 orient	 surviving	 resources	
towards	 a	 possible	 opportunity	 creation	 phase	 later,	 should	 conditions	 allow.	 Then,	
even	 in	 the	midst	of	a	collapsed	state,	 survivors	can	undertake	very	specific	 steps	 to	
form	patterns	 of	 action	 in	 an	 unstable	world,	 create	 new	 opportunities	 and,	 if	 such	
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opportunity	persists,	to	rebuild	reliable	capabilities	of	the	emergent	firm.	By	knowing	
these	steps	in	advance,	we	argue	that	the	early	stages	of	decline	can	be	better	managed	
with	a	clear	eye	to	later	rebuilding.	
	 As	 we	 take	 this	 approach	 and	 apply	 it	 to	 other	 distressed	 firms	 facing	
irrevocable	dissolution,	we	notice	that,	over	time,	the	survivors	behave	differently	with	
the	 resources	 they	have.	 Patterns	 of	 activity	 allow	 for	 a	 possible	 time	where	 certain	
assumptions	of	continuity	or	stability	may	not	apply.	Resource	allocation	decisions	are	
made	not	only	on	strategic	advantage	in	the	short	term,	but	resilience	and	support	in	
adverse	conditions	in	the	mid	term.	Our	belief	is	that	such	thinking	makes	for	a	more	
resilient	organization;	one	that	anticipates	adversity	but	doesn’t	encourage	it,	that	can	
cope	with	loss	but	doesn’t	succumb	to	it	and	that	can	rebuild	again	without	assuming	
the	strategic	context	of	the	past	will	remain	unaltered.	
	 In	 this	 way,	 our	 U-model	 is	 only	 one	 half	 of	 an	 ongoing	 cycle	 of	 a	 firm’s	
existence;	the	half	below	the	threshold	of	operating	stability.	An	equally	critical	area	
for	managers	to	study	lies	in	deliberately	building	organizational	resilience	in	times	of	
strategic	coherence	and	resource	sufficiency,	as	exists	above	the	threshold	of	operating	
stability.	 We	 argue	 that	 the	 learning	 of	 a	 resilience	 capability	 will	 enable	
organizational	 survival	 and	 growth	 in	 both	 good	 times	 and	 bad,	 that	 can	 exploit	
transient	advantages	(McGrath,	2013)	for	a	long	term	benefit	yet	can	also	live	without	
routine	based	capabilities	should	adverse	conditions	prevail	and	the	very	existence	of	
their	firm	is	at	stake.	
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CHAPTER	6	|	DISCUSSION	AND	CONCLUSION	
6.1	INTRODUCTION	
This	program	of	research	began	as	a	project	to	understand	the	trajectory	of	a	firm	
experiencing	multiple	sequences	of	collapse	and,	in	particular,	what	steps	the	firm	
could	 take	 to	 rebuild	 after	 a	 decline	 trajectory.	 In	 pursuing	 this	 understanding,	
how	the	 firm	managed	to	persist	despite	 failure	of	strategy	and	 loss	of	resources	
became	 a	 central	 issue	 for	 theory	 building.	 Consequently,	 the	 central	 thesis	
research	question	is:	How	can	firms	build	capabilities	in	resilience?		
This	 overarching	 question	 was	 broken	 down	 into	 component	 parts	 and	 has	
been	 expressed	 through	 Chapters	 2,	 3,	 4	 and	 5,	 covering	 topics	 of	 the	 engaged	
scholarship	method,	dynamic	capabilities,	heuristics	and	organizational	resilience.	
This	 closing	 chapter	 serves	 to	 integrate	 the	 insights	 from	 each	 of	 these	 earlier	
chapters	to	address	the	central	research	question.		
A	recapitulation	of	the	major	contributions	of	the	earlier	chapters	is	presented,	
then	these	 insights	are	 integrated	to	offer	a	specific	and	more	general	answer	 to	
the	 research	 question.	 In	 the	 first	 part,	 the	 theorising	 developed	 in	 the	 earlier	
chapters	 is	 extended	 to	 propose	 a	 resilience	 capabilities	 loop	 that	 utilises	 a	
changing	heuristics	pattern	under	both	stable	and	unstable	operating	conditions.	
While	 building	 on	 the	 model	 developed	 in	 chapter	 3,	 the	 extended	 model	
incorporates	 additional	 insights.	 The	 resilience	 capabilities	 loop	 model	 offers	 a	
specific	answer	to	the	central	research	question	based	on	the	data	from	our	focal	
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case.	This	means	that	the	model	is	restricted	to	addressing	how	firms	can	build	a	
heuristics-based	dynamic	capability	that	renders	it	more	resilient.		
	In	 a	 later	 section	 a	 more	 general	 model	 is	 developed	 going	 beyond	 just	
heuristics-based	 dynamic	 capabilities.	 Assembling	 the	 key	 variables	 into	
categories	 of	 antecedents,	 internal	 factors	 and	 outcomes	 led	 to	 this	 generalized	
theoretical	model	for	firms	building	resilience	capabilities.	Following	this	analysis,	
I	 then	 elaborate	 on	 the	 contributions,	 theoretical	 implications,	 directions	 for	
future	research	as	well	as	the	practical	implications	before	concluding	the	thesis.	
6.2	RECAPITULATION	OF	EARLIER	CHAPTERS		
The	 four	 preceding	 chapters	 were	 each	 written	 as	 individual	 manuscripts,	 as	
outlined	in	the	introduction	chapter	and	summarised	again	in	Table	1	below.	The	
first	 of	 these	 provides	 an	 early	 introduction	 to	 the	 literature	 underpinning	
resilience	 and	 capabilities	 (Chapter	 2).	 Then,	 the	 empirical	 case	 is	 presented	
(Chapter	3)	that	investigates	the	data,	outlines	the	method	adopted	to	undertake	
the	 case	 analysis	 and	 proposes	 heuristics-based	 capabilities	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	
routine-based	capabilities	under	conditions	of	strategic	and	resource	collapse.		
	 The	 engaged	 scholarship	 method	 is	 then	 more	 deeply	 explored	 (Chapter	 4)	
with	 regards	 to	 how	 it	 was	 applied	 and	 the	 learning	 derived	 for	 more	 general	
application.	 	 The	 findings	 in	 these	 earlier	 chapters	 are	 then	 presented	 for	 a	
practitioner	 audience	 (Chapter	 5),	 to	 demonstrate	 how	mastery	 of	 the	 decline-
collapse-rebuilding	 sequence	with	 its	 focal	 heuristics	 can	 enhance	 the	 resilience	
capability	development	within	the	firm.	A	brief	review	of	each	chapter	follows.	
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Table	1:	Research	questions	and	contribution	of	the	four	central	chapters.	
Thesis	
Chapter	
Research	Question	 Main	Contributions	
2	
What	are	the	conceptual	
foundations	for	a	resilience-based	
approach	to	organizations?	
	A	 process	 model	 of	 organization	 resilience	 including	
antecedents,	processes,	orientations	and	outcomes	
3	
How	can	firms	build	dynamic	
capabilities	to	bounce	back	from	
collapse	with	new	strategic	
impetus?	
Theoretical	model	of	how	focal	firm	built	heuristics-based	
dynamic	 capabilities	 for	 navigating	 and	 growing	 from	
collapse	through	purposeful	capability	dismantling	during	
collapse	and	capability	re-building	post-collapse			
4	
How	can	academic	and	
practitioner	engagement	
encourage	new	real-time	
knowledge?	
Advances	 rigour-real	 time-impact	 nexus	 to	 explore	
impact	 goals	 and	 gives	 an	 empirical	 example	 of	 engaged	
scholarship	 method	 to	 include	 real	 time	 assistance	 and	
research	impact	
5	
How	can	organizations	remain	
capable	when	their	capabilities	
are	gone?	
	Offers	 detailed	 practical	 guidance	 to	 practitioners	
experiencing	 collapse,	 including	 documenting	 the	 major	
phases	 of	 collapse	 and	 the	 adjustment	 of	 practical	
strategies	as	each	phase	is	encountered		
6.2.1	A	Dynamic	Capability	View	of	Organizational	Resilience		
The	thesis	was	not	initially	conceived	as	taking	a	resilience	perspective.	Rather,	it	
emerged	 within	 the	 ‘Innovate’	 phase	 of	 the	 delve-test-innovate-unlock	 cycle	
(explained	 in	 Chapter	 4)	 underpinning	 the	 theory-building	 process.	 Resilience	
emerged	as	a	way	to	conceptually	embrace	two	oscillating	tensions	impacting	the	
firm:	a	competitive	advantage	focus	of	capabilities	when	things	are	going	well	and	
resources	are	stable	as	opposed	to	a	stability	focus	when	the	firm	is	in	decline	and	
resources	are	unstable.		
	 Naturally,	 it	 became	 important	 to	 review	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 as	used	 in	
the	organization	sciences	because	this	construct	addresses	the	notion	of	positive	
adaptation	 to	 adversity.	 It	 was	 the	 multi-disciplinary	 review	 of	 resilience	 that	
informed	this	notion	and	gave	new	understanding	to	how	the	construct	could	aid	
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management	 practice.	 The	 investigation	 sought	 to	 overcome	 the	 weakly-held	
assumptions	 of	 organizational	 decline	 and	 reaction	 to	 negative	 conditions	 that	
may	 limit	 theory-building	 and	 impact	 on	practice.	The	 review	highlighted	 these	
assumptions	 and	 drew	 particularly	 on	 the	 work	 within	 the	 psychology	 domain	
around	 post-traumatic	 growth	 (Richardson,	 2002)	 as	 an	 equivalent	 construct	 to	
positive	adaptation	to	adversity	for	organizations	(Martin	&	Sunley,	2015).			
Heuristics	 appeared	 important	 in	 psychology	 research	 as	 an	 efficient	
mechanism	for	people	to	embed	learning	from	adversity	so	as	to	be	more	resilient	
in	 the	 future	 (Gigerenzer,	 2008).	 The	 review	 in	 Chapter	 2	 drew	 connections	
between	heuristics	 and	 resilience	 research	 to	more	 fully	 expound	 the	 links	with	
dynamic	 capabilities	 (Bingham	 &	 Eisenhardt,	 2011),	 allowing	 a	 more	 nuanced	
interpretation	 of	 the	 empirical	 data	 in	 the	 subsequent	 empirical	 chapter	 about	
learning	(Bingham	&	Haleblian,	2012).		
Uncertainty	 confronts	 firms	 in	 high	 velocity	 markets,	 requiring	 distinctly	
different	 actions	 to	 successfully	 navigate	 as	 compared	 to	 moderately	 volatile	
markets	(Davis,	Eisenhardt,	&	Bingham,	2009).	The	role	of	heuristics	in	navigating	
such	uncertainty	 is	 referenced	 in	 the	context	of	 selective	 information	processing	
and	 decision	 making	 (Gigerenzer	 &	 Gaissmaier,	 2011)	 towards	 improving	
performance	 (Eisenhardt,	 Furr,	 &	 Bingham,	 2010)	 and	 enhancing	 strategy	
development	 (Bingham	 &	 Eisenhardt,	 2011)	 but	 is	 not	 referenced	 in	 relation	 to	
contributing	 to	 resilience	 as	 a	 capability.	 The	 foundations	 for	 building	 an	
organizational	resilience	capability	were	developed	in	Chapter	2,	deriving	insights	
from	the	extended	construct	development	across	all	the	domains,	with	particular	
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emphasis	on	a	process	model	derived	from	the	psychology	domain	(Luthar,	2006;	
Masten,	2007,	2014;	Richardson,	2002).		
	 Exploring	underlying	assumptions	generated	a	range	of	questions	that	need	to	
be	answered	when	applying	the	construct	to	management	sciences.	If	resilience	is	
assumed	to	be	a	trait	(of	an	individual	or	a	firm),	then	the	means	for	developing	
those	 traits	 needs	 to	 be	 explicit	 (cp.	 Lissack	 &	 Letiche,	 2002).	 If	 resilience	 is	
assumed	to	be	a	process	of	learning	protective	actions	to	guard	against	perceived	
vulnerabilities	 (as	 commonly	 modelled	 for	 engineering	 resilience,	 as	 in	 Hale	 &	
Heijer,	 2006)	 then	 the	process	 for	building	 resilience	over	 time	also	needs	 to	be	
made	 explicit	 for	 firms	 (Masten,	 2001).	 Also	 for	 organizational	 settings,	 the	
assumptions	 underpinning	 resilience	 as	 a	 global	 phenomena	 applied	 across	 any	
array	 of	 adversities,	 as	 compared	 to	 a	 specific	 phenomena	 learnt	 and	 applied	 to	
distinct	 configurations	 of	 threats	 and	 requiring	 distinct	 configurations	 of	
responsive	action,	need	clear	articulation	(Masten	&	Obradović,	2008).	
	 The	model	presented	as	Figure	1	in	Chapter	2	is	based	on	process	research	into	
psychological	 resilience	 (Richardson,	 2002).	 It	 exposes	 how	 resilience	 works	 in	
response	to	threats	and	disorganizations	over	time	leading	to	a	range	of	outcomes.	
The	 process	 model	 begins,	 firstly,	 with	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	
adverse	 conditions.	 It	 offers	 the	 key	 threat	 dimensions	 as	 severity,	 complexity,	
catalysts	for	propagation	of	the	threat,	frequency	of	occurrence	and	familiarity	of	
the	 threat	 elements	 with	 survivors	 in	 the	 firm.	 By	 their	 nature	 these	 threats	
represent	 an	 uncertain	 outcome	 for	 the	 firm,	 so	 will	 demand	 some	 immediate	
response	 from	 key	 decision	 makers	 (or	 survivors	 if	 the	 firm	 has	 already	
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experienced	 a	 decline)	 to	 harness	 resources	 and	 dynamic	 capabilities	 so	 as	 to	
refute	the	threat	or	integrate	its	dimensions	into	a	more	capable	operation.	
	 Secondly,	 the	 firm	 assesses	 the	 likely	 impact	 of	 such	 threats	 given	 the	
protections	it	has	in	place	and	the	stability	or	otherwise	of	its	strategy,	resources	
and	 routines.	 The	 key	 consideration	 proposed	 here	 is	 way	 the	 threat	 generates	
disorganization	 and	 three	 are	 indicated.	 Strategic	 disorganization	 means	 the	
threat	 challenges	 the	way	 the	 firm	 is	 seeking	 to	make	money,	 perhaps	 even	 the	
underlying	 business	 model.	 Operating	 disorganization	 challenges	 the	 activities	
being	 used	 by	 the	 firm	 to	 realise	 its	 strategy	 and	 resource	 disorganization	
challenges	 the	 assets	 the	 firm	 controls,	 or	 has	 access	 to,	 in	 order	 to	 enact	 the	
routines	 of	 action.	 Each	 type	 of	 organization	 requires	 a	 different	 response	 from	
the	firm.	
	 Thirdly,	 the	 way	 the	 firm	 is	 able	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 threats	 and	 resulting	
disorganization(s)	 is	 a	 function	 of	 its	 mastery	 of	 routines	 (and	 their	 agile	
adjustment)	 and	 the	 repertoire	 of	 heuristics	 (and	 the	 context	 in	which	 they	 are	
best	applied)	when	routines	cannot	be	maintained.	This	division	of	routine-based	
and	heuristic-based	responses	to	disruption	differentiates	organizational	resilience	
from	personal	resilience	as	it	is	articulated	in	the	literatures	to	date.	
	 Finally,	the	range	of	outcomes	that	can	result	allow	not	only	for	recovery	to	a	
former	level	of	performance,	but	to	actually	exceeding	this	former	level,	to	a	state	
labelled	 as	 resilient	 reintegration	 (Richardson,	 2002)	 or	 adaptability	 (Limnios,	
Mazzarol,	 Ghadouani,	 &	 Schilizzi,	 2014).	 This	 possibility	 of	 post-traumatic	 gain	
(Masten,	 2014;	 Zoellner	 &	Maercker,	 2006)	 supports	 the	 notion	 that	 a	 firm	 can	
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build	 stronger,	 more	 robust	 capabilities	 as	 a	 direct	 consequence	 of	 navigating	
adverse	conditions.	Thriving	through	adversity	by	resilience	and	agility	(Lengnick-
Hall	&	Beck,	2009)	becomes	a	real	option	offered	by	this	process	model.	
	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 this	 process	 differentiates	 between	 routine	 based	
capabilities,	 where	 reliably	 repeated	 actions	 yield	 efficiency	 but	 under	 adverse	
conditions	can	lack	flexibility,	and	heuristics,	where	simple	rules	ignore	swathes	of	
information	in	favour	of	conserving	cognitive	and	operating	resources	for	the	key	
performance	 requirement	 of	 surviving	 the	 disruption.	While	 routines	 are	 a	well	
established	 feature	 of	 the	 capabilities	 based	 view	 (Felin,	 Foss,	 Heimeriks,	 &	
Madsen,	 2012;	 Winter,	 2013),	 heuristics	 and	 their	 impact	 on	 capabilities	 when	
navigating	 uncertainty	 are	 a	 less	 common	 research	 area	 (with	 Bingham	 &	
Haleblian,	2012;	Mousavi	&	Gigerenzer,	2014	being	an	exception).	
	 For	 organizational	 settings,	 resilience	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 process	 of	 capability	
building	than	as	a	trait	requiring	innate	orientations,	meaning	it	can	be	acquired	
(Taleb,	 2012).	 Firms	 face	 different	 types	 and	 configurations	 of	 threats	 and	
disorganizations,	requiring	a	dynamic	capability	that	adjusts	resilient	responses	to	
these	 varying	 configurations.	 The	 orientation	 a	 firm’s	 key	 decision	makers	 have	
towards	 resilience	 (eg.	 return	 to	 homeostasis	 versus	 growth)	 also	 profoundly	
affects	the	achievable	outcomes.	Chapter	2	set	out	to	address	the	question:	what	
are	 the	 conceptual	 foundations	 for	 a	 resilience-based	 approach	 to	 organizations?	
The	 key	 contribution	 of	 the	 review	 is	 greater	 abstraction	 of	 the	 theoretical	
variables	 and	 assumptions	 that	 underpin	 resilience	 as	 a	 capability	 that	 can	 be	
learned	by	firms	and	applied	under	adverse	conditions.		
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6.2.2	Heuristics	to	Survive	Firm	Collapse	
Chapter	 3	 posits	 the	 question:	 What	 capabilities	 are	 required	 to	 survive	 firm	
collapse?	Drawing	on	 14	years	of	 empirical	data	 this	process	 research	applied	an	
engaged	scholarship	methodology	in	accessing	interviews,	diaries,	notes,	files	and	
emails	from	24	informants,	to	build	an	interpretive	schema	of	how	the	focal	firm	
navigated	 three	 successive	 cycles	 of	 capability	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 rebuilding.	
Each	 of	 these	 cycles	 were	 addressed	 as	 a	 distinct	 sequence	 so	 providing	 an	
embedded	 case	 design	 within	 the	 engaged	 scholarship	 framework.	 A	 key	
component	of	this	approach	lay	in	the	exchanges	between	informant	practitioners	
and	 academics	 to	 interpret	 the	 deep	 privileged	 access	 to	 the	 firm’s	 data,	 with	
myself	as	the	lead	researcher	providing	an	insider	perspective.		
The	findings	informed	the	process	of	decline,	by	proposing	a	distinct	capability	
dismantling	activity	during	decline	with	a	view	to	surviving	collapse	and	later	an	
opportunity	forming	activity	set	to	rebuild	the	firm.	Decline	is	usually	represented	
as	 a	 sustained	 sequence	 of	 substantially	 decreasing	 resources	 (Cameron,	Kim,	&	
Whetten,	 1987)	 and	 implying	 that	 a	 firm	 has,	 at	 best,	 a	 single	 shot	 at	 turning	
around	the	decline	 to	 transition	 to	a	new,	sustaining	strategic	 initiative	 to	avoid	
failure	and	extinction	(Sheppard	&	Chowdhury,	2005).		
The	 model	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 3	 instead	 proposes	 a	 conceptualisation	 of	
decline	as	recoverable	through	iterative	attempts	at	survive	with	a	small,	unstable	
or	 initially	 intangible	 resource	 base	 and	 to	 rebuild	 a	 firm	 by	 attracting	 new	
resources	 (or	 recognising	 previously	 overlooked	 resources)	 around	 one	 or	more	
uniquely	 formed	opportunities.	By	 including	 iterative	 cycles	 around	a	pattern	of	
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boundary	 transitions,	 the	model	 expands	 beyond	 an	 emphasis	 on	 a	 single	 shot	
strategic	 attempt	 and	 provides	 for	 many	 attempts	 to	 survive	 environmental	
turbulence,	 strategic	 uncertainty	 and	 resource	 collapse.	 This	 model	 not	 only	
recognises	 the	 value	 of	 using	 existing	 resources	 in	 new	 ways	 towards	 an	
organizational	 recovery	 (Morrow,	 Sirmon,	 Hitt,	 &	 Holcomb,	 2007)	 but	 also	
embraces	the	iterative	actions	of	attracting	new	resources	to	form	and	enable	key	
strategic	 opportunities	 (Alvarez	 &	 Barney,	 2007;	 Barreto,	 2012;	 Denrell,	 Fang,	 &	
Winter,	2003)	to	avoid	decision	incongruence	(Mitchell	&	Shepherd,	2012).	
These	 iterative	 actions	 are	 embedded	 as	 dynamic	 capabilities	 within	 an	
anatomy	 of	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 rebuilding	 incorporating	 four	 key	 boundary	
transitions.	Whereas	 commonly	 such	 changes	of	 state	under	difficult	 conditions	
are	 considered	 through	 a	 single	 lens,	 such	 as	 strategy	 (Hodgkinson	 &	 Wright,	
2002)	or	resources	(De	Carolis,	Yang,	Deeds,	&	Nelling,	2009)	or	occasionally	both	
(Agarwal,	Barney,	Foss,	&	Klein,	2009),	here	 I	adopt	three	key	 lenses	of	strategy,	
resources	and	communications.	That	 is,	 strategy,	 resources	and	communications	
emerged	 in	 the	 course	 of	managing	 collapse	 as	 key	 sites	 for	 locating	 the	 use	 of	
heuristics.		
Adopting	 a	 heuristics	 based	 dynamic	 capabilities	 orientation	 underpins	 the	
rebuilding	 process.	 Such	 rebuilding	 draws	 on	 both	 strategic	 and	 resource	
attraction	 attributes	 of	 the	 firm,	 rather	 than	 just	 a	 strategic	 renewal	 process	
through	scenario	planning	and	cognitive	mapping	(Hodgkinson	&	Wright,	2002).	
One	of	the	key	findings	was	that	future	resilience	of	the	firm	lay	in	surviving	the	
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adverse	 conditions	of	 the	present	 and	 that	 such	 survival	 required	 adaptive	 rules	
that	could	be	applied	when	strategy	was	failing	and	resources	becoming	unstable.		
This	is	shown	in	Figure	2	of	Chapter	3,	being	the	model	developed	to	describe	
the	 decline-collapse-rebuilding	 sequence	 and	 to	 detail	 the	 heuristics	 based	
transitions	 for	 each	 phase.	 This	 model	 presented	 four	 boundary	 transitions	
occurring	 during	 the	 period	 where	 the	 firm	 operates	 below	 the	 threshold	 of	
operating	stability.	The	focus	of	the	firm	under	these	conditions	requires	the	more	
difficult	task	of	leveraging	temporary	advantages	to	regain	stability	(Sirmon,	Hitt,	
Arregle,	 &	 Campbell,	 2010),	 as	 compared	 to	 a	 focus	 on	 sustained	 competitive	
advantage	 that	 commonly	 apply	 under	 conditions	 of	 strategic	 cohesion	 and	
resource	sufficiency	(D'Aveni,	Dagnino,	&	Smith,	2010;	McGrath,	2013).	
From	 the	 data	 gathered,	 the	 first	 boundary	 transition	 occurs	 when	 the	 firm	
begins	to	experience	operating	instability,	as	resource	gaps	emerge	causing	breaks	
in	 routine	 execution	 and	 thereby	 begins	 the	 process	 of	 capability	 decline.	 This	
transition	proscribed	a	strategy	focus	on	stripping	away	high	resource	consuming	
assets	 in	 favour	of	 retaining	a	 low	resource-consuming	base,	 in	anticipation	of	a	
future	 collapse	 of	 resources.	 Maintaining	 the	 low	 resource	 consuming	 assets	
increase	 the	 chances	 of	 the	 firm	 surviving	 the	 period	 of	 collapse	 by	 drawing	 on	
unstable	 or	 intermittent	 and	 opportunistic	 resource	 access.	 This	 transition	 also	
suggests	 a	 communication	 format	 that	 includes	 stakeholders	 (being	members	of	
the	firm	as	well	as	engaged	stakeholders	and	advisors)	in	a	pragmatic	appraisal	of	
looming	constraints	and	likely	rebuilding	timeframes.	
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The	 second	 boundary	 transition	 occurs	 as	 the	 firm	 enters	 a	 collapsed	 state,	
where	all	but	the	lowest	resource	consuming	assets	(such	as	legacy	reputation,	key	
stakeholder	 commitment	and	partner	alliances)	 can	 remain	 sufficiently	 intact	 to	
allow	the	possibility	of	rebuilding	at	some	future	time.	At	this	transition,	the	focus	
lies	 in	 iteratively	 forming	 new	 opportunities	 through	 combinations	 of	 resource	
access	options,	which	can	only	be	advanced	 if	 that	particular	 strategy	 formation	
proceeds.	 In	 other	words,	 absent	 control	 of	 resources,	 the	 firm	must	 rely	 on	 its	
relationship	 forming	 and	 strategy	 development	 skills,	 so	 that	 opportunity	
development	 meets	 the	 needs	 of	 that	 particular	 arrangement	 of	 partners	 and	
resources.	The	activity	sequences	are	necessarily	ad	hoc	and	opportunistic,	 since	
no	 stable	 routines	 can	 be	 maintained	 without	 stable	 resources	 and	 a	 secure	
strategic	 focus.	 Communications	 rely	 in	 articulating	 future	 operating	 actions	 to	
partners,	particularly	those	that	act	as	gatekeepers	to	essential	resources	to	secure	
opportunity	formation	of	that	specific	strategy.	
The	 third	boundary	 transition	occurs	as	a	 strategic	 focus	 forms	sufficiently	 to	
allow	resources	and	resource	access	to	establish	in	a	favourable	pattern	to	secure	
strategic	 formation	and	 increasingly	 stable	activity	 sets.	 Surviving	 firm	members	
learn	 new	 actions	 to	 derive	 immediate	 value	 from	 the	 resources	 they	 currently	
access	 in	 the	knowledge	 that	 should	 this	 rebuilding	 trajectory	 continue,	 entirely	
new	routines	of	action	may	later	be	required	as	resource	control	becomes	stable.	
This	 stage	 represents	 one	 of	 adaptation	 and	 operating	 agility	 since	 the	 future	
benefits	 of	 the	 chosen	 strategic	 formation	 remains	 uncertain	 and	 resources	 can	
still	be	unstable.	
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The	 fourth	and	final	boundary	transition	described	 in	the	model	prepares	the	
firm	for	a	return	to	operating	stability,	where	resources	are	reliably	secure,	actions	
sufficiently	 robust	 to	 become	 routine	 and	 coherent	 strategy	 allows	 the	 firm	 to	
again	 focus	 on	 competitive	 advantage	 rather	 than	 the	 survival	 focus	 of	 earlier	
phases.	 It	 is	 this	 transition	 where	 a	 number	 of	 consequences	 are	 presented,	
yielding	either	a	return	to	a	former	state	of	homeostasis	without	further	growth,	a	
new	collapse	 sequence,	 the	construction	of	new	operating	capabilities	compared	
to	those	that	existed	prior	to	the	initial	decline	or	even	an	entirely	new	strategic	
direction	 addressing	 different	 markets.	 Each	 of	 these	 options	 reflect	 differing	
realisations	of	a	resilience	capability.	
The	 central	 binding	 ability	 for	 traversing	 these	 phases	 is	 learning	 by	 the	
survivors	from	current	conditions	and	their	adapting	to	new	conditions	that	form	
as	new	opportunities	emerge.	This	model	addresses	how	dynamic	capabilities	are	
built	to	bounce	back	from	collapse,	by	defining	a	sequence	of	heuristics	operating	
within	 an	 anatomy	 of	 capabilities	 to	 iteratively	 rebuild	 from	 newly	 formed	
opportunities.	 One	 of	 these	 capabilities	 is	 organisational	 resilience,	 on	 the	
assumptions	 that	 adverse	 conditions	will	 continue	 to	 impact	 upon	 the	 firm	 and	
that	 it	 will	 remain	 vulnerable	 to	 such	 adversities	 unless	 it	 learns	 new	 actions,	
adapts	 to	 changing	 resource	 access	 configurations	 and	 iteratively	 forms	 new	
opportunities	with	very	few	resources.		
	The	chapter	contributes	 to	a	number	of	 literatures.	Firstly,	 it	 seeks	 to	deepen	
the	understanding	of	dynamic	capabilities	by	disconnecting	repeated	routines	of	
action	 from	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 firm	 to	 reconfigure	 its	 resource	 base	 and	 the	
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activities	 that	make	use	of	 these	 resources	 (Helfat	et	al.,	 2007;	Winter,	2003).	 In	
doing	 so,	 it	 casts	 dynamic	 capabilities	 as	 engines	 of	 regeneration	 (Ambrosini,	
Bowman,	 &	 Collier,	 2009)	 through	 perceiving	 possible,	 not	 currently	 extant,	
resource	 combinations	 that	 may	 lead	 to	 an	 advantage	 whether	 transient	 or	
sustained	and	so	forming	new	opportunities	through	these	new	combinations.	The	
focus	 here	 lies	 in	 survival	 under	 conditions	 of	 collapse	 rather	 than	 firm	
performance	in	high	velocity	environments	(Drnevich	&	Kriauciunas,	2011).	
	Secondly,	it	contributes	to	literature	on	heuristics	by	giving	a	clear	context	and	
framework	to	the	rules	 that	can	apply	through	a	collapse	episode.	Heuristics	are	
explored	 in	 both	 management	 sciences	 (Bingham	 &	 Eisenhardt,	 2011)	 and	
cognitive	 psychology	 (Gigerenzer	 &	 Brighton,	 2009),	 mirroring	 the	 similar	
combination	of	domains	explored	in	Chapter	2		with	regards	to	resilience.	
Thirdly,	 it	 advances	 turnaround	 literature	 beyond	 a	 series	 of	 value	 creating	
strategic	renewal	attempts,	 that	seek	to	recombine	existing	resources	yet	predict	
extinction	 should	 those	 recovery	 attempts	 prove	 unsuccessful	 (Morrow	 et	 al.,	
2007).	 It	 offers	 an	 iterative	process	of	 a	 continuing	opportunity	 formation	effort	
that	involves	not	only	attracting	access	to	new	resources	but	also	partner	alliances	
to	regain	operating	stability	despite	an	unstable	resource	base.	
6.2.3	Engaged	Scholarship	with	Impact	
Chapter	4	outlined	the	engaged	scholarship	methodology	at	the	heart	of	the	thesis	
research,	 providing	 detail	 regarding	 how	 the	 methodology	 was	 employed	 to	
collect	 and	 analyse	 data	 and	 inform	 theory-building.	 This	 chapter	 aims	 to	
contribute	 to	 engaged	 scholarship	 research	 method	 literature	 by	 detailing	 two	
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additional	tools	to	help	researchers	achieve	aims	of	rigor,	real	time	assistance	and	
impact.	 It	 highlights	 the	 belief	 that	 these	methods	 deserve	 an	 increased	 role	 in	
management	research.		
This	 chapter	 describes	 a	 real	 life	 example	 of	 engaged	 scholarship	 in	 action,	
whereby	 academic	 researchers	 collaborated	with	practitioners	 to	 solve	problems	
in	real	time,	build	new	theory	that	may	assist	other	firms	and,	in	the	process	build	
new	skills	that	enhanced	the	firm’s	own	organisational	resilience	to	withstanding	
future	 shocks.	 Here	 academics	 in	 the	 research	 team	 had	 to	 become	 intimately	
acquainted	 with	 making	 practical	 decisions,	 while	 practitioners	 learnt	 skills	 in	
theory-building.	 In	particular,	 the	chapter	describes	how	 the	 iterative	process	of	
problem	formulation,	theory	building,	research	design	and	problem	solving	led	to	
increasingly	 more	 complex	 models	 tested	 against	 their	 value	 in	 real	 time	 to	
decision	makers	 in	 the	 focal	 case.	The	empirical	 case	 targets	 the	 rigor-relevance	
debate,	 explored	 through	 a	 research	 question	 asking	 how	 academic	 and	
practitioner	engagement	can	encourage	new	real-time	knowledge.		
	 The	 particular	 phenomena	 of	 note	 was	 the	 inclusion	 of	 myself	 as	 an	 active	
insider,	 straddling	 roles	 as	 both	 a	 key	 decision	 making	 practitioner	 within	 the	
focal	firm,	enacting	strategy	and	capability	dismantling	or	rebuilding	through	the	
decline-collapse-rebuilding	trajectory,	as	well	as	knowledge	producing	researcher,	
learning	new	skills	derived	from	insights	gained	within	the	focal	firm.	
	 In	 terms	of	 real	 time	assistance,	Chapter	4	outlines	how	reflection	on	 theory-
building	 progressed	 throughout	 the	 thesis.	 Several	 early	 theory-building	models	
were	 shared	 culminating	 in	 the	main	 theoretical	model	 presented	 in	Chapter	 3.	
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Reflection	identified	four	phases	and	15	steps	involved	in	theory-building.	The	four	
phases	 are:	 1)	 delve	 –	 deep	 immersion	 in	 the	 data,	 2)	 test	 –	 review	 of	 emerging	
model	by	external	academics	and	testing	of	real	time	impact	with	practitioners,	3)	
innovate	 –	 step	outside	 the	box	of	 current	model	 building	 and	 experiment	with	
innovative	 lenses	and	4)	once	a	 lens	 is	 selected	 then	explore	 it	deeply	 to	unlock	
theoretical	 value.	 The	 delve-test-innovate-unlock	 cycle	 sits	 within	 Van	 de	 Ven’s	
(2007)	four	stages	of	engaged	scholarship	(problem	formulation,	theory-building,	
research	 design	 and	 problem	 solving)	 but	 reveal	 more	 of	 the	 theory-building	
micro-dynamic	that	propagates	the	four	stages.		
	 The	original	interpretation	of	the	events	confronting	the	focal	firm	proposed	a	
single	period	of	decline	and	perturbations	of	capabilities	as	the	firm	wrestled	with	
strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse.	 This	 conceptualisation	 conforms	 with	 extant	
turnaround	literatures	(Chowdhury,	2002;	Weitzel	&	Jonsson,	1989).	Adaptation	of	
the	 engaged	 scholarship	 iterative	 actions	 developed	 that	 original	 interpretation	
into	 the	 three	 embedded	 cases	 presented	 in	 the	 timeline	 figure,	 as	 the	 15	 steps	
became	 a	 repeated	 sequence.	 This	 development	 demonstrates	 how	 learning	
occurred	not	 just	 for	 heuristics	 to	master	 new	 rules	 for	 navigating	 collapse,	 but	
also	for	the	method	itself,	to	distil	new	actions	in	how	the	engagement	could	add	
value	to	the	firm	and	build	new	theory.	
	 The	key	contribution	is	how	engagement	can	encourage	real	time	assistance	to	
benefit	 decision	 making	 under	 ambiguous	 and	 adverse	 conditions	 while	 also	
building	 theory	 that	 potentially	 benefits	 a	wider	 distribution	 of	 firms.	 Such	 real	
time	assistance	is	a	generally	overlooked	benefit	missing	from	much	of	the	rigour-
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relevance	debate	(eg.	Aguinis,	Shapiro,	Antonacopoulou,	&	Cummings,	2014).	The	
role	of	such	real	time	benefits	as	a	proxy	for	impact	was	explored	using	an	iterative	
sequence	labelled	as	delve-test-innovate-unlock.		
	 Impact	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 long	 term	 or	 indirect	 effect	 on	 stakeholders	 of	 the	
outcomes	 resulting	 from	 the	 chosen	 action	 (Penna	&	 Phillips,	 2005).	 In	 current	
research	impact	is	judged	in	terms	of	academic	citations	and	is	often	left	vague	in	
terms	 of	 practitioner	 outcomes.	 Chapter	 4	 linked	 research	 impact	 with	
conversations	 in	 social	 entrepreneurship	 and	 the	 non-profit	 sector	 concerning	
how	to	measure	 impact	 (Penna	&	Phillips,	2005).	The	BACKS	model	 (behaviour,	
attitude,	conditions,	knowledge	and	status)	was	presented	as	one	option	for	how	
impact	 can	 be	 measured	 in	 the	 research	 process.	 By	 expanding	 the	 engaged	
scholarship	 framework	 with	 additional	 tools,	 I	 hope	 this	 review	 of	 the	 adopted	
method	 can	 positively	 contribute	 to	 the	 rigor	 versus	 relevance	 debate	
(Hodgkinson	&	Rousseau,	2009;	Kieser	&	Leiner,	2009).	
6.2.4	Remaining	Capable	without	Capabilities	
Chapter	5	set	out	to	interpret	the	empirical	findings	resulting	from	the	extensive	
longitudinal	data	collection	and	address	them	to	managers	in	the	field.	The	aim	is	
to	 offer	 guidance	 for	 the	 development	 of	 resilience	 capabilities	 in	 response	 to	
threats	of,	 and	navigation	 through,	 strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse.	This	 chapter	
demonstrates	 how	 conceptual	 findings	 drawn	 from	 empirical	 data	 can	 be	
translated	to	a	practitioner	audience.		
	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 chapter	 highlights	 a	 particular	 pathology,	 the	 collapse	 trap,	
that	can	affect	firms	facing	conditions	of	strategic	failure	and	resource	dissipation.	
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The	collapse	trap	describes	actions	that	are	aimed	to	recover	from	decline	but	that	
in	 fact	 extend	 collapse,	 propagated	 by	 naïve	 assumptions	 about	 collapse	 and	
recovery	that	drive	mistaken	actions.	These	flawed	assumptions	include	a	focus	on	
resource	recovery	when	strategic	objectives	do	not	meet	expectations,	as	well	as	a	
focus	on	existing	resources	that	are	unable	to	deliver	new	strategic	outcomes	with	
new	 routines	 of	 action.	 Whereas	 strategic	 failure	 and	 dissipating	 resources	 are	
commonly	 regarded	 as	 leading	 to	 firm	 cessation,	 this	 assumption	 may	 not	
necessarily	 need	 to	 be	 entirely	 true.	 This	 chapter	 posits	 that	 firms	 can	 learn	 to	
survive	 (even	 if	 barely)	 and	 be	 sufficiently	 capable	 at	 navigating	 strategic	 and	
resource	collapse,	so	providing	an	opportunity	to	escape	the	collapse	trap.	
	Capabilities	are	defined	in	terms	of	exploitation	of	resources	by	robust	routine	
actions,	 with	 repeatable	 routines	 that	 reliably	 deliver	 positive	 outcomes	 being	
regarded	as	capabilities.	Consequently	when	resource	gaps	appear	routine	actions	
become	 less	 robust	 and	 less	 reliable.	 Under	 conditions	 of	 resource	 collapse,	
routines	disappear	altogether	 to	be	 replaced	with	ad	hoc	actions	 requiring	more	
intense	 cognition	 on	 the	 part	 of	managers	 and	 less	 reliability	 and	 repetition	 in	
delivering	positive	outcomes.	
	 The	research	question	underpinning	this	paper	addresses	how	the	firm	can	still	
be	 capable	 in	 delivering	 or	 developing	 value	 without	 reliable	 capabilities.	 In	
addressing	this	condition	to	a	practitioner	audience,	it	is	focussed	on	real	actions	
managers	 can	 take	 to	 facilitate	 active	 capability	 dismantling	 during	 the	 decline	
phase	of	the	trajectory	ready	for	an	indeterminate	period	of	collapse.	During	this	
period	of	collapse,	a	focus	on	agile	adaptation,	learning	and	opportunity	formation	
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allows	a	more	developed	model	of	regaining	capabilities	than	current	turnaround	
models.	Flawed	assumptions	underscore	subsequent	flawed	actions,	more	likely	to	
lead	to	a	failure	to	recover	from	a	collapsed	state,	remaining	caught	in	the	collapse	
trap.	
	 The	 chapter	 adds	 richness	 to	 the	 anatomy	 of	 collapse	 and	 the	 varying	 paths	
firms	 may	 take	 as	 they	 navigate	 through	 adverse	 conditions.	 The	 focus	 on	
managerial	 cognitions	 in	 the	 form	 of	 flawed	 assumptions	 leads	 to	 the	
identification	of	key	cognitions	and	actions,	underpinning	how	firms	can	(and	can	
not)	build	capabilities	in	resilience.	
6.3	INTEGRATIVE	ANSWER	TO	THESIS	RESEARCH	QUESTION	
In	this	section,	the	collective	insights	are	integrated	to	address	the	central	thesis	
research	question	in	two	parts.	In	the	first	part,	an	integrated	model	for	how	firms	
can	 build	 a	 specific	 type	 of	 resilience	 capability	 -	 a	 heuristics-based	 dynamic	
capability	-	is	presented.		This	model	draws	on	and	expands	the	data	gathered	in	
investigating	 three	 sequences	 of	 collapse	 and	 the	 analysis	 undertaken	 to	 derive	
specific	heuristics	adopted	by	the	focal	firm.	
In	 the	 second	 part,	 this	 data	 is	 abstracted	 to	 distil	 the	 key	 variables	 at	 play	
affecting	 how	 firms	 can	 build	 resilience	 capabilities.	 This	 second	 section	moves	
away	 from	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 resilience	 capability,	 which	 has	 been	 the	
focus	 of	 the	 thesis	 research,	 to	 abstract	more	 general	 principles	 governing	 how	
firms	build	resilience	capabilities.		
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6.3.1	Part	1:	Heuristics-based	Dynamic	Resilience	Capability	
The	 study	 of	ActiveSky	 began	 as	 a	 process	 to	 understand	why	 a	 firm	with	 such	
radical	 technology	 operating	 under	 such	 promising	 initial	 conditions	 should	
flounder	 and	 collapse	 on	 multiple	 occasions.	 What	 began	 as	 a	 study	 assessing	
decisions	and	decision	processes	at	strategic	and	operating	levels	became	a	study	
of	resilience	and	adaptive	cycles	as	waves	of	adversities	impacted	upon	the	firm.	
This	 study	 shows	 how	 rational	 heuristics	 learning	 resulted	 from	 process	
experience.	That	is,	that	firms	first	learn	simple	rules	for	selection	of	resources	and	
the	 procedures	 by	 which	 they	 can	 be	 utilised	 and	 then,	 with	 more	 experience,	
learn	 the	 timing	 and	 priorities	 to	 be	 applied	 to	 such	 sequencing	 (Bingham	 &	
Eisenhardt,	2011).	As	an	initial	approach,	the	strategists	at	ActiveSky	were	oriented	
towards	 validating	 the	 significance	 of	 their	 technology	 and	 gaining	 peer	 group	
acceptance	and	so	selected	partner	relationships	and	processes	towards	this	goal.		
After	 experiencing	 collapse	 they	 learned	 that	 the	most	 pressing	 need	 was	 to	
establish	positive	cash	 flows	and	 that	business	model	architecture	and	details	of	
capability	development,	whether	gained	in	house	or	accessed	via	partner	alliances,	
needed	priority	consideration	and	embedding	over	resource	utilisation	activities.	
They	built	resource	inertia	too	quickly,	when	in	fact	they	should	have	maintained	
high	flexibility	(Eisenhardt	et	al.,	2010;	Gilbert,	2005).	In	hindsight,	an	initial	focus	
on	 the	 timing	 and	priority	 of	 the	 opportunities	 they	navigated	may	have	drawn	
early	consideration	of	the	required	capabilities	to	enact	their	strategic	goals.	Then,	
they	 could	 have	 focussed	 on	 resource	 selections	 and	 operating	 procedures,	
evolving	these	into	robust	routines	to	enact	such	strategic	goals.	
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Across	 a	 range	 of	 research	 domains,	 evidence	 is	 given	 that	 resilience	
capabilities	 can	be	built	 in	 a	 variety	of	ways,	 but	 simple	 rules	 that	 enable	quick	
decisions	 in	uncertain	 conditions	 are	 central.	Accordingly,	 theory	building	drew	
focus	on	heuristic	based	dynamic	capabilities	as	 the	central	 feature	of	a	 resilient	
firm,	particularly	under	conditions	of	strategic	and	resource	collapse.	This	draws	
on	 earlier	 research	 covering	 strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse	 (McGrath,	 1999;	
Mellahi	&	Wilkinson,	2004;	Probst	&	Raisch,	2005;	Sheppard	&	Chowdhury,	2005)	
as	well	 as	 extensive	 literatures	 covering	 firms	 under	 conditions	 of	 strategic	 and	
resource	cohesion	(Ensley,	Pearson,	&	Amason,	2002;	Raynor,	2007;	Rumelt,	2011)	
to	 model	 how	 a	 heuristics	 based	 resilience	 capability	 would	 function	 across	 a	
range	of	 operating	 conditions	 (Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	 2011).	 The	 three	heuristic	
clusters	 of	 strategy,	 resources	 and	 communications,	 derived	 from	 the	 data	
gathered,	were	used	to	describe	what	rules	are	used	as	a	firm	navigates	sequences	
of	 decline,	 collapse,	 rebuilding	 and	 performance	 through	 various	 boundary	
transitions.	
The	progression	of	heuristics,	skills,	benefits	and	traps	at	each	of	the	boundary	
transitions,	including	the	four	transitions	outlined	above,	is	given	in	Table	2	below	
to	 show	 how	 dynamic	 capabilities	 vary	 in	 their	 construction	 depending	 on	 the	
stage	the	firm	is	navigating	along	with	the	heuristics	that	are	applied.	This	analysis	
gives	 a	 greater	 insight	 into	 the	 nuances	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities,	 beyond	 an	
amorphous	 hierarchical	 mass	 into	 a	 context-specific,	 heuristics-based,	 multi-
faceted	 phenomenon	 requiring	 continual	 cognitive	 analyses	 and	 selection	
activities.	This	representation	of	dynamic	capabilities	differs	from	the	portrayal	of	
	237	
higher	 order	 and	 lower	 order	 dynamic	 capabilities	 and	 other	 such	multilayered	
divisions	 (Danneels,	 2012;	Hine,	Parker,	 Pregelj,	&	Verreynne,	 2014;	 Schreyögg	&	
Kliesch-Eberl,	2007)	that	seek	to	model	how	dynamic	capabilities	themselves	test	
for	context	and	sense	and	apply	new	routines	of	change	and	transformation.	
This	 conceptualization	 suggests	 that	 phases	 of	 decline	 and	 rebuilding	 can	 be	
split	 into	 two	 distinct	 paths,	 each	 requiring	 distinct	 sets	 of	 heuristics	 and	
resilience	capabilities.	These	distinct	paths	are	separated	by	a	notional	threshold	
of	operating	stability,	above	which	the	firm	can	rely	on	access	to	resources,	even	if	
these	 may	 be	 shrinking	 or	 growing,	 and	 below	 which	 such	 resource	 access	 is	
unstable	 or	 not	 available.	 The	 case	 data	 and	 modelling	 indicate	 that	 different	
capabilities	 and	 rules	 are	 required	 to	describe	 the	 transitional	 arc	depending	on	
the	 strategic	 cohesion	 and	 resources	 available	 to	 the	 firm,	 independent	 of	 the	
perceived	environmental	velocity.		
This	 notion	 of	 a	 progressive	 arc	 contrasts	 with	 the	 view	 from	 turnaround	
literature	that	commonly	portrays	decline	as	a	contiguous	sequence	of	progressive	
loss	of	capability	and	resources	to	be	reversed	by	a	single	strategic	shift	or	choice.	
Should	the	strategic	shift	prove	successful	and	the	firm	can	begin	to	recover,	such	
capability	 rebuilding	 is	 commonly	portrayed	 as	 a	 contiguous	process	 of	 strategy	
application,	 resource	 accumulation	 and	 capability	 growth	without	 any	 reference	
to	 the	 changing	 foci	 and	 dynamic	 boundary	 conditions	 that	 emerge	 for	 each	
progressive	step.		
This	 approach	 also	 impacts	 the	 inter-relationships	 of	 various	 types	 of	
organizational	capabilities	if	these	are	regarded	as	a	hierarchical	system.	In	such	a	
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hierarchy,	 resources	 act	 as	 the	 zero	 order	 competency,	 requiring	 actions	 to	
between	 them	 to	 create	 value	 (Gruber,	Heinemann,	 Brettel,	 &	Hungeling,	 2010)	
while	such	resources	provide	a	buffer	when	the	firm	navigates	adverse	conditions	
(De	Carolis	et	al.,	2009).	Operating	capabilities	extract	value	from	such	resources	
through	repeated	activity	sets,	or	routines,	as	a	first	order	competency	(Pentland,	
Feldman,	 Becker,	 &	 Liu,	 2012).	 Dynamic	 capabilities	 serve	 to	 reconfigure	 these	
operating	routines	and	resource	combinations	to	adapt	to	changing	conditions	as	
a	 second	 order	 competency	 (Danneels,	 2012)	 that	 enables	 change,	 renewal	 and	
regeneration	of	the	resource	base	and	attendant	routines	(Ambrosini	et	al.,	2009).	
These	 hierarchical	 inter-relationships	 therefore	 must	 founder	 of	 the	 resource	
foundation,	 along	 with	 the	 routines	 used	 to	 extract	 value,	 collapse	 or	 become	
unstable.	 If	 the	 lifecycle	 of	 such	 relationships	 are	 regarded	 as	 a	 simple	 linear	
progression	 through	 capability	 accumulation,	 reconfiguration	 or	 disposal,	 all	
assuming	 an	 underlying	 resource	 sufficiency	 (Helfat	 &	 Peteraf,	 2003),	 then	 the	
capability	 hierarchy	meets	 a	 boundary	 condition	 during	 the	 adverse	 conditions	
experienced	by	the	focal	firm	of	this	study.		
The	 data	 from	 this	 focal	 firm	 shows	 a	 need	 for	 more	 than	 just	 a	 change	 in	
strategy	for	turn	around	of	decline	to	be	successful	(as	in	Chowdhury,	2002).	The	
study	 shows	 that	 firms	 can	 survive	 strategic	 failure	 and	 unstable	 resources	 if	
capabilities	 are	 built	 on	 heuristics	 rather	 than	 routines.	 For	 heuristic	 based	
capabilities	to	be	shown	as	distinct	from	routine	based	capabilities	yet	potentially	
co-existing,	 I	 need	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 dynamic	 capabilities	 are	 applied	 with	
changes	 in	 strategic	 cohesion	 and	 resource	 sufficiency,	 augmenting	 the	 already	
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developed	 view	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities	 changing	 with	 environmental	 velocity	
(Eisenhardt	 &	 Martin,	 2000).	 I	 argue	 that	 conditions	 of	 strategic	 and	 resource	
collapse	 represent	 a	 distinct	 space,	 focussed	 on	 survival	 and	 regaining	 stability,	
compared	 to	 conditions	 of	 strategic	 cohesion	 and	 resource	 sufficiency,	 focussed	
on	sustained	competitive	advantage.	In	this	context,	a	resilience	capability	can	be	
learned,	to	support	a	firm	under	both	sets	of	conditions	regardless	of	the	speed	of	
change	outside	the	firm.	Next,	I	will	expand	from	the	data	to	propose	a	resilience	
capability	 loop	 that	 draws	 on	 heuristic	 based	 dynamic	 capabilities	 and	 how	
sustained	resilience	requires	management	of	both	heuristics	and	routines.	
The	Resilience	Capability	Loop	
Heuristic	based	capabilities	have	been	charted	 in	 chapter	 3,	under	 conditions	of	
strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse	 where	 the	 firm	 focus	 lies	 in	 survival.	 Firm	
performance	 under	 conditions	 of	 strategic	 cohesion	 and	 resource	 sufficiency,	
where	 the	 firm	 can	 focus	 on	 sustaining	 competitive	 advantage,	 are	well	 charted	
(eg.	Newbert,	2008).	Accordingly,	the	resilience	capability	loop	is	an	expansion	of	
the	model	introduced	in	chapter	3,	to	yield	six	sectors	shown	in	Table	2	embrace	
both	 adverse	 and	 advantage	 orientations	 of	 cyclic	 yet	 ongoing	 performance	 and	
growth	 to	 underpin	 a	 resilience	 capability.	 Figure	 1	 depicts	 the	 sectors	 and		
boundary	 transitions	 as	 these	 apply	 above	 or	 below	 the	 threshold	 of	 operating	
stability.	They	 indicate	how	the	focus	of	dynamic	capabilities	progress	 for	a	 firm	
under	 different	 strategic,	 operating	 and	 resource	 conditions	 and	 the	 transitions	
required	to	enable	such	progression.	The	sectors	are	defined	in	terms	of	dynamic	
capabilities	and	heuristics	in	Table	3	below.	
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Table	2:	How	heuristics,	skills,	benefits	&	traps	vary	through	each	of	the	6	transitions	for	the	resilience	capabilities	loop	
Boundary	
Transition	
Heuristics	 Skills	 Benefits	 Traps	
1	
Strategy:	change	from	recovery	goal	to	
retain	low	resource-consuming	assets	
Resources:	strip	high	resource-
consuming	assets	&	suppress	structure	
Communications:	warn	of	impending	
restrictions	&	consequences	
Strategic	agility	to	detect	
instability	onset	&	change	from	
recovery	focus	to	dismantling	
focus	
Early	release	of	resource	hungry	
assets	&	routines	of	action	
Lose	stability	&	momentum	if	
recovery	condition	ensues,	
despite	earlier	assessment,	key	
resource	mix	needs	rebuilding.	
Also,	dismantling	hard	to	
control,	so	resources	(such	as	
staff)	can	exit	firm	and	accelerate	
instability	
2	
Strategy:	Reiteratively	form	new	
insights	for	potential	partners	with	
resource	options	
Resources:	devise	ad	hoc	activity	
sequences	from	individual	skills	
available	
Communications:	share	strategic	
options	&	configurations	with	survivors	
&	advisors	
Business	model	design	to	shape	
options	with	resources	required	
and	access	to	such	resources,	
while	striving	for	a	stability	focus	
Practice	strategic	option	forming	
with	resource	targeting	&	access	
–	benefit	carries	forward	to	
rebuilding	phase	if	this	arises	
Survivors	lose	belief	in	the	firm	
being	capable	to	enact	identified	
strategic	options	&	resource	
access	and	exit,	cementing	
collapse	state	
3	
Strategy:	Assemble	resources	around	
new	opportunities	iteratively	
developed	
Resources:	learn	new	activity	patterns	
suiting	resources	
Communications:	test	strategy	&	
action	sequences	
Identify	range	of	operating	
conditions	required	for	each	
resource	bundle	&	steps	to	
dismantle	if	opportunity	falters	
Assemble	agile	resources	suiting	
strategy	with	clear	exit	process	
for	each	resource	
Firm	unable	to	gain	traction	with	
any	new	opportunity	due	to	
resource	access	restrictions	or	
low	survivor	commitment	
4	
Strategy:	secure	control	of	resources	
for	emerging	opportunity	of	greatest	fit	
Resources:	configure	activity	patterns	
&	build	structure	
Communications:	reinforce	strategy	
&	action	patterns	
Consolidate	new	collective	
activities	to	deliver	desired	
results	as	robust,	routine	actions	
Re-enter	condition	operating	
stability	with	reliable	results	
from	routine	actions	
Activities	do	not	translate	to	
collective	knowledge	&	skill	
sharing,	undermining	stability	&	
performance	
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5	
Strategy:	tune	configuration	of	
resources	&	activities	for	consolidated	
opportunity	
Resources:	routines	of	action	drive	
resource	configuration	for	repeatable	
performance		
Communications:	reinforce	strategic	
fit	with	resources	&	activities	adopted;	
highlight	remedies	for	any	identified	
misfits	
Reconfiguring	&	attracting	new	
resources	&	activity	patterns	to	
maintain	performance	
advantages.	Reviewing	for	
strategic	fit,	seeking	exceptions	
&	anomalies	for	remedy	with	
new	resource	development	or	
acquisition	
Practiced	adaptation	to	setbacks	
by	adjusting	resource	mix	&	
activities	to	continue	
competitive	advantages	builds	
resilience	responses	
Strategic,	resource	or	routine	
rigidities	can	block	cognition	of	
potentially	destabilizing	
conditions	preventing	
maintenance	of	operating	
stability	
6	
Strategy:	balance	efficiency	&	
flexibility	in	reconfiguring	resources	&	
activities	for	established	opportunities	
Resources:	seek	improved	resource	
matrix	with	renewed	activities	to	
recover	performance	premium	
Communications:	articulate	
heuristics	used	to	balance	efficiency	&	
flexibility	
Key	balancing	heuristics	for	
structure	environment	&	
cognition	to	maintain	stability	as	
strategic	&	resource	fluctuations	
or	decline,	while	maintaining	a	
competitive	advantage	focus	as	
gaps	in	routine	performance	
emerge	
Early	stages	of	any	decline	
maintain	competitive	
advantages,	mindful	of	key	
performance	thresholds	that	
may	invoke	operating	instability	
and	strategic	or	operating	
uncertainty	&	complexity.	
Deepens	resilience	responses	&	
adaptations	
Adaptation	insufficient	while	
strategy	intact	&	resources	
sufficient,	invoking	loss	of	
operating	stability	and	deeply	
restricted	strategic	&	resource	
options	
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Figure	1:	The	performance	loop	of	resilience	capabilities	showing	a	six	stage	progression	of	boundary	transitions.		
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Table	3:	Using	heuristics	 to	enact	dynamic	capabilities	across	sectors	of	 the	 resilience	capability	 loop,	as	derived	 from	case	data	and	
extant	literature.	
Sector	 Dynamic	Capabilities	 Key	Heuristics	
1-2	|	Unstable	decline,	
without	operating	
stability	
Seek	diversity	of	commitment	(eg	through	ad	hoc	alliances)	
to	 aid	 later	 rebuilding	 of	 strategy	 &	 resources	 (Brock,	
Mäler,	&	Perrings,	2002)	
a)	concentrate	strategic	control	to	central	group	of	survivors;		
b)	identify	&	strip	high	consumption	resources	
2-3	|	Collapsed	state	
seeking	stability	
Requires	 sufficient	 survivor	 commitment	 to	 pursue	
formation	 of	 new	 options	 &	 business	 models	 and	 then	
negotiating	resource	access	to	enable	value	growth	(Walker	
&	Salt,	2012)	
a)	reiteratively	shape	&	form	new	opportunities,	identifying	base	
resources	needing	access	to	realise	growth	
3-4	|	Rebuilding	
activities	towards	
operating	stability	
Specific	processes	to	attract,	access	&	configure	a	changing	
resource	 base	 using	 heuristics	 (as	 for	 high	 velocity	
conditions)	yielding	unpredictable	outcomes	(Eisenhardt	&	
Martin,	2000;	Peteraf,	Di	Stefano,	&	Verona,	2013)	
a)	 allocate	 resource	 access	 based	 on	 attractive	 returns	 from	
forming	options	&	cultural	fit	between	resource	holders	
4-5	|	Capabilities	growth	
towards	competitive	
advantages	
Routine	 based	 capabilities	 form	 through	 iterations	 of	
productive	 activity	 sets	 developed	 from	 ad	 hoc	 problem	
solving	 into	 proven	 repeated	 performance	 (Becker,	 2004;	
Winter,	2003,	2012)	
a) adaptive	 balance	 of	 exploration	 &	 exploitation	 in	 self-
organizing	business	units	as	capabilities	grow	(Limnios	et	al.,	
2014)	
5-6	|	Sustained	
performance	seeking	to	
extend	competitive	
advantage	
Integrate	 &	 build	 resource	 &	 activity	 configurations	
through	sensing,	seizing	&	transforming	new	opportunities	
with	 routine	 actions	 to	 sustain	 high	 performance	 (Teece,	
Pisano,	&	Shuen,	1997)	
a)			maintain	high	performance	by	balancing	efficiency	with	
flexibility	(Eisenhardt,	Furr	&	Bingham,	2010)	
b) practice	iteratively	reconfiguring	resources	&	associated	
activity	routines	by	leveraging	asymmetries	(Miller,	2003)	
6-1	|	Stable	decline	with	
operating	stability	
Iterate	 responses	 &	 positive	 transitions	 using	 turnaround	
orientation	 to	 recover	 full	 advantages	 (Chowdhury,	 2002;	
Woods,	2006)	
a) reconfigure	existing	resources	to	gain	new	strategic	growth	
options	(Morrow	et	al.,	2007)	
b) deepen	resource	cognition	&	their	scope	of	possible	uses	
(Danneels,	2010)	
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	 Sector	 1-2	 is	 initiated	 when	 the	 firm	 discerns	 a	 change	 from	 stability	 to	
instability,	 a	 division	 that	 distinguishes	 this	 model	 from	 other	 decline	 and	
turnaround	 models.	 The	 insight	 here	 that	 is	 that	 the	 strategic	 choices	 and	
opportunity	types	that	can	be	generated	are	different	for	a	firm	navigating	decline	
in	 the	 context	 of	 strategic	 change	 and	 resource	 sufficiency	 (a	 state	 above	 the	
threshold	 of	 operating	 stability)	 and	 a	 firm	 navigating	 such	 decline	 but	 in	 a	
context	of	strategic	and	resource	collapse	(a	state	below	the	threshold	of	operating	
stability).	The	data	 indicates	 that	a	concentration	of	strategic	control,	 to	quickly	
and	cohesively	 form	and	take	up	 fragile	opportunities	 for	development	 into	new	
options,	 along	 with	 stripping	 high	 resource	 consuming	 attributes	 (such	 as	
expensive	 office	 space,	 financially	 needy	 staff	 or	 high	 maintenance	 partner	
arrangements)	underpin	the	rules	needed	during	the	passage	of	 this	sector.	This	
resource	 stripping	 action	 contradicts	 common	 responses	 to	 crises	 that	 invoke	
sustainability	 goals	 through	 the	 higher	 costs	 of	 increasing	 complexity	 and	
concentrated	control	(eg.	Tainter	&	Taylor,	2014).	
	 Sector	 2-3	 represents	 a	 deeply	 unstable	 sequence	 to	 navigate	 without	 any	
certainty	that	the	firm	will	survive.	Strategic	and	resource	collapse	in	many	ways	is	
living	in	the	midst	of	chaos	rather	than	on	the	edge	of	it	(see	Brown	&	Eisenhardt,	
1998;	Burgelman	&	Grove,	2007).	The	proposal	here	is	the	firm	needs	to	constantly	
and	iteratively	shape	and	form	new	opportunities,	despite	it’s	lack	of	resources	it	
controls	or	 can	access,	with	 a	 view	 to	 identifying	 their	own	unique	 skills.	These	
identified	 advantages	 allow	 an	 opportunity	 to	 emerge	 that	 otherwise	 could	 not	
exist.	 I	do	not	claim	this	opportunity	 formation	 is	an	easy	activity	 to	pursue	but	
the	 data	 supports	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 opportunities	 even	 when	 no	 coherent	
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strategy	is	in	place	and	resources	have	largely	dissipated.	The	assumed	condition	
is	that	committed	survivors	adopt	an	asymmetric	view	of	advantage	(Miller,	2003)	
so	to	adaptively	grasp	how	their	skills,	experience	and	insights	add	value	to	arising	
options,	can	adapt	 to	a	 range	of	business	models	 that	allow	them	to	 rebuild	 the	
firm’s	capabilities	while	adding	value	to	 their	customers.	Crucially,	 this	sector	of	
the	model	 requires	 the	 survivors	 to	 identify	 and	 attract	 the	 necessary	 resources	
and	activity	sets	to	enact	such	value	creation.	
	 Sector	3-4	is	a	time	of	rebuilding	through	developing	those	opportunities	that	
gain	 strategic	 and	 resource	 traction.	 That	 is,	 the	 upside	 is	 attractive	 to	 the	
survivors	of	a	firm	seeking	to	exit	collapse	and	these	survivors	are	able	to	attract	
the	necessary	resources,	possibly	through	alliance	partners,	and	learn	new	activity	
sequences	 to	 rebuild	 the	organization.	These	 actions	have	been	characterised	as	
ad	hoc	problem	solving	(Winter,	2013),	bricolage	(Baker	&	Nelson,	2005),	rational	
heuristics	(Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	2011),	entrepreneurial	action	(Teece,	2012)	and	
dynamic	capabilities	 in	high	velocity	environments	 (Eisenhardt	&	Martin,	2000).	
While	aspects	of	all	of	these	labels	are	relevant,	I	frame	this	rebuilding	period	from	
collapse	primarily	as	a	time	of	strategic	and	activity	pattern	learning,	opportunity	
formation	 and	 testing,	 along	 with	 resource	 and	 alliance	 attraction.	 These	
sequences	 are	 iterative	 and	 interdependent,	 meaning	 that	 if	 traction	 on	 a	
particular	opportunity	cannot	be	gained,	the	firm	reverts	to	the	previous	unstable	
sector	 2-3.	 In	 sector	 3-4,	 the	 firm	 still	 cannot	 establish	 operating	 routine	 based	
capabilities	 since	 resources	 remain	 only	 transiently	 stable,	 its	 access	 to	 such	
resources	 volatile	 and	 its	 patterns	 of	 action	 not	 reliably	 delivering	 desired	
outcomes.	Taken	together,	they	indicate	that	new	capabilities	are	heuristics	based.	
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If	the	opportunity	remains	sufficiently	attractive	and	continues	to	deliver	desired	
returns,	 routine	 actions	 may	 begin	 to	 supplant	 heuristic	 actions	 to	 consolidate	
stability	(cp.	Winter,	2012).	
	 Sector	 4-5	 enters	 the	 familiar	 territory	 of	 cohesive	 strategy,	 stable	 resources,	
patterned	 activities	 forming	 reliable	 routines	 of	 operating	 action	 that	 emerge	 as	
operating	 capabilities	 and	 a	 shift	 in	 focus	 from	 survival	 towards	 operating	
stability.	 Whether	 the	 firm	 remains	 in	 a	 market	 exhibiting	 conditions	 of	 high	
velocity	change,	moderate	velocity	change	or	a	stable	operating	environment,	the	
firm	 operates	 in	 this	 space	 with	 relative	 security	 regarding	 its	 resources,	 its	
strategy	and	its	capacity	to	reconfigure,	renew	and	organise	towards	gaining	peak	
performance	(Abell,	Felin,	&	Foss,	2008;	Teece,	2014).	 In	 this	 sector,	efficiency	 is	
encouraged	with	 routine	 base	 capabilities	 while	 flexibility	 to	 adapt	 to	 changing	
conditions	is	derived	from	heuristics	based	capabilities	(Eisenhardt	et	al.,	2010)	
	 Sector	5-6	again	represents	familiar	territory	of	established	successful	resource	
configuration,	high	performing	routines	and	reliable	operations	were	the	key	issue	
to	be	addressed	is	overcoming	the	negative	impacts	of	inertia	through	an	iterative	
process	 of	 rebalancing	 routine	 based	 efficiency	 and	 heuristic	 based	 flexibility	
(Eisenhardt	et	al.,	2010).	
	 Sector	6-1	 represents	 the	early	 stage	of	decline,	when	 resources	 still	 exist	 and	
strategy	 is	 faltering	 but	 is	 not	 yet	 incoherent.	 The	 transition	 to	 entering	 such	
decline	 indicates	 gaps	 in	 the	 dynamic	 capabilities	 that	 sense	 changes	 in	
endogenous	capacity	or	exogenous	conditions,	 seize	emerging	opportunities	and	
transform	existing	resource	configurations	and	routine	actions	to	build	from	such	
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opportunities	 (Teece,	 2007).	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 process	 of	 navigating	 sequences	 of	
capability	decline	can	be	positive	 for	 the	 firm,	providing	 they	are	able	 to	extract	
new	learning	and	apply	this	knowledge	to	improving	skills,	renewing	routines	or	
introducing	heuristic	actions	to	less	stable	resources.	Constructs	such	as	resource	
cognition	(Danneels,	2010),	routine	and	resource	rigidity	(Gilbert,	2005),	strategic	
turnaround	 (Lohrke,	 Bedeian,	 &	 Palmer,	 2004)	 and	 capability	 dynamization	
(Schreyögg	&	Kliesch-Eberl,	2007)	have	well	covered	this	terrain,	using	underlying	
assumptions	of	resource	sufficiency	and	strategic	cohesion	between	actors	(usually	
top	management	teams).		
In	 support	 of	 my	 argument,	 I	 regard	 any	 actions	 above	 the	 threshold	 of	
operating	stability	(according	to	my	model	as	Figure	1)	as	a	productive	space	to	try	
new	ideas	and	cope	with	strategic	and	resource	fluctuations	with	either	routine	or	
heuristic	 actions.	 Combining	 these	 differing	 action	 types	 builds	 resilience	
capabilities	 through	 practice	 of	 both	 routines	 and	 heuristics.	 Should	 deeply	
adverse	 conditions	 strike	 and	 their	 operations	 become	unstable,	 they	 have	 then	
practised	 the	 iterations	 of	 strategy,	 resourcing	 and	 communication	 heuristics	 to	
quickly	and	competently	adjust	towards	regaining	operating	stability.	
	 The	progression	through	these	six	sectors	in	terms	of	dynamic	capabilities	and	
focal	heuristics	 are	 summarised	 in	Table	 3,	 consolidating	 the	descriptions	 above	
and	 supplementing	 the	 outline	 of	 six	 boundary	 transitions	 and	 their	 associated	
heuristic	orientations	as	represented	in	Figure	1.	
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6.3.2	Part	2:	General	Principles	
The	 overall	 thesis	 research	 question	 is:	 How	 can	 firms	 build	 capabilities	 in	
resilience?	 In	 the	 preceding	 section,	 the	 individual	 contributions	 of	 earlier	
chapters	 were	 integrated	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 central	 thesis	 research	 question	
through	heuristics-based	dynamic	 capabilities.	This	 specific	 case	 arises	based	on	
the	 presentation	 of	 specific	 configurations	 of	 threats	 and	 disorganizations	
experienced	 by	 the	 firm.	However,	 the	 accumulated	 understanding	 also	 permits	
identification	of	more	general	principles	that	may	apply	in	answering	the	central	
thesis	research	question.			
The	 following	 tables	 show	 this	 process	 by	 listing	 in	 the	 first	 column	 the	 key	
variables	within	each	of	the	theoretical	models	identified	from	Chapters	2,	3	and	5	
respectively1.	 The	 second	 column	 then	 abstracts	 further	 from	 these	 variables	 to	
identify	 the	 broader	 variable	 at	 play.	 So	 for	 example,	 the	 theoretical	 model	 in	
Chapter	 3	 references	 a	 heuristics-based	 dynamic	 capability	 as	 a	 first-order	
variable.	This	 is	a	 “type	of	capability”.	That	 is,	while	 in	 the	case	heuristics-based	
dynamic	capabilities	were	pertinent	owing	to	a	range	of	contextual	circumstances,	
other	circumstances	may	require	routine-based	capabilities	to	provide	the	needed	
resilience.	But	the	overall	point	is	that	building	a	capability	in	resilience	requires	
understanding	 what	 type	 of	 capability	 needs	 to	 be	 developed	 to	 suit	 particular	
circumstances.	 These	 higher-order	 constructs	 identify	 the	 critical	 underlying	
parameter	in	building	a	capability	in	resilience.		
																																								 								
1	Chapter	4	examined	experiences	in	adopting	the	engaged	scholarship	method	and	complementary	
processes	rather	than	factors	relevant	to	the	thesis	research	question.	
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	 Once	higher-order	constructs	were	identified,	further	analysis	made	it	apparent	
that	each	could	be	classified	as	either	an	antecedent	to	the	conditions	to	hand,	an	
internal	factor	in	shaping	response	to	this	context	or	an	outcome	resulting	from	
the	responsive	action.	These	latter	three	categories	then	enable	portrayal	into	a	
theoretical	framework,	which	is	shown	as	Figure	2	below.	
This	figure	represents	a	composite	model	of	all	factors	identified	as	salient	
within	the	models	presented	through	the	thesis.	It	frames	a	generalized	and	
integrated	answer	to	the	research	question	by	showing	1)	the	salient	antecedents	
that	affect	how	firms	can	build	capabilities	in	resilience,	2)	the	internal	
organizational	factors	largely	governing	how	firms	can	build	capabilities	in	
resilience	and	3)	the	outcomes	affecting	how	firms	can	build	capabilities	in	
resilience,	whether	based	on	routines	or	heuristics.	Resilient	re-integration,	also	
known	as	positive	adaptation	to	adversity,	is	derived	from	the	ability	to	transition	
from	routines	to	heuristics	and	back	as	conditions	demand,	whether	through	
exogenous	environmental	velocity	or	endogenous	strategic	and	resource	collapse.	
In	short,	firms	can	build	capabilities	in	resilience	by	considering	the	questions	
across	the	range	of	antecedents,	internal	factors	and	outcomes	identified.	Answers	
to	these	questions	will	affect	the	make-up	of	the	capabilities	developed.	Ignorance	
of	these	factors	is	likely	to	undermine	resilience	capability	development.	
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Table	4:	Variables	highlighted	from	Chapter	2	as	Salient	to	the	Research	Question	
Variables	identified	in	Theoretical	
Model	
Higher-Order	Construct	 Type	of	Variable	
Process	model	 Practitioner	Theory	of	Resilience	
(process	vs	trait)	
Internal	factor	
Threat	dimensions	(severity,	complexity)	 Anatomy	of	threats	 Antecedent	
Strategic,	operating,	resource	
disorganizations	
Anatomy	of	disorganizations	 	
Routine	or	heuristics-based	responses	 Type	of	capability	 Internal	Factor	
Intended	outcomes	from	resilience,	eg.	
Return	to	homeostasis	vs	growth	
Reintegration	Orientation	 Internal	factor	
Actual	outcomes	from	resilience,	eg.	
extinction,	return	with	loss,	return	to	
homeostasis	
Outcomes	from	resilience	 Outcomes	
	
Table	5:	Variables	highlighted	from	Chapter	3	as	Salient	to	the	Research	Question	
Variables	identified	in	Theoretical	
Model	
Higher-Order	Construct	 Type	of	Variable	
Advantage	oriented	versus	stability-
oriented	
Degree	of	operating	stability	 Antecedent	
Decline-Collapse-Re-build	sequence	&	
Inflection	points	
Anatomy	of	decline	&	re-
building	
Antecedent	
Heuristics	 Decision	context	of	Actors		 Antecedent		
Heuristics-based	dynamic	capability	 Type	of	capability	 Internal	factor	
Re-collapse,	return	to	homeostasis,	new	
capabilities,	new	firm	
Resilience	outcomes	 Outcome	
Strategic	and	resource	collapse	 Anatomy	of	disorganization	 Antecedent	
Strategy,	resource,	communication	
heuristics	
Anatomy	of	capabilities	 Internal	Factors	
	
Table	6:	Variables	highlighted	from	Chapter	5	as	Salient	to	the	Research	Question	
Variables	identified	in	Theoretical	
Model	
Higher-Order	Construct	 Type	of	Variable	
Flawed	actions	taken	during	collapse	and	
the	flawed	assumptions	on	which	they	are	
based	
Practitioner	theory	of	resilience	 Internal	factor	
Collapse	trap	 Reintegration	orientation	 Internal	factor	
Purposeful	learning	and	capability	
building	for	decline	and	re-building	
Anatomy	of	capabilities	 Internal	factor	
Forming	opportunities	from	individual	
skills	and	engaged	partner	resources	into	
collective	actions	
Type	of	capability	 Internal	factor	
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Figure	2:	An	integrated	model	of	resilience	capability	showing	how	the	firm	learns,	through	iterations	of	responses	and	consequent	
outcomes,	from	various	adverse	incidents.	
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The	Model	Explained	
Antecedents	A	resilience	capability	is	not	a	capability	with	fixed	boundaries.	Nor	is	it	
some	concrete	thing	that	is	picked	up	and	deployed	as	the	same	capability,	the	same	
way	 each	 time.	 Rather,	 a	 resilience	 capability	 is	 a	 dynamic	 capability,	 which	means	
that	it	consists	of	a	repertoire	of	knowledge,	skills,	heuristics	and	processes	learnt	from	
adversity	 experiences	 but	whose	 configuration	needs	 to	be	 judiciously	 selected	 from	
this	 repertoire	depending	at	 least	on	 the	 set	of	 antecedents	 faced.	Through	multiple	
deployments	 with	 these	 configurations	 firms	 learn	 which	 capability	 elements	 are	
required	for	particular	sets	of	antecedents.	A	resilience	capability	develops	when	this	
learning	becomes	embedded	into	conscious	resilience	capability	development	that	can	
be	used	in	future	scenarios.	
The	 thesis	 research	 highlighted	 at	 least	 five	 main	 groups	 of	 antecedents	 which	
affect	how	a	resilience	capability	 is	developed.	The	anatomy	of	threats	 faced	(type	of	
threat	as	well	as	severity,	familiarity,	complexity,	catalysis	and	frequency)	and	the	type	
and	degree	of	disorganization	(strategic,	operating,	resource)	experienced	by	the	firm	
affect	what	is	learnt	and	the	consequent	repertoire	of	knowledge,	skills,	heuristics	and	
processes	 that	 are	built	 in	 relation	 to	 resilience.	 Figure	 2	 in	Chapter	 3	modelled	 the	
anatomy	 of	 a	 sequence	 of	 decline,	 collapse	 and	 re-build.	 This	model	 indicated	 how	
different	 tactics	were	 required,	 at	 least	 in	 terms	 of	 heuristics,	 at	 different	 boundary	
transition	points	along	this	trajectory.	This	adds	a	temporal	dimension	to	a	resilience	
capability,	which	reflects	a	process	of	moving	through	different	phases	to	accomplish	
positive	outcomes.	Therefore,	the	anatomy	of	the	decline	and	re-building	process	also	
affects	how	firms	build	resilience	capabilities.	
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	 A	 key	 finding	 from	 empirical	 data	 concerned	 the	 importance	 of	 heuristics	 as	 the	
most	efficient	and	suitable	way	for	the	firm’s	managers	to	manage	collapse	and	steer	
on	 a	 path	 away	 from	 a	 collapse	 trap	 or	 death	 towards	 rebuilding.	 Heuristics	 were	
shown	to	be	an	important	part	of	the	make-up	of	the	developing	resilience	capability	
because	alternatives	 like	deploying	routines	had	become	unavailable,	 since	resources	
were	 decimated.	 The	 loss	 of	 staff,	 cash	 and	 vital	 assets	 all	 destroyed	 previously	
available	 routines	 that	 could	 be	 called	 on	 to	 stem	 decline.	 Instead,	 resource	
deprivation	 imposed	 constraints	 on	 the	 options	 available	 to	 managers	 to	 deal	 with	
threats.	This	 analysis	 reveals	 that	 the	decision	 context	of	 actors	 is	 also	 important	 to	
how	firms	build	a	resilience	capability.	In	resource-deprived	circumstances,	heuristics	
become	a	key	part	of	the	make-up	of	a	resilience	capability.	In	less	severe	episodes	of	
adversity,	key	 resources	and	assets	may	remain	 intact	and	so	 routines	and	heuristics	
together	may	be	part	of	 the	resilience	capability	make-up.	Therefore,	 the	constraints	
and	opportunities	 in	 the	actor’s	decision	context	 (eg.	degree	and	nature	of	 resources	
available,	speed	of	response	required)	affect	how	firms	build	resilience	capabilities.	
The	 model	 captured	 this	 tension	 between	 constraints	 and	 opportunities	 in	 the	
actor’s	 decision	 context	 through	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 threshold	 of	 operating	 stability.	
Above	 this	 threshold	 suggests	 sufficient	 resources	 remain	 available	 with	 strategy	
intact.	 Strategic	 and	 resource	 sufficiency	 impact	 on	 how	 a	 resilience	 capability	 is	
developed	to	cope	with	adversities.	Such	a	comparatively	healthy	state	of	affairs	makes	
a	greater	range	of	resources	and	tactics	available	to	maintain	resilience	across	a	range	
of	operating	conditions.	However,	if	this	process	is	mismanaged	or	the	threat	worsens,	
the	 firm	 can	plummet	 into	 unstable	 operations.	Within	 this	 zone,	my	data	 suggests	
seeking	stability	replaces	the	pursuit	of	competitive	advantage	as	the	primary	focus.	
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Fewer	and	less	stable	resources	and	the	possible	collapse	of	the	firm’s	strategy	both	
can	 trigger	 a	 downward	 spiral	 calling	 for	 a	 different,	 more	 resource-constrained,	
actions.	 Therefore,	 how	 firms	 build	 resilience	 capabilities	 is	 also	 predicated	 on	 the	
degree	 of	 operating	 stability	 being	 experienced	 by	 the	 firm.	 The	 complexion	 of	
resilience	capabilities	can	therefore	be	different	above	and	below	the	line	of	operating	
stability.	Nevertheless,	these	five	discrete	elements	given	in	the	model	shown	in	Figure	
2	above	require	consideration	to	properly	frame	responses	to	the	factors	antecedent	to	
the	onset	of	adverse	conditions.	
Internal	 Factors	 The	 foregoing	 discussion	 indicates	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 resilience	
capabilities	 can	 be	 different	 based	 on	 the	 set	 of	 antecedents	 faced.	 For	 example,	
organizational	resilience	could	take	the	form	of	a	heuristics-based	dynamic	capability	
as	 occurred	 in	 the	 study	 underlying	 this	 thesis	 or,	 absent	 survival	 challenging	
conditions,	resilience	could	adopt	routine	actions.	Building	a	resilience	capability	calls	
for	an	understanding	of	the	anatomy	of	capabilities,	with	special	attention	to	how	the	
individual	knowledge	and	skills	of	actors	cohere	into	collective	processes.		
The	 conceptual	 analysis	 of	 the	 resilience	 construct	 in	 Chapter	 2	 predicts	 the	
practitioner’s	cognitive	frame	will	have	a	profound	effect	on	how	resilience	capabilities	
are	developed.	Further,	the	outcome	is	impacted	by	the	framing	of	resilience	as	a	trait,	
implying	 the	assembly	of	protective	 factors	 such	as	 resource	slack	 to	offset	adversity	
(eg.	Cheng	&	Kesner,	1997;	De	Carolis	et	al.,	2009),	or	as	a	process	requiring	different	
components	 at	 different	 times	 before,	 during	 and	 after	 adversity.	 These	 questions	
highlight	 how	 answers	 to	 these	 underlying	 assumptions	 will	 affect	 how	 firms	 build	
resilience	capabilities.		
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Another	 key	 assumption	 within	 the	 cognitive	 frame	 of	 decision	 makers	 is	 the	
orientation	to	reintegration.	The	concept	of	reintegration	was	introduced	in	Chapter	2,	
reflecting	 the	 intended	goal	 to	 improve	performance	as	a	 consequence	of	navigating	
adverse	conditions	(derived	from	Richardson,	2002).	Reintegration	orientation	then,	as	
part	 of	 the	 practitioner’s	 theory	 of	 resilience,	 affects	 how	 a	 resilience	 capability	 is	
developed	 and	 to	what	 intended	 ends.	As	 an	orientation,	 a	 return	 to	homeostasis	 is	
likely	to	be	less	opportunity-seeking	than	an	orientation	towards	growth	and	renewal.		
The	 eight	 propositions	 included	 in	 Chapter	 2	 that	 explore	 various	 contributions	 of	
specific	heuristics	serve	to	underpin	such	a	growth	orientation.			
Outcomes	Figure	2	above	divides	outcomes	into	two	distinct	groups:	those	outcomes	
where	performance	returns	to	or	exceeds	performance	levels	existing	prior	to	the	onset	
of	 that	 particular	 adversity	 (grouped	 as	 resilient	 reintegration)	 and	 those	 outcomes	
whereby	performance	decline	results	(grouped	as	representing	the	collapse	trap).	The	
resilient	 reintegration	 outcome	 posits	 that	 the	 firm	 can	 learn	 from	 disruption	 to	
modify	internal	responses	to	antecedent	conditions.		
Considering	different	scenarios	 in	the	trajectory	of	the	focal	case	 indicates	a	more	
generalized	 articulation	 of	 how	 the	 components	 of	 antecedents	 and	 internal	 factors	
combine	 to	 yield	 particular	 outcomes	 and	 the	 impact	 delivered.	 Reviewing	 the	 case	
data	acts	as	a	test	of	how	effective	the	model	can	be	in	real	time	conditions.	
The	first	scenario	considered	is	the	period	when	the	focal	case	crossed	the	threshold	
of	operating	stability.	This	 traversing	of	 the	 threshold	 is	marked	as	occurring	 in	mid	
2003	 coinciding	 with	 a	 major	 retrenchment	 round.	With	 regards	 to	 the	 conditions	
antecedent	to	the	decline,	the	decision	context	of	the	actors	can	best	be	described	as	
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optimistic,	 certain	 as	 they	 were	 of	 the	 technical	 superiority	 of	 their	 wireless	 media	
platform.	The	threats	were	defined	by	uncertainty	about	how	the	wireless	space	would	
develop,	particularly	in	terms	of	developing	applications	that	customers	would	pay	for.	
In	this	regard,	ActiveSky	had	a	strong	case	for	optimism	and	confidence	in	navigating	
the	uncertainty,	having	struck	a	commercial	arrangement	with	a	major	sports	brand	to	
deliver	 then	 novel	 sports	 information	 services	 to	 wireless	 devices.	 While	 decision	
making	was	 at	 times	 chaotic	 within	 the	 firm,	 operating	 processes	 worked	 smoothly	
enough	 with	 the	 firm	 investing	 in	 project	 managers,	 quality	 control	 and	 product	
testing	 facilities	 indicating	 a	 stable	 operating	 culture.	 In	 that	 regard,	 there	 was	 no	
evidence	of	an	awareness	of,	nor	expectation	for,	a	future	decline.	
	 In	 terms	 of	 internal	 factors	 that	 impacted	 at	 this	 time	 and	 indicated	 in	 the	 case,	
capabilities	covered	areas	of	 technology	development	and	business	development	and	
were	 built	 on	 the	 assumption	 of	 resource	 sufficiency,	 proving	 robust	 to	 changes	 in	
strategy	but	not	robust	to	collapse	of	resources.	The	continued	decline	and	subsequent	
collapse	 of	 resources	 and	 strategy	 prove	 this	 point.	No	 real	 evidence	 of	 a	 practicing	
function	 of	 resilience	 presented	 during	 the	 study,	 nor	 any	 actions	 that	 might	 have	
rendered	a	future	reintegration	into	a	different	capabilities	mix.	The	firm	lived	in	the	
here	and	now,	assuming	its	own	technical	superiority	would	win	business	growth.	
	 The	second	scenario	arose	when	the	 firm’s	strategy	 for	business	growth	could	not	
be	sustained,	given	the	constraints	of	available	cash	and	their	inability	to	leverage	the	
existing	 sports	 information	 service	 to	 gain	 additional	 similar	 revenue	 streams,	
resources	were	shed.	Capabilities	collapsed	as	resources	dissipated,	routines	of	action	
could	not	be	sustained	and	no	new	strategic	opportunities	were	created.	At	this	time,	
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the	 focal	 firm	behaves	unexpectedly.	The	 indicative	 outcome	 should	have	been	 firm	
extinction	 and	 the	 steps	 the	 venture	 funds	 undertook	 next,	 in	 surrendering	 their	
control	 over	 the	 firm,	 supporting	 the	 view	 that	 this	 was	 a	 widely	 held	 stakeholder	
expectation.	 Yet	 the	 firm	 survived	 through	 the	 persistent	 efforts	 of	 a	 small	 cell	 of	
committed	 actors,	 sufficiently	 to	 engineer	 a	 rebuilding	 of	 capabilities.	 The	 model	
reflected	 in	 Figure	 2	 helps	 explain	 how	 this	 mechanism	 of	 unexpected	 persistence	
arose.	Why	it	arose	perhaps	falls	best	within	the	domain	of	founder	identity	(Powell	&	
Baker,	 2014).	Why	persistence	was	 sustained	 reflects	 sufficient	 venture	progress	 as	 a	
function	of	survivor	efforts	(Gielnik,	Spitzmuller,	Schmitt,	Klemann,	&	Frese,	2015).	
	 The	 third	 scenario	 is	 shown	 through	 the	 expectation	 by	 the	 firm	 of	 the	 gains	
flowing	 from	 its	 perceived	 technological	 superiority.	With	 that	 entrenched	mindset,	
no	other	strategy	that	addressed	different	consumer	uptake	scenarios	was	considered.	
Also	following	that	mindset	of	large	corporate	thinking,	perhaps	akin	to	the	“too	large	
to	 fail”	mindset	 of	 some	 firms	 in	 the	 banking	 industry	 during	 2008	 (Agarwal	 et	 al.,	
2009),	 there	 existed	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	 routine	 rigidity	 so	 that	 when	 resources	
dissipated,	 activities	 were	 not	 adjusted	 for	 fear	 of	 failing	 to	 realise	 the	 envisaged	
market	 dominance.	 When	 the	 firm	 collapsed,	 these	 mindset	 constraints	 also	
evaporated	and	into	this	vacuum	emerged	the	individual	skills	and	aspirations	of	the	
survivors.	 These	 survivors	 now	 had	 no	 resistance	 to	 build	 new	 activities	 around	
personal	preferences	rather	than	mandated	sequences	by	remote	stakeholders.	In	that	
sense,	 this	 rebuilding	was	 an	 exciting	 time,	 as	 reported	 by	 several	 informants.	 They	
now	had	 free	hand	 to	 rebuild	 the	 firm	 in	ways	 they	had	 always	 preferred	 to	 do	but	
were	 blocked	 by	 a	 hubristic	 culture	 and	 strategy	 development	 regime	 controlled	
remotely	(cp.	Hayward,	Forster,	Sarasvarthy,	&	Fredrickson,	2010).	
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	 The	 fourth	 scenario	 arises	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 survivors	 experienced	 some	
success	 and	 were	 able	 to	 live	 for	 a	 short	 period	 before	 collapsing	 again	 perhaps	
indicates	more	a	lucky	break	(cf.	Gielnik	et	al.,	2015),	since	no	practical	appreciation	of	
resilience	existed	within	the	firm	during	this	first	collapse	episode.	With	the	arrival	of	
the	second	collapse	sequence,	however,	evidence	emerges	of	learning	by	the	survivors.	
Some	preparation	for	future	disorganization	and	striving	for	stability	is	demonstrated	
by	the	proactive	steps	taken	to	embrace	unstable	resources,	accessed	through	alliance	
partners.	Prior	to	the	first	collapse	episode,	the	firm	sought	to	own	everything	itself,	in	
an	 effort	 to	 control	 its	 own	 resources	 and,	 as	 imagined,	 therefore	 control	 its	 own	
strategy	 and	destiny.	When	 this	 became	 impossible	 following	 strategic	 and	 resource	
collapse,	the	survivors	 learned	to	negotiate	resource	access	with	partners,	even	when	
this	meant	sharing	the	spoils	of	any	gains	through	equity	allocations	or	profit	sharing	
deals.	
	 By	 the	 time	 of	 the	 third	 decline/collapse	 sequence,	 the	 survivors	 had	 some	
experience	 at	 capability	 dismantling	 in	 anticipation	of	 a	 future	 resource	hibernation	
and	so	have	proven	to	keep	alive	sufficiently	to	maintain	the	option	of	rebuilding	while	
existing	in	a	dormant	state.	The	outcome	of	this	hibernation	may	well	be	eventual	firm	
extinction	 but	 the	 sole	 remaining	 technology	 development	 option	 through	 a	 loyal	
alliance	partner	offers	 the	prospect	 that	 the	 firm	could	still	 reincarnate	 itself	 into	an	
entirely	 different	 firm	 from	 the	 wireless	 media	 publishing	 platform	 it	 once	
represented.	 Alternatively,	 the	 firm	 could	 leverage	 the	 radical	 shifts	 in	 wireless	
technology	 that	 have	 occurred	 while	 it	 has	 been	 dormant	 (with	 regards	 the	
innovations	 from	 Apple	 and	 Samsung,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 players	 in	 the	 wireless	 eco-
system)	to	rebuild	itself	into	a	thriving,	resilient	and	capable	outfit	that	emerges	from	
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these	sequences	of	collapse	stronger	and	more	able	than	it	was	at	the	time	it	entered	
its	first	collapse.	
	 The	 model	 represented	 in	 Figure	 2	 above	 does	 not	 seek	 to	 dictate	 which	
combinations	 of	 parameters	 as	 antecedents	 and	 internal	 factors	 will	 yield	 the	 best	
outcomes.	It	does,	however,	seek	to	identify	the	parameters	that	require	consideration	
across	a	multitude	of	possible	combinations	so	that	the	survivors	who	persist	can	focus	
on	the	combinations	available	to	them,	or	at	 least	to	nurture	a	possible	combination	
along	with	 partners	 they	 can	 attract	 to	 build	 new	 capabilities	 and	 gain	 an	 outcome	
that	is	better	than	walking	away.	
6.4	 CONTRIBUTIONS,	 THEORETICAL	 IMPLICATIONS	 &	 FUTURE	
RESEARCH	
The	thesis	has	contributed	to	a	range	of	literatures	including	organizational	resilience,	
dynamic	 capabilities,	 heuristics	 and	 engaged	 scholarship.	 These	 contributions	 and	
implications	along	with	prospects	for	future	research	are	now	discussed.	
6.4.1	Capabilities	
Capabilities	 are	 commonly	 viewed	 as	 a	 hierarchy	 (Gavetti,	 2005),	 with	 resources	
forming	 the	 base	 of	 that	 hierarchy,	 reliable	 and	 robust	 routines	 applied	 to	 such	
resources	 form	operating	capabilities	and	 the	 reconfiguring	of	 such	routines	and	 the	
creativity	of	innovation	forming	the	dynamic	capabilities	apex	of	the	hierarchy	(Hine	
et	 al.,	 2014).	 Organizational	 capabilities	 are	 the	 end	 result	 of	 a	 process	 of	 learning	
within	 the	 firm,	where	 resources	 are	 linked	 in	 stable	 and	 routine	ways	 to	 achieve	 a	
desired	outcome	and	those	 linkages	become	increasingly	more	effective	and	efficient	
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over	 time	 (Schreyögg	 &	 Kliesch-Eberl,	 2007;	 Zollo	 &	 Winter,	 2002).	 Dynamic	
capabilities	 are	 “the	 firm’s	 ability	 to	 integrate,	 build	 and	 reconfigure	 internal	 and	
external	 competencies	 to	 address	 rapidly	 changing	 environments”	 (Teece	 et	 al.,	 1997:	
516),	representing	specific	and	identifiable	processes	(Eisenhardt	&	Martin,	2000).	
	 A	central	tenet	in	this	study	has	been	to	explore	collapse	of	resources,	which	must	
mean	a	collapse	in	routines	since	routines	of	action	rely	on	stable	resources	for	their	
effect.	The	hierarchical	view	of	capabilities	suggests	that	absent	routines,	a	firm	cannot	
possess	capabilities.	Yet	this	study	has	shown	that	a	firm	can	remain	capable	despite	
the	 loss	 of	 reliable	 and	 robust	 routines	 of	 action.	 Loss	 of	 routines	means	 operating	
instability,	 but	 it	 can	 still	 capably	 achieve	 desired	 goals	 if	 efforts	 focus	 on	 stripping	
resource	 consuming	 assets,	 forming	 new	 opportunities	 and	 rebuilding	 collective	
sequences	of	action	toward	regaining	stability.			
	 Such	a	conceptualization	places	dynamic	capabilities,	being	the	capacity	to	attract,	
reconfigure,	 learn	and	adapt,	as	central	 to	gaining	operating	stability	 (under	adverse	
conditions)	or	sustaining	competitive	advantage	(under	promising	conditions).	While	
this	conceptualization	has	already	garnered	acceptance	in	the	pursuit	of	performance	
under	conditions	of	strategic	and	resource	sufficiency	(Eisenhardt	et	al.,	2010),	the	role	
of	 dynamic	 capabilities	 has	 attracted	 far	 less	 attention	 for	 firms	 facing	 strategic	 and	
resource	collapse.	
	 Yet	 questions	 remain	 to	 be	 answered,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 dynamic	
capabilities	 shift	 as	 the	 firm	 changes	 from	 a	 survival	 focus	 (below	 the	 threshold	 of	
operating	 stability,	 as	 depicted	 in	 Figure	 1)	 to	 a	 performance	 focus	 (above	 the	
threshold).	Further	research	into	this	capabilities	change	may	derive	additional	insight	
into	the	origins	of	capabilities	(Winter,	2012)	and	also	when	routine	based	capabilities	
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are	 best	 applied,	 rather	 than	 capabilities	 drawing	 on	 heuristics	 or	 entrepreneurial	
action.	 These	 alternative	 states	 and	 consequential	 expansions	 of	 the	 capabilities	
construct	 collectively	 represent	 conditions	 of	 (perhaps	 transient)	 strategic	 and	
resource	 sufficiency.	 While	 some	 research	 is	 emerging	 on	 transient	 as	 opposed	 to	
sustained	competitive	advantages	(D'Aveni	et	al.,	2010;	McGrath,	2013)	more	research	
is	 required	 to	expand	 the	capabilities	 framework	and	apply	 this	 to	provide	 real	 time	
advantage	 to	 managers	 and	 entrepreneurs	 facing	 unstable,	 transient	 or	 uncertain	
conditions.	
6.4.2	Resilience		
Adverse	 conditions	 impact	 every	 firm	 yet	 not	 every	 firm	 sets	 out	 to	 withstand	 the	
almost	 inevitable	 future	 set	 back	 (Barney,	 1991).	 This	 study	 has	 taken	 the	 setting	 of	
adverse	 conditions	as	 these	applied	 to	one	 firm	and	explored	not	only	how	 the	 firm	
managed	to	survive	but	also	how	it	deliberately	sought	to	make	itself	more	resilient	in	
the	 process.	 This	 approach	 is	 different	 to	 resilience	 being	 regarded	 as	 an	 adaptive	
quality	 where	 failed	 firms	 allow	 for	 knowledge	 dispersal	 that	 benefit	 other	 firms	
(Välikangas,	2007).	The	study	has	also	been	specific	 in	pursuing	real	time	benefits	 for	
firms	 experiencing	 collapse,	 rather	 then	 general	 frames	 for	 organizational	 resilience	
(Hamel	&	Välikangas,	2003).	
	 The	 models	 presented	 in	 the	 study	 place	 organizational	 resilience	 as	 a	 key	 and	
central	part	of	the	suite	of	dynamic	capabilities	a	firm	needs	to	possess	or	learn	in	real	
time	 so	 it	 can	overcome	 rigidity	 and	 attract	new	 resources,	 devise	new	 strategy	 and	
regain	 operating	 stability.	 The	 resilience	 loop	 goes	 further,	 by	 advocating	 the	
continued	 development	 and	 reinforcement	 of	 resilience	 even	 when	 the	 firm	 is	 not	
buffeted	 by	 shocks	 during	 performance	 periods	 when	 it	 can	 focus	 on	 sustaining	 its	
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competitive	advantages.	The	loop	invites	managerial	skill	development	in	both	routine	
and	heuristic	based	capabilities	during	promising	and	adverse	conditions,	with	the	mix	
of	each	capability	set	shifting	according	to	these	circumstances.	
	 The	 foundations	 of	 resilience	 capabilities	 as	 these	 are	 applied	 to	 phases	 of	
dismantling	and	rebuilding	need	greater	definition.	Resilience	reflects	complex	social	
phenomena	 between	 actors	 but	 is	 a	 requisite	 parameter	 for	 navigating	 uncertainty	
(Weick	&	Sutcliffe,	2007).	Navigating	uncertainty	with	the	proposed	step	sequence	of	
both	Figure	1	and	Figure	2,	needs	confirming	and	likely	expansion	across	a	wider	range	
of	 cases	 and	 conditions.	 In	 this	 process,	 the	 resilience	 construct	 as	 it	 applies	 to	
organizations	will	gain	greater	clarity,	consistency	and	applicability.	
	 The	 foundations	of	organizational	 resilience,	derived	 from	the	deep	and	extensive	
tradition	across	psychology,	ecology,	engineering	and	the	management	sciences,	were	
explored	 in	 Chapter	 2	 and	 applied	 in	 Chapters	 3	 and	 5.	 The	 analysis	 sought	 to	
articulate	a	set	of	robust	assumptions	where	firms	are	developed	to	be	the	opposite	of	
fragile	 yet	 not	 rigid	 in	 the	 way	 they	 respond	 to	 adversity	 (Taleb,	 2012).	 The	model	
invites	 further	 research	 about	 the	 parameters	 included	 and	 the	 way	 they	 interact	
towards	achieving	particular	outcomes.	The	desirability	of	the	various	outcomes	under	
particular	adversities	also	requires	further	research	across	a	range	of	conditions.	
6.4.3	Heuristics	
While	heuristics	have	recently	been	applied	as	an	alternative	to	routine	based	actions	
within	 firms	 for	management	science	(Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	2011),	 the	 logic	of	why	
heuristics	work	 is	also	a	developing	 research	 front	 in	psychology	 (Gigerenzer,	2008).	
The	 thesis	 places	heuristics	 centrally	 to	 its	modelling,	 sequencing	 them	 in	 an	 arc	 of	
action	 as	 different	 stages	 of	 the	 capability	 decline-collapse-rebuilding	 trajectory.	
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Routine	 actions	 have	 been	 a	mainstay	 of	 the	 capabilities	 based	 view	 and	 have	 been	
viewed	 positively	 as	 sources	 of	 change	 (Feldman	 &	 Pentland,	 2003),	 innovation	
(Ventresca	 &	 Kaghan,	 2008),	 learning	 (Miner,	 Ciuchta,	 &	 Gong,	 2008)	 and	 problem	
solving	(Dosi,	Faillo,	&	Marengo,	2008),	negatively	as	sources	of	inertia	(Gilbert,	2005)	
and	 both	 positively	 and	 negatively	 as	 sources	 of	 bias	 (Gigerenzer	 &	 Brighton,	 2009;	
Tversky	&	Kahneman,	1974).	
	 An	 underlying	 assumption	 derived	 from	 this	 study	 has	 been	 that	managers	 seek	
simple	rules	to	apply	to	the	complex	problems	they	encounter.	Heuristics	simplify	the	
amount	of	cognitive	processing	required	as	the	actors	face	fast	moving,	unstable	and	
ambiguous	conditions.	By	practising	a	range	of	rules	that	can	be	applied	to	a	bounded	
set	 of	 conditions,	 such	 uncertainty	 enable	 strategies	 that	 can	 be	 more	 readily	
navigated	 (Mousavi	&	Gigerenzer,	 2014).	This	 example	 assigns	 a	 central	 role	 to	 such	
rules	and	proposes	a	chain	of	deployments	of	these	rules	to	address	the	instability	and	
ambiguity	of	strategic	and	resource	collapse.	The	range	of	heuristics	to	be	deployed	is	
a	 clear	 avenue	 of	 further	 research	 as	 is	 the	 phenomena	 of	 heuristics	 themselves,	
including	how	they	originate,	their	structure	and	their	function	over	time.	
	 This	research	adds	to	knowledge	of	the	role	of	heuristics	and	how	firms	learn	them	
(Bingham	 &	 Eisenhardt,	 2011;	 Bingham	 &	 Haleblian,	 2012)	 by	 framing	 these	 simple	
rules	as	an	alternative	to	routine	based	capabilities.	Heuristics	are	more	defined	than	
ad	 hoc	 decision	 making	 (Winter,	 2003)	 or	 entrepreneurial	 action	 (Teece,	 2012),	
framing	how	options	are	interpreted,	the	style	of	response	best	suited	and	how	future	
responses	 can	be	 tuned	 in	 line	with	 learning	 from	previous	 experience.	While	 some	
attempts	have	been	made	to	define	a	foundational	repertoire	of	heuristics	as	these	may	
apply	to	management	practice	(Mousavi	&	Gigerenzer,	2014)	and	even	the	building	of	
		264	
resilience	 frameworks	 (Madni	&	 Jackson,	 2009),	 further	 research	 is	 required	on	base	
heuristics	 (if	 these	 exist)	 that	 apply	 across	 all	 organizational	 conditions	 and	 the	
specific	 development	 trajectories	 such	 rules	 undergo	 under	 a	 variety	 of	 real	 time	
conditions.	Such	research	need	also	investigate	how	firms	best	function	in	combining	
routine	based	and	heuristics	based	capabilities	across	an	array	of	operating	conditions.	
6.4.4	Engaged	Scholarship	
Engaging	 researchers	 with	 practitioners	 is	 an	 approach	 that	 seeks	 to	 increase	 the	
relevance	of	rigorous	research	to	both	theory	and	practice.	This	thesis	has	provided	an	
example	 of	 its	 application,	 yielding	 both	 real	 time	 assistance	 to	 decision	making	 as	
problems	were	solved	as	well	as	outlining	a	15	step	activity	sequence	across	four	phases	
of	delve,	test,	innovate	and	unlock.	These	phases	represented	the	real	time	application	
of	the	generic	engaged	scholarship	method.	
	 This	example	demonstrates	how	such	deep	engagement	can	overcome	a	common	
fear	 of	 loss	 of	 objectivity	 and	 rigor	 in	 building	 new	 theory,	 to	 yield	 insights	 and	
understandings	 likely	 unobtainable	 by	 other	 research	 methods.	 The	 construct	 of	
organizational	collapse	is	not	widely	researched	(Diamond,	2011),	yet	its	threat	impacts	
the	vast	majority	of	firms.	The	deep	engagement	method	deployed	in	this	project	has	
offered	 some	 new	 parameters	 and	 combinations	 of	 existing	 parameters,	 to	 view	 the	
collapse	phenomena	differently	than	firm	extinction	at	the	end	of	a	linear	decline.	The	
rich	data	exposed	by	this	method	has	allowed	more	of	the	complexity,	uncertainty	and	
arising	opportunities	to	be	harnessed	to	further	the	firm’s	survival.		
	 Future	 research	 can	 take	 the	 identified	 capabilities	 and	 heuristics	 along	with	 the	
nominated	sequences	of	application	to	uncover	the	array	of	conditions	where	they	are	
best	 applied	 and	 circumstances	 where	 they	 are	 not	 properly	 applied.	 This	 example	
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shows	how	impact	can	be	achieved	with	academically	rigorous	research	that	is	relevant	
to	both	researchers	and	practitioners.	
6.5	PRACTICAL	IMPLICATIONS	
The	engaged	scholarship	methodology	was	used	because	an	emphasis	could	be	placed	
on	 real	 time	 assistance	 to	 the	 focal	 firm.	 The	 practical	 implications	 of	 the	 models	
presented	 can	 be	 directly	 derived	 from	 the	 real	 time	 assistance	 experienced	 by	 the	
focal	 firm	as	 the	 research	progressed.	Firstly,	by	 identifying	business	practitioners	as	
actors	 that	 are	 skilled	 in	 choosing	 and	 applying	 heuristics	 to	 the	 problems	 they	
encounter	in	real	time,	the	sequence	of	boundary	transitions	offered	in	Figure	1	of	this	
chapter	(and	figures	2	of	both	empirical	chapters	3	and	5)	provides	a	clear	opportunity	
for	 practitioners	 to	 anticipate	 likely	next	 steps,	while	 entering	 the	unstable	 arena	of	
strategic	and	resource	collapse.	These	models	aren’t	so	prescriptive	as	to	limit	action	
or	constrain	agility	but	do	provide	some	guidance	as	to	likely	states	to	emerge	and	the	
remedial	 rules	 that	 have	 been	 distilled	 from	 a	 complex	 focal	 case.	 The	 idea	 of	 a	
resilience	 loop	 extends	 the	model	 so	 that	managers	 can	 build	 routine	 and	 heuristic	
based	capabilities	suited	to	good	times	as	well	as	difficult	times.	
	 As	an	example,	had	the	key	decision	makers	 in	the	focal	 firm	adopted	a	resilience	
perspective	and	anticipated	adverse	 conditions	 rather	 than	assuming	an	 increasingly	
positive	 environment	 for	 their	 technology,	 they	 may	 have	 paid	 more	 attention	 to	
resource	 selection	 in	 the	 early	 days,	 matching	 resource	 growth	 to	 revenue	 growth	
rather	than	market	hype.	This	practical	view	generally	conforms	to	the	notion	of	being	
hungry	 for	 profit	 rather	 than	 growth	 while	 still	 in	 the	 early	 start	 up	 phases	
(Christensen	&	Raynor,	2003).	As	 the	 focal	 firm	 learned	new	resilient	orientations,	 it	
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was	 able	 to	 sustain	 a	 collapsed	 state	 for	 an	 extended	 period	while	 also	 retaining	 an	
ability	to	rebuild,	should	the	survivors	so	choose.	
	 Secondly,	 by	 identifying	 key	parameters	 for	 antecedents	 and	 internal	 factors,	 and	
outlining	 a	 range	 of	 outcomes	 resulting	 from	 how	 these	 parameters	 can	 interact,	
managers	 can	 focus	 their	 cognitive	 problem	 solving	 process	 on	 high	 impact	
components	of	their	firm	and	consider	a	range	of	scenarios	across	those	options.	Real	
options	 logic,	 as	 it	 applies	 to	 sequencing	 of	 opportunities,	 constraints	 on	 initial	
commitments	and	retaining	an	ability	to	reallocate	resources	when	bets	fail	(Klingebiel	
&	Adner,	2015),	 informs	the	internal	 factors	at	play.	While	significant	further	work	is	
required	 to	 understand	 the	 various	 combinations	 of	 antecedents	 and	 capabilities	 as	
noted	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 and	 the	 boundary	 conditions	 that	may	 apply	 to	 each	
combination,	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 parameters	 themselves	 informs	 practical	 action,	
providing	 some	 focus	 to	 how	 managers	 can	 assess	 complex,	 unstable	 conditions	
towards	configuring	accessible	resources	with	available	activity	sequences	using	simple	
rules	toward	harnessing	desirable	outcomes	from	such	uncertainty.	
6.6	CONCLUSION	
ActiveSky	began	with	great	promise	and	very	quickly	attracted	high	levels	of	investor	
and	 technology	 developer	 interest,	 endowing	 (or	 burdening)	 it	 with	 great	
expectations	among	the	early	participants.	After	gaining	initial	strong	traction	in	the	
uncertain	wireless	marketplace,	those	expectations	were	dealt	a	series	of	all	but	fatal	
blows	 as	 it	 dived	 into	 decline	 and	 collapse,	 several	 times	 in	 succession.	 As	 a	
participant,	I	began	this	research	to	better	understand	the	reasons	for	that	series	of	
events;	 to	 gain	 insights	 into	 the	 dynamics	 of	 an	 uncertain	 market,	 the	 strategic	
		267	
missteps,	 the	 misjudged	 opportunities	 and	 both	 forced	 and	 unforced	 resource-
allocation	errors.	What	stands	out	most	strongly	of	all	is	how	the	firm	survived	these	
successive,	 adverse	 conditions,	 instilling	 a	 resilient	 capability	 so	 that	 it	 could	
continue	to	rebuild	several	times.		
	 Despite	 its	 promising	 beginnings,	 ActiveSky	 has	 not	 achieved	 high	 growth	
performance.	It	is	not	an	exemplar	for	other	entrepreneurial	firms	with	high	growth	
aspirations	to	emulate.	While	holding	out	against	the	odds,	it	has	not	been	successful	
in	eventually	coming	out	on	top.	Yet	it	is	a	compelling	case	in	what	firms	can	do	to	
survive	collapse	and	it	is	the	lessons	about	organizational	resilience	and	the	choices	
made	to	instill	them	that	I	have	explored	in	this	thesis.	Given	the	high	rates	of	failure	
of	entrepreneurial	firms	(Bhidé,	2000)	and	the	inadequate	attention	to	the	empirical	
and	 conceptual	 study	 of	 organizational	 resilience,	 this	 research	 makes	 four	 key	
contributions.	
	 Firstly,	 it	 provides	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 the	 dual	 nature	 of	 the	 dynamic	
capabilities	 construct	 (Peteraf	 et	 al.,	 2013).	Dynamic	 capabilities	 can	 be	 the	 central	
change	 mechanism,	 driving	 reconfiguration	 of	 existing	 resources	 and	 routines	
(Zahra,	 Sapienza,	 &	 Davidsson,	 2006)	 and	 also	 creating	 opportunities	 that	 require	
resources	 and	 alliances	 not	 yet	 available,	 exploited	 by	 entrepreneurial	 actions	 that	
have	yet	 to	evolve	 into	newly	discovered	or	newly	created	opportunities	 (Alvarez	&	
Barney,	 2007;	 Barreto,	 2012).	 In	 the	 tradition	 of	 a	 capabilities	 hierarchy,	 where	
dynamic	capabilities	sit	atop	operating	capabilities,	resources	and	the	routine	actions	
(Hine	et	al.,	2014),	their	purpose	serves	as	the	value	engine	for	sustained	competitive	
advantage	(Teece	et	al.,	 1997).	The	model	 in	Figure	1	 frames	this	space	as	occurring	
above	the	threshold	of	operating	stability.		
		268	
	 Yet	 dynamic	 capabilities	 can	 also	 be	 unstable	 actions	 of	 change	 that	may	 not	
always	be	sustainable	(Eisenhardt	&	Martin,	2000),	not	only	in	high	velocity	markets	
but	also	under	conditions	below	the	threshold	of	operating	stability,	as	indicated	in	
Figure	1.	Conceptual	arguments	of	this	duality	frame	dynamic	capabilities	in	terms	of	
the	speed	of	environmental	change	(Peteraf	et	al.,	2013).	This	research	broadens	that	
argument	to	also	embrace	unstable	operations	where	strategy	gaps	have	emerged	or	
even	 failed	 altogether	 and	 resources	 have	 dissipated	 to	 the	 point	 of	 collapse.	 This	
means	 that	 firms	 can	 exist,	 even	 without	 capabilities	 defined	 as	 actions	 of	
reconfiguration	of	resources,	providing	they	are	still	able	to	form	new	opportunities	
and	 undertake	 heuristic-based	 actions	 to	 attract	 access	 to	 resources	 sufficiently	 to	
complete	tasks	of	rebuilding.	Dynamic	capabilities	are	shown	as	the	central	engine	of	
a	 resilient	 firm	 under	 any	 conditions,	 of	 high	 or	 low	 environmental	 dynamism,	
strategic	coherence	or	collapse	and	resource	sufficiency	or	instability.	
	 This	 argument	does	not	presume	 to	 claim	 that	 the	 resilience	 capability	 loop	 is	
secure	and	repeatable.	Rather,	I	argue	that	heuristic-based	capabilities,	in	addition	to	
routine-based	capabilities,	allow	a	firm	to	navigate	unstable	conditions	of	decline	and	
collapse	 and	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 strategic	 uncertainties	 such	 conditions	 engender.	 I	
frame	 routine-based	 capabilities,	 both	 dynamic	 and	 operating,	 primarily	 as	 the	
domain	in	pursuit	of	sustained	competitive	advantage	goals	during	times	of	strategic	
coherence	and	resource	sufficiency.	I	frame	heuristics-based	capabilities	primarily	as	
the	domain	pursuing	stability,	under	conditions	of	uncertainty	and	instability	when	
the	 very	 survival	 of	 the	 firm	 is	 in	 question.	 I	 also	 argue	 that	 different	 skills	 are	
required	 for	 routine-based	 capabilities	 compared	 to	 heuristics-based	 capabilities.	
Without	 the	 ability	 to	 transition	 between	 these	 two	 types	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities,	
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continued	decline	of	the	form	experienced	by	the	case	study	will	lead	to	paralysis,	as	
survivors	have	no	means	of	sustaining	routine	actions.	Such	paralysis,	left	unchecked,	
must	eventually	 lead	to	 firm	extinction,	as	so	many	turnaround	trajectories	assume	
(Chowdhury,	 2002).	 The	 study	 indicates	 that	 renewal	 from	 decline	 resulting	 from	
strategic	 and	 resource	 collapse	 can	 be	 achieved	 with	 heuristics-based	 dynamic	
capabilities	as	the	engine	of	new	opportunity	formation.	
	 Secondly	 and	 distinct	 from	 the	 discussion	 of	 dynamic	 capabilities	 as	 either	
routine-based	or	heuristics-based,	the	role	of	heuristics	in	enabling	the	exclusion	of	
information	as	a	means	to	make	better	decisions	when	navigating	conditions	of	great	
uncertainty,	 whether	 high	 velocity	 or	 not,	 has	 only	 recently	 gained	 currency	
(Mousavi	&	Gigerenzer,	2014).	The	idea	of	frugal	rules	has	been	in	the	organizational	
domain	 for	 some	 time	 (Eisenhardt	&	 Sull,	 2001)	 and	 is	 gaining	 increased	 attention	
(Bingham	&	Eisenhardt,	 2011).	The	model	depicted	 in	Figure	 1	 presents	 an	 iterative	
series	of	heuristic	actions,	framed	to	address	changing	contexts	of	strategy,	resources	
and	communications	between	survivors	navigating	unstable	conditions	of	imminent	
extinction.	The	loop	of	sectors	and	transitions	builds	on	fast	and	frugal	rules	to	focus	
on	 key	 elements	 of	 a	 context	 and	 to	 exclude	 information	 the	 case	 data	 suggest	
distracts	from	productive	action.	These	heuristic	sequences	are	presented	as	a	central	
element	 of	 a	 resilient	 organization,	 dismantling	 routines	 as	 decline	 proceeds	 and	
drawing	 on	 inherent	 individual	 skills,	 biases	 and	 asymmetries	 to	 build	 a	 capability	
creating	organization	(Miller,	Eisenstat,	&	Foote,	2002).	
	 Thirdly,	 in	 undertaking	 a	 multi-disciplinary	 review	 of	 the	 resilience	 construct	
through	 the	 four	 domains	 of	 psychology,	 ecology,	 engineering	 and	 organization	
science,	I	have	sought	to	focus	on	positive	adaptation	to	adversity	(Martin	&	Sunley,	
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2015),	 otherwise	 known	 as	 post-traumatic	 growth	 (Masten,	 2014).	 This	 framing	
presents	 resilience	 as	 the	 robust	 quality	 to	 reap	 long	 term	 benefit	 from	 adverse	
conditions,	 benefits	 that	 would	 not	 have	 been	 achieved	 absent	 the	 adversity.	 This	
orientation	 renders	 adversity	 as	 a	 potentially	 beneficial	 impact	 that	 yields	 positive	
growth	and	resilience	as	a	fundamental	quality	to	supplant	organizational	fragilities	
(Taleb,	 2012).	 As	 summarized	 earlier,	 in	 the	 management	 sciences	 the	 resilience	
construct	 has	 received	 quite	 general	 consideration,	 offering	 inconsistent	 and	 often	
simply	developed	underlying	mechanisms,	in	need	of	further	development	(Bhamra,	
Dani,	&	Burnard,	2011).		
	 Some	organizational	 resilience	 frameworks	have	begun	 to	 align	with	 and	build	
on	 the	 capabilities	 construct,	 even	 embracing	 both	 desirable	 and	 undesirable	
characteristics	 that	 highlight	 system	 adaptation	 built	 on	 dynamic	 capabilities	
(Limnios	et	al.,	 2014).	The	manifestation	of	 resilience	capabilities,	given	 in	Figure	2	
above,	 show	 the	 antecedents	 to	 adverse	 conditions	 arising	 as	 separated	 into	 five	
distinct	 parameter	 groups.	 These	 antecedent	 conditions	 are	 then	 addressed	 by	 the	
four	 internal	 capabilities	 and	 orientations	 of	 the	 firm.	 This	 reaction	 to	 adverse	
conditions,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 existing	 antecedents,	 shapes	 the	 type	 of	 outcome	 the	
firm	can	hope	for	in	the	circumstances.	There	may	well	be	circumstances	where	firms	
should	 cease	 (Dew,	 Goldfarb,	 &	 Sarasvathy,	 2006)	 but	 I	 have	 explored	 here	 the	
actions	 required	where	 firms	 choose	 to	 persist	 (Powell	 &	 Baker,	 2014),	 despite	 the	
apparent	odds	against	such	persistence.	
	 In	 a	more	general	way,	 the	model	presented	 in	Figure	2	outlines	 the	 factors	 at	
play	 in	 terms	of	 antecedents	 to	 adversity	 and	how	equipped	 the	 firm	 is	 to	 react	 to	
such	adversity	in	terms	of	their	internal	capabilities,	capacity	to	act	resiliently	and	to	
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chase	 a	 positive	 reintegration.	 This	 model	 does	 not	 indicate	 that	 resilient	
reintegration	 is	 always	 the	 best	 choice;	without	 commitment	 of	 survivors	 to	 learn,	
adapt	and	be	agile,	it	may	well	be	time	to	extinguish	that	firm	(Dew	et	al.,	2006).	But	
should	 these	 survivors	 of	 collapse	 choose	 to	 persist,	 this	 model	 indicates	 the	
parameters	that	interact	toward	achieving	a	particular	outcome.	
	 Fourth,	this	research	project	has	explored	a	relatively	under-researched	arena	of	
firm	collapse	(Wilkinson	&	Mellahi,	2005)	using	a	relatively	uncommon	methodology	
of	 engaged	 scholarship	 (Deetz,	 2008)	 to	 build	 new	 theory	 that	 assists	 both	
researchers	 and	 practitioners	 alike	 in	 understanding	 how	 strategic	 and	 resource	
collapse	 can	 be	 navigated.	 The	 modeling	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 articulates	 the	
underlying	 parameters	 and	 forces	 that	 can	 benefit	 other	 firms	 that	 seek	 to	 survive	
through	 deeply	 adverse	 conditions.	 Through	 academic-practitioner	 engagement,	 I	
have	 sought	 to	 deliver	 research	 that	 is	 not	 only	 useful	 to	 practitioners	 (Mohrman,	
Gibson,	&	Mohrman,	2001)	but	also	rigorous	in	its	application	and	interpretation,	so	
cementing	 rigor	 and	 relevance	 as	 a	 central	 premise	 for	 engagement	 and	 discovery	
(Starkey,	Hatchuel,	&	Tempest,	2009).	
	 Taken	 together,	 these	 insights	 contribute	 to	 the	 toolkit	 for	 managers	 to	
anticipate	 and	 positively	 adapt	 to	 adverse	 conditions,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 the	
conceptualization	 of	 firms	 as	 capable	 even	 when	 capabilities	 appear	 to	 have	
evaporated.	 This	 thesis	 has	 taken	 lessons	 from	 a	 period	 of	 organizational	 collapse	
observed	 at	 close	 quarters	 and,	 from	 that	 vantage	 point,	 pointed	 a	 way	 towards	
building	organizational	resilience	as	a	capability	to	be	learned	and	applied	across	all	
operating	conditions.	
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